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Satya Nadella explains how he knew Amazon had not already won the cloud: 1. Sorting which markets can be won by one company is the whole job. Nadella calls being very good at understanding what are winner take all markets and what are not winner take all markets, in some sense, everything. He puts it above the technology calls he had just been describing. 2. The people telling you it is over will be credible. Nadella says that in the early days when he was getting into Azure, Amazon had a pretty significant lead, and people and investors would come to him and say, oh, it's game over, you'll never make it, Amazon's, it's winner take all. He was hearing this while committing Microsoft's money to the buildout. 3. Use the last market you competed in as evidence. Nadella says that having competed against Oracle and IBM in client server, he knew that the buyers will not tolerate winner take all. His answer to the investors came out of a market he had already lived through, not out of a forecast about this one. 4. Look at who signs the check, because that is what decides it. Nadella says structurally hyperscale will never be a winner take all because buyers are smart. When the buyer is a corporation, an enterprise, an IT department, they will want multiple suppliers, and he says consumer markets are the ones that can sometimes go winner take all. 5. Aim to be one of the suppliers they keep. Nadella's instruction is that you got to be one of the multiple suppliers. Azure did not have to displace Amazon to be worth the money, which is why the investors' framing was the wrong test. 6. Expect a free version of a closed product to appear and hold its price down. Nadella says one of the big lessons from Windows was that a closed source operating system gets a complement that is open source, and he calls that a real check on what happens. He expects the same in models: a few closed ones, and an open source alternative that makes sure the closed source winner take all is mitigated. 7. Expect governments to act once the technology matters enough. Nadella says that if this thing is really as powerful as people make it out to be, the state is not going to sit around and wait for private companies. He counts that as a third reason the category does not settle on one owner. Nadella grants the other side on the same tape. He says consumer categories can still concentrate through network effects, and he points at ChatGPT as an at scale consumer property with real escape velocity, sitting in the App Store top five whenever he looks, using an early advantage to build an app advantage. In the enterprise he expects different winners by category. What makes this usable is that he was paying for the answer while investors told him he was wrong. He looked at who the buyer was, remembered that Oracle and IBM never got to be the only supplier either, and kept funding Azure on that reading. The test only works where buyers are professionals who protect their own bargaining power, and Nadella says plainly that consumers do not behave that way. Satya Nadella Satya Nadella, Dwarkesh Podcast, February 2025

Satya Nadella explains how he knew Amazon had not already won the cloud: 1. Sorting which markets can be won by one company is the whole job. Nadella calls being very good at understanding what are winner take all markets and what are not winner take all markets, in some sense, everything. He puts it above the technology calls he had just been describing. 2. The people telling you it is over will be credible. Nadella says that in the early days when he was getting into Azure, Amazon had a pretty significant lead, and people and investors would come to him and say, oh, it's game over, you'll never make it, Amazon's, it's winner take all. He was hearing this while committing Microsoft's money to the buildout. 3. Use the last market you competed in as evidence. Nadella says that having competed against Oracle and IBM in client server, he knew that the buyers will not tolerate winner take all. His answer to the investors came out of a market he had already lived through, not out of a forecast about this one. 4. Look at who signs the check, because that is what decides it. Nadella says structurally hyperscale will never be a winner take all because buyers are smart. When the buyer is a corporation, an enterprise, an IT department, they will want multiple suppliers, and he says consumer markets are the ones that can sometimes go winner take all. 5. Aim to be one of the suppliers they keep. Nadella's instruction is that you got to be one of the multiple suppliers. Azure did not have to displace Amazon to be worth the money, which is why the investors' framing was the wrong test. 6. Expect a free version of a closed product to appear and hold its price down. Nadella says one of the big lessons from Windows was that a closed source operating system gets a complement that is open source, and he calls that a real check on what happens. He expects the same in models: a few closed ones, and an open source alternative that makes sure the closed source winner take all is mitigated. 7. Expect governments to act once the technology matters enough. Nadella says that if this thing is really as powerful as people make it out to be, the state is not going to sit around and wait for private companies. He counts that as a third reason the category does not settle on one owner. Nadella grants the other side on the same tape. He says consumer categories can still concentrate through network effects, and he points at ChatGPT as an at scale consumer property with real escape velocity, sitting in the App Store top five whenever he looks, using an early advantage to build an app advantage. In the enterprise he expects different winners by category. What makes this usable is that he was paying for the answer while investors told him he was wrong. He looked at who the buyer was, remembered that Oracle and IBM never got to be the only supplier either, and kept funding Azure on that reading. The test only works where buyers are professionals who protect their own bargaining power, and Nadella says plainly that consumers do not behave that way. Satya Nadella Satya Nadella, Dwarkesh Podcast, February 2025

