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Armchair Warlord

@ArmchairW157,021 subscribers

Weaboo, author and battle theorist. Interactions are not endorsements.

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I've suspected this for a couple days but it's good to see confirmation that Israeli claims of air defense success aren't any more credible than Ukrainian ones. According to initial "reports" (read: Israeli disinformation) all of these warheads were intercepted.

I've suspected this for a couple days but it's good to see confirmation that Israeli claims of air defense success aren't any more credible than Ukrainian ones. According to initial "reports" (read: Israeli disinformation) all of these warheads were intercepted.

766,301 görüntüleme

Considering that Ukrainian War peace plans are in vogue, here's a peace plan the Russians would actually agree to:⬇️ - Ukrainian evacuation of the Four Oblasts to their prewar administrative boundaries. - The Four Oblasts within their prewar administrative boundaries and Crimea recognized as sovereign Russian territory by the US, EU, and UN; - Neutrality and nonalignment of Ukraine; - Ban on the deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine; - Russian recognized as the second official language of Ukraine; - Ukrainian Orthodox Church in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate recognized as the state church of Ukraine; - Ban on veneration of the OUN, UPA, Galician SS, Stepan Bandera in person, and proscription of their successors in ideology to specifically include Azov; - AFU capped at 100,000 personnel including reserves, paramilitaries and auxiliaries; - Ukraine to possess or operate no weapons of any kind with a range of greater than 100 kilometers; - Termination of all Ukrainian drone programs and destruction of all extant Ukrainian combat drones under UN supervision. These represent the minimum acceptable outcomes of the "four pillars" of Russian war policy: demilitarization, denazification, neutrality, and territorial cession of all regions claimed by Russia. This is what any final peace deal in this war is going to include as a minimum, so we might as well stop coping about how letting people speak Russian in public in Kharkov is an abomination against the sovereignty of Ukraine and start telling the Ukrainians the alternative is unconditional surrender. "But AW," you say, "This would reward the Russians!" Yeah, it would. I don't care. Beyond that the Russian position is the morally correct one, as a matter of pure national interest the exact line of the western border of the Russian Federation is of no legitimate concern to the United States so long as it's somewhere generally east of the Vistula. If the Europeans want to get the Russians to agree to less than the above they're welcome to try without our assistance, I guess - they'll be singing a different tune soon enough.

Considering that Ukrainian War peace plans are in vogue, here's a peace plan the Russians would actually agree to:⬇️ - Ukrainian evacuation of the Four Oblasts to their prewar administrative boundaries. - The Four Oblasts within their prewar administrative boundaries and Crimea recognized as sovereign Russian territory by the US, EU, and UN; - Neutrality and nonalignment of Ukraine; - Ban on the deployment of foreign troops in Ukraine; - Russian recognized as the second official language of Ukraine; - Ukrainian Orthodox Church in communion with the Moscow Patriarchate recognized as the state church of Ukraine; - Ban on veneration of the OUN, UPA, Galician SS, Stepan Bandera in person, and proscription of their successors in ideology to specifically include Azov; - AFU capped at 100,000 personnel including reserves, paramilitaries and auxiliaries; - Ukraine to possess or operate no weapons of any kind with a range of greater than 100 kilometers; - Termination of all Ukrainian drone programs and destruction of all extant Ukrainian combat drones under UN supervision. These represent the minimum acceptable outcomes of the "four pillars" of Russian war policy: demilitarization, denazification, neutrality, and territorial cession of all regions claimed by Russia. This is what any final peace deal in this war is going to include as a minimum, so we might as well stop coping about how letting people speak Russian in public in Kharkov is an abomination against the sovereignty of Ukraine and start telling the Ukrainians the alternative is unconditional surrender. "But AW," you say, "This would reward the Russians!" Yeah, it would. I don't care. Beyond that the Russian position is the morally correct one, as a matter of pure national interest the exact line of the western border of the Russian Federation is of no legitimate concern to the United States so long as it's somewhere generally east of the Vistula. If the Europeans want to get the Russians to agree to less than the above they're welcome to try without our assistance, I guess - they'll be singing a different tune soon enough.

