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Creating COM hijacking payloads has never been easier than with RustPack! With COM Hijacking, you can persist on a target system by 'living' in trusted user processes, such as the Chrome browser. You only need to bring one DLL. When the user opens Chrome, for example, a C2 connection...

16,165 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce •via X (Twitter)

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How do you create your payloads in 2025? At MSec Operations we prefer to use DLL sideloading for EDR evasion. This technique allows our malicious code to run within a signed, legitimate executable. Combining this technique with other useful techniques will provide stable execution to fly under the radar. 🛸 The following video demonstrates the use of #RustPack to create such a payload in just a few seconds. The command line usage shows that our input payload is a simple unmodified Apollo C2 executable. We want to clone all the exported functions from the original Windows wininet.dll to create our own library with the same name. The execution of the payload will be delayed by ~5 seconds in this case, without using the Win32 sleep function, but by performing random calculations. ⏲️ Hardware breakpoints are used to bypass the Antimalware Scan Interface (AMSI). Without an AMSI bypass, Apollo would be flagged as a C# assembly when loaded. 🎓 Our payload will only fire on a domain joined system, this basically prevents it from running in e.g. sandbox environments. 🤠 Last but not least, in this example, the encrypted payload itself is stored in a separate file on the target system and not even in the same folder as our malicious DLL. Anyone analysing just the DLL will never be able to find out what the payload is. Automatic sample submissions for cloud analysis usually only upload the executable or DLL, emulators won't see the real payload either. 🤠 Tired of creating such payloads yourself? With #RustPack it's really easy, and payloads always look completely different, even if the same payload is packed twice to avoid signature-based detection Contact us via info[at] for more information! 👍

MSec Operations

26,047 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce

In one of our previous videos we demonstrated how to generate sideloading binaries by cloning the exports of an existing DLL to forward them - . However, using Microsoft DLLs and Microsoft-signed binaries is not the best OPsec, as it's easy for EDR vendors to create a detection rule for e.g. "version.dll" being loaded from a non-System32 directory. 🧐 We therefore recommend using third party signed executables that attempt to load their own DLL. This is much harder to track/map on the endpoint. If you know which functions are imported from your signed binary (see import table), you can also generate a sideloading DLL for persistence or initial access use cases. Bring your own third-party signed binary and voila - you're trusted! In this example, we sideload into java.exe, which is signed by Oracle. It attempts to load several DLLs - including jli.dll as shown in the video. #RustPack can easily create such DLLs with custom export functions - anti-debugging features, sandbox evasion, signature evasion and anti-emulation can be easily added. 🔥🔥 Userland hooks are bypassed by default options and you can enable custom AMSI/ETW bypasses for the process on top. If you want to use it for persistence, you can of course still clone the original DLL exports as we did in the previous video and forward them accordingly. 👍 Interested in buying RustPack? Contact us at info[at] ! #RedTeam #Pentest #OST #Maldev #Malware #Havoc

MSec Operations

10,686 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce

yesterday i showed claude code using codex's computer use, today i got some more fucking fire for you claude can also drive codex's official chrome extension, and it controls chromium browsers beautifully all in the background, without the "allow" popup chrome devtools mcp throws at you every time a new agent connects it even handles more than one browser: each install of the extension gets its own instance id, so claude knows which is which i have helium as my main and chrome for work, and claude code now uses both first, install the chrome plugin in the codex app and add openai's chatgpt extension to your chromium browser (or all of them, if you have a few) then give this to your claude: "Set up Codex's Chrome extension for you on my Mac. I've installed the Chrome plugin in the Codex app and the extension. Use Codex's computer use MCP server as user MCP "codex-cu": keep it if it's already registered, otherwise copy the "cua_repl" entry from ~/.codex/plugins/cache/openai-bundled/unified-computer-use/ /.mcp.json. Its browser side rejects calls without Codex turn metadata, so put a small stdio proxy in front that adds _meta["x-codex-turn-metadata"] (session_id and turn_id as a JSON string) to every tools/call. Add a Stop hook that tells this session's proxy to call the hidden turn_ended tool and start a new turn_id, so your tabs get released without touching other sessions. Test it by opening a tab straight at a URL in each browser with cua.createBrowserTab(browserId, url). Browsers can all report as "Chrome", so if I have several, ask me which test tab showed up in which browser." got more than one browser and ok with it touching your claude.md? give it this too: "Write each browser's name and metadata.extensionInstanceId into my global CLAUDE.md, with a note to pick browsers by that id and open tabs straight at a URL."

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73,991 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce