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1/3 🇺🇿Uzbekistan Armed forces during an Air Defense target practice exercise with multiple anti-aircraft missiles from 🇨🇳China: FD-2000B (HQ-9) + KS-1C (HQ-12) + FM-90 (HQ-7B) & from 🇷🇺Russia: S-125 Neva/Pechora (via wb/疯子白杨)

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47,880 просмотров • 8 месяцев назад •via X (Twitter)

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According to military experts, Venezuela had the most powerful and multi-layered air defense network in Latin America. There are also reports that Russia has transferred its air defense systems to Venezuela in the fall of 2025. In this video, Maduro speaks about 5,000 Russian Igla MANPADS protecting Venezuela's borders. None of them did their job, it seems. The main tasks of protecting the country's airspace were carried out by the Bolivarian Military Aviation (Aviación Militar Bolivariana), which includes all branches of aviation, air defense forces, and other structures. There are six joint aerospace defense commands (Comando de Defensa Aeroespacial Integral) responsible for different areas. CODAI oversees surveillance units, combat aviation, and air defense systems. The Bolivarian Navy also had its own capabilities for protection against an air attack. According to publicly available data, a radar field has been established along Venezuela's borders for the rapid detection of an air attack. At the most critical areas, modern Chinese-made JYL-1 and JY-11B 3D radars are deployed (from 8 to 10 units). Bolivarian Military Aviation also has the following in service: 🔹 Russian S-300VM Antey-2500 system: two divisions, including radars, a command post, up to six launchers each, and anti-aircraft missiles, received by Caracas from Moscow in 2013; 🔹 Russian Buk-M2E surface-to-air missile system: according to open sources, nine combat vehicles; 🔹 S-125 Pechora-2M SAM system: outdated equipment that has been actively decommissioned, but around 24 launchers remain in service; 🔹 Tor-M1 SAM systems: between 10 and 12 units; 🔹 Small-caliber artillery systems of various types: at least 400 units, half of which are Soviet/Russian 23-mm ZU-23-2 autocannons; 🔹 Man-portable air-defense systems: Russian Igla systems and similar foreign-made MANPADS; 🔹 Anti-aircraft artillery: approximately 260 guns, including Swedish Bofors L70. And if we add fighter aircraft (at least 20 Russian Su-30MKVs and up to 10 operational American F-16s) and naval equipment to this, it becomes clear that Venezuela does have air defense capabilities. However, none of this did its job.
1:04

According to military experts, Venezuela had the most powerful and multi-layered air defense network in Latin America. There are also reports that Russia has transferred its air defense systems to Venezuela in the fall of 2025. In this video, Maduro speaks about 5,000 Russian Igla MANPADS protecting Venezuela's borders. None of them did their job, it seems. The main tasks of protecting the country's airspace were carried out by the Bolivarian Military Aviation (Aviación Militar Bolivariana), which includes all branches of aviation, air defense forces, and other structures. There are six joint aerospace defense commands (Comando de Defensa Aeroespacial Integral) responsible for different areas. CODAI oversees surveillance units, combat aviation, and air defense systems. The Bolivarian Navy also had its own capabilities for protection against an air attack. According to publicly available data, a radar field has been established along Venezuela's borders for the rapid detection of an air attack. At the most critical areas, modern Chinese-made JYL-1 and JY-11B 3D radars are deployed (from 8 to 10 units). Bolivarian Military Aviation also has the following in service: 🔹 Russian S-300VM Antey-2500 system: two divisions, including radars, a command post, up to six launchers each, and anti-aircraft missiles, received by Caracas from Moscow in 2013; 🔹 Russian Buk-M2E surface-to-air missile system: according to open sources, nine combat vehicles; 🔹 S-125 Pechora-2M SAM system: outdated equipment that has been actively decommissioned, but around 24 launchers remain in service; 🔹 Tor-M1 SAM systems: between 10 and 12 units; 🔹 Small-caliber artillery systems of various types: at least 400 units, half of which are Soviet/Russian 23-mm ZU-23-2 autocannons; 🔹 Man-portable air-defense systems: Russian Igla systems and similar foreign-made MANPADS; 🔹 Anti-aircraft artillery: approximately 260 guns, including Swedish Bofors L70. And if we add fighter aircraft (at least 20 Russian Su-30MKVs and up to 10 operational American F-16s) and naval equipment to this, it becomes clear that Venezuela does have air defense capabilities. However, none of this did its job.

Anton Gerashchenko

244,043 просмотров • 9 месяцев назад

Why a naval blockade against Iran would be complex and hard 1- It would have to stay outside the range of their conventional anti-ship missiles, so something like a line from Mumbai to Somalia, about 2,500 km. That’s a huge area. You’d need a task force with multiple submarines, surface ships, and ISR drones operating there 24/7. 2- If we’re also talking about staying out of range of the ballistic missiles they’ve converted to anti-ship roles, you have to go even farther out, and now we’re looking at a blockade line of 3,500–5,000 km. I’ll be watching to see how they manage that without enormous cost. 3- Is Iran just going to accept the starvation of its regime? If not, how do you deal with 25–30 submarines equipped with special torpedoes and submerged-launched Jask-2 anti-ship missiles? And that’s not all, their larger subs can launch anti-ship cruise missiles with up to 2,000 km range. 4- How do you handle their UVVs, UAVs, and countless small boats when you’re outranged? Their anti-ship missiles have much greater range than the American ones and Iran has plenty of drones for target acquisition. The US could activate its airpower to crush the Iranian navy, but there would be losses and it would be a prolonged fight. 5- A blockade would mean that force is targeted day and night, under unimaginable stress, which will in any case force the US to take offensive measures, and they’ll have to do it while already under attack, with no element of surprise. Iran, for its part, has two big problems if it tries to close the Strait of Hormuz: the trouble it will create with its neighbors, and the problem with China, its main financier and the destination for most of the tankers that leave Hormuz. The strait is where one-third of the world’s seaborne oil trade and 1/5-1/4 of e LNG passes. Some people will say: “Iran’s missile precision is terrible. They can’t hit a moving target.” Well, in the 12-day war they had enough precision to hit the Weizmann Institute, the Haifa refinery, and I personally saw footage of strikes on mobile launchers, some remarkably precise, others not so much. I’d say their guidance still has a lot of room for improvement, but you can’t assume they won’t hit large ships, especially since they’ve been operating long-range anti-ship missiles for many years. Besides, nobody starts a war counting on the enemy being completely unable to hit back. Your forces are always planned on the opposite assumption. Obviously a near-trillion-dollar budget like the US has is an absolute advantage, but the scenario is much more complex than that and won’t be solved with the forces currently in the region. It would require many more naval assets and multiple land bases in an expensive operation that could end up uniting the regime instead of bringing it down. Could a massive bombing campaign with 500 aircraft topple the regime? I’m skeptical about the efficiency of Iranian ADs due to several motives. Surely 500 jets involved in waves of attacks could cause a lot of destruction, but the outcome is uncertain. That’s a risk that has to be very carefully considered. From other hand, the regime is in a fragile moment.
0:26

Why a naval blockade against Iran would be complex and hard 1- It would have to stay outside the range of their conventional anti-ship missiles, so something like a line from Mumbai to Somalia, about 2,500 km. That’s a huge area. You’d need a task force with multiple submarines, surface ships, and ISR drones operating there 24/7. 2- If we’re also talking about staying out of range of the ballistic missiles they’ve converted to anti-ship roles, you have to go even farther out, and now we’re looking at a blockade line of 3,500–5,000 km. I’ll be watching to see how they manage that without enormous cost. 3- Is Iran just going to accept the starvation of its regime? If not, how do you deal with 25–30 submarines equipped with special torpedoes and submerged-launched Jask-2 anti-ship missiles? And that’s not all, their larger subs can launch anti-ship cruise missiles with up to 2,000 km range. 4- How do you handle their UVVs, UAVs, and countless small boats when you’re outranged? Their anti-ship missiles have much greater range than the American ones and Iran has plenty of drones for target acquisition. The US could activate its airpower to crush the Iranian navy, but there would be losses and it would be a prolonged fight. 5- A blockade would mean that force is targeted day and night, under unimaginable stress, which will in any case force the US to take offensive measures, and they’ll have to do it while already under attack, with no element of surprise. Iran, for its part, has two big problems if it tries to close the Strait of Hormuz: the trouble it will create with its neighbors, and the problem with China, its main financier and the destination for most of the tankers that leave Hormuz. The strait is where one-third of the world’s seaborne oil trade and 1/5-1/4 of e LNG passes. Some people will say: “Iran’s missile precision is terrible. They can’t hit a moving target.” Well, in the 12-day war they had enough precision to hit the Weizmann Institute, the Haifa refinery, and I personally saw footage of strikes on mobile launchers, some remarkably precise, others not so much. I’d say their guidance still has a lot of room for improvement, but you can’t assume they won’t hit large ships, especially since they’ve been operating long-range anti-ship missiles for many years. Besides, nobody starts a war counting on the enemy being completely unable to hit back. Your forces are always planned on the opposite assumption. Obviously a near-trillion-dollar budget like the US has is an absolute advantage, but the scenario is much more complex than that and won’t be solved with the forces currently in the region. It would require many more naval assets and multiple land bases in an expensive operation that could end up uniting the regime instead of bringing it down. Could a massive bombing campaign with 500 aircraft topple the regime? I’m skeptical about the efficiency of Iranian ADs due to several motives. Surely 500 jets involved in waves of attacks could cause a lot of destruction, but the outcome is uncertain. That’s a risk that has to be very carefully considered. From other hand, the regime is in a fragile moment.

