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Sishuwa Sishuwa

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Historian | Academic | Political Commentator | Senior Lecturer @StellenboschUni | Author of Party Politics and Populism in Zambia | PhD @UniofOxford

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Abductions, Enforced Disappearances, and Unlawful Detentions: Zambia's Descent into State Lawlessness By Sishuwa Sishuwa Zambia is on a knife-edge only several hours before voters head to the ballot box on 13 August to choose political leaders in a general election that might see Hakainde Hichilema becoming the latest casualty of the anti-incumbent election wave that has recently seen the defeat of sitting presidents in other African countries such as Botswana and Malawi. As i show in greater detail below, Hichilema is racing into the final days unfettered by any rules and willing to do anything he want to steal the results. People’s rights are being arbitrarily withdrawn. Abductions, enforced disappearances, unlawful detentions, and political violence instigated by the state and ruling party cadres have characterised the descent into state lawlessness ahead of Thursday’s election. Those on the receiving end are people who question authority or do much more than what is convenient as well as opposition officials, members, and supporters (perceived or real). The sight of anguished family members pleading to the state to disclose the whereabouts of their abducted loved ones has become very common in Lusaka. A special unit consisting of officers, from the Drug Enforcement Commission, the only body that has pre-signed search warrants, has been assembled to raid houses, arrest political opponents, and forcibly abduct opposition members or sympathisers. The script is the same: those abducted by armed state agents who move in motor vehicles without license plates, are usually taken to ‘safe houses’, not police stations, which makes it difficult for families to find their illegally detained relatives. Their phones and other electronic devices are confiscated, making it impossible to communicate with the abducted or know what has happened to them. This situation has left many people living in a state of fear and paralysis. In the last few days, I have spoken to civil society activists such as Brebner Changala, prominent personalities like Mulenga Kapwepwe, and at least 14 journalists who have all resigned themselves to any possibility. “We are just waiting for our turn. We do not know when we will be abducted and where we will be taken. When you are no longer able to reach us, just know that we have been taken”, one of them told me. The profile of those abducted is largely the same: opposition members and innocent people suspected to be supporting or financing Brian Mundubile, Hichilema’s main rival in the election. Nearly all of them are being arrested daily without following due process. Many of these people have been abducted from their homes or the street rather than being summoned to the police, charged, and either issued with bond or taken to court within the prescribed legal time-frame. Musa Mwenye, one of Zambia’s most outstanding citizens who, as Attorney General, defended the Constitution in 2014 when ministers wanted to overthrow it, captured the state of things in the country when he published the following observation on 10 August: “When people are held in detention beyond the reach of the courts, contrary to the law and due process, they are being held ‘extra judicially’. Further, when people are detained for their political activities and mobilization, they are ‘political detainees’. Do we have political detainees who are being held extra judicially in Zambia today? Sadly, the answer is yes. I never thought I would ever utter the words, ‘political detainee’ and ‘extra judicial detention’ in one sentence with regards to democratic Zambia, whose democratic credentials have been a beacon of good governance and the rule of law in Africa and beyond. In the past, when persons were detained for their political activities, the accused persons were subjected to due process in courts of law. We are now witnessing detentions without even the pretension of any court process, whatsoever. This is not who we are, and, it is certainly not what we should be known for. Zambia’s well-earned name in observance of human rights and our democratic credentials is in serious jeopardy. I appeal to the Government to release all political detainees who are being held extra judicially or to present them before courts of law for the due process of the law to take its course.” On the same day, Amnesty International released its latest report on the state of human rights in Zambia. Titled “Authoritarian practices eating away at human rights in Zambia: Escalating crackdown on human rights ahead of the 2026 general elections”, the mild but relatively critical report details how the Hichilema administration has presided over “an alarming regression into authoritarian practices that undermine human rights and participation in government”, leading to “a climate of fear and impunity”. To read Amnesty’s report, click here: A coalition of 11 civil society organisations has become the latest interest group to raise alarm about this deteriorating state of democracy. The civic bodies detailed major concerns that undermine the integrity of the electoral process. These include the restrictions on opposition mobilisation, the unequal treatment accorded to the competing contestants by state institutions, the use of public resources for partisan advantage, the unchecked electoral violence, and the late/unclear guidance on valid ballot marking. They further called on the electoral body to “act with visible impartiality”, on Hichilema to stop the “use state resources for partisan gain”, and on “the police [to] hold perpetrators of violence accountable – regardless of political affiliation”. Unfortunately, their call has come too late and is unlikely to meet positive reception from the authorities. As one of Hichilema's presidential aides regularly tells some of us, ‘You can cut my finger: HH is going nowhere. It is high time you started working with him.” Given that impunity and lawlessness appear to be Hichilema’s governing principles, it is easy to see where the aide’s confidence is coming from. Much of this “climate of fear and impunity” has been created by the authorities as part of a wider effort to save Hichilema from electoral defeat. The actual details behind the effort are as chilling as they are alarming. A prominent local businessman and one of my closet friends, Stelios Sardanis, was murdered on 9 August in his house a few days after he shared fears that his life was in danger because ‘they are accusing me of financing the opposition’. Masked men came from the bush, attacked him, and vanished in the same bush. Another prominent local businessman, Valden Findlay, has been in unlawful detention since 4 August without charge! Like many of those abducted, Findlay is being kept in a shipping container in Mwembeshi, not in any prison system, or police station. His crime? Suspicion that he is financing the opposition. Only last night, nearly the entire top leadership of Mundubile’s campaign committee was either abducted and taken to unknown places or ordered by the authorities to appear before the police today. Among the affected are Mundubile’s spokesperson George Chisanga, national campaign manager Japhen Mwakalombe, and senior presidential campaign official Sebastian Kopulande (abducted). A day earlier, Mundubile’s media team was abducted and taken to an unknown place. A week before that, on 27 July, Kennedy Kamba, the official in charge of vote protection in Mundubile’s party, was arrested. He remains in detention without charge. Meanwhile, 32 artists, journalists, and other senior officials in Mundubile’s campaign team were arrested in Western Province during a lawful and peaceful rally that police deliberately disrupted for no reason using tear gas canisters. The arrested were charged with minor offences such as conduct likely to cause breach of peace, but none of them have been given bond or taken to court and consequently remain in unlawful detention, over 600 kilometers away from their families. More opposition leaders, members and supporters are earmarked for arrest and abduction today, tomorrow, and perhaps beyond. The goal of these abductions, arrests and detentions is twofold: either provoke a reaction that Hichilema can use as a pretext to declare a state of emergency, suspend the Constitution, cancel the election, and arrest even more people, or deprive Mundubile of his core support team that can help prevent industrial scale vote-rigging in Thursday’s election. In my lifetime, I have watched the end of the one-party state, the reintroduction of multiparty democracy, the protection of presidential term limits, the defence of the constitution from executive-driven manipulation, the election of a Tonga to State House, and the repeated peaceful transitions of power enabled by a professional military that chose non-intervention whenever an incumbent was defeated. After this week’s election, I remain confident that I will be witness to an even more extraordinary national story: an opposition challenger who overcame enormous obstacles to win power at the first attempt, defeating a president who promoted regionalism, nurtured corruption, eroded democracy, increased poverty, and enabled multinational plunder of the country’s mineral wealth. I maintain that Hichilema will lose Thursday's election. Although the president is doing his desperate best to try to steal the vote, I am convinced that he is going, whether he likes it or not. In fact, his desperate antics reveal his fear even at this late hour. As I have said before, the only thing that can save Hichilema from defeat is reckless industrial scale vote-rigging or the pre-ballot death of his main rival. There are several factors that militate against the opposition in African politics, but the obstacles that have been placed in the path of Brian Mundubile are considerable. This is why I am saying his victory will be extraordinary, given the lengths to which Hichilema has gone to retain power. I have nothing personal against Hichilema. It is just that my professional training empowers me to see things that many others can only see after the event. As early as June 2023, I warned that Hichilema was so desperate to retain power that he had devised a five-point plan which, “if successfully implemented, risks undermining Zambia’s hard-won democracy”. I identified the plan as consisting of five objectives: containing the Catholic Church; co-opting influential elites from civil society; capturing the two formal institutions that are critical to the management of elections: the Electoral Commission of Zambia and the judiciary; weakening opposition parties; and covering corruption tracks. In the same article, I explained the three reasons behind Hichilema’s early desperation to secure a second term: fear of prosecution, the desire to avoid the embarrassment of losing power after just one term, and the push for a sectarian agenda aimed at entrenching his co-ethnic Tongas in state positions and grossly reducing the influence of the majority Bemba and Chewa ethnic groups in public life. At the time, few people understood what I was saying. Some said I just hated Hichilema, and not even reason-based evidence to the contrary changed their false perceptions. Others like Hichilema's fellow ethnic Tongas, led by Dr O’Brien Kaaba, a law lecturer at the University of Zambia, and Dr Priva Hang’andu, a Policy Advisor at the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), rose to the President’s defence, dismissing my concerns about “shrinking democratic space, mounting corruption, political intolerance, and government desperation” as entirely unfounded. To read my 2023 article, click here: To read Kaaba and Hang’andu’s response in defence of their fellow Tonga, click here: Well, the passage of time has absolved me and given practical meaning to Thabo Mbeki’s observation that “Empty stomachs can be good or bad teachers. The problem with our African intellectuals is that they too have stomachs, in addition to their excellent brains.” For the sake of Zambia, I wish my 2023 concerns were wrong. I raised them then in the hope that Hichilema, who was elected on a ticket of democratic