53,551 просмотров • 5 дней назад

Steve Jobs' team told him to his face that his ship date was reality distortion. He agreed with their evidence and kept the date anyway. The tape explains a decision rule most founders never learn. December 1985. NeXT is 90 days old, funded with Jobs' own money after he left Apple. At the first company retreat, the team debates slipping the launch from spring 1987 to spring 1988. The pushback is brutal and specific. One team member has receipts: "We've got a person here that said he could do a word processor in six months that's taking three years." Another names the danger: "Reality distortion is reality distortion. It has its motivational value." Build the plan on a fake date, and every design decision made from it gets torn up later. Jobs does not argue the evidence. "Well, George, I can't change the world." He argues something else entirely: "I think we have to drive a stake in the ground somewhere. And I think if we miss this window, then a whole series of events come into play." "We can't sell enough units in 87 to pay for our operating costs." Colleges buy computers in the summer. The campus surveys had already put the ceiling at $3,000. Miss spring 1987, and NeXT sells nothing for a year while burning his money. "We have 18 months. So I don't think we have a company if we don't do this. No matter what I say or anybody else says, that is my deepest belief. If we don't do this, we will not be able to attract great people. We will not be able to retain some of the ones we have." My note: the team argued estimates. Jobs argued conditions. An estimate says when the work might be done, and it invites negotiation. A condition says when the company is dead, and it does not negotiate. That is why the stake held. He anchored the date to the market's calendar and his own runway, not to optimism. The engineers could refute the schedule. Nobody in the room could refute the window. The uncomfortable version for founders: if your deadline comes from your team's estimates, it will move. If it comes from the physics of your market, it was never really a deadline. It is a survival condition wearing one. Steve Jobs at the first NeXT retreat, December 1985. Footage released by the Steve Jobs Archive in May 2026. Founders: if you want your X to do this for your business, check the first reply.

Steve Jobs' team told him to his face that his ship date was reality distortion. He agreed with their evidence and kept the date anyway. The tape explains a decision rule most founders never learn. December 1985. NeXT is 90 days old, funded with Jobs' own money after he left Apple. At the first company retreat, the team debates slipping the launch from spring 1987 to spring 1988. The pushback is brutal and specific. One team member has receipts: "We've got a person here that said he could do a word processor in six months that's taking three years." Another names the danger: "Reality distortion is reality distortion. It has its motivational value." Build the plan on a fake date, and every design decision made from it gets torn up later. Jobs does not argue the evidence. "Well, George, I can't change the world." He argues something else entirely: "I think we have to drive a stake in the ground somewhere. And I think if we miss this window, then a whole series of events come into play." "We can't sell enough units in 87 to pay for our operating costs." Colleges buy computers in the summer. The campus surveys had already put the ceiling at $3,000. Miss spring 1987, and NeXT sells nothing for a year while burning his money. "We have 18 months. So I don't think we have a company if we don't do this. No matter what I say or anybody else says, that is my deepest belief. If we don't do this, we will not be able to attract great people. We will not be able to retain some of the ones we have." My note: the team argued estimates. Jobs argued conditions. An estimate says when the work might be done, and it invites negotiation. A condition says when the company is dead, and it does not negotiate. That is why the stake held. He anchored the date to the market's calendar and his own runway, not to optimism. The engineers could refute the schedule. Nobody in the room could refute the window. The uncomfortable version for founders: if your deadline comes from your team's estimates, it will move. If it comes from the physics of your market, it was never really a deadline. It is a survival condition wearing one. Steve Jobs at the first NeXT retreat, December 1985. Footage released by the Steve Jobs Archive in May 2026. Founders: if you want your X to do this for your business, check the first reply.