Patricia Marins

185,114 просмотров • 8 месяцев назад

Indonesia arrives on the scene In the last 5 years alone, Indonesia has finalized the purchase of no less than 84 modern fighter jets: 42 Rafale and 42 J-10C. However, nothing compares to the strides made by the Indonesian Navy. The country acquired 8 modern frigates and 2 battery-powered electric submarines - with Tot- in a Naval Group configuration that allows for submergence periods of up to 80 days. Indonesia, alongside Japan and Germany, now becomes one of the sole operators of this new generation of submarines. Including smaller vessels, the nation has closed deals for approximately 20 ships in these last 5 years alone. To build the ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities of this fleet and support army operations, nearly 100 reconnaissance and combat drones were purchased, with a highlight on 60 Bayraktar units. This is joined by the acquisition of Turkish ballistic missiles with technology transfer, as well as at least 2 to 3 models of Turkish and Chinese anti-ship missiles. Fighters - 42 Dassault Rafale (Air Force, contracts in tranches with France, 2022–2023). - 42 Chengdu J-10C (Air Force, contract with China, October 2025). Submarines - 2 Scorpène Evolved-class submarines (Navy, contract with Naval Group/France and PT PAL, 2024–2025). Frigates and Major Surface Combatants - 2 PPA-class frigates (Thaon di Revel/Brawijaya) (Navy, contract with Fincantieri/Italy, 2024). - 4 Arrowhead 140-class frigates (Balaputradewa) (Navy, licenses from Babcock/UK, local construction by PT PAL; 2 initial + 2 additional in January 2026). - 2 İstif-class (I-class) frigates (Navy, contract with TAIS/Turkey, January 2026). Smaller Vessels (OPVs, Patrol Boats, and FAC) - 2 90-meter OPVs (Navy, local construction by PT Daya Radar Utama, started 2021). - 2 additional KCR-60-class Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Navy, local construction by PT PAL, ~2024–2025). - 2 18-meter patrol boats (Navy, donation from Japan via Official Security Assistance, 2025). Mine Countermeasures Vessels - 2 Pulau Fani-class MCMVs (Navy, built by Abeking & Rasmussen/Germany; delivered and commissioned 2023–2024). - 4 Inspector 90 USVs + Seascan and K-Ster systems (ROVs) (Navy, contract with Exail/France, June 2025). Helicopters - 3 Bell 505 Jet Ranger X helicopters (Navy, delivered 2021–2022). UAVs/Drones - 60 Bayraktar TB3 + 9 Bayraktar Akinci (primarily Navy, joint contract with Baykar/Turkey, February 2025, with local production). - 14 ScanEagle (Navy, contract with Boeing Insitu). - 12 Anka (Air Force, contract with TAI/Turkey, 2023). ( Indonesia is also developing indigenous UVVs) Anti-Ship Missiles - 45 Atmaca (Navy, initial units under contract with Roketsan/Turkey, 2024; additional contracts in 2025 for more units and local production). - Çakır (anti-ship cruise missile, Navy): Contract for local production with Roketsan/Turkey (July 2025), quantity not specified. - YJ-12/CM-302 (coastal anti-ship, Army): Acquisition confirmed in 2025, no public unit number. Ballistic Missiles - KHAN system (export Bora) (Army, contract with Roketsan/Turkey ~2022–2025; number of units/batteries not publicly disclosed). Other Confirmed Upgrades - Upgrades to CN-235 MPA and C-130 Hercules (Air Force, contracts 2024–2025; number of affected units not detailed publicly, but applies to multiple existing aircraft).
0:28

Indonesia arrives on the scene In the last 5 years alone, Indonesia has finalized the purchase of no less than 84 modern fighter jets: 42 Rafale and 42 J-10C. However, nothing compares to the strides made by the Indonesian Navy. The country acquired 8 modern frigates and 2 battery-powered electric submarines - with Tot- in a Naval Group configuration that allows for submergence periods of up to 80 days. Indonesia, alongside Japan and Germany, now becomes one of the sole operators of this new generation of submarines. Including smaller vessels, the nation has closed deals for approximately 20 ships in these last 5 years alone. To build the ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) capabilities of this fleet and support army operations, nearly 100 reconnaissance and combat drones were purchased, with a highlight on 60 Bayraktar units. This is joined by the acquisition of Turkish ballistic missiles with technology transfer, as well as at least 2 to 3 models of Turkish and Chinese anti-ship missiles. Fighters - 42 Dassault Rafale (Air Force, contracts in tranches with France, 2022–2023). - 42 Chengdu J-10C (Air Force, contract with China, October 2025). Submarines - 2 Scorpène Evolved-class submarines (Navy, contract with Naval Group/France and PT PAL, 2024–2025). Frigates and Major Surface Combatants - 2 PPA-class frigates (Thaon di Revel/Brawijaya) (Navy, contract with Fincantieri/Italy, 2024). - 4 Arrowhead 140-class frigates (Balaputradewa) (Navy, licenses from Babcock/UK, local construction by PT PAL; 2 initial + 2 additional in January 2026). - 2 İstif-class (I-class) frigates (Navy, contract with TAIS/Turkey, January 2026). Smaller Vessels (OPVs, Patrol Boats, and FAC) - 2 90-meter OPVs (Navy, local construction by PT Daya Radar Utama, started 2021). - 2 additional KCR-60-class Fast Attack Craft-Missile (Navy, local construction by PT PAL, ~2024–2025). - 2 18-meter patrol boats (Navy, donation from Japan via Official Security Assistance, 2025). Mine Countermeasures Vessels - 2 Pulau Fani-class MCMVs (Navy, built by Abeking & Rasmussen/Germany; delivered and commissioned 2023–2024). - 4 Inspector 90 USVs + Seascan and K-Ster systems (ROVs) (Navy, contract with Exail/France, June 2025). Helicopters - 3 Bell 505 Jet Ranger X helicopters (Navy, delivered 2021–2022). UAVs/Drones - 60 Bayraktar TB3 + 9 Bayraktar Akinci (primarily Navy, joint contract with Baykar/Turkey, February 2025, with local production). - 14 ScanEagle (Navy, contract with Boeing Insitu). - 12 Anka (Air Force, contract with TAI/Turkey, 2023). ( Indonesia is also developing indigenous UVVs) Anti-Ship Missiles - 45 Atmaca (Navy, initial units under contract with Roketsan/Turkey, 2024; additional contracts in 2025 for more units and local production). - Çakır (anti-ship cruise missile, Navy): Contract for local production with Roketsan/Turkey (July 2025), quantity not specified. - YJ-12/CM-302 (coastal anti-ship, Army): Acquisition confirmed in 2025, no public unit number. Ballistic Missiles - KHAN system (export Bora) (Army, contract with Roketsan/Turkey ~2022–2025; number of units/batteries not publicly disclosed). Other Confirmed Upgrades - Upgrades to CN-235 MPA and C-130 Hercules (Air Force, contracts 2024–2025; number of affected units not detailed publicly, but applies to multiple existing aircraft).

Patricia Marins

176,088 просмотров • 8 месяцев назад

🚨12 HOUR NEWS RECAP 1.⁠ Trump warned that all airspace over and around Venezuela is now “closed in its entirety,” a blunt message delivered as U.S. forces intensify pressure on Maduro. 2.⁠ U.S. Navy jets have been flying low and “dark” just miles off Venezuela’s coast - even orbiting over Maduro’s airspace with transponders off - as the Ford carrier group ramps up pressure. 3.⁠ Maduro’s presidential jet landed on the Venezuela-Brazil border with no explanation, sparking speculation he may be fleeing as his regime teeters. 4.⁠ Russia sent Tu-22M3 bombers armed with Mach-5 Kh-32 missiles over the Baltic, escorted by Su-35 fighters, in a five-hour show of force that showcased long-range strike power right on NATO’s doorstep. 5.⁠ Germany is rolling out Israel’s Arrow-3 missile defense system - the first deployment outside Israel - bringing a space-intercepting, Iran-war-proven shield to Europe as it scrambles to prepare for high-speed missile threats. 6.⁠ A child’s birthday party in the U.S turned into a massacre when a targeted shooting killed 4 people - including kids - and wounded 10 more, with witnesses describing a minute-long “war zone” as the gunman fled and the FBI joined the manhunt. 7.⁠ FBI Director Kash Patel says a hidden cache of Trump-Russia probe documents - stuffed into “burn bags” in a locked room at FBI HQ - is being prepared for full public release, promising to expose everything. 8.⁠ Turkey’s new Kızılelma combat drone just became the first to autonomously hunt, lock onto, and shoot down a jet-powered target with its own radar, marking the arrival of true drone-vs-jet warfare. 9.⁠ A Cuban illegal with a long rap sheet beheaded his motel manager in front of the man’s wife and child, yet Dallas County’s Soros-backed DA has taken the death penalty off the table - offering only life without parole in a case Trump has already blasted as the brutal consequence of soft-on-crime policies. 10.⁠ UK councils are rolling out AI-enabled drone fleets to monitor everything from “antisocial behaviour” to daily life, turning routine governance into a full-blown surveillance state that feels more like Orwell than public safety.
0:11

