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Sarah Adams

@sarahadams404,322 subscribers

CIA Alum 🥷 Facts over Narratives 10% Humanitarian | 90% Warlord — Host, @The_Watch_Floor Author, Benghazi: Know Thy Enemy

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Does anyone actually believe this qualifies as a competent response? Come on.

Does anyone actually believe this qualifies as a competent response? Come on.

410,247 次观看

Tune in to The Watch Floor next Friday on YouTube for the premiere of our special series, Back to Benghazi. In Episode 1, we return in person to the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, where we revisit the attack, explore what has changed since 2012, and examine why Benghazi still matters today. Dave Benton John “TIG” Tiegen Kris Paronto Mark Geist

Tune in to The Watch Floor next Friday on YouTube for the premiere of our special series, Back to Benghazi. In Episode 1, we return in person to the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi, Libya, where we revisit the attack, explore what has changed since 2012, and examine why Benghazi still matters today. Dave Benton John “TIG” Tiegen Kris Paronto Mark Geist

22,924 次观看

Did you catch that!? Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, Director General of ISPR, confirmed Hamza bin Laden is alive and in contact with the Afghan Taliban. Of course he is. Of his four wives, Hamza is married to the daughters of both Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani. That makes Mullah Yaqoob, the Taliban’s Minister of Defense, and Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Minister of Interior, his brothers-in-law. Anyone still trying to cover up that he is alive is going to have to work a lot harder.

Did you catch that!? Lieutenant General Ahmed Sharif Chaudhry, Director General of ISPR, confirmed Hamza bin Laden is alive and in contact with the Afghan Taliban. Of course he is. Of his four wives, Hamza is married to the daughters of both Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani. That makes Mullah Yaqoob, the Taliban’s Minister of Defense, and Sirajuddin Haqqani, the Minister of Interior, his brothers-in-law. Anyone still trying to cover up that he is alive is going to have to work a lot harder.

149,211 次观看

Some places never leave you, and some missions never end….

Some places never leave you, and some missions never end….

61,793 次观看

The Islamic State will be releasing a statement taking credit for the terrorist attack today in Islamabad, Pakistan. So far over 30 people are dead and 169 others injured after a suicide bomber targeted worshippers at the Qasr-e-Khadijatul Kubra Mosque in Islamabad during Friday prayers.

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The Islamic State will be releasing a statement taking credit for the terrorist attack today in Islamabad, Pakistan. So far over 30 people are dead and 169 others injured after a suicide bomber targeted worshippers at the Qasr-e-Khadijatul Kubra Mosque in Islamabad during Friday prayers.