reform, could change for the better before it was too late. Unfortunately, his transition from a promising reform to a despot only got worse with time, as I showed two years later in another opinion piece published by the Mail & Guardian several months before Hichilema's State House team asked the newspaper's new editors to stop giving me platform. To read the article in which I examined how the fear of losing power and the financial and political benefits that come with it after only one term in office was evident in President Hichilema’s increasingly panicky and politically suicidal decisions, click here: The “authoritarian practices” and ‘escalating crackdown on human rights” that Amnesty International and others were to only to notice three years later could have been stopped much earlier if many voices had stood up to Hichilema before his autocratic aspirations were emboldened by their silence. The obstacles that Hichilema has placed in Mundubile’s path to power are illustrative of how the president has, over the last five years, repeatedly abused state institutions to systematically destroy organised political opposition and any semblance or vestige of autonomy in formal institutions outside the executive. There are many obstacles that Hichilema has placed in Mundubile’s path, but I will highlight only 10 here to illustrate the point that the leading opposition challenger has had so many domestic and foreign forces working against him in this election that it is extraordinary that he has made it a competitive contest. The first obstacle was the limitation placed on Mundubile's international travel. When he tried to leave the country to mobilise resources for his presidential bid, the state blocked him. He was arrested at the airport, charged with a cyber-related offence, and had all his travel documents and phones confiscated. The latter action means that he has not been able to leave Zambia since March this year as his passport remains with the state. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work. The second obstacle was the restriction on the political party ticket that Mundubile could use to run in the election. After the state instigated divisions in all parties that were perceived as capable of serving as possible vehicles for the expression of his presidential ambition, including the main opposition Patriotic Front (PF) to which he belonged, another opposition party, namely the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) offered him a platform. However, the state quickly moved in and, as it had done to other parties, factionalised the FDD to prevent him from running on it. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, ultimately finding a home in the little-known National Reconciliation Party for Unity and Prosperity (NRPUP) on the eve of nominations. The third obstacle was mere appearance on the ballot. After Mundubile formally presented his credentials to the officials of the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), what should have been a straightforward acceptance of his nomination papers turned into a long waiting game as the authorities exerted significant pressure on the electoral body to find reason to disqualify his candidature, as was done to several other presidential hopefuls. Instead of complaining, he remained calm throughout this unnecessary attempt at electoral exclusion until the ECZ, hours later, reluctantly accepted his nomination. The fourth obstacle emerged soon after Mundubile became a presidential candidate. As soon as his campaign took off to a rapturous reception, the ECZ halted it, ordering that no one should conduct meetings that have not been sanctioned by the electoral body. The ECZ subsequently imposed a campaign schedule that required him to start in his strongest constituencies and end in the ruling party strongholds: Northwestern, Western, and Southern provinces. Any keen observer understood the motivation: to arrest whatever momentum his campaign would have built by the time he was arriving in the final three provinces where he was expected to draw the least crowds. To demonstrate their lack of impartiality, the ECZ decided against issuing any campaign schedule to Hichilema, treating him as President who can go wherever he wants rather than a presidential candidate who, like his rivals, was subject to the same rules. When thousands turned up at Mundubile's rallies in the first two provinces, the ruling party and the state employed violence in a bid to curtail his campaign activities and provoke a reaction that could be used as a pretext for arresting him. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, even as his campaign vehicles were extensively destroyed by ruling party thugs. The fifth obstacle is the scarce resources resulting in part from restrictions placed on Mundubile's capacity to mobilise financial resources for his campaign. Unable to leave the country, he turned to local businessmen for support but nearly all who tried to render a helping hand had their bank accounts frozen or faced threats and intimidation from the authorities. Others who were merely suspected to be sympathetic to him were arrested and kept in detention without charge (the earlier cited Valden Findlay is a good example here) or murdered in suspicious circumstances by unknown people (As I said, Stelios Sardanis had expressed concern about state-linked threats on his life before he was assassinated!). Instead of complaining, Mundubile quietly went about his work, successfully turning to crowdfunding to raise resources from ordinary citizens who, overlooking their own struggles, injected whatever little money they could afford into his campaign. The sixth obstacle is extremely limited media coverage. After his candidacy was confirmed, the state blocked any positive coverage of Mundubile in the publicly funded media and while the ruling party used financially rewarding ads to buy almost all the advertising space in the private media, that is in newspapers, television and radio stations. This was in addition to buying influencers and almost the entire music industry to endorse and support Hichilema. The objective of crowding Mundubile out of media coverage was to help nurture the false narrative that there is no opposition in Zambia. Instead of complaining that he is completely blacked out of coverage by the public media and has much of the private media arraigned against him, Mundubile quietly went about his work, regularly communicating with the public through his social media pages, public rallies, one radio station (Hot FM) and one television station (KBN) – the latter two suffering continued threats and intimidation from the state and ruling party for daring to carry his adverts. The seventh obstacle was the denial of permission for Mundubile to use the airspace for efficient campaign activities. At the start of his campaign, a known private charter company that should have flown him around the country approached the authorities on his behalf to seek clearance. Its application was however frustrated by the authorities who only said “those above” had denied it. Instead of complaining, Mundubile quietly went about his work. He undertook all his campaign activities across 116 districts and 10 provinces – minus the places he was unable to visit due to violent attacks from ruling party cadres – in less than 60 days using road travel. So grave was the threat of violence against Mundubile in Southern Province, what should have been his concluding stop, that he had to cancel his trip there and instead hold a virtual public rally, following credible intelligence reports that he was earmarked for assassination while in the province. The eighth obstacle has been the constant arrests and abduction of his campaign officials and even parliamentary candidates as well as high-level defections of his party functionaries to the ruling party following extremely attractive financial inducements. As stated earlier, his media team has been abducted and remains in unlawful detention. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work with remnants of his previously bigger campaign team. The ninth obstacle has been state-instigated baits to lure him into provocation. In Kitwe, his campaign team was attacked, but the attackers deliberately left behind the bus they had used to launch the attacks in the hope that he and his team would set it ablaze so that they could be arrested for arson and kept in detention. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, urging his team to exercise restraint and avoid any attempts at retaliation. In Lusaka, his campaign team was violently attacked. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, urging his team to exercise restraint and avoid any attempts at retaliation. In Solwezi, his campaign team was violently attacked. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, urging his team to exercise restraint and avoid any attempts at retaliation. In Luampa, Kalabo and Mongu, his campaign team was violently attacked by ruling party cadres and the police. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, urging his team to exercise restraint and avoid any attempts at retaliation. Had he accepted the bait, he could, by now, be in prison or six feet under the ground. The tenth obstacle has been the attempt by the state to undermine his vote protection measures. It is hard enough to go into an election that is administered by a largely compromised Electoral Commission of Zambia. Never before has the ECZ been led by a chairperson who is the incumbent president’s former personal lawyer; who, unlike all her predecessors who came from the judiciary and had a lucrative lifetime pension to fall back on in case of exit from office, knows that she will have no job if her former client loses the election tomorrow; and who has a daughter facing a no-bail murder charge that was revised to the less serious charge of manslaughter in unclear circumstances that many saw as a possible trade-off, linked to the election, between those in the executive and the accused’s mother. Amidst credible fears of vote manipulation, Mundubile managed under difficult circumstances to organise about seven million Kwacha for the payment of polling agents throughout the country. On 10 August, state agents grabbed all this money for no credible reason in a move that is clearly aimed at making it easier to bribe the polling agents and manipulate the vote, especially if, as some fear, the government will shut down the internet during the counting and employ violent thugs to remove opposition polling agents and election observers for the purpose of facilitating the swapping of the ballots or inflating the figures in support of the incumbent president in ruling party strongholds where turnout might be low. Instead of complaining, he has quietly gone about his work, believing that with the support of the people, there is little that the president can do to prevent his exit from power. Mundubile has proved his mettle. In essence, many people are supporting Mundubile in this election not because he is the best candidate but because he is the recipient of the revulsion against a president that many people see as primarily serving foreign commercial interests as well as his own private interests and those of his ethnic-regional community. Mundubile has become the figurehead of a growing movement that is determined to peacefully remove a dangerous president who, were he to succeed in stealing the vote, would set Zambia on an even more perilous path. I sincerely hope the Zambian people will turn out on Thursday to say “enough.” However, with a compromised ECZ, a police service that only arrests members of the opposition, a partisan leadership in charge of the country’s military, and an incumbent president with a character that knows no restraint, anything is possible after Thursday’s vote. Prepare for the worst, hope for the best. NB: The violence in the attached video clip shows what happens when soldiers, who are not trained to maintain law and order, are deployed to handle police functions, as Hichilema did in January this year when he asked them to "sort out" informal small scale miners in the country's North-Western Province. The pro-Hichilema army commander, Geoffrey Zyeele ,whose orders resulted in this barbaric violence after he directed soldiers "to exterminate and fumigate all illegal miners" remains in his position to date.
