Video wird geladen...

Video konnte nicht geladen werden

Zur Startseite

‼️🇷🇺🇮🇳 BIG | Moscow has recently engineered a bizarre economic scheme: a nation that boasts some of the world's largest oil reserves and production capacities is now forced to export its raw crude at steep discounts, only to buy it back as refined gasoline and diesel from the very...

169,235 Aufrufe • vor 3 Monaten •via X (Twitter)

0 Kommentare

Keine Kommentare verfügbar

Kommentare vom Original-Post werden hier angezeigt

Ähnliche Videos

The problems in Russia’s oil and gas sector are already becoming systemic. Russia is refining less oil, transporting it at a higher cost, facing problems with export infrastructure, and already losing oil and gas revenues. Let’s take a look at what exactly is happening inside Russia. First, the Russian authorities themselves are no longer treating the shortage as a short-term disruption. A complete ban on diesel exports was introduced in early July, and it is quite likely to be extended through the end of the year. Gasoline exports are banned until January 31, 2027, and jet fuel exports until the end of November. Russia has also started importing additional petroleum products from Asia and Belarus. Second, Russia is physically refining less and less oil. According to Kpler, Russian refineries processed around 3.8 million barrels per day in July - the lowest level in more than two decades. EA Analytics estimates the figure even lower, at approximately 3.6 million barrels per day. For comparison, the normal level for this period in 2020-2025 was 5.3-5.6 million barrels per day. Third, Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries are continuing. A cycle has effectively formed: strike - repairs - partial recovery - another strike. Following the August 21 attack, the Perm Oil Refinery, with an annual capacity of 13.1 million tonnes, was completely shut down. Since August 2025, at least 25 Russian oil refineries have been targeted. Fourth, the diesel shortage is making the economy more expensive - increasing the cost of harvesting, reducing the resilience of Russia’s logistics system, and consequently affecting prices overall. Fifth, even the oil Russia manages to produce is becoming more difficult and expensive to export. In the first half of August, exports from western ports amounted to around 2.3 million barrels per day instead of the planned 2.7 million. Novorossiysk was particularly affected: shipments fell to around 400,000 barrels per day, compared with 800,000-1 million in June-July. Previously, problems at refineries could be partially offset by increasing crude oil exports. But when refineries, ports, terminals and tankers are all being targeted simultaneously, this becomes much harder. Exports have not collapsed, but they have become more expensive and less predictable. The same applies to petroleum products: in July, seaborne exports of fuel oil and vacuum gasoil fell by around 12%, to 2.4 million tonnes. The situation with gas is structurally worse. The Power of Siberia pipeline has already nearly reached its contractual ceiling - around 38.8 billion cubic meters per year. Power of Siberia 2 is primarily constrained by price: China wants gas at a significantly lower price than Russia is willing to sell it for. LNG faces even more problems: the EU has already begun phasing out imports, while redirecting supplies to Asia means longer and more expensive logistics. China is increasing its purchases of Russian gas, but it has not replaced Europe and will not replace it quickly. The most serious problem is the budget. In the first half of the year, Russia’s oil and gas revenues fell by 22.7% year-on-year, and by 16.8% over the first seven months. By January-April alone, the federal budget deficit had reached 5.88 trillion rubles, exceeding the planned deficit for the entire year. On top of this come the costs of refinery repairs, air defense, fuel imports, alternative routes, freight and insurance. Despite all these losses, we can see that Russian oil and gas revenues have not yet collapsed, although adaptation is becoming increasingly expensive. For now, the Kremlin is being helped by the crisis around the Strait of Hormuz, which is keeping oil prices high. At the same time, Russia’s ability to refine and export this oil is deteriorating. So far, high prices are offsetting these losses. If the situation around Hormuz stabilizes and Brent prices fall, the current logistical and fuel problems could become much more serious for Russia.