133,371 次观看

Leaks, Lies, and Lessons: Taliban, This One’s for You Over the last week, the Taliban decided to run a ridiculous social media campaign accusing me of being a Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy and by supporting other misinformation campaigns—a feeble attempt to distract from the fact that they still can’t figure out how I compromised their General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) and their Ministries of Interior and Defense. As most people know, I’m not one to get mad. I’m one to get even. So, if the Taliban are begging me to help Pakistan, for example, why not give them exactly what they’re asking for? Let’s do this, shall we? Honestly, I just do not want to see a military wasting perfectly good munitions made by great American companies on the wrong locations. That seems utterly foolish. What We Observed On November 27, 2025, we monitored the movements of American-made Navistar 7000 military trucks loaded with light and heavy weapons and ammunition departing the central depots of the Taliban’s three principal military and intelligence institutions: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the GDI. Attached are videos so the Taliban understands that I am serious here. These trucks were ferrying weapons left behind by the United States, along with ammunition from Taliban-controlled depots in the Central and Eastern Zones, to newly constructed “classified” (oops, classified no longer) storage sites in Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Helmand provinces. These locations were chosen due to the Taliban’s historic strongholds during their twenty-year insurgency, but they forget that some of us made friends there, too. Why They Moved the Arsenal The relocation plan began immediately after recent Pakistani Air Force strikes on terrorist camps belonging to designated foreign terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as on Taliban weapons stockpiles across Kabul, Nangarhar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Kunar, and Kandahar. The strikes rattled the Taliban’s leadership, and I enjoyed every second of the internal implosions, as they couldn’t find the source of the leak(s) that compromised their weapons depots. It finally hit them that their entire storage network had a massive vulnerability and was no longer safe or secure. The Order From Haibatullah The Taliban’s Supreme Leader Mullah Haibatullah personally ordered the redistribution of these weapons on Wednesday, October 15, 2025, during a meeting of the Taliban Cabinet’s Leadership Council at Mandigak Palace in Kandahar’s 2nd security district. While the meeting addressed other issues, including appointing a delegation led by Mullah Yaqoob for “peace” talks with Pakistan in Doha, Qatar, the core agenda was simple: secure the arsenal, move it far from Pakistan’s targeting reach, and hide it where outsiders (a reference to people like me) cannot locate it. They were so close to meeting all these objectives. The Transfer Plan Again, fearing that Pakistan had acquired precise coordinates for their long-standing depots, they devised a multi-layered, compartmented transfer system designed to eliminate tracking and shield the operation from internal leaks. Well, I guess there is no better time than now to leak it. The plan relied on three groups of drivers: let’s call them what the Taliban did—Group A, Group B, and Group C. Group A: These drivers transported the weapon-loaded trucks from Kabul’s central depots to the Salar area of Maidan Wardak, where the trucks were handed off to Group B. The drivers were not given each other’s identities and were barred from seeing each other’s physical features. The handover occurred only after Group B confirmed a rotating codeword issued directly by the Ministry of Defense and Haibatullah’s Leadership Council. You don’t really need to know this part, but it’s very important for the Taliban to understand that I know it. Group B: These drivers then moved the cargo to the end of Shah Joy also known as Shahr-e-Safa between Zabul and Kandahar, and onward to the entrance of Daman district. The first two videos are evidence from the Group B movement. There, another codeword-verified the handover and transfer of the weapons to Group C. It's just like the movies, isn't it?! Group C: These drivers were no ordinary unit. How could they be? They were supposed to be the only individuals who knew the final weapons storage locations. Video evidence from the Group C transport is the third attachment. This segment of the movement was carried out by Omari Lashkar, a special forces unit tasked with protecting Haibatullah. The unit also received transport support from the Al-Badr Force, a special forces unit under the command of Mullah Yaqoob. These fighters-turned-drivers were originally trained as suicide operatives who were never selected for missions (not the best look boys, you couldn’t even hack it as a suicide bomber) and have now been reorganized into parts of the Taliban’s special operations units. For this move, both units fell under the direct command of Mawlawi Abdul Ahad Talib, the current Taliban Police Chief in Kandahar. Group C’s overall mission was to deliver the U.S. weapons and ammunition into newly carved tunnel complexes in the remote, mountainous regions of Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Helmand. These tunnels were dug out after 2022 on Haibatullah’s verbal order and built by the Taliban’s Ministry of Defense as hardened, covert weapons depots. Their locations were meant to be isolated, inaccessible, and fortified—a model of next-generation strategic storage by terrorists. The Monitoring System Along the route, observation posts were established about every 60 miles on mountain tops and high ridges to monitor the entire process (see the last attached video showcasing one of these posts). Each post had three purposes: (1) To monitor the weapon-transporting trucks in real time and ensure they did not deviate from their assigned route; (2) To host liaison officers from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and GDI who monitored the trucks' movements when they entered their zone; and (3) To communicate and maintain constant contact with the truck drivers to solve any issues immediately. And here is the part the Taliban will really hate: every one of these movements was tracked. Every handoff. Every convoy. Every tunnel entrance. If you think you buried those locations so deep that no one knows where you’re hiding your arsenal now, you are sorely mistaken. A Final Message for the Taliban For My Dear Friends in the Taliban: You wanted a reaction. What you got was a lesson. I really hate having to make you move your weapons again, just kidding, I don't give a damn!