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Abductions, Enforced Disappearances, and Unlawful Detentions: Zambia's Descent into State Lawlessness By Sishuwa Sishuwa Zambia is on a knife-edge only several hours before voters head to the ballot box on 13 August to choose political leaders in a general election that might see Hakainde Hichilema becoming the latest casualty of the anti-incumbent election wave that has recently seen the defeat of sitting presidents in other African countries such as Botswana and Malawi. As i show in greater detail below, Hichilema is racing into the final days unfettered by any rules and willing to do anything he want to steal the results. People’s rights are being arbitrarily withdrawn. Abductions, enforced disappearances, unlawful detentions, and political violence instigated by the state and ruling party cadres have characterised the descent into state lawlessness ahead of Thursday’s election. Those on the receiving end are people who question authority or do much more than what is convenient as well as opposition officials, members, and supporters (perceived or real). The sight of anguished family members pleading to the state to disclose the whereabouts of their abducted loved ones has become very common in Lusaka. A special unit consisting of officers, from the Drug Enforcement Commission, the only body that has pre-signed search warrants, has been assembled to raid houses, arrest political opponents, and forcibly abduct opposition members or sympathisers. The script is the same: those abducted by armed state agents who move in motor vehicles without license plates, are usually taken to ‘safe houses’, not police stations, which makes it difficult for families to find their illegally detained relatives. Their phones and other electronic devices are confiscated, making it impossible to communicate with the abducted or know what has happened to them. This situation has left many people living in a state of fear and paralysis. In the last few days, I have spoken to civil society activists such as Brebner Changala, prominent personalities like Mulenga Kapwepwe, and at least 14 journalists who have all resigned themselves to any possibility. “We are just waiting for our turn. We do not know when we will be abducted and where we will be taken. When you are no longer able to reach us, just know that we have been taken”, one of them told me. The profile of those abducted is largely the same: opposition members and innocent people suspected to be supporting or financing Brian Mundubile, Hichilema’s main rival in the election. Nearly all of them are being arrested daily without following due process. Many of these people have been abducted from their homes or the street rather than being summoned to the police, charged, and either issued with bond or taken to court within the prescribed legal time-frame. Musa Mwenye, one of Zambia’s most outstanding citizens who, as Attorney General, defended the Constitution in 2014 when ministers wanted to overthrow it, captured the state of things in the country when he published the following observation on 10 August: “When people are held in detention beyond the reach of the courts, contrary to the law and due process, they are being held ‘extra judicially’. Further, when people are detained for their political activities and mobilization, they are ‘political detainees’. Do we have political detainees who are being held extra judicially in Zambia today? Sadly, the answer is yes. I never thought I would ever utter the words, ‘political detainee’ and ‘extra judicial detention’ in one sentence with regards to democratic Zambia, whose democratic credentials have been a beacon of good governance and the rule of law in Africa and beyond. In the past, when persons were detained for their political activities, the accused persons were subjected to due process in courts of law. We are now witnessing detentions without even the pretension of any court process, whatsoever. This is not who we are, and, it is certainly not what we should be known for. Zambia’s well-earned name in observance of human rights and our democratic credentials is in serious jeopardy. I appeal to the Government to release all political detainees who are being held extra judicially or to present them before courts of law for the due process of the law to take its course.” On the same day, Amnesty International released its latest report on the state of human rights in Zambia. Titled “Authoritarian practices eating away at human rights in Zambia: Escalating crackdown on human rights ahead of the 2026 general elections”, the mild but relatively critical report details how the Hichilema administration has presided over “an alarming regression into authoritarian practices that undermine human rights and participation in government”, leading to “a climate of fear and impunity”. To read Amnesty’s report, click here: A coalition of 11 civil society organisations has become the latest interest group to raise alarm about this deteriorating state of democracy. The civic bodies detailed major concerns that undermine the integrity of the electoral process. These include the restrictions on opposition mobilisation, the unequal treatment accorded to the competing contestants by state institutions, the use of public resources for partisan advantage, the unchecked electoral violence, and the late/unclear guidance on valid ballot marking. They further called on the electoral body to “act with visible impartiality”, on Hichilema to stop the “use state resources for partisan gain”, and on “the police [to] hold perpetrators of violence accountable – regardless of political affiliation”. Unfortunately, their call has come too late and is unlikely to meet positive reception from the authorities. As one of Hichilema's presidential aides regularly tells some of us, ‘You can cut my finger: HH is going nowhere. It is high time you started working with him.” Given that impunity and lawlessness appear to be Hichilema’s governing principles, it is easy to see where the aide’s confidence is coming from. Much of this “climate of fear and impunity” has been created by the authorities as part of a wider effort to save Hichilema from electoral defeat. The actual details behind the effort are as chilling as they are alarming. A prominent local businessman and one of my closet friends, Stelios Sardanis, was murdered on 9 August in his house a few days after he shared fears that his life was in danger because ‘they are accusing me of financing the opposition’. Masked men came from the bush, attacked him, and vanished in the same bush. Another prominent local businessman, Valden Findlay, has been in unlawful detention since 4 August without charge! Like many of those abducted, Findlay is being kept in a shipping container in Mwembeshi, not in any prison system, or police station. His crime? Suspicion that he is financing the opposition. Only last night, nearly the entire top leadership of Mundubile’s campaign committee was either abducted and taken to unknown places or ordered by the authorities to appear before the police today. Among the affected are Mundubile’s spokesperson George Chisanga, national campaign manager Japhen Mwakalombe, and senior presidential campaign official Sebastian Kopulande (abducted). A day earlier, Mundubile’s media team was abducted and taken to an unknown place. A week before that, on 27 July, Kennedy Kamba, the official in charge of vote protection in Mundubile’s party, was arrested. He remains in detention without charge. Meanwhile, 32 artists, journalists, and other senior officials in Mundubile’s campaign team were arrested in Western Province during a lawful and peaceful rally that police deliberately disrupted for no reason using tear gas canisters. The arrested were charged with minor offences such as conduct likely to cause breach of peace, but none of them have been given bond or taken to court and consequently remain in unlawful detention, over 600 kilometers away from their families. More opposition leaders, members and supporters are earmarked for arrest and abduction today, tomorrow, and perhaps beyond. The goal of these abductions, arrests and detentions is twofold: either provoke a reaction that Hichilema can use as a pretext to declare a state of emergency, suspend the Constitution, cancel the election, and arrest even more people, or deprive Mundubile of his core support team that can help prevent industrial scale vote-rigging in Thursday’s election. In my lifetime, I have watched the end of the one-party state, the reintroduction of multiparty democracy, the protection of presidential term limits, the defence of the constitution from executive-driven manipulation, the election of a Tonga to State House, and the repeated peaceful transitions of power enabled by a professional military that chose non-intervention whenever an incumbent was defeated. After this week’s election, I remain confident that I will be witness to an even more extraordinary national story: an opposition challenger who overcame enormous obstacles to win power at the first attempt, defeating a president who promoted regionalism, nurtured corruption, eroded democracy, increased poverty, and enabled multinational plunder of the country’s mineral wealth. I maintain that Hichilema will lose Thursday's election. Although the president is doing his desperate best to try to steal the vote, I am convinced that he is going, whether he likes it or not. In fact, his desperate antics reveal his fear even at this late hour. As I have said before, the only thing that can save Hichilema from defeat is reckless industrial scale vote-rigging or the pre-ballot death of his main rival. There are several factors that militate against the opposition in African politics, but the obstacles that have been placed in the path of Brian Mundubile are considerable. This is why I am saying his victory will be extraordinary, given the lengths to which Hichilema has gone to retain power. I have nothing personal against Hichilema. It is just that my professional training empowers me to see things that many others can only see after the event. As early as June 2023, I warned that Hichilema was so desperate to retain power that he had devised a five-point plan which, “if successfully implemented, risks undermining Zambia’s hard-won democracy”. I identified the plan as consisting of five objectives: containing the Catholic Church; co-opting influential elites from civil society; capturing the two formal institutions that are critical to the management of elections: the Electoral Commission of Zambia and the judiciary; weakening opposition parties; and covering corruption tracks. In the same article, I explained the three reasons behind Hichilema’s early desperation to secure a second term: fear of prosecution, the desire to avoid the embarrassment of losing power after just one term, and the push for a sectarian agenda aimed at entrenching his co-ethnic Tongas in state positions and grossly reducing the influence of the majority Bemba and Chewa ethnic groups in public life. At the time, few people understood what I was saying. Some said I just hated Hichilema, and not even reason-based evidence to the contrary changed their false perceptions. Others like Hichilema's fellow ethnic Tongas, led by Dr O’Brien Kaaba, a law lecturer at the University of Zambia, and Dr Priva Hang’andu, a Policy Advisor at the Canadian Institutes of Health Research (CIHR), rose to the President’s defence, dismissing my concerns about “shrinking democratic space, mounting corruption, political intolerance, and government desperation” as entirely unfounded. To read my 2023 article, click here: To read Kaaba and Hang’andu’s response in defence of their fellow Tonga, click here: Well, the passage of time has absolved me and given practical meaning to Thabo Mbeki’s observation that “Empty stomachs can be good or bad teachers. The problem with our African intellectuals is that they too have stomachs, in addition to their excellent brains.” For the sake of Zambia, I wish my 2023 concerns were wrong. I raised them then in the hope that Hichilema, who was elected on a ticket of democratic reform, could change for the better before it was too late. Unfortunately, his transition from a promising reform to a