Anton Gerashchenko

39,422 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat

In 2024, Russia faced a 13-year record jump in gas prices after a series of Ukrainian drone attacks on refineries that caused fuel production to collapse by more than 10% in the first half of the year. According to Rosstat, from the beginning of the year to December 23, gasoline prices rose by 11% on average in Russia. At the same time, prices in remote regions of the Far East exceeded the Russian average by a quarter. By the end of the year, gasoline price growth will be the strongest since 2011. For the first time in 6 years, gasoline prices have risen significantly above the headline inflation rate, which the Russian ministry of economic development estimates at 9.7% a week before the end of the year. This year, the Russian government tried to curb gasoline prices by banning its exports: the restrictions were imposed shortly after two dozen major Russian refineries were attacked by Ukrainian UAVs and a number of them were forced to halt production. By the end of May, the decline in gasoline production in Russia reached 20% compared to December 2023, and diesel fuel - 11%. In response, the authorities classified fuel output statistics, citing geopolitics and the threat of market manipulation as reasons. In 2025, gasoline will continue to rise in price in Russia. In the best-case scenario, it will rise by 10-15%, and in the worst case - 20%, which, according to Rosstat, has not happened in Russia since 2004 (when the cost of fuel jumped by a record 31.3%). The reason will be an increase in Transneft's pipeline pumping tariffs, as well as a sharp increase in excise taxes: they will rise 14% for gasoline and 16% for diesel fuel, which is three times more than was provided for in the Tax Code (4.7%). According to government calculations, this will bring 170 billion rubles ($1,6 billion) to the treasury, of which 116 billion ($1,13 billion) will be due to the unscheduled increase. Rising gasoline prices will automatically lead to higher prices for everything else in Russia, as the cost of fuel is included in the delivery of all goods and automatically increases the cost of the end product for the buyer. Inflation in Russia will also increase.