75,654 görüntüleme

This is actually rather interesting because it allows us to roughly estimate kill drone production volumes. Certainly the Russians produce their own fiber-optic cable and some of this likely goes into infrastructure, but we can certainly see how many drones this would support.⬇️ Now, what's important to realize is this likely represents a bulk buy to build a stockpile to support production going forward into the future. With that being said, we can see that the Russian Federation has imported approximately 650,000 miles of fiber-optic cable from China in 2025 after importing about 200,000 miles in 2024 and de minimis quantities previously. This converts to approximately one million kilometers of cabling. Wire-guided drones come with different sizes of wire canisters to provide for varying ranges, but a 10km coil seems to be the average length - canisters up to 50km have been seen occasionally while most drones launched at closer targets likely use more manageable 5km spools or shorter. With that being said, at this point it's a simple matter of division to determine that the Russians will likely deploy around 100,000 wire-guided kill drones in 2025. This is simultaneously a huge amount of firepower and a further hard data point suggesting that claims of millions of drones slung about monthly between the combatants are fantasy. For context, Russian artillery can and has easily consumed over 100,000 shells in a single hot day. Pictured: Expended kill drone wires in the Donbass.

This is actually rather interesting because it allows us to roughly estimate kill drone production volumes. Certainly the Russians produce their own fiber-optic cable and some of this likely goes into infrastructure, but we can certainly see how many drones this would support.⬇️ Now, what's important to realize is this likely represents a bulk buy to build a stockpile to support production going forward into the future. With that being said, we can see that the Russian Federation has imported approximately 650,000 miles of fiber-optic cable from China in 2025 after importing about 200,000 miles in 2024 and de minimis quantities previously. This converts to approximately one million kilometers of cabling. Wire-guided drones come with different sizes of wire canisters to provide for varying ranges, but a 10km coil seems to be the average length - canisters up to 50km have been seen occasionally while most drones launched at closer targets likely use more manageable 5km spools or shorter. With that being said, at this point it's a simple matter of division to determine that the Russians will likely deploy around 100,000 wire-guided kill drones in 2025. This is simultaneously a huge amount of firepower and a further hard data point suggesting that claims of millions of drones slung about monthly between the combatants are fantasy. For context, Russian artillery can and has easily consumed over 100,000 shells in a single hot day. Pictured: Expended kill drone wires in the Donbass.

82,223 görüntüleme

Lo and behold - and exactly as predicted - by striking a key Ukrainian facility with a previously unknown conventional precision-strike IRBM, Putin did nothing in the most bloodcurdling way possible in response to the last week's Ukrainian missile provocations. Your move, NATO.

Lo and behold - and exactly as predicted - by striking a key Ukrainian facility with a previously unknown conventional precision-strike IRBM, Putin did nothing in the most bloodcurdling way possible in response to the last week's Ukrainian missile provocations. Your move, NATO.

86,555 görüntüleme

War mappers: The Russians are parading flags in this village but haven't brought in a marching band yet, so we're going to claim this is the "gray zone." (Russian troops appear to be making good progress reducing the large Ukrainian "pocket" southeast of Kupyansk)

War mappers: The Russians are parading flags in this village but haven't brought in a marching band yet, so we're going to claim this is the "gray zone." (Russian troops appear to be making good progress reducing the large Ukrainian "pocket" southeast of Kupyansk)

27,223 görüntüleme

Ukraine got rocked tonight. Hit after hit after hit, largest attack we've seen in some time. Gerans are still landing. Ukraine tried to strike back with a small-ish cope drone wave (some possibly from the Baltics), but doesn't seem to have had had any success worth noting.⬇️ What does this portend for ground operations? Objectively nothing - the Russians have launched many large air raids before with no significant followup on the ground. We'll know the they are moving on the ground when they move on the ground. With that being said, the situation is ripe for significant moves and Putin has given the order to secure a buffer zone across Chernigov, Sumy and Kharkov - a move that would double the length of the active front - so it's almost a given at this point that we're looking at the run-up to a major offensive.

Ukraine got rocked tonight. Hit after hit after hit, largest attack we've seen in some time. Gerans are still landing. Ukraine tried to strike back with a small-ish cope drone wave (some possibly from the Baltics), but doesn't seem to have had had any success worth noting.⬇️ What does this portend for ground operations? Objectively nothing - the Russians have launched many large air raids before with no significant followup on the ground. We'll know the they are moving on the ground when they move on the ground. With that being said, the situation is ripe for significant moves and Putin has given the order to secure a buffer zone across Chernigov, Sumy and Kharkov - a move that would double the length of the active front - so it's almost a given at this point that we're looking at the run-up to a major offensive.