despot only got worse with time, as I showed two years later in another opinion piece published by the Mail & Guardian several months before Hichilema's State House team asked the newspaper's new editors to stop giving me platform. To read the article in which I examined how the fear of losing power and the financial and political benefits that come with it after only one term in office was evident in President Hichilema’s increasingly panicky and politically suicidal decisions, click here: The “authoritarian practices” and ‘escalating crackdown on human rights” that Amnesty International and others were to only to notice three years later could have been stopped much earlier if many voices had stood up to Hichilema before his autocratic aspirations were emboldened by their silence. The obstacles that Hichilema has placed in Mundubile’s path to power are illustrative of how the president has, over the last five years, repeatedly abused state institutions to systematically destroy organised political opposition and any semblance or vestige of autonomy in formal institutions outside the executive. There are many obstacles that Hichilema has placed in Mundubile’s path, but I will highlight only 10 here to illustrate the point that the leading opposition challenger has had so many domestic and foreign forces working against him in this election that it is extraordinary that he has made it a competitive contest. The first obstacle was the limitation placed on Mundubile's international travel. When he tried to leave the country to mobilise resources for his presidential bid, the state blocked him. He was arrested at the airport, charged with a cyber-related offence, and had all his travel documents and phones confiscated. The latter action means that he has not been able to leave Zambia since March this year as his passport remains with the state. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work. The second obstacle was the restriction on the political party ticket that Mundubile could use to run in the election. After the state instigated divisions in all parties that were perceived as capable of serving as possible vehicles for the expression of his presidential ambition, including the main opposition Patriotic Front (PF) to which he belonged, another opposition party, namely the Forum for Democracy and Development (FDD) offered him a platform. However, the state quickly moved in and, as it had done to other parties, factionalised the FDD to prevent him from running on it. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, ultimately finding a home in the little-known National Reconciliation Party for Unity and Prosperity (NRPUP) on the eve of nominations. The third obstacle was mere appearance on the ballot. After Mundubile formally presented his credentials to the officials of the Electoral Commission of Zambia (ECZ), what should have been a straightforward acceptance of his nomination papers turned into a long waiting game as the authorities exerted significant pressure on the electoral body to find reason to disqualify his candidature, as was done to several other presidential hopefuls. Instead of complaining, he remained calm throughout this unnecessary attempt at electoral exclusion until the ECZ, hours later, reluctantly accepted his nomination. The fourth obstacle emerged soon after Mundubile became a presidential candidate. As soon as his campaign took off to a rapturous reception, the ECZ halted it, ordering that no one should conduct meetings that have not been sanctioned by the electoral body. The ECZ subsequently imposed a campaign schedule that required him to start in his strongest constituencies and end in the ruling party strongholds: Northwestern, Western, and Southern provinces. Any keen observer understood the motivation: to arrest whatever momentum his campaign would have built by the time he was arriving in the final three provinces where he was expected to draw the least crowds. To demonstrate their lack of impartiality, the ECZ decided against issuing any campaign schedule to Hichilema, treating him as President who can go wherever he wants rather than a presidential candidate who, like his rivals, was subject to the same rules. When thousands turned up at Mundubile's rallies in the first two provinces, the ruling party and the state employed violence in a bid to curtail his campaign activities and provoke a reaction that could be used as a pretext for arresting him. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, even as his campaign vehicles were extensively destroyed by ruling party thugs. The fifth obstacle is the scarce resources resulting in part from restrictions placed on Mundubile's capacity to mobilise financial resources for his campaign. Unable to leave the country, he turned to local businessmen for support but nearly all who tried to render a helping hand had their bank accounts frozen or faced threats and intimidation from the authorities. Others who were merely suspected to be sympathetic to him were arrested and kept in detention without charge (the earlier cited Valden Findlay is a good example here) or murdered in suspicious circumstances by unknown people (As I said, Stelios Sardanis had expressed concern about state-linked threats on his life before he was assassinated!). Instead of complaining, Mundubile quietly went about his work, successfully turning to crowdfunding to raise resources from ordinary citizens who, overlooking their own struggles, injected whatever little money they could afford into his campaign. The sixth obstacle is extremely limited media coverage. After his candidacy was confirmed, the state blocked any positive coverage of Mundubile in the publicly funded media and while the ruling party used financially rewarding ads to buy almost all the advertising space in the private media, that is in newspapers, television and radio stations. This was in addition to buying influencers and almost the entire music industry to endorse and support Hichilema. The objective of crowding Mundubile out of media coverage was to help nurture the false narrative that there is no opposition in Zambia. Instead of complaining that he is completely blacked out of coverage by the public media and has much of the private media arraigned against him, Mundubile quietly went about his work, regularly communicating with the public through his social media pages, public rallies, one radio station (Hot FM) and one television station (KBN) – the latter two suffering continued threats and intimidation from the state and ruling party for daring to carry his adverts. The seventh obstacle was the denial of permission for Mundubile to use the airspace for efficient campaign activities. At the start of his campaign, a known private charter company that should have flown him around the country approached the authorities on his behalf to seek clearance. Its application was however frustrated by the authorities who only said “those above” had denied it. Instead of complaining, Mundubile quietly went about his work. He undertook all his campaign activities across 116 districts and 10 provinces – minus the places he was unable to visit due to violent attacks from ruling party cadres – in less than 60 days using road travel. So grave was the threat of violence against Mundubile in Southern Province, what should have been his concluding stop, that he had to cancel his trip there and instead hold a virtual public rally, following credible intelligence reports that he was earmarked for assassination while in the province. The eighth obstacle has been the constant arrests and abduction of his campaign officials and even parliamentary candidates as well as high-level defections of his party functionaries to the ruling party following extremely attractive financial inducements. As stated earlier, his media team has been abducted and remains in unlawful detention. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work with remnants of his previously bigger campaign team. The ninth obstacle has been state-instigated baits to lure him into provocation. In Kitwe, his campaign team was attacked, but the attackers deliberately left behind the bus they had used to launch the attacks in the hope that he and his team would set it ablaze so that they could be arrested for arson and kept in detention. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, urging his team to exercise restraint and avoid any attempts at retaliation. In Lusaka, his campaign team was violently attacked. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, urging his team to exercise restraint and avoid any attempts at retaliation. In Solwezi, his campaign team was violently attacked. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, urging his team to exercise restraint and avoid any attempts at retaliation. In Luampa, Kalabo and Mongu, his campaign team was violently attacked by ruling party cadres and the police. Instead of complaining, he quietly went about his work, urging his team to exercise restraint and avoid any attempts at retaliation. Had he accepted the bait, he could, by now, be in prison or six feet under the ground. The tenth obstacle has been the attempt by the state to undermine his vote protection measures. It is hard enough to go into an election that is administered by a largely compromised Electoral Commission of Zambia. Never before has the ECZ been led by a chairperson who is the incumbent president’s former personal lawyer; who, unlike all her predecessors who came from the judiciary and had a lucrative lifetime pension to fall back on in case of exit from office, knows that she will have no job if her former client loses the election tomorrow; and who has a daughter facing a no-bail murder charge that was revised to the less serious charge of manslaughter in unclear circumstances that many saw as a possible trade-off, linked to the election, between those in the executive and the accused’s mother. Amidst credible fears of vote manipulation, Mundubile managed under difficult circumstances to organise about seven million Kwacha for the payment of polling agents throughout the country. On 10 August, state agents grabbed all this money for no credible reason in a move that is clearly aimed at making it easier to bribe the polling agents and manipulate the vote, especially if, as some fear, the government will shut down the internet during the counting and employ violent thugs to remove opposition polling agents and election observers for the purpose of facilitating the swapping of the ballots or inflating the figures in support of the incumbent president in ruling party strongholds where turnout might be low. Instead of complaining, he has quietly gone about his work, believing that with the support of the people, there is little that the president can do to prevent his exit from power. Mundubile has proved his mettle. In essence, many people are supporting Mundubile in this election not because he is the best candidate but because he is the recipient of the revulsion against a president that many people see as primarily serving foreign commercial interests as well as his own private interests and those of his ethnic-regional community. Mundubile has become the figurehead of a growing movement that is determined to peacefully remove a dangerous president who, were he to succeed in stealing the vote, would set Zambia on an even more perilous path. I sincerely hope the Zambian people will turn out on Thursday to say “enough.” However, with a compromised ECZ, a police service that only arrests members of the opposition, a partisan leadership in charge of the country’s military, and an incumbent president with a character that knows no restraint, anything is possible after Thursday’s vote. Prepare for the worst, hope for the best. NB: The violence in the attached video clip shows what happens when soldiers, who are not trained to maintain law and order, are deployed to handle police functions, as Hichilema did in January this year when he asked them to "sort out" informal small scale miners in the country's North-Western Province. The pro-Hichilema army commander, Geoffrey Zyeele ,whose orders resulted in this barbaric violence after he directed soldiers "to exterminate and fumigate all illegal miners" remains in his position to date.