Leaks, Lies, and Lessons: Taliban, This One’s for You Over the last week, the Taliban decided to run a ridiculous social media campaign accusing me of being a Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy and by supporting other misinformation campaigns—a feeble attempt to distract from the fact that they still can’t figure out how I compromised their General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) and their Ministries of Interior and Defense. As most people know, I’m not one to get mad. I’m one to get even. So, if the Taliban are begging me to help Pakistan, for example, why not give them exactly what they’re asking for? Let’s do this, shall we? Honestly, I just do not want to see a military wasting perfectly good munitions made by great American companies on the wrong locations. That seems utterly foolish. What We Observed On November 27, 2025, we monitored the movements of American-made Navistar 7000 military trucks loaded with light and heavy weapons and ammunition departing the central depots of the Taliban’s three principal military and intelligence institutions: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the GDI. Attached are videos so the Taliban understands that I am serious here. These trucks were ferrying weapons left behind by the United States, along with ammunition from Taliban-controlled depots in the Central and Eastern Zones, to newly constructed “classified” (oops, classified no longer) storage sites in Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Helmand provinces. These locations were chosen due to the Taliban’s historic strongholds during their twenty-year insurgency, but they forget that some of us made friends there, too. Why They Moved the Arsenal The relocation plan began immediately after recent Pakistani Air Force strikes on terrorist camps belonging to designated foreign terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as on Taliban weapons stockpiles across Kabul, Nangarhar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Kunar, and Kandahar. The strikes rattled the Taliban’s leadership, and I enjoyed every second of the internal implosions, as they couldn’t find the source of the leak(s) that compromised their weapons depots. It finally hit them that their entire storage network had a massive vulnerability and was no longer safe or secure. The Order From Haibatullah The Taliban’s Supreme Leader Mullah Haibatullah personally ordered the redistribution of these weapons on Wednesday, October 15, 2025, during a meeting of the Taliban Cabinet’s Leadership Council at Mandigak Palace in Kandahar’s 2nd security district. While the meeting addressed other issues, including appointing a delegation led by Mullah Yaqoob for “peace” talks with Pakistan in Doha, Qatar, the core agenda was simple: secure the arsenal, move it far from Pakistan’s targeting reach, and hide it where outsiders (a reference to people like me) cannot locate it. They were so close to meeting all these objectives. The Transfer Plan Again, fearing that Pakistan had acquired precise coordinates for their long-standing depots, they devised a multi-layered, compartmented transfer system designed to eliminate tracking and shield the operation from internal leaks. Well, I guess there is no better time than now to leak it. The plan relied on three groups of drivers: let’s call them what the Taliban did—Group A, Group B, and Group C. Group A: These drivers transported the weapon-loaded trucks from Kabul’s central depots to the Salar area of Maidan Wardak, where the trucks were handed off to Group B. The drivers were not given each other’s identities and were barred from seeing each other’s physical features. The handover occurred only after Group B confirmed a rotating codeword issued directly by the Ministry of Defense and Haibatullah’s Leadership Council. You don’t really need to know this part, but it’s very important for the Taliban to understand that I know it. Group B: These drivers then moved the cargo to the end of Shah Joy also known as Shahr-e-Safa between Zabul and Kandahar, and onward to the entrance of Daman district. The first two videos are evidence from the Group B movement. There, another codeword-verified the handover and transfer of the weapons to Group C. It's just like the movies, isn't it?! Group C: These drivers were no ordinary unit. How could they be? They were supposed to be the only individuals who knew the final weapons storage locations. Video evidence from the Group C transport is the third attachment. This segment of the movement was carried out by Omari Lashkar, a special forces unit tasked with protecting Haibatullah. The unit also received transport support from the Al-Badr Force, a special forces unit under the command of Mullah Yaqoob. These fighters-turned-drivers were originally trained as suicide operatives who were never selected for missions (not the best look boys, you couldn’t even hack it as a suicide bomber) and have now been reorganized into parts of the Taliban’s special operations units. For this move, both units fell under the direct command of Mawlawi Abdul Ahad Talib, the current Taliban Police Chief in Kandahar. Group C’s overall mission was to deliver the U.S. weapons and ammunition into newly carved tunnel complexes in the remote, mountainous regions of Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Helmand. These tunnels were dug out after 2022 on Haibatullah’s verbal order and built by the Taliban’s Ministry of Defense as hardened, covert weapons depots. Their locations were meant to be isolated, inaccessible, and fortified—a model of next-generation strategic storage by terrorists. The Monitoring System Along the route, observation posts were established about every 60 miles on mountain tops and high ridges to monitor the entire process (see the last attached video showcasing one of these posts). Each post had three purposes: (1) To monitor the weapon-transporting trucks in real time and ensure they did not deviate from their assigned route; (2) To host liaison officers from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and GDI who monitored the trucks' movements when they entered their zone; and (3) To communicate and maintain constant contact with the truck drivers to solve any issues immediately. And here is the part the Taliban will really hate: every one of these movements was tracked. Every handoff. Every convoy. Every tunnel entrance. If you think you buried those locations so deep that no one knows where you’re hiding your arsenal now, you are sorely mistaken. A Final Message for the Taliban For My Dear Friends in the Taliban: You wanted a reaction. What you got was a lesson. I really hate having to make you move your weapons again, just kidding, I don't give a damn!