55,676 görüntüleme

Given the light conditions during the actual operation this was probably a video taken of a rehearsal some time previously and later recycled for propaganda.

Given the light conditions during the actual operation this was probably a video taken of a rehearsal some time previously and later recycled for propaganda.

30,585 görüntüleme

What if I told you the Ukrainians tried to surrender earlier this week? Let's walk through a bizarre chain of events that we all just watched play out in real time - and which nobody seems to have fully grasped the significance of. Down the rabbit hole.⬇️ On Monday - July 21st, 2025 - the Ukrainian authorities moved against the Ukrainian National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), with the SBU raiding their offices. The next day, the Rada - acting at warp speed on direct orders from Zelensky - passed a law stripping both agencies of their independence and placing them under the supervision of the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office. It's important to remember that these agencies, as formerly structured, effectively answer to nobody within the Ukrainian government and have considerable powers to investigate and prosecute "corruption" as broadly defined. They are also objectively terrible at their jobs - NABU does not "pay for itself," only recovering a small fraction of what it receives in funding, and Ukraine has only grown more corrupt under its watch. Any observer of the Ukrainian state is quite familiar with the absolutely industrial level of corruption that its elite habitually indulge in and which the war has made so much worse. So clearly there's something else going on. Simply put, these agencies are quite obviously tools through which Western interests - who fully control them through the usual NGO cutouts and deep state connections - exert direct influence on the Ukrainian authorities. NABU and SAPO exist to investigate the "right" corruption to ensure that Ukraine stays in its lane as a Davos proxy Now for the interesting part. At the exact same time that the Ukrainians moved against these Western-cutout "anticorruption" agencies - Tuesday, July 22nd - the Ukrainians and Russians announced a round of snap negotiations to take place the very next day - Wednesday, July 23rd. Delegates would meet in Istanbul on essentially no notice. Here's where the plan seems to have come apart. When Zelensky moved against them, Davos pulled out its usual playbook and huge mob - orders of magnitude larger than any protest against a government that has turned Ukraine into an open-air prison camp and its war of choice that has killed or maimed a disturbingly large portion of the country's population - descended on the Maidan. The only difference from the usual color revolution fare was the NGOs had learned their lesson from Georgia last year and told their footsoldiers to make crude cardboard signs (to a generally uniform specification) so it would look more authentic and spontaneous. As this was happening an avalanche of condemnation poured in from the Western press, with prominent outlets calling for Zelensky's ouster. Front and back-channel diplomatic messages were doubtless far harsher. Meanwhile in Istanbul on Wednesday - quite possibly because the Russians sensed their counterparts would not be able to keep any agreement they made in the face of the pro-Western mob occupying the Maidan, regardless of what they were offering - the negotiations quickly collapsed. The delegations met for only a little over half an hour and very little was agreed to. The next day - Thursday, July 24th - Zelensky folded and ordered the "anti-corruption" agencies restored to their former positions and authorities. So what are we to make of this? Well, lining these two events up, I think that Zelensky tried to make a play against Davos and NATO, and tried to make an offer to Russia - and his plan failed spectacularly. The Davos Regime exerted maximum pressure to yank him back into line, and the Russians seem to have rejected out of hand whatever his delegation was willing to offer and quite possibly walked out then and there. Left with no options, Zelensky capitulated to his sponsors and restored the status quo ante for their "anticorruption" proxies. The end result to all of this will have been to dramatically weaken Zelensky's position given that he made his move and it not only failed but backfired spectacularly. At this point the credentialed media in the West is openly talking about his departure, and the Russians don't seem to take his government seriously at all as a negotiating partner.