🚨12 HOUR NEWS RECAP 1.⁠ Trump warned that all airspace over and around Venezuela is now “closed in its entirety,” a blunt message delivered as U.S. forces intensify pressure on Maduro. 2.⁠ U.S. Navy jets have been flying low and “dark” just miles off Venezuela’s coast - even orbiting over Maduro’s airspace with transponders off - as the Ford carrier group ramps up pressure. 3.⁠ Maduro’s presidential jet landed on the Venezuela-Brazil border with no explanation, sparking speculation he may be fleeing as his regime teeters. 4.⁠ Russia sent Tu-22M3 bombers armed with Mach-5 Kh-32 missiles over the Baltic, escorted by Su-35 fighters, in a five-hour show of force that showcased long-range strike power right on NATO’s doorstep. 5.⁠ Germany is rolling out Israel’s Arrow-3 missile defense system - the first deployment outside Israel - bringing a space-intercepting, Iran-war-proven shield to Europe as it scrambles to prepare for high-speed missile threats. 6.⁠ A child’s birthday party in the U.S turned into a massacre when a targeted shooting killed 4 people - including kids - and wounded 10 more, with witnesses describing a minute-long “war zone” as the gunman fled and the FBI joined the manhunt. 7.⁠ FBI Director Kash Patel says a hidden cache of Trump-Russia probe documents - stuffed into “burn bags” in a locked room at FBI HQ - is being prepared for full public release, promising to expose everything. 8.⁠ Turkey’s new Kızılelma combat drone just became the first to autonomously hunt, lock onto, and shoot down a jet-powered target with its own radar, marking the arrival of true drone-vs-jet warfare. 9.⁠ A Cuban illegal with a long rap sheet beheaded his motel manager in front of the man’s wife and child, yet Dallas County’s Soros-backed DA has taken the death penalty off the table - offering only life without parole in a case Trump has already blasted as the brutal consequence of soft-on-crime policies. 10.⁠ UK councils are rolling out AI-enabled drone fleets to monitor everything from “antisocial behaviour” to daily life, turning routine governance into a full-blown surveillance state that feels more like Orwell than public safety.

Mario Nawfal

499,864 просмотров • 10 месяцев назад

🚨12 HOUR NEWS RECAP 1. Trump ordered U.S fighter jets and armed drones to launch a major assault on Houthi targets in Yemen. He issued a statement telling the Houthis: "Your time is up, and your attacks must stop." 2. A missile fired from Yemen struck Egypt's Sinai Peninsula near the resort city of Sharm el-Sheikh. The IDF is investigating whether Israel was the intended target but has not yet confirmed this. 3. SpaceX's Dragon capsule docked with the ISS, delivering 4 astronauts in a NASA crew swap. It will also bring back 2 stranded astronauts who have been on the ISS for 9 months since their Boeing Starliner was deemed too unsafe to return them. 4. Macron declared that Russia has no say in whether NATO troops enter Ukraine, stating that the decision lies solely with Kyiv. Britain and France are considering deploying thousands of peacekeepers as part of a ceasefire plan, while Russia outright rejects any NATO forces in Ukraine. 5. Todd Lyons, Acting ICE Director, said that Biden had cooked the books on ICE arrest data: "They were purposely misleading the American people by categorizing individuals processed and released into the interior of the United States as ICE arrests." 6. Over 300,000 Serbians took part in anti-government protests, calling for the resignation of President Aleksandar Vučić. It was Serbia's largest protest ever. 7. A fire at Club Pulse in Kocani, North Macedonia, killed at least 50 people and injured over 100. The blaze started during a concert by the band DNA when pyrotechnics were used, rapidly spreading through the crowded venue. 8. Kim Kardashian is reportedly taking legal action to remove Ye's new track from X after it featured their 11-year-old daughter, North. The song, 'Lonely Roads Still Go To Sunshine,' includes what appears to be Diddy's voice, despite his ongoing legal troubles, as well as a verse from North. 9. Trump signed an order to downsize the U.S Agency for Global Media, cutting wasteful spending at taxpayer-funded media outlets. It led to most Voice of America journalists being placed on administrative leave. 10. Israel's Defense Minister confirmed that the Iron Beam, a high-power laser air defense system, will be operational by the end of 2025. The Rafael-developed system is designed to intercept rockets, mortars, UAVs, and cruise missiles - at just $2-$3.50 per shot, compared to $40,000-$50,000 per Iron Dome interceptor.
0:17

🚨12 HOUR NEWS RECAP 1. Trump ordered U.S fighter jets and armed drones to launch a major assault on Houthi targets in Yemen. He issued a statement telling the Houthis: "Your time is up, and your attacks must stop." 2. A missile fired from Yemen struck Egypt's Sinai Peninsula near the resort city of Sharm el-Sheikh. The IDF is investigating whether Israel was the intended target but has not yet confirmed this. 3. SpaceX's Dragon capsule docked with the ISS, delivering 4 astronauts in a NASA crew swap. It will also bring back 2 stranded astronauts who have been on the ISS for 9 months since their Boeing Starliner was deemed too unsafe to return them. 4. Macron declared that Russia has no say in whether NATO troops enter Ukraine, stating that the decision lies solely with Kyiv. Britain and France are considering deploying thousands of peacekeepers as part of a ceasefire plan, while Russia outright rejects any NATO forces in Ukraine. 5. Todd Lyons, Acting ICE Director, said that Biden had cooked the books on ICE arrest data: "They were purposely misleading the American people by categorizing individuals processed and released into the interior of the United States as ICE arrests." 6. Over 300,000 Serbians took part in anti-government protests, calling for the resignation of President Aleksandar Vučić. It was Serbia's largest protest ever. 7. A fire at Club Pulse in Kocani, North Macedonia, killed at least 50 people and injured over 100. The blaze started during a concert by the band DNA when pyrotechnics were used, rapidly spreading through the crowded venue. 8. Kim Kardashian is reportedly taking legal action to remove Ye's new track from X after it featured their 11-year-old daughter, North. The song, 'Lonely Roads Still Go To Sunshine,' includes what appears to be Diddy's voice, despite his ongoing legal troubles, as well as a verse from North. 9. Trump signed an order to downsize the U.S Agency for Global Media, cutting wasteful spending at taxpayer-funded media outlets. It led to most Voice of America journalists being placed on administrative leave. 10. Israel's Defense Minister confirmed that the Iron Beam, a high-power laser air defense system, will be operational by the end of 2025. The Rafael-developed system is designed to intercept rockets, mortars, UAVs, and cruise missiles - at just $2-$3.50 per shot, compared to $40,000-$50,000 per Iron Dome interceptor.

Mario Nawfal

206,057 просмотров • 1 год назад

💥 Footage of the Russian Tor in action The Tor missile system (NATO: SA-15 Gauntlet) stands as one of the most effective and battle-proven short-range air defense systems in the world, a flagship product of Russian military engineering that continues to demonstrate unmatched versatility, reliability, and lethality in modern asymmetric warfare. Developed by the Almaz-Antey concern (with key production by the Kupol plant), the Tor family was conceived in the Soviet era but has undergone continuous, combat-driven modernization that keeps it ahead of evolving threats like drones, cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions, and low-flying aircraft. Tor is not merely a defensive tool—it is a mobile guardian that enables offensive operations by providing layered, all-weather protection to ground forces, critical infrastructure, and forward bases. Technical Capabilities: Precision, Mobility, and Multi-Threat Engagement The core strength of the Tor lies in its integrated design: a tracked (or wheeled in variants like Tor-M2K) chassis carrying a 360-degree surveillance radar, fire-control radar, electro-optical/TV & thermal imaging systems & vertical-launch missiles. Key specifications for the advanced Tor-M2 include: Engagement envelope: Targets from as low as 3–10 meters altitude up to 10 km, with ranges typically 12–16 km (Russian sources highlight effective performance out to 32 km in optimized scenarios for the latest missiles like the 9M338/9M9331 series). Missile performance: PMach 2.5+ speed, 165–170 kg launch weight, 15–50 kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead with proximity fuse. Up to 8–16 ready-to-fire missiles per vehicle. Multi-target handling: Newer variants feature four guidance channels, allowing simultaneous engagement of up to four targets while tracking dozens more. Mobility and autonomy: Full operation on the move at speeds up to 40–65 km/h, with rapid 3–5 second reaction times after a short stop. It can operate autonomously or networked into larger air defense layers (e.g., alongside S-300/400 or Pantsir systems). ECM and stealth resistance: Exceptional electronic countermeasures resistance, proven in heavy jamming environments. It reliably detects and destroys small, low-signature targets (down to tennis-ball size), including radar-evading drones and stealthy munitions. Russian testing has repeatedly shown near-100% success rates against multiple simultaneous high-speed, small targets in ECM-heavy conditions—capabilities Western systems often struggle to match in real-world scenarios. Variants and Ongoing Modernization Russia has iteratively improved the Tor to stay relevant: Tor-M1: Enhanced accuracy and dual-target engagement. - **Tor-M2/M2U/M2E**: Core current variant with superior radar, digital algorithms, and better low-altitude performance. Wheeled (M2K) and Arctic (M2DT on DT-30 all-terrain vehicle) versions extend its reach into any terrain. - **Specialized adaptations**: Naval Tor-M2 for shipborne defense against sea-skimming threats; modular/containerized options; and recent anti-drone protection kits (jammers, detectors, and EW modules) developed in response to battlefield lessons. These upgrades, driven directly by operational feedback, underscore Russian industry’s agility—something pro-Russian analysts contrast favorably with slower Western procurement cycles. Combat Effectiveness: Proven in Syria and the Special Military Operation The Tor’s true value shines in real combat, where Russian forces have validated its design against the full spectrum of contemporary threats. Syria (Khmeimim Airbase Protection): First major foreign deployment of the Tor-M2. It operated both standalone and in integrated networks, repeatedly neutralizing drone swarms, guided bombs, and cruise missiles. Russian reports credit it with superior performance over even the Pantsir-S1 in countering improvised UAV attacks, protecting Russian assets with minimal losses. >>>>
0:58