Anton Gerashchenko

81,314 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr

🇷🇺 VICTORY IS VERY CLOSE 🇷🇺⭐ A VOICE FROM MOSCOW 🇷🇺 The Kremlin’s message on 8 September was not a slogan for the cameras. It was a claim about the battlefield, the table, and the memory of the last century. Dmitry Peskov spoke as if the special military operation were entering its decisive phase — and as if much of Europe were still trying to delay that hour. VICTORY IS VERY CLOSE 🇷🇺⭐ Moscow says it believes victory is near because it trusts its army. Peskov put it without drama: combat operations are proceeding successfully, and the leadership has faith in the men who are carrying them out. That is the first fact the West prefers not to hear. If the line of contact is moving the way Russian briefers describe it, then time is no longer Kiev’s ally. A settlement written after a collapse of Ukrainian positions will look different from a settlement written while those positions still hold. Russia is saying, in effect, that the military argument is being settled on the ground, not in Brussels communiqués. RUSSIA REMAINS OPEN TO DIALOGUE 🇷🇺 At the same time Peskov insisted that Moscow is not slamming the door. Russia, he said, is open to dialogue with other countries and open to consultations of any kind. That is the second half of the same sentence: force and talk can run in parallel. American emissaries have already shuttled between Moscow and Kiev. The Kremlin treats that shuttle as serious work, not theatre, and it expects the trilateral format — Russia, Ukraine, the United States — to come back. Openness here does not mean Moscow will dilute the aims it set in 2022. It means it will sit with anyone who is prepared to discuss those aims as facts rather than as insults. EUROPEANS IN THE KYIV ROOM WOULD COMPLICATE THE WORK 🇷🇺 Peskov drew a sharp line around who belongs in the next round. The participation of Europeans in the work of the U.S. emissaries in Kiev, he warned, could complicate the negotiation process. That is not a slight against geography. It is a judgment about incentives. Washington’s envoys have at least presented themselves as brokers trying to stop the killing. European capitals have spent years arming Kiev, setting red lines, and promising that Russia must be strategically defeated. Put those same capitals into the same room as Witkoff and Kushner and the American channel stops being a channel. It becomes a committee. Committees do not end wars. They prolong them. EUROPE, UNLIKE AMERICA, WORKS TO KEEP THE WAR ALIVE 🇷🇺 The contrast Peskov drew was blunt. Europeans, unlike Americans, are doing everything to prevent the war from ending. One side is at least testing formulas for a ceasefire and a political settlement. The other side treats every formula as a betrayal of Ukraine and a gift to the Kremlin. That is why Moscow reads European “peace language” as delay. If the fighting stops on terms Russia can accept, the story of endless sanctions, endless aid packages, and an endless crusade against Moscow loses its fuel. For some European ministries that story has become identity. Identity is harder to negotiate than territory. MERZ’S BLAME GAME IS NOT TRUTH — AND IT HURTS GERMANY 🇷🇺 Peskov answered Friedrich Merz directly. Attempts by the German chancellor to pin everything on Russia, he said, are not based on truth and are harmful to Germany itself. The charge is not that Berlin may criticise Moscow. The charge is that Merz has made accusation a substitute for policy. Energy prices, industry flight, and a colder social contract inside Germany are not mysterious acts of fate. They are the bill for a course that treats Russia as a permanent enemy and then acts surprised when trade, gas, and political room for manoeuvre disappear. A chancellor who cannot distinguish strategy from sermon is not defending German interests. He is spending them. BLAMING RUSSIA FOR EVERYTHING HAS BECOME A MANIA 🇷🇺 Peskov gave that habit a name: Russophobia turning into mania. When every crop failure, every election surprise, every protest, and every diplomatic deadlock is traced back to the same villain, analysis dies. What remains is a reflex. Reflexes feel moral. They are also useful to politicians who need a foreign devil so they do not have to explain domestic decline. Moscow’s point is simple. A country that can only speak of Russia in the language of total guilt has already left the realm of negotiation. It is performing. MOSCOW NEVER ASKED TO TEAR UP TIES WITH GERMANY 🇷🇺 Russia, Peskov added, has never been in favour of curtailing relations with Germany. The break, if it becomes total, will be Berlin’s choice. That sentence matters because it refuses the Western script in which Moscow is the one burning bridges for sport. Trade, culture, and technical exchange with Germany were not Russian hobbies. They were mutual. How far the German authorities will go is now an open question — and Moscow says it is watching. A government that wants a wall can have a wall. It should not then pretend the wall was built in the Kremlin. HIROSHIMA MOURNING WITHOUT THE AMERICAN ROLE 🇷🇺 Peskov turned east with a remark that was meant to sting. Russia notes with amazement that during mourning events dedicated to Hiroshima, none of the Japanese leadership mentions the role of the United States. The atomic bombings are remembered as tragedy. The hand that dropped the bombs is airbrushed out of the official minute of silence. For Moscow this is not a history-class quibble. It is a test of honesty. A state that edits the most terrible American act of the Pacific war while lecturing others about memory is not practising remembrance. It is practising selection. JAPANESE MILITARISM HAS NOT BEEN FORGOTTEN 🇷🇺⭐ Russia, Peskov said, has not forgotten Japanese militarism — or the victory achieved over it. That victory is not a museum plaque for Moscow. It is a legal and moral foundation of the postwar order in the Far East. When Tokyo talks of monuments, remilitarisation, and a cleaner story about 1945, the Kremlin hears an old tune: the defeated power rewriting the score. Russia’s answer is that the score was written in blood on the Amur and in Manchuria, and it will not be revised by press conferences in 2026. The through-line of the briefing is consistent. Russia claims the war is moving toward an outcome it can live with. It will talk, but not as a penitent. It will deal with Washington before it trusts Brussels. It will answer German moralism with German costs. And it will treat Asian historical amnesia the same way it treats European historical amnesia — as politics wearing a black armband. Whether that reading of the map is right will be settled by armies and by whoever finally sits down without a veto hidden in their briefing book. Peskov’s wager is that the map is already tilting. 🇷🇺