257,257 просмотров • 1 месяц назад

Warren Buffett literally gave a 9-minute masterclass on what makes a business worth owning, inside the interview where he explains why he broke his own rule on technology. Eight things he teaches: 1. A good business is not one that grows. It is one that earns high returns on capital for a long time. His words: "something that you can expect to earn high returns on capital over a long period of time." Growth without returns on capital is just a bigger version of the same problem. 2. Measure it against doing nothing. Buffett points out he can put huge amounts of money into government bonds and collect payments every year with no risk. So a good business has to earn a lot more than treasuries, and be expected to keep doing it. If your business does not clear the riskless rate by a wide margin, the capital has a better home. 3. The gap between similar-looking businesses is enormous. Most banks earn 13 or 14 percent on capital. Ask anyone to guess American Express and they say something similar. It earns 30 percent plus, and Buffett is clear it "does not incur more risk in doing so than the banks that earn 13 or 14 percent." Same industry, more than double the return, no extra risk taken. 4. Charlie Munger's test: the cash has to be real. Munger pounded the idea that a business was not good just because it was doing sexy things. It had to be earning real cash, be able to pay that cash out if it wanted, and better yet be able to put it back to work inside the business. A company that earns high returns but cannot redeploy the money is worth less than one that can. 5. Time is the multiplier, so duration is the thing to protect. Buffett says a long period of time "gets to be very important because it doubles later on to the very big numbers." One great year is noise. The rate is what compounds. 6. When the facts change, retire the rule. Buffett spent decades known for not buying technology, and said so himself. His explanation for buying now is that the business changed: Google and its competitors are "laying out hundreds of billions," they are big capital spenders, and that is real money. When they were asset-light he passed and the market loved them. Now that they spend heavily, shareholders like them less and he thinks they are more likely to win. He did not change his test. He noticed the business had moved into the category his test rewards. 7. Nobody is measuring the thing that matters. Buffett says he cannot recall a report on Wall Street that gets into the internal rates of return a business is actually earning, and calls the fixation on next quarter ridiculous. He rates Alphabet ahead of 90 or 95 percent of what gets merchandised through Wall Street, on the record rather than the story. If your own reporting tracks growth and headcount but not return on capital, you are measuring what is easy. 8. Every wonderful business gets attacked, so ask how long it stays wonderful. In 1958 he helped start Data Documents, after IBM was forced by an antitrust settlement to divest half the capacity of its best business. That advantage ran out after 10 or 15 years, and he knew some of the people who caused it to run out. His closing line is the whole lesson: "It's not a question of whether it was wonderful yesterday. The question is, how long is it going to be wonderful?" The move for an operator: run the test on your own business this quarter. What return are you earning on the capital in it, how does that compare to doing nothing, and what would have to be true for that return to survive the next ten years. Warren Buffett with Becky Quick, CNBC Squawk Box, July 2026.

Warren Buffett literally gave a 9-minute masterclass on what makes a business worth owning, inside the interview where he explains why he broke his own rule on technology. Eight things he teaches: 1. A good business is not one that grows. It is one that earns high returns on capital for a long time. His words: "something that you can expect to earn high returns on capital over a long period of time." Growth without returns on capital is just a bigger version of the same problem. 2. Measure it against doing nothing. Buffett points out he can put huge amounts of money into government bonds and collect payments every year with no risk. So a good business has to earn a lot more than treasuries, and be expected to keep doing it. If your business does not clear the riskless rate by a wide margin, the capital has a better home. 3. The gap between similar-looking businesses is enormous. Most banks earn 13 or 14 percent on capital. Ask anyone to guess American Express and they say something similar. It earns 30 percent plus, and Buffett is clear it "does not incur more risk in doing so than the banks that earn 13 or 14 percent." Same industry, more than double the return, no extra risk taken. 4. Charlie Munger's test: the cash has to be real. Munger pounded the idea that a business was not good just because it was doing sexy things. It had to be earning real cash, be able to pay that cash out if it wanted, and better yet be able to put it back to work inside the business. A company that earns high returns but cannot redeploy the money is worth less than one that can. 5. Time is the multiplier, so duration is the thing to protect. Buffett says a long period of time "gets to be very important because it doubles later on to the very big numbers." One great year is noise. The rate is what compounds. 6. When the facts change, retire the rule. Buffett spent decades known for not buying technology, and said so himself. His explanation for buying now is that the business changed: Google and its competitors are "laying out hundreds of billions," they are big capital spenders, and that is real money. When they were asset-light he passed and the market loved them. Now that they spend heavily, shareholders like them less and he thinks they are more likely to win. He did not change his test. He noticed the business had moved into the category his test rewards. 7. Nobody is measuring the thing that matters. Buffett says he cannot recall a report on Wall Street that gets into the internal rates of return a business is actually earning, and calls the fixation on next quarter ridiculous. He rates Alphabet ahead of 90 or 95 percent of what gets merchandised through Wall Street, on the record rather than the story. If your own reporting tracks growth and headcount but not return on capital, you are measuring what is easy. 8. Every wonderful business gets attacked, so ask how long it stays wonderful. In 1958 he helped start Data Documents, after IBM was forced by an antitrust settlement to divest half the capacity of its best business. That advantage ran out after 10 or 15 years, and he knew some of the people who caused it to run out. His closing line is the whole lesson: "It's not a question of whether it was wonderful yesterday. The question is, how long is it going to be wonderful?" The move for an operator: run the test on your own business this quarter. What return are you earning on the capital in it, how does that compare to doing nothing, and what would have to be true for that return to survive the next ten years. Warren Buffett with Becky Quick, CNBC Squawk Box, July 2026.