💥 Footage of the Russian Tor in action The Tor missile system (NATO: SA-15 Gauntlet) stands as one of the most effective and battle-proven short-range air defense systems in the world, a flagship product of Russian military engineering that continues to demonstrate unmatched versatility, reliability, and lethality in modern asymmetric warfare. Developed by the Almaz-Antey concern (with key production by the Kupol plant), the Tor family was conceived in the Soviet era but has undergone continuous, combat-driven modernization that keeps it ahead of evolving threats like drones, cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions, and low-flying aircraft. Tor is not merely a defensive tool—it is a mobile guardian that enables offensive operations by providing layered, all-weather protection to ground forces, critical infrastructure, and forward bases. Technical Capabilities: Precision, Mobility, and Multi-Threat Engagement The core strength of the Tor lies in its integrated design: a tracked (or wheeled in variants like Tor-M2K) chassis carrying a 360-degree surveillance radar, fire-control radar, electro-optical/TV & thermal imaging systems & vertical-launch missiles. Key specifications for the advanced Tor-M2 include: Engagement envelope: Targets from as low as 3–10 meters altitude up to 10 km, with ranges typically 12–16 km (Russian sources highlight effective performance out to 32 km in optimized scenarios for the latest missiles like the 9M338/9M9331 series). Missile performance: PMach 2.5+ speed, 165–170 kg launch weight, 15–50 kg high-explosive fragmentation warhead with proximity fuse. Up to 8–16 ready-to-fire missiles per vehicle. Multi-target handling: Newer variants feature four guidance channels, allowing simultaneous engagement of up to four targets while tracking dozens more. Mobility and autonomy: Full operation on the move at speeds up to 40–65 km/h, with rapid 3–5 second reaction times after a short stop. It can operate autonomously or networked into larger air defense layers (e.g., alongside S-300/400 or Pantsir systems). ECM and stealth resistance: Exceptional electronic countermeasures resistance, proven in heavy jamming environments. It reliably detects and destroys small, low-signature targets (down to tennis-ball size), including radar-evading drones and stealthy munitions. Russian testing has repeatedly shown near-100% success rates against multiple simultaneous high-speed, small targets in ECM-heavy conditions—capabilities Western systems often struggle to match in real-world scenarios. Variants and Ongoing Modernization Russia has iteratively improved the Tor to stay relevant: Tor-M1: Enhanced accuracy and dual-target engagement. - **Tor-M2/M2U/M2E**: Core current variant with superior radar, digital algorithms, and better low-altitude performance. Wheeled (M2K) and Arctic (M2DT on DT-30 all-terrain vehicle) versions extend its reach into any terrain. - **Specialized adaptations**: Naval Tor-M2 for shipborne defense against sea-skimming threats; modular/containerized options; and recent anti-drone protection kits (jammers, detectors, and EW modules) developed in response to battlefield lessons. These upgrades, driven directly by operational feedback, underscore Russian industry’s agility—something pro-Russian analysts contrast favorably with slower Western procurement cycles. Combat Effectiveness: Proven in Syria and the Special Military Operation The Tor’s true value shines in real combat, where Russian forces have validated its design against the full spectrum of contemporary threats. Syria (Khmeimim Airbase Protection): First major foreign deployment of the Tor-M2. It operated both standalone and in integrated networks, repeatedly neutralizing drone swarms, guided bombs, and cruise missiles. Russian reports credit it with superior performance over even the Pantsir-S1 in countering improvised UAV attacks, protecting Russian assets with minimal losses. >>>>

𝐃𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐝 𝐙 🇷🇺 🇷🇸🇮🇪

11,369 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад

Trump prepares to invade Cuba. Can the island Resist? Following the difficulties encountered in Iran, despite expenditures exceeding $100 billion, Donald Trump is betting on a victory through military action against Cuba. On the 20th, the USS Nimitz and its carrier strike group, which includes the destroyer USS Gridley, officially arrived in the Caribbean. The official justification was that the movement is part of Operation Southern Seas 2026, but U.S. Southern Command emphasized that the presence serves as a strategic advantage and combat readiness. The arrival occurred on the same day the U.S. formally indicted former Cuban leader Raúl Castro for homicide, escalating fears of a military intervention similar to the one in Venezuela months earlier. This aligns with flight tracking data confirming that the U.S. has established a constant surveillance siege of Cuba with MQ-4C Triton drones; at least three of these high-altitude, long-endurance drones were detected operating near the island. At least five P-8A Poseidon aircraft are also participating in patrols, alongside Rivet Joint (RC-135) planes used for electronic eavesdropping to intercept communications and radar signals from Cuban defenses. The Trump administration justified this mobilization by citing intelligence that Cuba had acquired over 300 military drones from Russia and Iran. According to Washington, these drones could be used to attack the Guantanamo base or even U.S. territory, a fanciful claim that rings the alarm for a military operation. The intended action is expected to unfold similarly to what happened in Venezuela, but can Cuba resist? Cuba is going through a difficult period, marked by power outages, a high cost of living, fuel shortages, and low tourism activity, in addition to the strangulation caused by the Trump administration’s embargo. Regarding air defenses, the Cubans recently contracted the Belarusian company ALEVKURP to upgrade their Pechora systems to the S-125-2BM standard, replacing old analog components with modern digital processors. The system can now attack not only aircraft but also land and maritime targets with known coordinates. There have also been improvements to radars for operation under heavy electronic warfare and the capability to track targets using thermal and TV cameras. This allows for firing without turning on the radar, avoiding detection by anti-radiation missiles. Furthermore, the upgrade allows the system to identify drones visually or by heat without emitting radar signals, much like Iranian systems. The Pechora-2BM standard uses radars mounted on high-mobility vehicles; the idea is to activate the radar, fire the missile, and change positions in less than 25 minutes. Despite all these improvements, the Pechora remains a limited system. I would say Cuba will face great difficulty in containing U.S. aviation, but it will force caution upon enemy pilots. The Cuban strategy focuses on being an aerial guerrilla defense: not trying to defeat the U.S. Air Force, but rather increasing the political cost of an invasion by imposing losses. Cuban forces are also betting on Electronic Warfare. They possess many Cold War-era systems that were also recently modernized by Russian and Belarusian companies. Cuba tested these systems to perform spoofing and jamming of satellite signals, generating magnetic anomalies in the Caribbean reported this May 2026. Several mobile EW units are scattered across the island and camouflaged, making it difficult for spy planes and drones to locate them. Full article:
0:43

Trump prepares to invade Cuba. Can the island Resist? Following the difficulties encountered in Iran, despite expenditures exceeding $100 billion, Donald Trump is betting on a victory through military action against Cuba. On the 20th, the USS Nimitz and its carrier strike group, which includes the destroyer USS Gridley, officially arrived in the Caribbean. The official justification was that the movement is part of Operation Southern Seas 2026, but U.S. Southern Command emphasized that the presence serves as a strategic advantage and combat readiness. The arrival occurred on the same day the U.S. formally indicted former Cuban leader Raúl Castro for homicide, escalating fears of a military intervention similar to the one in Venezuela months earlier. This aligns with flight tracking data confirming that the U.S. has established a constant surveillance siege of Cuba with MQ-4C Triton drones; at least three of these high-altitude, long-endurance drones were detected operating near the island. At least five P-8A Poseidon aircraft are also participating in patrols, alongside Rivet Joint (RC-135) planes used for electronic eavesdropping to intercept communications and radar signals from Cuban defenses. The Trump administration justified this mobilization by citing intelligence that Cuba had acquired over 300 military drones from Russia and Iran. According to Washington, these drones could be used to attack the Guantanamo base or even U.S. territory, a fanciful claim that rings the alarm for a military operation. The intended action is expected to unfold similarly to what happened in Venezuela, but can Cuba resist? Cuba is going through a difficult period, marked by power outages, a high cost of living, fuel shortages, and low tourism activity, in addition to the strangulation caused by the Trump administration’s embargo. Regarding air defenses, the Cubans recently contracted the Belarusian company ALEVKURP to upgrade their Pechora systems to the S-125-2BM standard, replacing old analog components with modern digital processors. The system can now attack not only aircraft but also land and maritime targets with known coordinates. There have also been improvements to radars for operation under heavy electronic warfare and the capability to track targets using thermal and TV cameras. This allows for firing without turning on the radar, avoiding detection by anti-radiation missiles. Furthermore, the upgrade allows the system to identify drones visually or by heat without emitting radar signals, much like Iranian systems. The Pechora-2BM standard uses radars mounted on high-mobility vehicles; the idea is to activate the radar, fire the missile, and change positions in less than 25 minutes. Despite all these improvements, the Pechora remains a limited system. I would say Cuba will face great difficulty in containing U.S. aviation, but it will force caution upon enemy pilots. The Cuban strategy focuses on being an aerial guerrilla defense: not trying to defeat the U.S. Air Force, but rather increasing the political cost of an invasion by imposing losses. Cuban forces are also betting on Electronic Warfare. They possess many Cold War-era systems that were also recently modernized by Russian and Belarusian companies. Cuba tested these systems to perform spoofing and jamming of satellite signals, generating magnetic anomalies in the Caribbean reported this May 2026. Several mobile EW units are scattered across the island and camouflaged, making it difficult for spy planes and drones to locate them. Full article:

Patricia Marins

106,889 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

Iran war summary, day 71! Ukraine has breached the 3 day ceasefire Trump took credit for, not once but almost 9k times! IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi: - missiles and drones are locked on US targets in the region and enemy ships - forces are awaiting the order to fire. Global oil reserves are declining at a record pace amid the Iran war Iran - Bloomberg -Supplies through SOH have almost completely stopped -Per Morgan Stanley, global oil reserves decreased by 4.8MMbpd (March-Apr) -This is largest reduction in reserves in the entire history of IEA observations -By June, the global system may reach an "operational stress level", - by Sept, will reach min level of reserves necessary for the operation of pipelines, refineries, & export infrastructure -Bloomberg most import-dependent Asian countries - Indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan, and the Philippines will face critical shortage of fuel in 1 month -In Europe, aviation fuel reserves are rapidly decreasing ahead of summer -The US has been consuming strategic reserves for several weeks. -Diesel reserves in the country have dropped to their lowest level since 2005 Is Iran impacted? -Gregory Brew, Lead Analyst for Iran and Energy at Eurasia Group: A US naval blockade would not significantly damage Iran's oil infrastructure. Iran war is crushing Asia's farmers! -SOH blockade is threatening global food supply -Prices of fuel and fertilizer are pushing farmers to make irreversible cuts as they enter key planting seasons. In Thailand, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Australia, farmers are choosing to skip or reduce planting, or cut fertilizer use, which will lower yield. -India and Brazil, two of the world's biggest agricultural producers are facing significant yield loss -anticipate further food inflation How many sailers and ships remain stranded? - > 20,000 sailors aboard 800+ ships remain stranded in SOH via blockade, -vessels running low on food, water, fuel, and medicine, WSJ reports. -10 sailors have died and more than 30 vessels have been hit by Iranian drones or missiles since the crisis began. -Crews live under constant fear of missile strikes, drones, sea mines, and Iranian naval patrols -insurance costs soar and supply shortages worsen. -Some ships switched off trackers, changed flags, or used Chinese flags Iran is reshaping regional order through the SOH! Iran takes control of all 7 undersea internet cables passing through the SOH! NOTE: These cables are critical for data traffic between Europe, Asia, and the Gulf. 1. Under the new policy, “foreign operators” would be required to obtain permits to use these cables 2. This would include paying fees and following Iranian law 3. All management and maintenance would be handled by Iranian companies 4. The IRGC has previously warned it could target these same cables Meanwhile, Trump is entertaining his base with meaningless UFC fights to distract from his various failures and crimes! Another failed Trump ceasefire! -8,970 ceasefire violations by Ukrainian Armed Forces recorded in SMO -Ukrainian forces launched 12 attacks on positions of Russian units; -The Russian Armed Forces responded symmetrically to ceasefire violations -Russian Air Defense shot down 8 guided aerial bombs, a HIMARS rocket, and 467 UAVs of from Ukrainian terror forces Ukrainian Armed Forces units lost about 940 servicemen in the special military operation zone over the past 24 hours as a result of the Russian forces' repelling of enemy attacks.
0:26

Iran war summary, day 71! Ukraine has breached the 3 day ceasefire Trump took credit for, not once but almost 9k times! IRGC Aerospace Force Commander Brigadier General Majid Mousavi: - missiles and drones are locked on US targets in the region and enemy ships - forces are awaiting the order to fire. Global oil reserves are declining at a record pace amid the Iran war Iran - Bloomberg -Supplies through SOH have almost completely stopped -Per Morgan Stanley, global oil reserves decreased by 4.8MMbpd (March-Apr) -This is largest reduction in reserves in the entire history of IEA observations -By June, the global system may reach an "operational stress level", - by Sept, will reach min level of reserves necessary for the operation of pipelines, refineries, & export infrastructure -Bloomberg most import-dependent Asian countries - Indonesia, Vietnam, Pakistan, and the Philippines will face critical shortage of fuel in 1 month -In Europe, aviation fuel reserves are rapidly decreasing ahead of summer -The US has been consuming strategic reserves for several weeks. -Diesel reserves in the country have dropped to their lowest level since 2005 Is Iran impacted? -Gregory Brew, Lead Analyst for Iran and Energy at Eurasia Group: A US naval blockade would not significantly damage Iran's oil infrastructure. Iran war is crushing Asia's farmers! -SOH blockade is threatening global food supply -Prices of fuel and fertilizer are pushing farmers to make irreversible cuts as they enter key planting seasons. In Thailand, the Philippines, Bangladesh and Australia, farmers are choosing to skip or reduce planting, or cut fertilizer use, which will lower yield. -India and Brazil, two of the world's biggest agricultural producers are facing significant yield loss -anticipate further food inflation How many sailers and ships remain stranded? - > 20,000 sailors aboard 800+ ships remain stranded in SOH via blockade, -vessels running low on food, water, fuel, and medicine, WSJ reports. -10 sailors have died and more than 30 vessels have been hit by Iranian drones or missiles since the crisis began. -Crews live under constant fear of missile strikes, drones, sea mines, and Iranian naval patrols -insurance costs soar and supply shortages worsen. -Some ships switched off trackers, changed flags, or used Chinese flags Iran is reshaping regional order through the SOH! Iran takes control of all 7 undersea internet cables passing through the SOH! NOTE: These cables are critical for data traffic between Europe, Asia, and the Gulf. 1. Under the new policy, “foreign operators” would be required to obtain permits to use these cables 2. This would include paying fees and following Iranian law 3. All management and maintenance would be handled by Iranian companies 4. The IRGC has previously warned it could target these same cables Meanwhile, Trump is entertaining his base with meaningless UFC fights to distract from his various failures and crimes! Another failed Trump ceasefire! -8,970 ceasefire violations by Ukrainian Armed Forces recorded in SMO -Ukrainian forces launched 12 attacks on positions of Russian units; -The Russian Armed Forces responded symmetrically to ceasefire violations -Russian Air Defense shot down 8 guided aerial bombs, a HIMARS rocket, and 467 UAVs of from Ukrainian terror forces Ukrainian Armed Forces units lost about 940 servicemen in the special military operation zone over the past 24 hours as a result of the Russian forces' repelling of enemy attacks.

Truth_teller 🇷🇺

14,213 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

The Kozyrev Doctrine – Why India Turned Away From Russia and Went West. And Why India needs to be Wary of Jumping Back to Moscow. 1. If hell is run by an Indian, there is a special place in it for Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister from 1990 to 1996. 2. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Kozyrev became the new foreign minister of Russia, and supported close ties with the West. He may have been a CIA mole because he single handedly destroyed the decades old Indo-Soviet partnership. 3. As per the Kozyrev Doctrine, the new Russia would no longer give special importance to India but instead would treat India and Pakistan as equals. This Russian foreign policy seemed like it was drafted in Washington DC. 4. The new Russian Doctrine took things too far. When Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao sent his emissary Mani Dixit to the Kremlin to urgently get spare parts for India's armed forces (which depended on Russia for 70% of their requirements), Kozyrev refused to meet him and instead sent a junior diplomat. No guarantees were given about spares. 5. If Pakistan or China had attacked India at that time, India's armed forces would have run out of spares in a week. This was not only a violation of legal contracts but a major betrayal that India's leadership took very seriously. 6. So Pakistan, the country that was responsible for the deaths of 15,000 Soviet lives during the Afghanistan War, was equated with India, a time tested friend. 7. Kozyrev relegated India to a secondary role. And India's leadership was forced to look West. 8. It was under Kozyrev's watch that India diversified away from Russia. Narasimha Rao had no choice but to diversify India's security links as its most crucial erstwhile ally continued to labour in confusion and anxiety over its economic and political status, with no clear signal regarding its foreign policy preferences. 9. Kozyrev currently lives in Miami where he has acquired lots of wealth and a nice tan. He slams Putin to the delight of his American backers (or perhaps CIA handlers). If Kozyrev is indeed an American asset then US intelligence agents deserve Congressional medals for pulling India away from the Russian sphere. 10. Following the Russian betrayal, India splurged billions of dollars on American weapons such as 12 C-130J Super Hercules aircraft ($2 billion), eight P-8I long-range maritime patrol aircraft ($2.1 billion), 10 C-17 Globemaster-III strategic airlift aircraft ($4.1 billion), and 145 ultralight M177 howitzers ($438 million), and 22 Apache attack helicopters plus 15 Chinook heavy-lift choppers ($2.5 billion). 11. The Kremlin has two types of diplomats. The old guard which values Russia's relationship with India and the rest of the world. Vladimir Putin belongs to this group which is currently powerful. 12. The second is the "Look West" group which seeks to build the unviable "Vancouver to Vladivostok Common European Family." Because let's face it, the Anglo Saxon looks down upon the Slav, especially the Russian, as Untermensch - racially inferior. 13. Putin and the old guard know this. The younger Russians are not as aware or do not care about their place on the geopolitical chessboard. All they care about is Starbucks. Many young Russians live in delusion that because they are white the West will welcome them as the last bulwark against the Asian hordes. 14. So the words of Russian diplomat Roman Babushkin hold little value. He is right that unlike the West, Moscow will never impose sanctions against India. But that is true only as long as Putin is around. The next generation of Russian leaders will once again sell their country to the Americans - just like Yeltsin and Kozyrev did. 15. Modi's Multilateralism is the best policy for India. Work with everybody. But do not trust anybody. The US is a future adversary - absorb as much technology as possible from it before the inevitable clash. Russia is unreliable - use it as a source of cheap oil and minerals.
1:13