Sishuwa Sishuwa

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"You just hate Hichilema": The dramatic fall of Zambia's president By Sishuwa Sishuwa Hakainde Hichilema stood in the queue to becoming President of Zambia for 15 years before voters finally removed him from it in August 2021. This demonstrates how badly the man wanted this job. But it has taken him only five years in office to display his unfitness for the role. When it comes to the bigger national issues, such as safeguarding our cherished democracy, getting the best out of Zambia’s mineral wealth, respecting the constitution and the rule of law, fighting corruption beyond rhetoric, genuine promotion of national unity and equitable distribution of appointments to public service positions, sorting out the cost-of-living crisis and the deplorable conditions of life for most Zambians, Hichilema has lamentably failed. In fact, I would go as far as saying that the President has become a clear and present danger to Zambia’s economy, to our democracy, our constitutional order, our nationhood and its 'One Zambia Nation' foundation, and to the lives of ordinary Zambians. Voting Hichilema out of office will be the highest expression of patriotism. As I have previously stated, I am convinced that Hichilema will lose the election on 13 August. The only thing that can save him from defeat is pre-ballot death (of any candidate) or industrial scale vote-rigging. I really hope that we Zambians will never again elect a lying, tribal, corrupt, unpatriotic, vindictive, hypocritical, lawless, and undemocratic scumbag. In addition to his policy failures on major issues of public concern, one reason why Hichilema is losing the election (unless he rigs it on an industrial scale) is because of having extremist supporters, mostly Zambezi supremacists, who dismiss legitimate criticism of his leadership actions as hate speech and consequently enable his continued failure to be receptive to criticism, to reflect on the feedback provided by the governed, and to change for the better. When citizens (be it the Catholic Bishops, opposition parties, civic actors, or ordinary Zambians like me) raise governance concerns, they do so in the spirit of accountable democratic governance. They do not do so because they hate the president as a person, hate his ethnic identity, or hate where he was born. I insist that a better Zambia is possible but we won’t get it if we treat criticism of presidential leadership failure as expression of hate. Unfortunately, even Hichilema himself has embraced this warped thinking that any criticism of his leadership actions is hate speech. This attitude has deprived him of the much needed feedback on his leadership performance and capacity to listen to divergent views, consequently impoverishing his presidency. We must embrace the unfamiliar, eschew haste in passing judgement, and be more tolerant and understanding. These qualities are especially essential to those in public leadership roles. I once raised concern that we seem to have prepared different standards for this president compared to those who came before him. If a leader can only provide five hours of electricity to the people in a day, they have failed. If a leader can only increase the cost of living, they have failed. If a leader…I can go on. In addition to denying the president the benefit of legitimate public feedback on his performance, misconstruing criticism as hate makes it look like the responsibility of holding our public leaders to account falls on those who either love him or hail from the region where the president does not come from. If his supporters and Tongas, Lozis and Zambians from Northwestern Province join in calling out the wrongs of Hichilema, he will no longer play the tribal card of reducing all criticism of his leadership to ethnic hatred. In the uncritical minds of some of the president's supporters, I criticise Hichilema because I hate him! Most of the individuals who hold this view are people who repeatedly criticise me on this platform, even when their criticism is quite often devoid of reason or substance. I do not think those who criticise me do so because they hate me. I think they criticise me, even if I hold no elected public office, simply because they have a different take, different opinions, on things. Why is it so hard to apply the same logic to my criticism of an elected public leader like Hichilema who is accountable to us, the public? I have been providing regular political commentaries on Zambian affairs since 2009. Why was my much stronger criticism of Hichilema's predecessors, namely Rupiah Banda, Michael Sata, and Edgar Lungu, not considered hatred of these individual leaders? In fact, many of the individuals who today accuse me of harbouring hatred for Hichilema were people who were very happy with my much stinging criticism of the leadership failures of his predecessors. When I called Sata a tribalist and undemocratic leader who did not listen to advise, and provided evidence in support of my conclusions, they were happy to cheer me on, even as Sata's supporters said I was bitter and a Hichilema supporter. When I called Lungu a tribalist and corrupt leader, and provided evidence in support of my conclusions, they were happy to cheer me on, even as Lungu's supporters said I was bitter and petitioned the police to arrest me for sedition. Some of Hichilema's supporters, as part of the enjoyment of their exercise of the right to free expression, even insult me, call me names, or outrightly declare that they dislike me. Of course I would prefer content-based discussion, but if the best that anyone's mind can do is to insult me, I will consider their actions as part of the right to free expression. I recognise that people have the right to dislike me, to call me names, to wish me whatever they desire, to feel however they want about me. I have no problem with all this. I do not speak to be liked or secure the validation of anyone. I speak to express myself and I respect the right of other people to do the same. As I have repeatedly stated, free speech is not just for the people or thoughts we like or agree with; it is also for people we despise and opinions that we do not support. The important point is not the position I take on a given issue of public interest. It is the reasoning advanced in support of said position. If I say Hichilema is a lying, tribal, corrupt, unpatriotic, vindictive, hypocritical, lawless, and undemocratic scumbag, what is important is not simply this description; it is the reasons and evidence I have adduced in support of this conclusion. Anyone is welcome to challenge my conclusions or evidence, to say "I disagree with your argument for this and that reason." What I totally reject is the idea that criticism of a president's leadership actions amounts to hate; it does not. If I point out that Hichilema is failing to ensure adequate ethnic diversity in public appointments and provide evidence in support of this assertion, anybody else is welcome to demonstrate weakness in my stated point of view. If I point out that Hichilema is a compulsive liar and provide evidence in support of this assertion, anybody else is welcome to demonstrate weakness in my stated point of view. If I point out that Hichilema’s fight against corruption is a sham and provide evidence in support of this assertion, anybody else is welcome to demonstrate weakness in my stated point of view. If I point out that Hichilema is a compulsive liar and provide evidence in support of this assertion, anybody else is welcome to demonstrate weakness in my stated point of view. If I point out that Hichilema has eroded Zambia’s democracy and provide evidence in support of this assertion, anybody else is welcome to demonstrate weakness in my stated point of view. If I point out that Hichilema has failed to reduce the cost of living, as per his campaign promise, and provide evidence in support of this assertion, anybody else is welcome to demonstrate weakness in my stated point of view. If I point out that Hichilema (working in cohort with his friend Situmbeko Musokotwane) has facilitated the extraction of the country’s mineral wealth by multinational corporations without ensuring sufficient returns in revenue collection for Zambia and provide evidence in support of this assertion, anybody else is welcome to demonstrate weakness in my stated point of view. If I point out that Hichilema has failed to…and provide evidence in support of this assertion, anybody else is welcome to demonstrate weakness in my stated point of view. Simply dismissing my criticism as an expression of my alleged hatred for Hichilema is most unhelpful. Those who do so are depriving me the opportunity to learn what I do not know and Hichilema the opportunity to adjust his leadership style and change for the better. While I do not hesitate to share my opinions on matters of public concern, I also retain the intellectual integrity of one who is willing to abandon their point of view if its weakness can be shown. I have repeatedly stated that I harbour no hatred against Hichilema. What I hate is his bad leadership, whose meaning I have explained in the article below. There is no constitutional democracy in the world that requires citizens to love their elected leaders. Loving individuals is the responsibility of their spouses and family members. Once these individuals step up to hold elective public office, we owe them one thing: accountability or feedback on their performance. No elected public leader or their supporter should burden me or another person with any demand for affirmation or affection. In a functioning democracy, the duty of citizens is to hold their elected leaders to account so that they deliver basic services and do not undermine accountable democratic governance. This is what I have been doing across different administrations, including this one. As early as December 2021, when I analysed Hichilma's first 100 days in office, I raised governance concerns of his leadership in the hope that he could address them so that they do not grow into bigger problems. He did not listen. In 2022, when he was celebrating one year in office, I raised governance concerns of his leadership in the hope that he could address them so that they do not grow into bigger problems. He did not listen. In 2023, I raised governance concerns of his leadership in the hope that he could address them so that they do not grow into bigger problems. He did not listen. In 2024, I raised governance concerns of his leadership in the hope that he could address them so that they do not grow into bigger problems. He did not listen. In fact, as did his predecessor in 2021 in response to my criticism of the abuse of state institutions to fix critics and opponents, the president asked his supporters to report me to the police for alleged hate speech against him! In 2025, I raised governance concerns