What if I told you the Ukrainians tried to surrender earlier this week? Let's walk through a bizarre chain of events that we all just watched play out in real time - and which nobody seems to have fully grasped the significance of. Down the rabbit hole.⬇️ On Monday - July 21st, 2025 - the Ukrainian authorities moved against the Ukrainian National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) and the Specialized Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAPO), with the SBU raiding their offices. The next day, the Rada - acting at warp speed on direct orders from Zelensky - passed a law stripping both agencies of their independence and placing them under the supervision of the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office. It's important to remember that these agencies, as formerly structured, effectively answer to nobody within the Ukrainian government and have considerable powers to investigate and prosecute "corruption" as broadly defined. They are also objectively terrible at their jobs - NABU does not "pay for itself," only recovering a small fraction of what it receives in funding, and Ukraine has only grown more corrupt under its watch. Any observer of the Ukrainian state is quite familiar with the absolutely industrial level of corruption that its elite habitually indulge in and which the war has made so much worse. So clearly there's something else going on. Simply put, these agencies are quite obviously tools through which Western interests - who fully control them through the usual NGO cutouts and deep state connections - exert direct influence on the Ukrainian authorities. NABU and SAPO exist to investigate the "right" corruption to ensure that Ukraine stays in its lane as a Davos proxy Now for the interesting part. At the exact same time that the Ukrainians moved against these Western-cutout "anticorruption" agencies - Tuesday, July 22nd - the Ukrainians and Russians announced a round of snap negotiations to take place the very next day - Wednesday, July 23rd. Delegates would meet in Istanbul on essentially no notice. Here's where the plan seems to have come apart. When Zelensky moved against them, Davos pulled out its usual playbook and huge mob - orders of magnitude larger than any protest against a government that has turned Ukraine into an open-air prison camp and its war of choice that has killed or maimed a disturbingly large portion of the country's population - descended on the Maidan. The only difference from the usual color revolution fare was the NGOs had learned their lesson from Georgia last year and told their footsoldiers to make crude cardboard signs (to a generally uniform specification) so it would look more authentic and spontaneous. As this was happening an avalanche of condemnation poured in from the Western press, with prominent outlets calling for Zelensky's ouster. Front and back-channel diplomatic messages were doubtless far harsher. Meanwhile in Istanbul on Wednesday - quite possibly because the Russians sensed their counterparts would not be able to keep any agreement they made in the face of the pro-Western mob occupying the Maidan, regardless of what they were offering - the negotiations quickly collapsed. The delegations met for only a little over half an hour and very little was agreed to. The next day - Thursday, July 24th - Zelensky folded and ordered the "anti-corruption" agencies restored to their former positions and authorities. So what are we to make of this? Well, lining these two events up, I think that Zelensky tried to make a play against Davos and NATO, and tried to make an offer to Russia - and his plan failed spectacularly. The Davos Regime exerted maximum pressure to yank him back into line, and the Russians seem to have rejected out of hand whatever his delegation was willing to offer and quite possibly walked out then and there. Left with no options, Zelensky capitulated to his sponsors and restored the status quo ante for their "anticorruption" proxies. The end result to all of this will have been to dramatically weaken Zelensky's position given that he made his move and it not only failed but backfired spectacularly. At this point the credentialed media in the West is openly talking about his departure, and the Russians don't seem to take his government seriously at all as a negotiating partner.

21,655 görüntüleme

Truth. Good night, lol

Truth. Good night, lol

13,590 görüntüleme

Watching video of delivery robots trundling around Moscow unmolested recently, it occurred to me that Russia has actually been a high-trust society for a long time. Soviet soda machines came with a single communal glass that didn't get stolen. The 1990s were just a horror show.

Watching video of delivery robots trundling around Moscow unmolested recently, it occurred to me that Russia has actually been a high-trust society for a long time. Soviet soda machines came with a single communal glass that didn't get stolen. The 1990s were just a horror show.

13,116 görüntüleme

While India-Pakistan has been hogging the limelight, Russian air defenses have been seeing off an extraordinarily large Ukrainian drone and missile raid all night. Probably planned and stocked up months ahead of time. No reports of any significant damage that I've seen thus far.

While India-Pakistan has been hogging the limelight, Russian air defenses have been seeing off an extraordinarily large Ukrainian drone and missile raid all night. Probably planned and stocked up months ahead of time. No reports of any significant damage that I've seen thus far.

