EUvsDisinfo
@EUvsDisinfo • 78,903 subscribers
We counter Kremlin information warfare, one claim at a time | Not official EU position
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More than 20,000 Ukrainian children have been forcibly transferred and deported by Russia, as documented by international investigators, human rights organisations, and Ukrainian authorities. Hundreds or even thousands of kilometres away from their homes and families, they are subjected to so-called ‘educational programmes’ designed to erase their Ukrainian identity. Millions more in Ukraine have been deprived of a safe childhood by the brutal Russian invasion. Russia’s systematic violations of children’s rights cannot go unpunished. Coordinated international action is needed more than ever to trace and return every child home.
EUvsDisinfo268,775 просмотров • 29 дней назад
Long before election day, another battle is already taking place online. Russia’s election playbook targets voters before they even reach the ballot box: fake accounts, fake news sites, influencers, AI-generated content, and narratives designed to promote pro-Kremlin candidates and destroy trust in democracy. In this mini-documentary, we at EUvsDisinfo break down: - How Russian influence operations are created and amplified - How narratives spread through state media, Telegram, fake websites, social media, messaging apps, and even video games - How pro-EU, pro-Western, and pro-Ukraine candidates are targeted with outrageous false claims - Why artificial intelligence makes these campaigns faster, cheaper, and harder to detect - How fake accounts, deepfakes, and automated content can shape public opinion - Why the bigger, long-term goal is to make people lose trust in policymakers, journalists, institutions, and democracy itself This is Russia's election playbook.
EUvsDisinfo44,054 просмотров • 7 дней назад
The Wikipedia wars As Wikipedia approaches its 25th anniversary in 2026, its open editing model faces a growing challenge: coordinated edit wars. In these campaigns, Kremlin-aligned actors try to rewrite history, launder disinformation, and lock distorted narratives into one of the world’s most trusted reference platforms. Founded on the idea that volunteers could collaboratively build a neutral, reliable encyclopaedia, Wikipedia has become one of the most influential information platforms ever created. It is often described as the world’s largest crowd-sourced knowledge project, built on consensus and verifiable sources. In recent years, however, it has also become a frontline in geopolitical information warfare. This is most visible in so-called edit wars: prolonged conflicts where opposing groups repeatedly overwrite and revise articles to control historical narratives. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, these battles have intensified. Kremlin-aligned actors have systematically targeted articles related to Eastern Europe, the Soviet past, and contemporary political leaders. Estonia and especially EU leader Kaja Kallas, Estonia’s former prime minister, have been frequent targets. What are edit wars? An edit war happens when editors repeatedly change the same content instead of resolving disputes through discussion. Wikipedia officially discourages this behaviour and emphasises consensus, neutrality, and reliable sources. In practice, however, edit wars can and do break out. Coordinated editors can use endurance, procedural rules, and administrator complaints to exhaust good faith contributors. The goal is rarely to win a single argument. Instead, it is to wear down opposition, freeze pages at favourable moments, and normalise contested language. Once a page is locked or protected, the version in place gains a sense of legitimacy, even if it reflects a distorted view. Edit wars exploit open systems, operate over long periods, and aim to embed manipulated narratives into reference material rather than spreading short-lived falsehoods. Multiple investigations show that Wikipedia manipulation increased sharply after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russian-language Wikipedia and parts of the English version became arenas for systematic narrative control, especially as independent Russian media was shut down. Wikipedia’s openness, once a strength, had suddenly become a vulnerability. Coordinated editor networks have worked to soften descriptions of Russian aggression, reframe invasions as ‘conflicts’, and question the legitimacy of post-Soviet states. These efforts rely on subtle wording changes, selective sourcing, and procedural tactics rather than obvious vandalism. Estonia and EU officials as targets Estonia shows how edit wars are used for historical revisionism and political influence. Since 2022, English-language Wikipedia articles about Estonia’s history, statehood, and politics have faced sustained pressure. One recurring tactic has been changing the birthplaces of hundreds of Estonian public figures from ‘Estonia’ to ‘Estonian SSR, Soviet Union’, despite