of his leadership in the hope that he could address them so that they do not grow into bigger problems. He did not listen. This year and for the many reasons that I shared in the interview on the link below, Hichilema is losing the election because he did not listen to criticism that we, as citizens, raised about his performance. He is also losing the election because of his extremist supporters who, in addition to a wilful but harmful failure to hold him to account, dismiss legitimate criticism of his leadership from other people as hate speech. What a pity! What a wasted opportunity! I have just read a story on a ruling party platform casually dismissing Global Witness's report that "Ahead of Zambia's general election...First Quantum Minerals and its associates have been running a decades-long covert influence campaign distorting the copper-rich nation's democracy" and that the Canadian firm has "become his [Hichilema's] largest funder in the upcoming 2026 election after pledging up to $50 million in support." The report adds that "FQM has reaped enormous benefits: major changes to Zambia's tax regime have save the company $771 million between 2022 and 2025, and it has been shielded from legal scrutiny." Rather than interrogating these grave concerns, the publisher, the Zambian Watchdog which is run from State House, is treating the issue so casually when Global Witness, a very credible international outlet, raises serious corruption and governance allegations. In January 2019, I raised questions about Hichilema's relationship with foreign mining firms, but was told by his supporters that I just hate him. Today, we are ere. The net result is that Hichilema, who in opposition politics had positioned himself as the reformist leader Zambia needed to reclaim its democracy, eliminate corruption, unite the country, and set it on the path to economic recovery, has, in power, turned out to be nearly everything he detested about his predecessor and, in some cases, much worse. Under his watch, corruption has thrived on a massive scale, the economy is a shambles, ethnic divisions have worsened, Zambia’s previously principled foreign policy has been shredded into something unrecognisable, and democracy is essentially non-existent. The man who was expected to lead reform has instead transitioned into an aspiring despot. Unless he rigs the election, or eliminates his main rival, Zambians should prepare for a new administration after 13 August. Many voters have reached a point of no return and it is too late for Hichilema to change their mind. A combination of failure to listen and the "you just hate Hichilema" brigade has destroyed his once promising presidency. I see many people expressing surprise at the huge turnout at Brian Mundubile's rallies. What they miss is that the turnout reflects the revulsion against Hichilema rather than genuine support for Brian. Even if Brian was not there, voters would have rallied behind another candidate through which to express their opposition to Hichilema as a result of his major policy failures. As early as 2023, wen I noticed Hichilema's direction of travel, I warned that the greatest opposition that he and the UPND face is a politically alert and informed citizenry, not an opposition party: “The biggest opposition that Hichilema faces is the people, particularly if he fails to lower the cost of living and tackle the huge unemployment outside the health and education sectors. They can stop opposition rallies like Edgar Lungu and the PF tried to do but if Zambians would have decided in a year or two that Hichilema must go at the next election, there is nothing that he can do to stop them....Even if Hichilema tries to, he cannot stop the people’s will. Even if he succeeds in killing the PF and in his manoeuvres to block his main political opponents from running in 2026, another platform and another candidate to serve as the outlet of opposition will be found. The voters will support any visionary patriot they see as better placed to be used as the vehicle for removing Hichilema just like they chose him as the vehicle for removing Lungu. Please tell him”. Hichilema did not listen. Again. This continued failure to listen prompted my conclusion two years later that "Many Zambians may not know yet who they will vote for in the 2026 presidential election, but they already know who they won’t vote for." The truth is that I tried to warn Hichilema in good time and at different points that he was heading in the wrong direction. The President, dripping with arrogance, did not listen. Think of it this way. A bus (representing a political party in power) is transporting passengers (active citizens) from Intercity terminus (2021, being the departure point of where we did not want to be anymore) to Nakonde (2026, being the arrival point of destination before subsequently deciding whether to book the same bus for the return trip). After leaving Intercity, some passengers notice that the bus is heading towards Livingstone (a wrong destination that takes us back to before 2021). A few of us (active citizens) decide to stand up (holding the leader to account) and confront both the driver (the president) and his conductor (Minister of Finance), demanding an explanation for why we are heading to Livingstone when we were promised that we woud be taken to Nakonde. Other passengers, mainly those who came from the ethnic group of the driver and conductor, defended the duo even before it could respond to our concerns. They repeatedly told us that "You just hate the driver. Please sit down!" One or two relatives of the conductor joined in support, saying the "The driver and the conductor are excellent and one of them has even won awards for stellar performance on his duties, including his remarkable capacity to understand direction of travel"! That is how some passengers kept quiet. I kept on talking, especially after we reached Choma in the hope that if we turned atthat point, we woudl not wast more time. I talked because I could not get off the bus at undesigned stations, so the only solution was to appeal to the driver to change course. I explained that it would be an act of extreme irresponsibility on my part as an active passenger to wait until the bus has reached Livingstone before holding the driver to account about the direction of travel. That is why I tried to warn the driver that we were headed in the wrong direction. Unfortunately, other passengers said we should just sit back comfortably, enjoy the ride which included some morsels of food delivered by the bus, and trust the driver because other drivers before him were much worse. In the end, we arrived in Livingstone, our undesired destination. Just when we were arriving, we saw another bus, loading passing from there directly to Nakonde. The driver, upon realising the cost of his failure to listen and the disappointment in the eyes of the passengers, urged everyone to sit down, promising that he would take us to Nakonde if we give him more time. With the exception of those who came from the driver's ethnic group and the auxiliary ones, most passengers, who had shown great faith in his driving skills by paying (voting) the fare for the bus as their mode of transport from Intercity to Nakonde, have left the bus for the other. These include those who had adopted silence during the journey after realising that the driver, aided by the choir mentioned, was not a listening kind. As I write this post, the alternative bus is almost full. The same passengers who accused those of us who, along the way, advised the driver to change course, of harbouring hatred for the driver are now wondering why nearly everyone is leaving the bus we came with for an alternative one that is promising to take us directly to Nakonde. One of the driver's supporters, reiterating the driver's earlier appeal that we should stick to the bus that brought us to Livingstone, just shouted at us a moment ago: "The alternative bus will take you to a wrong destination. Its driver cannot be trusted; just stick to this one because you won't have to pay a new fare". The supporter is overlooking the point that we are already at a wrong destination, the current driver has betrayed our trust, and that we would rather repose our trust in another person. It is not good to remain on a bus, driven by a person who does not listen, out of the fear that an alternative one might be driven by someone who could be worse. Let us try the alternative bus. If its driver takes us to a wrong destination, we will disembark from the bus we are about to jump onto, as we have done before, and find another one until we reach Nakonde. For me and other active passengers, such has been the the current driver's betrayal of our trust that we have reached a point of no return. We cannot trust this driver anymore, especially that when we tried to correct him, no one explained to us why our concerns were unfounded. We were just told that we hate hate the driver or his ethic group or or the province where he comes from. Recently, Dr Lee Habasonda, a lecturer in political science at the University of Zambia, told Reuters (watch the video clip on the link below) that electoral success is a matter of thresholds – of grievances, feelings, frustrations, etc. Lee’s view is that once a certain threshold or tipping point has been reached, "no matter your manifesto, ideology, lies" or whatever those in power do or say, the voters will "decide to change government" because they would have reached a point of no return. Emotionally, many Zambian voters, including some that I know who voted for Hichilema in 2021, have passed that threshold where no matter what Hichilema or UPND does, these voters will reject him. This is because the threshold, or the point of no return, has been reached. As Lee argued, those in power "may say we have already won this election when they campaign but the political coalitions and realignment" suggest otherwise. When the opposition wins next month, we will need to advise them to get non-sycophants at State House and in the critical posts in the civil service. It is important that they understand that unless there is a clear shift away from the harmful culture we have raised concerns about, we will be compelled to challenge them with the same resolve we previously applied to both the PF and UPND governments. On my part, I promise that I will always be on the side of the people. You will not find me in government even after the election. Once Hichilema is out of office, I will leave him alone and my attention will shift to holding to account the next set of public leaders. As I made clear in 2021, I am content serving as an academic and I will work, as part of my civic duty, to hold the new Government to account as I did with previous Governments. I am not available for or interested in any form of government job. For now, Iet me continue listening to the attached song. Chalo chesu.