12,731 görüntüleme

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General Gerasimov recently announced the village of Borovaya had been taken by the Russian Army. This set off a storm of accusations that he was lying, because no mapper had Russian troops anywhere near the town in force. Today the MoD posted proof they seized it weeks ago.⬇️ You can watch the video for yourself, it's attached. Notice that the leaves are off the trees, indicating that the assault went in and the Russians cleared the town during the March-April timeframe. Thus as far as the Russian Army was concerned, their holding Borovaya was old news and they were presumably quite surprised to see frenzied Telegram blowback on the announcement. No "serious" mapper as of yesterday had Russian troops anywhere near the town - most had their front line approximately five kilometers to the north. And as I pointed out earlier, this seizure was actually old news to the point the Russians felt comfortable announcing it officially. By now the true Russian front line is likely some ways south of the town and the area is secure. There's an old saying in America, "The people who know aren't talking, and the people who talk don't know." The Russians have always had good operational security in general, and earlier this year one of the only side-channels that voenkor commentators used to communicate with their few actual front-line sources - pirated Starlink terminals - were bricked.* Cut off from the front line, Russian civilian commentators fell back on analyzing Ukrainian propaganda (something they've always heavily relied upon) at the exact moment the Ukrainians also seem to have tightened their own OPSEC and become institutionally aware of the role their own propaganda was playing in mapping Russian advances for the public and refuting their narrative of constant success. * This is why broenkors have been screaming and rending their garments about Starlink access. It's their leak vector. The Russian Army never officially used pirated terminals to any significant extent and may have in fact intentionally triggered the crackdown to choke off an OPSEC risk by putting a couple pirated terminals on cruise drones. I specifically believe that the Ukrainians have imposed media and even propaganda blackouts in two sectors - Kupyansk and Zaporozhie - in which they attempted to launch counteroffensives in the last six months. Both of those attacks failed, but the blackouts seemingly remain to avoid embarrassment - and given the Russians only post front updates sporadically and in accordance with their own OPSEC requirements, this means that the front lines in both sectors probably bear little resemblance to the war mappers' current traces. Given that all of this also happened in the February-April timeframe this further suggests that the Russian "pause" in March of this year was simply a reporting artifact and that they're sitting on significant unrecognized gains. Which the Russian MoD has in fact reported on two occasions now during high-level updates, but the mappers refused to believe them!