the legal consensus that Estonia was occupied, not legitimately incorporated, by the USSR between 1940 and 1991. This is not a minor wording issue. Calling Estonia a ‘Soviet republic’ supports the Russian claim that the Baltic states voluntarily joined the USSR and directly contradicts the position of Estonia, the EU, NATO countries, and international law. Historical topics have also been targeted. The Estonian War of Independence between 1918 and 1920 has at times been reframed as an ‘offensive campaign’ or ‘separatism from Russia’, language that closely mirrors contemporary Kremlin rhetoric. High-profile figures are especially vulnerable because their pages attract constant attention and frequent administrative action. The Wikipedia article on Kaja Kallas has repeatedly been edited to reflect Russian-aligned interpretations of history and geopolitics. At key moments, the page was locked while these contested narratives were in place, blocking corrective edits. Page protection, meant to prevent disruption, instead helped freeze a favourable version of the article. This shows how procedural tools can be exploited as effectively as false information. Why Wikipedia matters Wikipedia is not just another website. It ranks highly in search results and serves as a default reference for journalists, students, policymakers, and the public. Winning an edit war on Wikipedia helps turn contested narratives into global ‘common knowledge’. For Kremlin-aligned actors, this makes Wikipedia a valuable target. Making small wording changes, downplaying occupation, reframing wars, and questioning democratic legitimacy can slowly erode our understanding of history and present-day aggression. Estonia’s experience shows how smaller states are especially exposed. Because Wikipedia is also a core source for AI systems, the stakes are even higher. Recent studies indicate that Wikipedia is one of the most cited sources for ChatGPT, effectively serving as a foundational knowledge base for how the AI understands and retrieves information. Manipulating articles today can therefore shape how future technologies understand, reproduce, and repeat history. This practice is referred to as LLM grooming, the deliberate attempt to influence large language models by seeding biased or distorted narratives into the sources they rely on. The rise in Wikipedia edit wars since 2022 reflects a broader shift in information warfare. Instead of loud propaganda, actors now use procedural, platform-native manipulation. Estonian history and Kaja Kallas are not isolated cases but targets of coordinated action. And as long as open-knowledge platforms shape how societies understand history and politics, sites like Wikipedia will remain contested ground.
EUvsDisinfo343,369 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад
In 2025, Russia has been framing the EU and Ukrainian leadership as "warmongers", who don't want to stop the war in Ukraine. This, of course, is an outright lie. In reality, it's the Kremlin who has rejected at least seven peace proposals in 2025 alone. Don't be deceived.
EUvsDisinfo244,266 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад
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Today marks the anniversary of the Bucha massacre. In Apr 2022—after Ukraine liberated the town—the world saw civilians executed in the streets, mass graves & torture sites in basements. Russia used its propaganda machine to claim it was staged. But evidence proved otherwise.
EUvsDisinfo76,183 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад
Russia was supposed to capture Kyiv in 3 days. Four years later,they are advancing at a snail’s pace. "Three Days That Never Came" is a mini-documentary about Ukrainian resistance & courage against Russian aggression. It also shows how Ukraine adapted in the information space.
EUvsDisinfo72,441 просмотров • 3 месяцев назад
In a study of more than 1,000 Russian prisoners of war conducted by the non-governmental group LingvaLexa and the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, 76% of soldiers believed at least one Kremlin propaganda narrative to some extent, and 68% perceived the ‘Special Military Operation’ as necessary.
EUvsDisinfo32,120 просмотров • 1 месяц назад
While Moscow loudly supports separatist movements abroad, even mild calls for independence inside Russia can lead to prison. The Kremlin’s “self-determination” has clear limits. Just ask yourself: how has the Kremlin reacted to secessionist aspirations in Tatarstan or Dagestan?
EUvsDisinfo39,667 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад
In 2026, the Russian economy is not yet in decline, but it is in real trouble.
EUvsDisinfo60,246 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад
Storm-1516 is Russia's big information war project targeting Europe. Disinformation, lies, fake websites, forged documentaries and AI-generated deepfakes... sounds scary, right? So far, this massively funded project has mostly produced a lot of noise with minimal impact.