31,343 просмотров • 18 дней назад

I'm actually insane for sharing this for free but screw it... I built an AI Automation that tells you how to sell anything to anyone, just from their name. • runs deep research on every booked call/name • full reports with goals, strengths, weaknesses & objections • exact lines & angles to close faster • instant positioning guide so you’re the obvious choice • no more guesswork → every call becomes predictable Not sure how long I’ll keep this live, it’s basically a cheat code for sales calls. Reply “SALES” and retweet this for the template + guide + prompts (must be following so i can send the dm)

I'm actually insane for sharing this for free but screw it... I built an AI Automation that tells you how to sell anything to anyone, just from their name. • runs deep research on every booked call/name • full reports with goals, strengths, weaknesses & objections • exact lines & angles to close faster • instant positioning guide so you’re the obvious choice • no more guesswork → every call becomes predictable Not sure how long I’ll keep this live, it’s basically a cheat code for sales calls. Reply “SALES” and retweet this for the template + guide + prompts (must be following so i can send the dm)

158,127 просмотров • 10 месяцев назад

Broadcom's CEO just exposed the real fight underneath Google's AI chip strategy. It is not Google versus Broadcom. It is Google and Broadcom trying to make Nvidia replaceable. Within two minutes at Bloomberg Tech, Hock Tan was asked whether Google bringing more chip design in house keeps him up at night. His exact words: "So we just compete against my own customer." Then he named the real enemy: "the real competitor facing all this is the GPU out of Nvidia." That is the part most people miss. Custom AI chips are not just cheaper GPUs. They are ownership claims. If Google owns the workload, the compiler stack, the cloud customer, and the TPU roadmap, Nvidia becomes a benchmark instead of the toll booth. But Broadcom is still in the room because independence is not binary. The hard part is not drawing a chip. The hard part is shipping generation after generation at scale, matching Nvidia's cadence, keeping networking tight, and making the whole system useful enough that developers do not care what silicon sits underneath. That is why Tan can say Google is trying to create customer owned tooling and still sound calm. Broadcom is not selling picks and shovels. It is selling the bridge out of Nvidia dependency. The numbers explain why this is suddenly a board level issue. Broadcom reported $22.2 billion of Q2 2026 revenue. Its AI semiconductor revenue hit $10.8 billion, up 143 percent year over year. For Q3, Broadcom guided AI semiconductor revenue to $16.0 billion, up more than 200 percent year over year. In the clip, Tan says Broadcom has exactly 6 custom AI accelerator customers. He says OpenAI has been engaged for over 2 years, its accelerator is already working in labs and data centers, and production is on track for late this year. That is the hidden mechanism: The AI labs are not becoming software companies with some chips attached. They are becoming capacity companies with model interfaces attached. Once your margin depends on tokens, latency, memory bandwidth, power contracts, packaging slots, networking gear, and a private accelerator schedule, the "model company" label starts to look like a costume. The precedent is Apple. Apple did not move into custom silicon because it wanted a cute chip branding story. It moved because the iPhone needed control over performance per watt, release cadence, and differentiation. A series chips in 2010. M1 in 2020. More than a decade of slowly pulling the bottleneck inside the company. But Apple still needed TSMC. That is the useful analogy for Google, OpenAI, and the other AI giants. They want Nvidia's margin pool. They want Nvidia's roadmap power. They want Nvidia's ability to decide who gets capacity first. But the first supplier they replace becomes the supplier they cannot live without. Broadcom is the customs officer at the border of private silicon. Second order consequence: AI company valuation will shift from model demos to infrastructure custody. Who owns the workload? Who controls the accelerator roadmap? Who has memory secured? Who can afford to keep a bad first generation alive long enough to get to the second and third? My bet: by the end of 2027, at least one major AI lab will be judged more by its custom chip execution than by its model benchmark lead. The model race is public. The margin race is being negotiated in silicon.