Armchair Warlord

37,312 görüntüleme • 17 gün önce

ArmchairW's profile picture

A dark theory for the evening. Let's talk about Russian strategy in Ukraine.⬇️ Looking at developments lately, specifically: (1) the Ukrainian casualty leak showing an astronomical 1.7M KIA/MIA; and (2) the Ukrainian collapse north of Pokrovsk - I thought should revisit a dark thought I had a while ago, namely that, "maybe the killing itself is the point of all of this." I've said before that the Russians have fought an extraordinarily clean war in Ukraine, but it should be understood that there is a very legalistic shade on that assessment. They've killed very few civilians, and Ukrainian propagandists are perpetually beclowning themselves trying to pretend that the usual single-digit handful of injured civilians that accompany the latest attack using hundreds of standoff weapons fired into city centers (producing secondary explosions visible from outer space as military targets hidden among civilian infrastructure are destroyed with surgical precision) somehow constitute gEnOCiDe rather than some of the most well-controlled warfighting in the history of the business. There is another and far darker side to Russia's "clean" war, however. Let us consider the fate of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - legal combatants all, whom the Russians can and do target and kill without limit. I mentioned the casualty leak earlier, but I feel this needs to have a line drawn under it - one point seven million personnel killed or missing in action in the AFU, over the course of the war. 1.7 MILLION. Seven or eight percent of Ukraine's prewar population, probably something like a quarter of the entire national cohort of military-aged males, dead or missing. Casualties on the scale of a genocide, sufficient to permanently cripple any postwar Ukrainian nation. Casualties multiple times that which I assessed two years ago as sufficient to shatter the AFU based on the experience of Nazi Germany. This brings me to the Ukrainian collapse north of Pokrovsk two weeks ago, in which a run-of-the-mill Russian attack walked through twenty kilometers of Ukrainian defensive belts and into open country. The Ukrainian propagandists coped by whining about how the single most important front sector for the AFU had somehow "run out of infantry." But did the Russians throw in a mobile reserve to collapse the front and chase the AFU back to the Dniper, despite doubtless knowing full well what was going on? No, they did not - they consolidated in the breach and awaited the inevitable, panicked Ukrainian counterattack, in which they would have the opportunity to destroy Ukraine's remaining elite troops. Which brings me to my conclusion. The Russians have had countless opportunities to make large advances in this war, especially recently - the Ukrainian front line is an absolute shambles and their "drone wall" tactic will falter against any serious attack. So ineffectual is the AFU that very few Russian moves at the front even face serious opposition these days, with most geolocations of Russian advances showing them already established in place and dealing with harassment by kill drones after having seized positions bloodlessly. The Russians have in fact consistently foregone breaking the front and taking swathes of ground in favor of killing the largest possible number of Ukrainian soldiers on the existing front line under the existing attritional combat dynamic. This "tactical directive" held true even during the Battle of Sudzha-Korenevo, fought in prewar Russia. Rather than counterattacking aggressively to evict the AFU, the Russians saw the opportunity to kill gigantic numbers of Ukrainians in a trap the enemy wouldn't be able to extract themselves from for ideological reasons, and they took it. That battle ended up being nine months of hideously lopsided butchery that broke the back of the AFU. All of this makes observing the war more than a little maddening, but it's a consistent pattern of behavior that begs for explanation. So here's my theory. The Russian government has consistently sought to end the war via peace treaty with the existing Ukrainian government, not via regime change, outright conquest, or even killing enough of that government to find a more flexible interlocutor among the Maidanites. Putin apparently wants a treaty with Zelensky. The Russians have also consistently made demands of the Ukrainian government - and its NATO sponsors - that are absolute political nonstarters for the Maidan-era regime and which that regime, by its very nature, simply cannot accept. Russian language rights, Orthodox religious rights, demilitarization, large territorial concessions which would see the AFU surrender vast urban areas without a shot fired. And yet the Russians insist, and they're going to continue killing Ukrainian soldiers at ever-more lopsided ratios until they get their way. Which leads me to the brutal conclusion: Putin doesn't want to see Ukraine conquered. He's never publicly expressed any desire for that. The consistent Russian policy is instead to see Ukraine - a "free" and "independent" Ukraine, having come to this impasse of its own sovereign will - utterly humiliated. Putin wants to make Zelensky put on a suit, come groveling to the Kremlin, and sign a treaty that will see the Maidanite government surrender its arms, disgorge huge amounts of territory, and reverse every single anti-Russian policy position it ever had. Ukrainian nationalism will be discredited overnight by the hands of those very nationalists, and the economically irrelevant, demographically shattered rump state will be sucked back into Russia's political orbit in a matter of days. So of course the Russians are only advancing in the most leisurely way possible. Their goal is to place the Ukrainian government into a militarily untenable situation so as to force a flamboyantly humiliating peace treaty upon them that includes large territorial concessions beyond the line of control - the ultimate Ukrainian taboo - so as to discredit Ukrainian nationalism by the hands of the very ultranationalists who took their nation to war in the first place.

Armchair Warlord

514,704 görüntüleme • 9 ay önce

ArmchairW's profile picture

The Iranian strike on Nevatim and Tel Nof Airfields (and other targets) in Israel on Tuesday completely validated my analysis from April. In April the Iranians demonstrated they could defeat Israel's BMD system at will and strike precision targets - this time they did damage.⬇️ Video of the engagement suggests that the vast majority of the Iranian salvo - probably more than 80% - penetrated and struck targets in Israel. There was once again no indication of any significant midcourse defensive effort, and terminal-phase defensive fire was sporadic and ineffective. Israeli defensive fire in fact appears to have been significantly lighter than in April, which I suspect can be chalked up to two things. First, the Iranians attacked with little to no warning and Israeli heavy SAM batteries (contra their Iron Dome systems) were likely at reduced readiness. Second, the Israelis may have fired off the majority of their available ammunition defending against the attack in April, and given diversions of missiles to Ukraine and the generally glacial pace of new ammunition coming out of Raytheon's factories, it may not have been entirely or even partially replaced as of October 1st. The Iranian attack put several warheads into hangars and flight lines at Nevatim that we know about, with imagery of Tel Nof still under embargo and presumably being sanitized ahead of release - a damning state of affairs. The Iranians can be expected to have damaged aircraft, infrastructure, SAM systems, and AD radars at both airfields, as well as hitting several other targets elsewhere in the country less intensively. The effectiveness of the strike can be seen by simply observing the Israeli reaction - rather than an immediate counterattack they have withdrawn for deliberations, with some talk of a deescalatory downward-step retaliation against the Houthis or Hezbollah. The reason for this is simple - the Iranians have now demonstrated the ability to overwhelm the Israeli AD system at will and precisely strike targets, and with their missile shield ineffective the Israeli leadership is coming to terms with the fact they run a small and isolated country with a limited amount of critical infrastructure. At this point the Ayatollah can push a button and turn the lights out in Israel, and no amount of American money can prevent that. As an aside, the Wasp ARG in the Mediterranean may have fired off all or nearly all of its stock of SM-3 missiles defending against the attack. US officials claimed 12 rounds were fired, with no assessment of successful interceptions. Clearly the task force was, at a minimum, simply overwhelmed by the sheer number of incoming vampires, to say nothing of the large amount of debris, booster fragments, and possibly decoys the missiles scattered in their wake. Not only do USN missile destroyers only carry a small number of these rounds in their silos (generally eight or less) but their production rate is glacial - apparently Raytheon only made 12 of them in 2023. The cost of that engagement to the US taxpayer, by the way, could have been as much as $340 million dollars if those were Block IIA interceptors.