124,181 次观看

Ann Coulter From Al-Qaeda literally teasing its next airline plot, one that aims to drop a dozen planes over U.S. soil using suicide bombers, but sure, walking through a scanner is the real overreach. A crushing sacrifice, really, to potentially save 4,000 lives.

Ann Coulter From Al-Qaeda literally teasing its next airline plot, one that aims to drop a dozen planes over U.S. soil using suicide bombers, but sure, walking through a scanner is the real overreach. A crushing sacrifice, really, to potentially save 4,000 lives.

34,862 次观看

Videos

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A Call to Local Action Against the Al-Qaeda Threat We’ve received too many reports that a number of state-wide fusion centers have NOT distributed the Office of the Director of National Intelligence's National Counterterrorism Center's (NCTC) al-Qaeda threat reporting to local law enforcement in their states. If agencies are unwilling to act, then everyday Americans must take responsibility to ensure these materials reach the people who need them. The scale and scope of the next attack on the U.S. homeland will be unlike anything we have seen before. You must take action now to prepare your community—because if you don't, no one else will. Please print the ODNI press release and the NCTC memo itself and deliver hard copies to nearby law enforcement offices, fire stations, and hospitals. Veteran communities will be among the most affected by al-Qaeda's upcoming plot after Washington, D.C., and the aviation sector. If you live in an area with a large veteran population, also be sure to alert city officials, churches, synagogues, schools, shopping centers, and public-transportation hubs as well. Thank you for doing the right thing for your communities. If this threat is not thwarted by our federal government, it falls to us to be prepared, to limit casualties in our hometowns, and to protect the people we love the most. ODNI Press Release titled 'NCTC Supports U.S. Law Enforcement, First Responders by Sharing Intel Product Aimed at Deterring Attacks by Al-Qa’ida': NCTC Memo for Law Enforcement and First Responders titled 'Al-Qa‘ida’s Recent Calls to Conduct Attacks in the US Highlights Its Enduring Threat to Public Safety':