The Kozyrev Doctrine – Why India Turned Away From Russia and Went West. And Why India needs to be Wary of Jumping Back to Moscow. 1. If hell is run by an Indian, there is a special place in it for Andrei Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister from 1990 to 1996. 2. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Kozyrev became the new foreign minister of Russia, and supported close ties with the West. He may have been a CIA mole because he single handedly destroyed the decades old Indo-Soviet partnership. 3. As per the Kozyrev Doctrine, the new Russia would no longer give special importance to India but instead would treat India and Pakistan as equals. This Russian foreign policy seemed like it was drafted in Washington DC. 4. The new Russian Doctrine took things too far. When Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao sent his emissary Mani Dixit to the Kremlin to urgently get spare parts for India's armed forces (which depended on Russia for 70% of their requirements), Kozyrev refused to meet him and instead sent a junior diplomat. No guarantees were given about spares. 5. If Pakistan or China had attacked India at that time, India's armed forces would have run out of spares in a week. This was not only a violation of legal contracts but a major betrayal that India's leadership took very seriously. 6. So Pakistan, the country that was responsible for the deaths of 15,000 Soviet lives during the Afghanistan War, was equated with India, a time tested friend. 7. Kozyrev relegated India to a secondary role. And India's leadership was forced to look West. 8. It was under Kozyrev's watch that India diversified away from Russia. Narasimha Rao had no choice but to diversify India's security links as its most crucial erstwhile ally continued to labour in confusion and anxiety over its economic and political status, with no clear signal regarding its foreign policy preferences. 9. Kozyrev currently lives in Miami where he has acquired lots of wealth and a nice tan. He slams Putin to the delight of his American backers (or perhaps CIA handlers). If Kozyrev is indeed an American asset then US intelligence agents deserve Congressional medals for pulling India away from the Russian sphere. 10. Following the Russian betrayal, India splurged billions of dollars on American weapons such as 12 C-130J Super Hercules aircraft ($2 billion), eight P-8I long-range maritime patrol aircraft ($2.1 billion), 10 C-17 Globemaster-III strategic airlift aircraft ($4.1 billion), and 145 ultralight M177 howitzers ($438 million), and 22 Apache attack helicopters plus 15 Chinook heavy-lift choppers ($2.5 billion). 11. The Kremlin has two types of diplomats. The old guard which values Russia's relationship with India and the rest of the world. Vladimir Putin belongs to this group which is currently powerful. 12. The second is the "Look West" group which seeks to build the unviable "Vancouver to Vladivostok Common European Family." Because let's face it, the Anglo Saxon looks down upon the Slav, especially the Russian, as Untermensch - racially inferior. 13. Putin and the old guard know this. The younger Russians are not as aware or do not care about their place on the geopolitical chessboard. All they care about is Starbucks. Many young Russians live in delusion that because they are white the West will welcome them as the last bulwark against the Asian hordes. 14. So the words of Russian diplomat Roman Babushkin hold little value. He is right that unlike the West, Moscow will never impose sanctions against India. But that is true only as long as Putin is around. The next generation of Russian leaders will once again sell their country to the Americans - just like Yeltsin and Kozyrev did. 15. Modi's Multilateralism is the best policy for India. Work with everybody. But do not trust anybody. The US is a future adversary - absorb as much technology as possible from it before the inevitable clash. Russia is unreliable - use it as a source of cheap oil and minerals.

