Azov commander Prokopenko: Russian mobilisation has already begun covertly and will go open after Russia's elections at the end of September. By the start of winter Russia can mobilise up to 600,000 troops and put them on the front line by year end. 1/

Prokopenko: Before the autumn campaign ends and the leaves fall, Russia will try to seize at least one city on the Dobropillia, Kostiantynivka, Druzhkivka, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk and Sviatohirsk line to build a bridgehead. We will not let it. 2/

Prokopenko: In October rain, fog and shorter daylight will push Russia from small foot groups back to heavy armour and mechanised breakthroughs. Last year we caught those columns in their staging areas and hit them 40 to 50km deep. Our corps can destroy 50 vehicles a day. 3/

Prokopenko: Russia may use part of its new mobilised reserve to pin down Ukrainian forces on our northern border. The aim is a buffer zone in Sumy and Chernihiv oblasts that stops us moving reserves, and continued terror against Kyiv. 4X

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Before gross vs net, there is an even more basic question: How confident should we be in the 600,000 figure itself? Prokopenko says Russia could rapidly mobilize up to 600,000 before winter and that these forces could begin appearing on the front by year-end. But Ukraine’s own intelligence briefing in August described a different timeline: 300,000 additional personnel in 2026 and another 300,000 in 2027. That is a major difference. And mobilizing 600,000 is not just a manpower decision. A buildup on that scale should leave observable signs: • mobilization orders and regional quotas • expansion of training capacity • more instructors and officers • accommodation and transport • equipment and uniforms • formation or reinforcement of units So what evidence supports the faster 600,000 scenario? And if Ukrainian intelligence already sees preparations on that scale, what is Ukraine planning to change in response? Only after establishing that the 600,000 estimate is credible does the next question become: how much of that gross intake turns into net effective combat power after training, losses and other attrition?

Si ya tienen toda esa información y ya ha pasado cuál es la solución que tomaste para era evitar, suavizar o eliminar ese cuello de botella ?