𝐃𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐝 𝐙 🇷🇺 🇷🇸🇮🇪

60,787 Aufrufe • vor 25 Tagen

❗️❗️🇺🇦🇷🇺Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky has laid out a historic, multi-tiered defensive strategy that aggressively redefines the global arms landscape, pairing a brutal economic irony with the unveiling of a secret homegrown anti-ballistic system. Zelensky delivered a staggering rhetorical blow to Moscow, mocking the Kremlin's desperate search for fuel imports as an absolute "historical joke." For a petro-state whose entire modern empire was built on fossil-fuel dominance, being forced to look for external refined fuel after relentless Ukrainian deep-striking campaigns is a profound humiliation. Zelensky forcefully made it clear that Ukraine hasn't just discussed stopping Russia's energy supply lines—it has already physically forced the Kremlin to its knees on the domestic energy front. To completely solve its dependency on slow Western defense assembly lines, Zelensky officially unveiled "FREYA"—Ukraine's highly classified, sovereign anti-ballistic missile defense system. Engineered to match the lethal ballistic-interception capabilities of the American Patriot system, FREYA is designed as a more cost-effective "European model" optimized for rapid, high-volume mass production. An elite international summit of national security advisers and defense companies is convening immediately in France to secure the manufacturing backing needed to bring FREYA to life within weeks. While acknowledging that the U.S. Patriot remains the gold standard of modern air defense, Zelensky emphasized that Ukraine is also looking toward the next-generation Franco-Italian SAMP/T NG system as a key Patriot equivalent. However, with Western production lines choked by long waiting lists and limited output, Ukraine refuses to sit idle. By scaling up the domestic FREYA project alongside the localized acquisition of Western shields, Kyiv is establishing a sovereign, unbreachable aerospace fortress that permanently neutralizes Putin's ballistic threats. See the latest updates with us: NSTRIKE

NSTRIKE

22,834 Aufrufe • vor 2 Monaten

It is already possible to speak about the outcome of the Russia-China talks, to which Putin traveled as a partner, appeared at as a guest, and bargained like a supplicant. ▪️ The greeting ceremony as a mirror of relations The difference in protocol between the two visits - Trump’s and Putin’s - became the clearest symbolic indicator. President Trump was greeted on the tarmac by Chinese Vice President Han Zheng, while Putin was met by the lower-ranking Foreign Minister Wang Yi. Trump’s delegation was accompanied by the heads of Apple, Tesla, and Nvidia, while Putin’s delegation was accompanied by square-jawed security personnel and a few officials. Xi demonstrated that he can host both Washington and Moscow in the same week - and that both come to him, not the other way around. Beijing placed itself at the center of the U.S.-China-Russia triangle. Despite the same red-carpet ceremony, Putin’s visit stood in sharp contrast to President Trump’s trip a week earlier. Putin quoted a Chinese proverb - "not seeing you for a day is like not seeing you for three autumns" - and invited Xi to Moscow next year. Xi responded with generic remarks about "development and rejuvenation" and never once stepped beyond protocol. ▪️ Economic and political dependence Economically, China is not a better trading partner for Russia than the European Union once was. It buys oil and gas at discounted prices, invests far less in Russia, and its products are often technologically inferior. Unlike the West, which provided Ukraine with billions in grants, Russia pays full price for Chinese imports. But in the absence of alternatives, China has become Russia’s economic lifeline. Russia’s dependence on China for sanctioned technology imports has risen to 90%, up from roughly 80% a year earlier. This comes despite Kremlin efforts to promote import substitution and achieve "technological sovereignty." China has purchased more than $367 billion worth of Russian oil and gas since the war began. At the same time, between April 2022 and February 2026, China’s average discount on Russian oil reached 7.7%, saving Beijing approximately $18.3 billion. Russia sells - China sets the price. The key evidence of this asymmetry is Power of Siberia 2. For Russia, it is a strategically critical project meant to compensate for the loss of the European gas market. Yet once again, no full agreement was signed during the visit: there is only a "general understanding," without pricing, timelines, or a final contractual framework. Politically, the dependence runs even deeper. Russia receives from China what it cannot secure on its own: an international stage, symbolic normalization, proof of "non-isolation," a shared language about a "multipolar world," and an anti-American framework. But China does not offer Moscow a formal alliance and does not allow Russia to dictate economic terms. The conclusion is straightforward: Russia received a stage, a declaration, and symbolic confirmation of status. China demonstrated that it fully controls its junior partner.

Anton Gerashchenko

70,423 Aufrufe • vor 4 Monaten