Rakesh Krishnan Simha

89,787 просмотров • 1 год назад

Hezbollah has been boasting how it could destroy the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) and its escorts. Lets dive into how Hezbollah Terrorists could attack a US Navy Aircraft carrier in the Med, what could happen, and the possible outcomes, assisted with Command Development Team simulation software. To understand the footage shown, let me break down some basic concepts of modern naval combat: Military ships often use a concept called "EMCON", which stands for EMission CONtrol, or "Radio silence" in laymans terms. Consider it like this: if you are with a flashlight in the night, you can spot a person say 500 Meters away by shining at him with the flashlight. You will however, be able to see that flashlight from many kilometers away, without being seen, even if it is directed at you, giving you the location of the person with the flashlight, without disclosing your presence. So ships really avoid "radio emissions", such as radar. Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) like the Ford CSG WANT Radar coverage for their own safety, but not in a way that their location can be known. This is done by Airplanes that fly in the general vicinity of the CSG, providing coverage, without compromising the CSG location. The US Navy uses the E-2 Hawkeye for this in most cases. In this case here, we are not using the E-2 Hawkeye, but the (likely in Theater anyway) E-3 Sentry from NATO. A system that is likely LESS sophisticated than the cutting edge E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes that were visible on the USS Ford pictures that surfaced recently. We do not simulate any carrier based "Combat Air Patrol" either, to test the "ship based" defenses. The composition of the Ford CSG is modeled using the actual ships listed. The CSG is moving on a nothern course at 15 knots, under full EMCON, 115 miles off the coast. The maximum range of the Russian Bastion-P coastal missle complex is about 100 miles, we have to assume that the US Navy will sail their ships outside of (possible) Hezbollah radar range. We also assume, as this is a time of very heightened alert, that the US Navy has Rules of Engagement that would allow it to shoot down any Hezbollah drones or craft coming at it with apparent hostile intention. I have assumed this to be 50 miles away from the CSG in this scenario. Now lets look at the Hezbollah side. We assume to have 6 Bastion-P complexes, with 2 missles per Transport-Erector-Launcher (TEL). So if it can be figured out where the CSG is, 12 P-800 Oniks missle with speeds over Mach 2 would be able to engage the CSG. The problem however is, that you can not "shoot" at a ship without knowing its location. While this may sound very simple indeed, when the ship you are looking for does not disclose its location voluntarily, you can not go to "marinetraffic" and look for the carrier. You can also not use your airforce, if you do not really have one, like Hezbollah. You can not use Sattelites, if you have none. You can try to use drones, if you know the overall direction, or use radar. Land based Radar? Out of Range. Drones? Yes, lets fly drones to the overall direction, hoping to see the carrier. Satellites? Nope. Wait, lets ask Putin. He will probably be nice enough to us, to have a liasion tell us in real time from a russian sattelite where the CSG is. And thats what we are running with here, as drones will not reach the carrier. A russian sattelite could provide rather real time information on the CSG location, allowing manual targeting. The video will provide you with the results. A US CSG with such powerful escorts will not be fundamentally threatened by the assets of Hezbollah. It will have to defend, but will do so rather easily. At the conclusion of the Engagement, the CSG still has literally 100s of SM-2, SM-6 and ESSM Missles. Note: this is done on commercially available software, the software uses NTDS/APP6 icons, white is air radar range, yellow surface, green sonar. The white cones off the missles are their onboard active radar seeker. If you have any questions understanding any of the things displyed, please ask. Note that this is a hobby analysis with publicly available data and tools, and not military research. Thanks for reading! #usnavy #HezbollahTerrorists #hezbullah #hezbollah #israel #IsraelUnderAttack #ukraine #russia #nato Naval News SubBrief Tyler Rogoway Status-6 (War & Military News) TheIntelFrog @CovertShores Raw Combat log output, starting with Hezbollah detecting CSG via RU Proxy: 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1070 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1149.3nm 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1071 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1149.3nm 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1072 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1149.3nm 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1073 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1145.4nm 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1074 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1153.3nm 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1075 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1148nm 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1073 has been positively identified as: DDG 63 Carney [Arleigh Burke Flight I] - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1121 nm) 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1071 has been positively identified as: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1125 nm) 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1070 has been positively identified as: CVN 78 Gerald R. Ford - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1125 nm) 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1072 has been positively identified as: DDG 61 Ramage [Arleigh Burke Flight I] - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1125 nm) 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1074 has been positively identified as: DDG 80 Roosevelt [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA] - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1129 nm) 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1075 has been positively identified as: CG 60 Normandy [Ticonderoga Baseline 3, VLS] - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1124 nm) 13/10/2023 12:47:23 - [USA] Contact: BOGEY #24 has been classified as: Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] - Determined as: Unfriendly (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: AN/SPY-1D(V) MFR [ABM Mod]] [NCTR mode] at 56.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:47:23 - [USA] Contact: BOGEY #26 has been classified as: Shahed-161 UAV - Determined as: Unfriendly (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: AN/SPY-1D(V) MFR [ABM Mod]] [NCTR mode] at 34.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3507 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 70deg - 95.2nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3508 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 96.4nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3509 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 70deg - 95.6nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3510 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 96.8nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3511 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 96.1nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3512 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 96.4nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3513 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 70deg - 97.1nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3514 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 98nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3515 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 70deg - 97.2nm 13/10/2023 12:48:12 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3576 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 68deg - 91nm 13/10/2023 12:48:12 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3577 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 89.9nm 13/10/2023 12:48:12 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3578 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 90.7nm 13/10/2023 12:48:13 - Side 'Hezbollah' is now considered HOSTILE to USA 13/10/2023 12:48:13 - [USA] Contact: Shahed-161 UAV #26 has been manually marked as hostile! 13/10/2023 12:48:20 - [USA] Contact: BOGEY #22 has been manually marked as hostile! 13/10/2023 12:48:55 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SAM #1238 - Detected by Shahed-161 UAV [Sensors: Generic IRST] at 266deg - 10nm 13/10/2023 12:48:59 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SAM #1243 - Detected by Shahed-161 UAV [Sensors: Generic IRST] at 266deg - 8.6nm 13/10/2023 12:49:00 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SAM #1245 - Detected by Shahed-161 UAV [Sensors: Generic IRST] at 234deg - 13.3nm 13/10/2023 12:49:17 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IA #40 is attacking Shahed-161 UAV with a base PH of 90%. PH adjusted for weapon speed: 36% (pure-aerodynamic attitude control). Intercept angle is 304 deg - hit probability adjusted to 25%.Final PH: 25%. Result: 30 - MISS 13/10/2023 12:49:17 - [Hezbollah] Hezbollah :Contact SAM #1238 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:25 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SAM #1271 - Detected by Shahed-161 UAV [Sensors: Generic IRST] at 248deg - 13.1nm 13/10/2023 12:49:34 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IB #41 is attacking Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] with a base PH of 90%. Intercept angle is 51 deg - hit probability adjusted to 65%.Final PH: 65%. Result: 12 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:49:34 - [Hezbollah] Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] has suffered weapon damage: 89.9 DPs 13/10/2023 12:49:34 - [Hezbollah] Hezbollah :Contact SAM #1271 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:34 - [Hezbollah] Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] has been destroyed! 13/10/2023 12:49:34 - [USA] Contact Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] #23 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:39 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IB #42 is attacking Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] with a base PH of 90%. Intercept angle is 313 deg - hit probability adjusted to 66%.Final PH: 66%. Result: 11 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:49:39 - [Hezbollah] Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] has suffered weapon damage: 89.9 DPs 13/10/2023 12:49:39 - [Hezbollah] Hezbollah :Contact SAM #1243 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:39 - [Hezbollah] Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] has been destroyed! 13/10/2023 12:49:39 - [USA] Contact Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] #24 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:43 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IB #43 is attacking Shahed-161 UAV with a base PH of 90%. Intercept angle is 65 deg - hit probability adjusted to 57%.Final PH: 57%. Result: 11 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:49:43 - [Hezbollah] Shahed-161 UAV has suffered weapon damage: 89.9 DPs 13/10/2023 12:49:43 - [Hezbollah] Hezbollah :Contact SAM #1245 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:43 - [Hezbollah] Shahed-161 UAV has been destroyed! 13/10/2023 12:49:43 - [USA] Contact Shahed-161 UAV #25 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:54 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SAM #1301 - Detected by Shahed-161 UAV [Sensors: Generic IRST] at 258deg - 10.5nm 13/10/2023 12:50:10 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IA #44 is attacking Shahed-161 UAV with a base PH of 90%. PH adjusted for weapon speed: 83% (pure-aerodynamic attitude control). Target signature modifier: -5% (Director [Active Radar Seeker] has tech-gen: Late 2010s). Intercept angle is 316 deg - hit probability adjusted to 59%.Final PH: 59%. Result: 42 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:50:10 - [Hezbollah] Shahed-161 UAV has suffered weapon damage: 89 DPs 13/10/2023 12:50:10 - [Hezbollah] Hezbollah :Contact SAM #1301 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:50:10 - [Hezbollah] Shahed-161 UAV has been destroyed! 13/10/2023 12:50:10 - [USA] Contact Shahed-161 UAV #26 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:51:58 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3507 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:51:59 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3508 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 13.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:51:59 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3509 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:51:59 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3511 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:00 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3510 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 13.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:00 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3512 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:04 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3513 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:04 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3577 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:05 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3514 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 13.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:05 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3515 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:06 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3576 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 13.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:06 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3578 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:08 - Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #45 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #28 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 357 deg - hit probability adjusted to 79%.Final PH: 79%. Result: 34 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:08 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3507 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:09 - Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #46 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #29 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 358 deg - hit probability adjusted to 79%.Final PH: 79%. Result: 31 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:09 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3508 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:11 - Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #49 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #32 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 358 deg - hit probability adjusted to 79%.Final PH: 79%. Result: 36 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:11 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3511 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:11 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #52 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #31 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 355 deg - hit probability adjusted to 78%.Final PH: 78%. Result: 9 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:11 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #57 has been redirected to new target: GuidedWeapon #3515 13/10/2023 12:52:11 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3510 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:12 - Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #50 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #30 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 356 deg - hit probability adjusted to 78%.Final PH: 78%. Result: 25 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:12 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3509 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:12 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #55 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #33 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 355 deg - hit probability adjusted to 78%.Final PH: 78%. Result: 20 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:12 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #59 has been redirected to new target: GuidedWeapon #3576 13/10/2023 12:52:12 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3512 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:13 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #47 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:14 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #48 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:15 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #57 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #36 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 0 deg - hit probability adjusted to 80%.Final PH: 80%. Result: 71 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:15 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3515 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #60 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #34 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 360 deg - hit probability adjusted to 80%.Final PH: 80%. Result: 49 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #65 has no eligible alternative target to be redirected to... 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3513 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #51 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #54 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #58 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #59 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #38 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 357 deg - hit probability adjusted to 78%.Final PH: 78%. Result: 75 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3576 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #63 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #38 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 359 deg - hit probability adjusted to 79%.Final PH: 79%. Result: 57 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #70 has been redirected to new target: GuidedWeapon #3514 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3577 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:17 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #53 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:17 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #65 has no eligible alternative target to be redirected to... 13/10/2023 12:52:17 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #56 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:17 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #61 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:18 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #70 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #35 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 358 deg - hit probability adjusted to 79%.Final PH: 79%. Result: 63 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:18 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3514 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:18 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IA #73 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #39 with a base PH of 90%. Intercept angle is 355 deg - hit probability adjusted to 88%.Final PH: 88%. Result: 34 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:18 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3578 has been lost.
9:08