Broadcom's CEO just exposed the real fight underneath Google's AI chip strategy. It is not Google versus Broadcom. It is Google and Broadcom trying to make Nvidia replaceable. Within two minutes at Bloomberg Tech, Hock Tan was asked whether Google bringing more chip design in house keeps him up at night. His exact words: "So we just compete against my own customer." Then he named the real enemy: "the real competitor facing all this is the GPU out of Nvidia." That is the part most people miss. Custom AI chips are not just cheaper GPUs. They are ownership claims. If Google owns the workload, the compiler stack, the cloud customer, and the TPU roadmap, Nvidia becomes a benchmark instead of the toll booth. But Broadcom is still in the room because independence is not binary. The hard part is not drawing a chip. The hard part is shipping generation after generation at scale, matching Nvidia's cadence, keeping networking tight, and making the whole system useful enough that developers do not care what silicon sits underneath. That is why Tan can say Google is trying to create customer owned tooling and still sound calm. Broadcom is not selling picks and shovels. It is selling the bridge out of Nvidia dependency. The numbers explain why this is suddenly a board level issue. Broadcom reported $22.2 billion of Q2 2026 revenue. Its AI semiconductor revenue hit $10.8 billion, up 143 percent year over year. For Q3, Broadcom guided AI semiconductor revenue to $16.0 billion, up more than 200 percent year over year. In the clip, Tan says Broadcom has exactly 6 custom AI accelerator customers. He says OpenAI has been engaged for over 2 years, its accelerator is already working in labs and data centers, and production is on track for late this year. That is the hidden mechanism: The AI labs are not becoming software companies with some chips attached. They are becoming capacity companies with model interfaces attached. Once your margin depends on tokens, latency, memory bandwidth, power contracts, packaging slots, networking gear, and a private accelerator schedule, the "model company" label starts to look like a costume. The precedent is Apple. Apple did not move into custom silicon because it wanted a cute chip branding story. It moved because the iPhone needed control over performance per watt, release cadence, and differentiation. A series chips in 2010. M1 in 2020. More than a decade of slowly pulling the bottleneck inside the company. But Apple still needed TSMC. That is the useful analogy for Google, OpenAI, and the other AI giants. They want Nvidia's margin pool. They want Nvidia's roadmap power. They want Nvidia's ability to decide who gets capacity first. But the first supplier they replace becomes the supplier they cannot live without. Broadcom is the customs officer at the border of private silicon. Second order consequence: AI company valuation will shift from model demos to infrastructure custody. Who owns the workload? Who controls the accelerator roadmap? Who has memory secured? Who can afford to keep a bad first generation alive long enough to get to the second and third? My bet: by the end of 2027, at least one major AI lab will be judged more by its custom chip execution than by its model benchmark lead. The model race is public. The margin race is being negotiated in silicon.

10,572 просмотров • 1 месяц назад

Nash's most famous discovery: The Prisoner's Dilemma. Two players, two choices: Cooperate or Cheat. • Both cooperate: $2 each • Both cheat: $0 each • One cheats, one cooperates: Cheater gets $3, cooperator loses $1 Rationally, you should ALWAYS cheat. The result? Both lose.

Nash's most famous discovery: The Prisoner's Dilemma. Two players, two choices: Cooperate or Cheat. • Both cooperate: $2 each • Both cheat: $0 each • One cheats, one cooperates: Cheater gets $3, cooperator loses $1 Rationally, you should ALWAYS cheat. The result? Both lose.

47,470 просмотров • 1 год назад

A nudge is invisible influence. It's changing someone's behavior by changing their environment. No force. No bribery. No lies. Just smart design that makes the better choice easier. Here's the wild part: most people never notice it's happening.

A nudge is invisible influence. It's changing someone's behavior by changing their environment. No force. No bribery. No lies. Just smart design that makes the better choice easier. Here's the wild part: most people never notice it's happening.

32,598 просмотров • 1 год назад

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