Sishuwa Sishuwa

32,874 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

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Churches, protests, and bribes: Hichilema’s triple power play to secure Edgar Lungu’s body By Sishuwa Sishuwa So committed to telling lies is President Hakainde Hichilema that he seemingly either cannot help himself or experiences a “high” when deceiving others. I know that politicians are generally perceived to be liars, but such is Hichilema’s uncontrollable urge to lie, often compulsively and without any apparent reason or benefit, that one can be forgiven for thinking that delivering lies was one of his major campaign promises in the last general election. In countries with robust oversight institutions, the President would have already been subjected to a thorough evaluation by professional experts to determine if he has pseudologia fantastica, also known as mythomania – a condition in which individuals frequently tell lies, often for no clear reason. The latest in the long running series of the President’s constant deviation from the truth occurred on 17 July 2025 when he told journalists that his administration is “quietly” holding negotiations with the family of late former president Edgar Lungu aimed at resolving the impasse between the two parties regarding Lungu’s burial. This is the second time in the preceding two weeks alone that Hichilema has made this claim. The first was on 9 July when he met US Ambassador to Zambia Michael Gonzales at State House. On both occasions, the President has been untruthful. I have spoken with the Lungu family, and they have confirmed that there have been no discussions whatsoever between the two parties since Hichilema's administration initiated the court case that stopped Lungu's burial nearly a month ago, on 24 June 2025. Why then does the President keep telling lies on this matter? What prevents him from telling the truth even on straightforward issues where his lies can more easily be uncovered? In search of answers, I reached out to different sources in government and at State House for insights. The sources, who spoke to me on condition of anonymity and provided irrefutable evidence in support of their insights, revealed that the President, fearful that the Pretoria High Court might rule against the Zambian government because the South African law is on the side of a deceased’s family, has devised a strategy consisting of three elements aimed at preventing this outcome and securing the elusive access to his predecessor’s body. The first element of this plan is to persuade the influential Catholic Church to release a statement urging the Lungu family to agree to a mediated settlement that would allow the former president to be buried in Zambia. While some religious and civic groups have already been pressured to make similar appeals, the Zambia Conference of Catholic Bishops (ZCCB) has not yet done so. Hichilema believes that a statement from the ZCCB would carry more weight. To achieve this goal, the President sent a four-member, high-ranking government delegation to meet with the ZCCB in Lusaka on 18 July 2025. The presidential delegation, consisting of Minister of Defence Ambrose Lufuma, Minister of Home Affairs and Internal Security Jack Mwiimbu, Minister of Community Development and Social Services Doreen Mwamba, and Special Assistant to the President for Legal Affairs Christopher Mundia – all practising Catholics – met with three representatives of the ZCCB, namely Ignatius Chama (Archbishop of the Archdiocese of Kasama and President of ZCCB), George Lungu (Bishop of Catholic Diocese of Chipata), and Valentine Kalumba (Bishop of the Catholic Diocese of Livingstone). During the meeting, Hichilema's representatives expressed concern that the Catholic Church had not issued a statement on the impasse between his administration and the Lungu family. Embracing the pathological lying disposition of their boss, the delegation also mentioned that negotiations between the State and the Lungu family were progressing, and the government hoped the Catholic Church would participate in the discussions. One or two members of Hichilema’s delegation in the meeting reportedly said: “since Archbishop Alick Banda appears to be close to the Lungu family, how can we get him to intervene in this matter and help us?” To be clear, Banda is the Archbishop in charge of Lusaka Archdiocese whom the ruling party has previously called a “thief”, the “Lucifer of Zambia”, and a man with no credibility. In addition, the Catholic Church has itself been the subject of regular attacks and harassment from both State actors and ruling party officials. In response, the Bishops explained that they have stayed away from the matter because they do not have sufficient knowledge of the underlying facts and only comment on issues they fully understand. The Bishops also expressed hope that the issue would be resolved conclusively since it is now before a competent authority – the South African High Court. Given the despicable attacks that Hichilema’s administration has repeatedly unleashed on both Archbishop Banda and the Catholic Church in general, and in the absence of any public apology or atonement for this State harassment, it was unlikely that the Bishops would be deceived. However, one cannot blame Hichilema for trying his luck. The timing of this State-orchestrated meeting with representatives of the ZCCB was not coincidental. For much of this week, the Catholic Bishops have been meeting in Lusaka to, among other things, look at various issues affecting the membership of the church and the nation. Such meetings usually culminate in the release of a pastoral letter that is read out in parishes across the country. The sources disclosed that Hichilema’s fear is that a rebuke from the ZCCB on how his administration has handled Lungu’s funeral would be politically damaging, especially when one considers the other two elements of the strategy that the President has devised to secure access to his predecessor’s body. In dispatching his officials to meet the Catholic Bishops, Hichilema is not only lobbying the influential religious organisation to publicly support his cause based on the false impression that negotiations with the Lungu family have reached an advanced stage; he is also seeking to pre-empt the ZCCB’s possible criticism of his failure to provide leadership on a matter that has seen him use taxpayers’ money to sue a grieving family and halt a funeral that was underway. The second element of Hichilema’s strategy is to carefully orchestrate State-financed public protests in Lusaka, on the Copperbelt, in Eastern Province (Lungu's home area) and in other parts of Zambia to create the false impression of widespread public outrage against the decision by the Lungu family to lay the former president to rest in South Africa. The sources revealed that Hichilema has already set this plan in motion and is closely working with Robert Chabinga, a renegade member of parliament belonging to the main opposition Patriotic Front (PF) party. Chabinga, who is guarded by State police, is the MP that Hichilema’s administration – using the office of the Registrar of Societies which falls under Mwiimbu’s ministry – has installed as the government-recognised leader of the PF in the absence of an election. He has also been installed as Leader of the Opposition in Parliament by the Speaker of the National Assembly, Nelly Mutti, Hichilema’s former personal lawyer, though he was elected by no one. According to insiders, Hichilema had initially wanted Chabinga to join the court case in South Africa as Leader of the Opposition. After the President received advice against the move, he and his allies then hatched the plan to organise “mass public protests” across the country by placard-carrying ruling party supporters masquerading as PF members and Zambian nationalists demanding the return of Lungu’s remains so that he could be buried at home. The objective of these demonstrations would be to manufacture evidence of popular anger against the Lungu family's position, fabricate visible proof of “public interest” in Lungu’s funeral, and create the pretext that the government hopes it can use to persuade the South African judge to rule in its favour. These acts of “nationalism” would not be as they would seem, however. What would appear to be spontaneous demonstrations of widespread outrage would be carefully orchestrated by Hichilema as part of his power play to wrestle Lungu from exile in death and bolster his beleaguered presidency. For Chabinga, who remains at the helm of Zambia’s main opposition party because of the complicit role of the judiciary, delivering on this presidential aspiration would cement his State-backed illegal leadership of the PF and reduce the political costs that might befall Hichilema in next year’s election should Lungu be buried abroad. The third and final element of Hichilema’s strategy is to attempt to bribe the South African judge who is handling the legal case between the Zambian government and the Lungu family. Hichilema and his allies have resigned themselves to the possibility of losing the case. In private conversations, they admit that the law in South Africa favours the Lungu family and that if the Pretoria Court is allowed to decide the case based on the facts and law, the Zambian government is likely to lose. To avoid this almost certain outcome, Hichilema and his supporters have considered the option of bribing the judge presiding over the case. There is no evidence yet that an approach has been made, but Chabinga, who was recently in South Africa on a State-facilitated trip, has privately expressed confidence that the judge might be amenable to bribery. "The judge needs to eat", Chabinga was heard saying. If the planned mass demonstrations are successful, Hichilema's proxy added, "the judge will make a ruling based on the public outcry in Zambia...to support the Attorney General". The renegade PF MP further conceded that there is "a possibility that the judge can rule in favour of the Lungu family because the laws of South Africa give too much power to a deceased's