Sarah Adams

394,922 次观看 • 8 个月前

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What to Watch for When You Fly: Doing Your Part to Keep America Safe As the holiday travel season approaches, every traveler can play a part in helping to thwart al-Qaeda’s upcoming aviation plot. Pre-attack surveillance often shows up days or weeks beforehand and then later in the season we will must shift our focus to watching for active threats. (1) Now through mid-December—watch for pre-attack surveillance and dry runs: -Passengers asking unusual or technical questions about crew, routes, or procedures. -Interest in sitting along the fuselage or near service areas. -Repeatedly accessing overhead bins or restrooms without reason; lingering near service carts. -Attempts to enter unauthorized areas of the airport or on the aircraft (including cockpit approaches). -Multiple boarding passes purchased under similar names/itineraries, often paid in cash. -Scouting trips on domestic routes to observe security routines. -Recording security and screening in procedures in the airport. -Testing crew responses by creating small disturbances or lingering near secured areas. -Anti-American remarks, isolating behavior, or attempts to avoid other passengers. -Unattended packages or bags — don’t ignore them. Please if you see something, say something. (2) Starting at the beginning of the Christmas travel season shift focus to signs of a possible suicide bomber or imminent attack: -Attempts to avoid or opt-out of the millimeter wave scanner. -Odd items on scanning belt including items like syringes; watch also inside the plane. -Lack of luggage or round trip travel. -Signs of drug use, particularly Ecstasy. -Erratic behavior or, conversely, an unnaturally calm, detached demeanor. -Visible physical stress signs: jugular vein extension (neck bulging), profuse sweating, clenched jaw, clenched fists, muscle rigidity, pacing. -Target fixation—obsessively looking at crew, flight deck doors, or passengers who appear to be law enforcement or military (“1,000-yard” stare). -Repeatedly touching or adjusting the same spot on clothing/body. -Watch for lines, bulging and sagging in clothing; attacker may also look at self in reflections throughout the airport for fear the bomb is visual. -Hyper sensitivity over an article of clothing on their body. -Visible burns, chemical marks, or other unexplained injuries on the skin. -Frequent self-reassuring gestures, whispered prayers, or profuse swearing combined with agitation. Trust your instincts. If something feels off, report it calmly to crew, airport security, or call 911 you may stop an attack before it ever begins. Note: The clip below related to the 2006 liquid bomb plot is a reminder that we haven’t seen attacks like these over the years because incredible humans have been stepped up and thwarted them. We need heroes like that again. Do your part!

Sarah Adams

140,254 次观看 • 7 个月前

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The Invisible Bomb: Why the Christmas Day 2009 Plot Still Matters As we approach the anniversary of the failed Christmas Day attack, it is worth revisiting the 2009 “underwear bomber” plot, not as a historical footnote, but as a case study in how layered security can still fail and why al-Qaeda has not abandoned this line of effort. What is often overlooked is that this device did not pass through a single checkpoint. The failed suicide bomber, Umar Faruq, trained overseas in Yemen, returned to Africa with the device, and then traveled internationally with it—passing through security screening at three separate airports before boarding the U.S.-bound flight from Amsterdam to Detroit on December 25, 2009. At no point was the device detected. This was not an isolated screening failure. It reflected systemic vulnerabilities shared across multiple aviation security environments at the time: reliance on detection technologies optimized for conventional threats, limited ability to identify non-metallic explosives concealed on the body, and inconsistent integration of behavioral indicators and intelligence. Each layer assumed the previous one had worked. The device ultimately failed due to malfunction NOT because the system succeeded. For al-Qaeda, this was not a dead end. It became an obsession. Within the organization, variations of this device have been referred to as the “hidden bomb”—what Western services describe as the “invisible bomb.” Making this concept work has remained a persistent objective, not because it is new, but because it exposed how close they came to bypassing aviation security entirely. And they plan to do it again. Importantly, this effort has never been viewed by al-Qaeda as separate from the individual who carried it out. The bomber himself has remained both a symbolic and operational priority, with repeated interest in freeing him from U.S. custody and using his sacrifice to motivate the newest generation of aviation suicide bombers. These objectives underscore how this plot is viewed internally: unfinished business, not a failure. Even without the more recent innovations al-Qaeda and its affiliates have pursued in materials, concealment, tradecraft, and binary detonation, the core concept behind the 2009 device would still challenge security systems under the right conditions. Aviation security has improved, but it remains probabilistic as it is not applied equally even across U.S. airports, nor is it absolute. It continues to rely on intelligence integration, human judgment, and institutional memory. The lesson of Christmas Day 2009 is not simply that the attack failed. It is how close it came to succeeding, slipping through security apparatuses across multiple countries, and why adversaries continue to probe, study, and refine methods that exploit gaps, seams, and vulnerabilities rather than attempting to overpower defenses. It’s a clear reminder that a single failure can lead to disaster. Terrorist organizations remember that. The risk is that we forget.