Armchair Warlord

298,185 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce

ArmchairW's profile picture

I've seen some people express incredulity over claims I've made recently that Ukrainian forces are suffering casualties an order of magnitude or more higher than the Russians in Ukraine. This is what inevitably happens when an artillery army faces a human wave army.⬇️ Contrary to the endless, unsupported claims of Ukrainian propagandists - a big lie repeated endlessly - the Russians are not constantly making mass attacks across the front and being repelled by "heroic Ukrainian defenders." The usual tactical cycle in Ukraine looks something along the lines of: 1. The Russians constantly shell, bomb, and drone all identified Ukrainian positions and forces, down to individual soldiers moving in the open, causing mass casualties. The Ukrainians have no substantial surface or aerial fires left and respond only with sporadic drone attacks, causing minor casualties. 2. The AFU continually throws press-ganged conscripts into the line to prevent outright collapse. Due to Russian fire superiority, these conscripts have to move up to front line positions on foot, over considerable distances, while under surveillance and constant attack by fire as they move from rear positions to intermediate positions to front line strongpoints. This process takes time and many don't make it. Russian forces making similar journeys to their own front line generally do so in safety. 3. Eventually some Ukrainian front line position becomes isolated in this hurricane of fire, and surveillance indicates that there are only a handful of effective combatants left in it - slated reinforcements were killed or haven't made it that far forward. 4. Russian command sends an assault platoon or even a squad forward to seize the weakened position. Generally these assaults are successful with few Russian casualties, and we only learn that the Russians have advanced because the Ukrainians publish video of drone harassment raids on the seized position. 5. Russian forces dig in on the captured position and continue bombarding the Ukrainians while monitoring for weak nodes in the front line. Damaged or disabled vehicles (if any) from the latest assault are recovered, repaired, and returned to service in days to weeks. Generally within a day or two another strongpoint or fortified zone fades and can be seized. You can immediately see how this tactical model produces casualties an order of magnitude or higher for the Ukrainian side than the Russian, and it is borne out by careful and skeptical observation of the character of fighting in Ukraine. The Russians advance a step at a time with utmost deliberation while the Ukrainians and their NATO advisors drive themselves insane trying and failing to stop them with decisive maneuver tactics in a war that the Russians have coldly shaped into a struggle of merciless, positional, lopsided attrition. The Russians have implemented and continually refined this tactical model since April 2022, seeking to maximize enemy casualties while minimizing their own. This really represents the pinnacle of data-driven Soviet fire doctrine - the application of "x" rounds into "y" specified enemy positions for "z" time can be resulted to expect in an advance of "K" kilometers and "D" enemy casualties. They've probably refined the old Soviet fire models (largely based off WWII data) to an absolutely Ptolemaic degree in this war. Eventually the Russians may change tack and resume a war of high-speed maneuver - presumably when they can do so in a relatively secure manner with minimal losses to their own forces. What is certain, however, is that they will only take this action at a time and place of their own choosing.

Armchair Warlord

65,688 görüntüleme • 8 ay önce