Hezbollah has been boasting how it could destroy the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) and its escorts. Lets dive into how Hezbollah Terrorists could attack a US Navy Aircraft carrier in the Med, what could happen, and the possible outcomes, assisted with Command Development Team simulation software. To understand the footage shown, let me break down some basic concepts of modern naval combat: Military ships often use a concept called "EMCON", which stands for EMission CONtrol, or "Radio silence" in laymans terms. Consider it like this: if you are with a flashlight in the night, you can spot a person say 500 Meters away by shining at him with the flashlight. You will however, be able to see that flashlight from many kilometers away, without being seen, even if it is directed at you, giving you the location of the person with the flashlight, without disclosing your presence. So ships really avoid "radio emissions", such as radar. Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) like the Ford CSG WANT Radar coverage for their own safety, but not in a way that their location can be known. This is done by Airplanes that fly in the general vicinity of the CSG, providing coverage, without compromising the CSG location. The US Navy uses the E-2 Hawkeye for this in most cases. In this case here, we are not using the E-2 Hawkeye, but the (likely in Theater anyway) E-3 Sentry from NATO. A system that is likely LESS sophisticated than the cutting edge E-2D Advanced Hawkeyes that were visible on the USS Ford pictures that surfaced recently. We do not simulate any carrier based "Combat Air Patrol" either, to test the "ship based" defenses. The composition of the Ford CSG is modeled using the actual ships listed. The CSG is moving on a nothern course at 15 knots, under full EMCON, 115 miles off the coast. The maximum range of the Russian Bastion-P coastal missle complex is about 100 miles, we have to assume that the US Navy will sail their ships outside of (possible) Hezbollah radar range. We also assume, as this is a time of very heightened alert, that the US Navy has Rules of Engagement that would allow it to shoot down any Hezbollah drones or craft coming at it with apparent hostile intention. I have assumed this to be 50 miles away from the CSG in this scenario. Now lets look at the Hezbollah side. We assume to have 6 Bastion-P complexes, with 2 missles per Transport-Erector-Launcher (TEL). So if it can be figured out where the CSG is, 12 P-800 Oniks missle with speeds over Mach 2 would be able to engage the CSG. The problem however is, that you can not "shoot" at a ship without knowing its location. While this may sound very simple indeed, when the ship you are looking for does not disclose its location voluntarily, you can not go to "marinetraffic" and look for the carrier. You can also not use your airforce, if you do not really have one, like Hezbollah. You can not use Sattelites, if you have none. You can try to use drones, if you know the overall direction, or use radar. Land based Radar? Out of Range. Drones? Yes, lets fly drones to the overall direction, hoping to see the carrier. Satellites? Nope. Wait, lets ask Putin. He will probably be nice enough to us, to have a liasion tell us in real time from a russian sattelite where the CSG is. And thats what we are running with here, as drones will not reach the carrier. A russian sattelite could provide rather real time information on the CSG location, allowing manual targeting. The video will provide you with the results. A US CSG with such powerful escorts will not be fundamentally threatened by the assets of Hezbollah. It will have to defend, but will do so rather easily. At the conclusion of the Engagement, the CSG still has literally 100s of SM-2, SM-6 and ESSM Missles. Note: this is done on commercially available software, the software uses NTDS/APP6 icons, white is air radar range, yellow surface, green sonar. The white cones off the missles are their onboard active radar seeker. If you have any questions understanding any of the things displyed, please ask. Note that this is a hobby analysis with publicly available data and tools, and not military research. Thanks for reading! #usnavy #HezbollahTerrorists #hezbullah #hezbollah #israel #IsraelUnderAttack #ukraine #russia #nato Naval News SubBrief Tyler Rogoway Status-6 (War & Military News) TheIntelFrog @CovertShores Raw Combat log output, starting with Hezbollah detecting CSG via RU Proxy: 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1070 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1149.3nm 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1071 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1149.3nm 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1072 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1149.3nm 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1073 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1145.4nm 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1074 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1153.3nm 13/10/2023 12:46:13 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SKUNK #1075 - Detected by Resurs P1 [Sensors: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at 177deg - 1148nm 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1073 has been positively identified as: DDG 63 Carney [Arleigh Burke Flight I] - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1121 nm) 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1071 has been positively identified as: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1125 nm) 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1070 has been positively identified as: CVN 78 Gerald R. Ford - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1125 nm) 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1072 has been positively identified as: DDG 61 Ramage [Arleigh Burke Flight I] - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1125 nm) 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1074 has been positively identified as: DDG 80 Roosevelt [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA] - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1129 nm) 13/10/2023 12:46:23 - [Hezbollah] Contact: SKUNK #1075 has been positively identified as: CG 60 Normandy [Ticonderoga Baseline 3, VLS] - Determined as: Hostile (ID by: Resurs P1 [Sensor: Generic Satellite Visual Camera] at Estimated 1124 nm) 13/10/2023 12:47:23 - [USA] Contact: BOGEY #24 has been classified as: Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] - Determined as: Unfriendly (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: AN/SPY-1D(V) MFR [ABM Mod]] [NCTR mode] at 56.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:47:23 - [USA] Contact: BOGEY #26 has been classified as: Shahed-161 UAV - Determined as: Unfriendly (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: AN/SPY-1D(V) MFR [ABM Mod]] [NCTR mode] at 34.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3507 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 70deg - 95.2nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3508 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 96.4nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3509 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 70deg - 95.6nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3510 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 96.8nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3511 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 96.1nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3512 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 96.4nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3513 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 70deg - 97.1nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3514 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 98nm 13/10/2023 12:47:52 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3515 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 70deg - 97.2nm 13/10/2023 12:48:12 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3576 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 68deg - 91nm 13/10/2023 12:48:12 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3577 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 89.9nm 13/10/2023 12:48:12 - [USA] New contact! Designated VAMPIRE #3578 - Detected by E-3A Sentry [Sensors: AN/APY-2 RSIP] at 69deg - 90.7nm 13/10/2023 12:48:13 - Side 'Hezbollah' is now considered HOSTILE to USA 13/10/2023 12:48:13 - [USA] Contact: Shahed-161 UAV #26 has been manually marked as hostile! 13/10/2023 12:48:20 - [USA] Contact: BOGEY #22 has been manually marked as hostile! 13/10/2023 12:48:55 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SAM #1238 - Detected by Shahed-161 UAV [Sensors: Generic IRST] at 266deg - 10nm 13/10/2023 12:48:59 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SAM #1243 - Detected by Shahed-161 UAV [Sensors: Generic IRST] at 266deg - 8.6nm 13/10/2023 12:49:00 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SAM #1245 - Detected by Shahed-161 UAV [Sensors: Generic IRST] at 234deg - 13.3nm 13/10/2023 12:49:17 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IA #40 is attacking Shahed-161 UAV with a base PH of 90%. PH adjusted for weapon speed: 36% (pure-aerodynamic attitude control). Intercept angle is 304 deg - hit probability adjusted to 25%.Final PH: 25%. Result: 30 - MISS 13/10/2023 12:49:17 - [Hezbollah] Hezbollah :Contact SAM #1238 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:25 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SAM #1271 - Detected by Shahed-161 UAV [Sensors: Generic IRST] at 248deg - 13.1nm 13/10/2023 12:49:34 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IB #41 is attacking Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] with a base PH of 90%. Intercept angle is 51 deg - hit probability adjusted to 65%.Final PH: 65%. Result: 12 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:49:34 - [Hezbollah] Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] has suffered weapon damage: 89.9 DPs 13/10/2023 12:49:34 - [Hezbollah] Hezbollah :Contact SAM #1271 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:34 - [Hezbollah] Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] has been destroyed! 13/10/2023 12:49:34 - [USA] Contact Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] #23 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:39 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IB #42 is attacking Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] with a base PH of 90%. Intercept angle is 313 deg - hit probability adjusted to 66%.Final PH: 66%. Result: 11 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:49:39 - [Hezbollah] Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] has suffered weapon damage: 89.9 DPs 13/10/2023 12:49:39 - [Hezbollah] Hezbollah :Contact SAM #1243 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:39 - [Hezbollah] Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] has been destroyed! 13/10/2023 12:49:39 - [USA] Contact Ababil-3 UAV [Mod. Seeker 2D Copy] #24 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:43 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IB #43 is attacking Shahed-161 UAV with a base PH of 90%. Intercept angle is 65 deg - hit probability adjusted to 57%.Final PH: 57%. Result: 11 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:49:43 - [Hezbollah] Shahed-161 UAV has suffered weapon damage: 89.9 DPs 13/10/2023 12:49:43 - [Hezbollah] Hezbollah :Contact SAM #1245 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:43 - [Hezbollah] Shahed-161 UAV has been destroyed! 13/10/2023 12:49:43 - [USA] Contact Shahed-161 UAV #25 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:49:54 - [Hezbollah] New contact! Designated SAM #1301 - Detected by Shahed-161 UAV [Sensors: Generic IRST] at 258deg - 10.5nm 13/10/2023 12:50:10 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IA #44 is attacking Shahed-161 UAV with a base PH of 90%. PH adjusted for weapon speed: 83% (pure-aerodynamic attitude control). Target signature modifier: -5% (Director [Active Radar Seeker] has tech-gen: Late 2010s). Intercept angle is 316 deg - hit probability adjusted to 59%.Final PH: 59%. Result: 42 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:50:10 - [Hezbollah] Shahed-161 UAV has suffered weapon damage: 89 DPs 13/10/2023 12:50:10 - [Hezbollah] Hezbollah :Contact SAM #1301 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:50:10 - [Hezbollah] Shahed-161 UAV has been destroyed! 13/10/2023 12:50:10 - [USA] Contact Shahed-161 UAV #26 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:51:58 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3507 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:51:59 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3508 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 13.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:51:59 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3509 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:51:59 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3511 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:00 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3510 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 13.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:00 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3512 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:04 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3513 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:04 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3577 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:05 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3514 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 13.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:05 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3515 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:06 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3576 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 13.9 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:06 - [USA] Contact: VAMPIRE #3578 has been type-classified as: GuidedWeapon (Classification by: DDG 116 Thomas Hudner [Arleigh Burke Flight IIA Technology Insertion] [Sensor: Mk46 Mod 1 [CCD]] at 14 nm) 13/10/2023 12:52:08 - Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #45 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #28 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 357 deg - hit probability adjusted to 79%.Final PH: 79%. Result: 34 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:08 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3507 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:09 - Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #46 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #29 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 358 deg - hit probability adjusted to 79%.Final PH: 79%. Result: 31 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:09 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3508 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:11 - Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #49 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #32 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 358 deg - hit probability adjusted to 79%.Final PH: 79%. Result: 36 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:11 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3511 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:11 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #52 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #31 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 355 deg - hit probability adjusted to 78%.Final PH: 78%. Result: 9 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:11 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #57 has been redirected to new target: GuidedWeapon #3515 13/10/2023 12:52:11 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3510 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:12 - Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #50 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #30 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 356 deg - hit probability adjusted to 78%.Final PH: 78%. Result: 25 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:12 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3509 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:12 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #55 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #33 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 355 deg - hit probability adjusted to 78%.Final PH: 78%. Result: 20 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:12 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #59 has been redirected to new target: GuidedWeapon #3576 13/10/2023 12:52:12 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3512 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:13 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #47 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:14 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #48 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:15 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #57 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #36 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 0 deg - hit probability adjusted to 80%.Final PH: 80%. Result: 71 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:15 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3515 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #60 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #34 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 360 deg - hit probability adjusted to 80%.Final PH: 80%. Result: 49 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #65 has no eligible alternative target to be redirected to... 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3513 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #51 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #54 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #58 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #59 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #38 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 357 deg - hit probability adjusted to 78%.Final PH: 78%. Result: 75 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3576 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #63 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #38 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 359 deg - hit probability adjusted to 79%.Final PH: 79%. Result: 57 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #70 has been redirected to new target: GuidedWeapon #3514 13/10/2023 12:52:16 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3577 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:17 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #53 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:17 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #65 has no eligible alternative target to be redirected to... 13/10/2023 12:52:17 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #56 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:17 - [USA] Weapon: RIM-162D ESSM #61 is running blind for more than 5 sec... self-destructing. 13/10/2023 12:52:18 - Weapon: RIM-162A ESSM #70 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #35 with a base PH of 90%. Target speed modifier: -10%. Intercept angle is 358 deg - hit probability adjusted to 79%.Final PH: 79%. Result: 63 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:18 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3514 has been lost. 13/10/2023 12:52:18 - Weapon: RIM-174A ERAM SM-6 Blk IA #73 is attacking SSC-5 Stooge [P-800 Yakhont] #39 with a base PH of 90%. Intercept angle is 355 deg - hit probability adjusted to 88%.Final PH: 88%. Result: 34 - HIT 13/10/2023 12:52:18 - [USA] Contact GuidedWeapon #3578 has been lost.

C Schmitz

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