Sarah Adams

106,873 次观看 • 5 个月前

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It’s Time to Shift Mindsets: Every Active Shooter Is a Potential Suicide Bomber Be wary of black puffer coats as they’re one of the easiest garments to conceal bombs inside, and Al-Qaeda has shown that repeatedly, including in their December 2023 video teasing their upcoming homeland plot. At least 10% of the attackers in the homeland plot are expected to be suicide bombers. That means you can’t treat an active shooter as “just” an active shooter anymore. You must assume he’s also a suicide bomber because that’s exactly how they designed it. Here are some basic SOPs for civilians and venue staff when a shooter may also be a suicide bomber: (1) Distance is survival: If a bomber is still mobile, the blast radius is the threat. Move away and create as much distance as possible: 30–50 feet minimum, 100+ if available. (2) Don’t rush to “help” the downed attacker: If the attacker drops, do not approach. Many vests use dead-man switches, pressure triggers, delayed chemical binaries, or can be remotely detonated by an overwatch. (3) Also, in the same vein, don’t dogpile an attacker: limit engagement to 1–3 responders to reduce the risk of additional casualties. Focus on controlling the attacker’s hands. The most critical element in any close-quarters fight is using firm, targeted restraint techniques to prevent detonation or access to a weapon. (4) Avoid chokepoints: Stairwells, elevators, and bottlenecks become kill zones in a blast. Keep moving toward open space and hard structure. (5) Expect secondary devices: Al-Qaeda doctrine routinely includes follow-on blasts. Treat abandoned bags, jackets, or dropped items as potential IEDs. (6) Clothing–behavior mismatch matters: Watch for heavy coats indoors or in warm climates, and for uneven weight distribution inside of clothing. Also, watch for attempts to evade placing items on belt scanners. (7) Choose hard cover, not concealment: Concrete, pillars, and engine blocks save lives. Drywall and furniture do not. (8) Communicate the right words: When calling 911, say: “Active shooter, possible suicide vest.” It triggers an immediate tactical shift in response. Law enforcement around the country has been preparing for this scenario, give them a leg up with concise reporting. (9) Control the flow. Push crowds away from the attacker, not toward him. Prevent panic surges toward gunfire as suicide bombers seek density. (10) After evacuation, don’t cluster. Most mass-casualty terrorist attacks anticipate crowds gathering outside. Move far and disperse; attackers often plan waves, and clustering makes you a target for a secondary strike. (11) Bombs may contain caustic chemicals. Stay clear of the area until a full HAZMAT assessment is completed. If you feel weak, dizzy, or unwell, seek medical evaluation immediately.

Sarah Adams

75,482 次观看 • 6 个月前

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Housewives of the Taliban Update Since Taliban Supreme Leader Haibatullah Akhundzada still refuses to back down on erasing women’s faces from Afghan national identity cards, I guess it’s time to release more Taliban wives today. I’ve got a bit of history with Haibatullah myself. Back in 2009, the agency kept getting a flood of garbage reporting claiming Mullah Omar was hiding in Haibatullah’s mosque and madrassa outside Quetta. I knew Omar was in Afghanistan, but I still had to waste time running down that false lead. CIA ain’t always glamorous. What I did learn about Haibatullah, though, was far worse than harboring a one-eyed stooge. He preyed on poor families, promising to take their children for an education, only to funnel them into his madrassa-turned–suicide bomber factory. He exploited the most vulnerable, twisted their minds, and sent them out to kill others. That is who he is: a man who built his power base on the shattered lives of children. He did nothing else to become the leader of the Taliban but harm others, and you don’t need more than that to be a terrorist. Justice will come for him, and Haibatullah will burn. Until then, every lie he tells, every woman he silences, and every child he sacrifices will be remembered—because they all deserved the life he and other terrorists like him tried to steal from them. *We will pause our releases for a few hours today to direct energy and prayer toward the hundreds of victims of the earthquake in Afghanistan. The Taliban drove out the best first responders, doctors, and medics, leaving survivors at the mercy of terrorists running an illegitimate regime—one with little ability to govern and no capacity to provide real care or support. Tragically, the Taliban will no doubt find new ways to exploit this disaster for their own gain and at the expense of innocent others.

Sarah Adams

93,765 次观看 • 9 个月前

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