EUvsDisinfo68,360 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад
Starlink shutdown exposes Russia’s military dependence Russia’s dependence on American technology shatters the Kremlin’s invincibility narrative, leading to a slowdown in advance on the front. Claims of Russia’s invincibility became a central element of the large-scale invasion of Ukraine as we examined in our recent article. Faith in the greatness and self-sufficiency of the Russian army has been turned into a mantra of Kremlin propaganda. However, the war against Ukraine has shown the world that this narrative, like the myth of Russia’s technical superiority(opens in a new tab) over Western weapons and technology, is far from the truth. The recent disconnection of Russian troops from the Starlink satellite communications system vividly confirms this. The Russian troops have been left unable to coordinate, slowing down their advance and leaving space for Ukraine to push back. Blind and deaf In early February 2026, Russian troops in the occupied Ukrainian territories faced an unexpected disaster. Overnight, the Starlink satellite communications system crashed(opens in a new tab) across the entire front line. Meanwhile, official communications stations operated by the Ukrainian defence forces continued to operate without interruption. The Russian suffered a severe blow, leaving the invading forces cut off from command posts. The disruption of Russian army Starlink terminals caused serious problems with inter‑unit coordination, logistics and the use of drones of various types, both ground‑based and aerial. According to the Institute for the Study of War(opens in a new tab), the blocking of unregistered Starlink terminals significantly complicated Russian military operations and limited their ability to carry out tactical strikes, consequently leading towards the slowest advance in two years. Opportunity for Ukraine Putting on a brave face, the Russian FIMI machine reverted to its familiar tactic of denying reality. Kremlin mouthpieces claimed(opens in a new tab) that troop command and control remained stable thanks to a complex and diversified communications network. Russian military leaders insisted(opens in a new tab) there were no losses and that the army was not dependent on Western communications terminals. Some Russian units, the General Staff asserted, had allegedly used Starlink terminals solely to mislead Ukrainian forces. The reality proved otherwise: ‘All we’ve got left now, are radios, cables and pigeons,’ says a Russian soldier in an intercepted transmission cited in Politico’s(opens in a new tab) reporting. Without reliable communications, Russian troops lost the ability to effectively control drones and maintain defensive positions. According to Ukrainian Armed Forces Commander-in-Chief Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine seized this opportunity(opens in a new tab). Within weeks, Ukrainian defence forces liberated eight settlements and more than 400 square kilometres of territory, taking advantage of the collapse of Russian command and communications. In February 2026, for the first time since the Kursk Offensive, the Ukrainian Defence Forces regained control of more territory(opens in a new tab) than Russia had managed to capture. The Ukrainian offensive continues, as do the Russian army’s communications problems. Russia’s own Starlink? Currently, Russian military correspondents and analysts are actively promoting a familiar narrative, urging battlefield units to remain patient until the Russian army’s alleged invulnerability is restored. Officials have also claimed that Russia is preparing to develop the Rassvet satellite constellation(opens in a new tab), presented as an analogue to Starlink and described as superior to existing systems. According to official statements(opens in a new tab), the first satellites are expected to be launched into low Earth orbit as early as the first quarter of 2026. The Kremlin’s experts further claim(opens in a new tab) that the initial objective is to deploy at least 300 satellites, with the constellation eventually expanding to up to 950 satellites. As recently as January 2026, Russian outlets quietly reported(opens in a new tab) that the launch of the first 16 experimental low‑orbit satellites had been postponed indefinitely. The satellites had originally been scheduled(opens in a new tab) for deployment in 2025, with official plans envisioning 156 satellites in orbit by 2026. Instead, delays and production shortfalls continue to push the timeline further back. Meanwhile, Moscow has been promising(opens in a new tab) a rapid build-up of its own broadband constellation since 2023, including frequent rocket launches carrying dozens of satellites. In reality, progress has stalled(opens in a new tab): only a handful of experimental satellites are currently in orbit, and experts remain sceptical(opens in a new tab) that Russia can deploy a functioning network anytime soon. The ‘Russian Starlink’ is beginning to look less like an imminent breakthrough and more like another technological promise that is quietly unravelling. The fall of the myth of technological superiority While the Kremlin’s propaganda machine continues to paint a rosy picture for Russian communications specialists, Russia currently lacks a fully fledged replacement for Starlink, and none is expected in the near term. As a result, Russian troops have been forced to rely on ground‑based communications, in some cases literally laying cables(opens in a new tab) under fire from Ukrainian forces. No matter how loudly the Russian disinformation machine promotes its latest weapons and technological breakthroughs, the underlying reality remains unchanged – the army hailed by some as the world’s second strongest has depended heavily on American civilian technology to wage its war.
EUvsDisinfo39,339 просмотров • 3 месяцев назад