family than to the government". He however reiterated his belief that if the judge is "pressured", aided with cooked up public protests, and made to "consider the fact that Lungu was a former president", the judicial official can rule in favour of the Zambian government. Chabinga and his backers know that attempting to bribe, in any way, a judge of a foreign country would be a major scandal that could adversely affect diplomatic relations between Zambia and South Africa. However, they seem determined to try their luck at implementing what Chabinga, in private conversations, calls a "special operation". Earlier, Chabinga had complained to his associates that he had been woken up by Hichilema at an ungodly hour to undertake, at short notice, the trip to Johannesburg but felt the need to sacrifice for the man he calls "ba boss". After briefing him about Hichilema's agenda for the "special operation", State actors had originally hoped to book Chabinga a seat on the first flight out of Lusaka, but he ended up traveling on a 10am Airlink flight. This followed a discovery that there were many prominent PF members on the earlier flight also traveling to South Africa. Ironically, even on the 10am flight, Hichilema's representative met several PF prominent figures such as Chanda Katotobwe, Nakiwe Simpungwe, and Christopher Shakafuswa who all greeted him and to whom he lied that he was traveling to Cape Town. It is important to clarify that the confidence of Hichilema's team that the affected judge might be open to bribery does not come from any personal knowledge of the justice handling the legal case. Rather, and as one of the sources stated, it stems from the knowledge that they have done similar things with some Zambian judges, particularly on matters involving the resolution of PF leadership wrangles, and got away with it. In private, Chabinga, for instance, acknowledges that a questionable judgement by the Pretoria High Court in favour of the Zambian government is likely to be reversed on appeal by a superior court. Nevertheless, the President's proxy is optimistic that the Lungu family will become fatigued by the time the verdict is delivered and ultimately consent to the return of the former president's body to Zambia rather than pursuing an appeal in the event of a dubious loss. The unfolding saga surrounding the burial of former president Lungu reveals more than a mere dispute over a final resting place. It exposes the depths to which political ambition can drive deception, manipulation, and ethical compromise. President Hichilema’s persistent falsehoods about negotiations, the planned orchestration of State-sponsored protests, and the alarming prospect of judicial bribery involving a foreign judge paint a troubling picture of governance undermined by desperation and duplicity. This strategy not only disrespects a grieving family but also erodes public trust in the institutions meant to uphold justice and truth. What began as a matter of state dignity and national closure has morphed into a volatile mix of political manoeuvring, public mobilisation, and devious ecclesiastical diplomacy. President Hichilema’s reported three-pronged strategy — courting the Catholic Church, rallying public protests, and attempting to sway a foreign court — suggests that the battle over Lungu’s body is about far more than burial rights. It is a symbolic struggle for control over Zambia’s political memory and moral authority. Whether these efforts succeed or backfire, they highlight a deeper crisis: the lingering divisions of Zambia’s political landscape and the extent to which historical rivals still cast long shadows over the present. In life and now in death, Lungu continues to provoke conflict, and President Hichilema appears determined to ensure that even in the afterlife, the final word belongs not to the Lungu family but to Hichilema himself. In a country that is yearning for transparency and integrity, such actions as the ones initiated by Hichilema highlight the urgent need for accountability at the highest levels of leadership. The true cost of this political theatre extends beyond the burial dispute; it threatens the moral fabric of Zambia itself. As citizens, observers, and custodians of democracy, we must demand honesty, respect for due process, and, above all, compassion in honouring – both in life and in death – those who have served the nation. No amount of spin or scheming can bury the truth forever. The nation watches and waits.

Sishuwa Sishuwa

69,112 просмотров • 1 год назад

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Hello Mr Hichilema! You must be pleased to have another prominent critic of your poor leadership gone. You are very fortunate sir: death keeps taking away your most prominent critics - Edith Nawakwi, Edgar Lungu and now the retired Archbishop of Lusaka Telesphore Mpundu. I pray that you will not be demanding to officiate the funeral now, drawing on your recent experience of giving sermons in Catholic Churches and of insisting to attend funerals of individuals whom you had little regard for while they lived. Even the picture you used to accompany your post tells a story. Because your recent relationship with him had turned sour, as it has with many of those who supported you in opposition but now regret it owing to your dreadful performance in office, you had to go back all the way to 2021 to find a suitable picture that was taken after the mass that the retired Archbishop conducted for you at State House soon after your election. What followed next is well known: Archbishop Mpundu, as he did to your predecessors whenever they strayed from the course of good governance, regularly criticised your leadership actions. In response, you and your supporters, as you have repeatedly done to the Catholic Bishops and to other well-meaning critics, denounced the man of God. Today, now that he has died, you want to pretend that you are sorrowful? Please cut us some slack, Mr Hichilema. You should have a sense of shame, sir. You can lie to yourself and to your zealot supporters but you will never deceive those of us who are familiar with your breathtaking hypocrisy. The truth that must be stated is that Archbishop Mpundu, who contributed to your election, died very disappointed at what you became in office, at the tragedy of your presidency. In one of his final public interviews (I have attached it to this post for ease of reference), Archbishop Mpundu correctly branded you as “a master of corruption”, “a dictator who does not listen to anyone”, and a failure who “should not be allowed to go [i.e. remain in office for] more than one term.” I can also now tell you that the Archbishop was extremely sad that you are now trying to send civil rights activist Brebner Changala, another person who helped you ascend to public office, to prison on a transparently silly charge of sedition using Magistrate Davies Chibwili. This issue really disturbed him. Mpundu died with his extremely high regard for Changala, whom he affectionately called Saint Brebner. As you know, Changala is the man who visited you in prison in July 2017 when you were unjustly arrested on a bogus charge of treason and whom you requested to ask the Catholic leadership to help secure your release from prison. Thanks to his efforts, you were released. Today, this is the same Changala you are determined to send to prison for criticising your leadership over the abduction of then Petauke constituency member of parliament Emmanuel Banda when the people whom the victim named as his abductors, who include two of your aides, are roaming scot-free. Do you see why the Archbishop was disappointed in what you have become? What kind of a person are you, Mr Hichilema? You are very poor at managing relations. If you cannot own up to your failings, please continue with your hypocrisy and leave us to mourn the Archbishop. By us, I mean the people to whom the Archbishop was a hero before 2021 and after 2021 when you and your supporters took turns to denounce him for the crime of pointing out the pitfalls of your leadership. Should you insist on attending the funeral, I pray that the Catholics do not allow you to speak so that we may be saved from listening to more of your repulsive diet of hypocrisy. Every country has, at one time or another, a religious leader who acts as the conscience of the nation and with the strength of conviction that is respected even by their fiercest critics. For Zambia, and since the deaths of Cardinal Medardo Joseph Mazombwe (2013), Bishop Paul Francis Duffy (2011), and Bishop Dennis Harold De Jong (2003), that honour belonged to Emeritus Archbishop of Lusaka Telesphore George Mpundu. A dignified and consistent advocate for justice, the 78-year-old was among a very small number of the Zambian clergy who are incapable of finding peace in an environment in which human suffering is manufactured by the politicians in power. Throughout his public life, Mpundu consistently raised both his voice and the quality of his argument to speak out against human rights violations, corruption in government, attacks on democracy, intentional polarisation, and the indifference of the country’s political leadership to the plight of many. It is as if he was spurred by the knowledge that to be silent in the face of these human-made sins is to actively participate in sustaining the status quo. In addition to bearing sympathy for the elites in power who found his ability to speak out on issues of public interest unbearable, the man of God refused to be bullied into silence by successive governing parties’ familiar tactic of accusing anyone who criticises the government, however well intentioned, of being an opposition supporter. A highly courageous and principled individual, Archbishop Mpundu served as an inspiring example of the kind of clergy Zambia or Africa needs – those with a deep sense of responsibility and a conscience that is restless in the face of injustice, bad governance, human rights violations and the degrading poverty that surrounds them. Archbishop Mpundu fought a good fight.

Sishuwa Sishuwa

13,618 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад