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Sarah Adams

@TPASarah323,485 subscribers

10% Humanitarian/90% Warlord - Author of Benghazi: Know Thy Enemy @benghaziattacks - Govie 🇺🇸 - CIA Alum 🥷 - Khyber’s Dog Mom 🦮 - Keep it Lagom

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Al‑Qaeda Isn’t Finished. They’re Intent on Turning Past Failures into Success. One of the most important things people miss about al‑Qaeda is this: They don’t abandon failed plots. They recycle them. Their current U.S. homeland strategy is built on bringing old failures back, and this time, making them succeed. Look at the pattern: They hit the World Trade Center in 1993 and failed to bring it down. Eight years later, they came back and finished the job. The same mindset applies to everything else al‑Qaeda tried and couldn’t pull off: Project Bojinka was the original blueprint for using commercial aviation as a weapon. Parts of it failed in the 1990s. They brought the idea back and used it to build 9/11. They still believe Bojinka must be completed. That is why the aviation plot is back. None of these ideas are over. The group’s current U.S. homeland plot is not new, it is simply being fulfilled by the next generation of al-Qaeda. It is a direct extension of what they attempted before, only now they intend to turn every past failure into a success. Yes, you read that right. Every. Single. One. Abu Bakr Naji, al‑Qaeda strategist and doctrinal advisor, author of The Management of Savagery, believed failure was part of a longer-term strategy, not a terminal endpoint. In his framework, setbacks aren’t the end of jihad, just a step in escalation, refinement, and eventual success. He wrote: “If we fail—we seek refuge with God from that—it does not mean an end of the matter. Rather, this failure will lead to an increase in savagery.” Understanding this is key: the next attack will hit harder. Our intelligence community knows how each plot failed before. So why can’t they thwart them now?

Al‑Qaeda Isn’t Finished. They’re Intent on Turning Past Failures into Success. One of the most important things people miss about al‑Qaeda is this: They don’t abandon failed plots. They recycle them. Their current U.S. homeland strategy is built on bringing old failures back, and this time, making them succeed. Look at the pattern: They hit the World Trade Center in 1993 and failed to bring it down. Eight years later, they came back and finished the job. The same mindset applies to everything else al‑Qaeda tried and couldn’t pull off: Project Bojinka was the original blueprint for using commercial aviation as a weapon. Parts of it failed in the 1990s. They brought the idea back and used it to build 9/11. They still believe Bojinka must be completed. That is why the aviation plot is back. None of these ideas are over. The group’s current U.S. homeland plot is not new, it is simply being fulfilled by the next generation of al-Qaeda. It is a direct extension of what they attempted before, only now they intend to turn every past failure into a success. Yes, you read that right. Every. Single. One. Abu Bakr Naji, al‑Qaeda strategist and doctrinal advisor, author of The Management of Savagery, believed failure was part of a longer-term strategy, not a terminal endpoint. In his framework, setbacks aren’t the end of jihad, just a step in escalation, refinement, and eventual success. He wrote: “If we fail—we seek refuge with God from that—it does not mean an end of the matter. Rather, this failure will lead to an increase in savagery.” Understanding this is key: the next attack will hit harder. Our intelligence community knows how each plot failed before. So why can’t they thwart them now?

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Videos

Exposing the Taliban’s ISKP Deception Day 8: The Continued Framing of Innocents—When ISIS Doesn’t Work, Try Kidnappers On December 17, 2023, four individuals—Abdul Aleem, Jamaluddin, Khwaja Younus, and Nusratullah—former members of Afghanistan’s security forces who had been deported from Iran, were targeted and executed by Taliban's GDI in the Company area of Kabul’s PD5. Video evidence (shared here) reveals these men were killed before they even had the chance to change out of the clothes they traveled from Iran in. The Taliban wasted no time accusing the victims of being affiliated with ISIS, despite consistent testimonies from their families and local residents affirming that the men were unarmed and had no connections to ISIS or any other group. When the families and residents protested the killings, the Taliban’s propaganda machine shifted narratives releasing content abandoning their standard ISIS claim and instead accusing two of the victims of being kidnappers. Yet, as expected, they provided no evidence—no weapons, no proof of abduction, nothing to substantiate their story. This second attempt at justifying the crime failed to gain credibility, but the Taliban quickly silenced local dissent through intimidation and threats, effectively forcing residents to stop discussing the incident publicly. This event is yet another example of the Taliban’s disturbing pattern of targeting former members of Afghanistan’s security services and framing them as ISIS operatives. These fake operations serve the Taliban’s dual objectives: projecting a façade of effective counterterrorism efforts against ISIS to maintain its relationship with the Department of Defense and U.S. Intelligence Community and securing continued funding under the guise of fighting terrorism—funding that ultimately originates from U.S. taxpayers. Every one of these examples underscores the extremes the Taliban will go to sustain its deception. They commit war crimes—crimes that we inadvertently fund—to maintain their grip on power and to reap the financial benefits of 'joint' counterterrorism efforts with our government.
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Exposing the Taliban’s ISKP Deception Day 8: The Continued Framing of Innocents—When ISIS Doesn’t Work, Try Kidnappers On December 17, 2023, four individuals—Abdul Aleem, Jamaluddin, Khwaja Younus, and Nusratullah—former members of Afghanistan’s security forces who had been deported from Iran, were targeted and executed by Taliban's GDI in the Company area of Kabul’s PD5. Video evidence (shared here) reveals these men were killed before they even had the chance to change out of the clothes they traveled from Iran in. The Taliban wasted no time accusing the victims of being affiliated with ISIS, despite consistent testimonies from their families and local residents affirming that the men were unarmed and had no connections to ISIS or any other group. When the families and residents protested the killings, the Taliban’s propaganda machine shifted narratives releasing content abandoning their standard ISIS claim and instead accusing two of the victims of being kidnappers. Yet, as expected, they provided no evidence—no weapons, no proof of abduction, nothing to substantiate their story. This second attempt at justifying the crime failed to gain credibility, but the Taliban quickly silenced local dissent through intimidation and threats, effectively forcing residents to stop discussing the incident publicly. This event is yet another example of the Taliban’s disturbing pattern of targeting former members of Afghanistan’s security services and framing them as ISIS operatives. These fake operations serve the Taliban’s dual objectives: projecting a façade of effective counterterrorism efforts against ISIS to maintain its relationship with the Department of Defense and U.S. Intelligence Community and securing continued funding under the guise of fighting terrorism—funding that ultimately originates from U.S. taxpayers. Every one of these examples underscores the extremes the Taliban will go to sustain its deception. They commit war crimes—crimes that we inadvertently fund—to maintain their grip on power and to reap the financial benefits of 'joint' counterterrorism efforts with our government.

Sarah Adams

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