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GuledWiliq

@GuledWiliq37,889 subscribers

Author & MEI Scholar @MiddleEastInst | Geopolitics & governance | Building crypto neobank & blockchain infra | Maritime security, Sanctions & illicit finance |

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Turkish-trained forces in Somalia are among the least effective in Somalia, second only to those trained by Eritrea. Here are the reasons why: 1. They have the highest number of desertion rates. 2. They struggle to hold territory. 3. Only 10% of the troops can read military maps. 4. They lack proficiency with the AK-47 and are only familiar with Turkish weapons, which are unsuitable for the Somalia environment. 5. Al-Shabaab refers to them as "birds" because they fail to hold territory even for short periods. This assessment comes from high-ranking Somali military officials who are not trained by the Turkish government.

Turkish-trained forces in Somalia are among the least effective in Somalia, second only to those trained by Eritrea. Here are the reasons why: 1. They have the highest number of desertion rates. 2. They struggle to hold territory. 3. Only 10% of the troops can read military maps. 4. They lack proficiency with the AK-47 and are only familiar with Turkish weapons, which are unsuitable for the Somalia environment. 5. Al-Shabaab refers to them as "birds" because they fail to hold territory even for short periods. This assessment comes from high-ranking Somali military officials who are not trained by the Turkish government.

42,624 Aufrufe

I created a digital animated infographic that explains Al-Shabaab's revenue based on 20 years of audited UN data and the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Somalia's domestic revenue since 2011. My three years of research shows that UN estimates of Al-Shabaab's revenue have remained unchanged at $120 million to $150 million from 2011 to 2024. In contrast, Somalia's domestic revenue has increased by an average of 25% each year since 2011. It is illogical to conclude that Al-Shabaab makes less than the Somali government, which relies 95% on domestic revenue from Mogadishu. I applied an 18% annual growth rate to Al-Shabaab's revenue from 2011 and found that by 2022, Al-Shabaab's revenue was at least 2.5 times that of Somalia's domestic revenue, exceeding $700 million. I welcome any feedback or comments and am happy to engage.

I created a digital animated infographic that explains Al-Shabaab's revenue based on 20 years of audited UN data and the Ministry of Finance and Central Bank of Somalia's domestic revenue since 2011. My three years of research shows that UN estimates of Al-Shabaab's revenue have remained unchanged at $120 million to $150 million from 2011 to 2024. In contrast, Somalia's domestic revenue has increased by an average of 25% each year since 2011. It is illogical to conclude that Al-Shabaab makes less than the Somali government, which relies 95% on domestic revenue from Mogadishu. I applied an 18% annual growth rate to Al-Shabaab's revenue from 2011 and found that by 2022, Al-Shabaab's revenue was at least 2.5 times that of Somalia's domestic revenue, exceeding $700 million. I welcome any feedback or comments and am happy to engage.

19,634 Aufrufe

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