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🛠️ Deploying autonomous agents requires infrastructure built for coordination, execution, and lifecycle management. Lithosphere is advancing an agent deployment framework designed to support scalable AI-native systems operating across decentralized environments. Read more 🔍 #Lithosphere #Web4 #AutonomousAgents #AgentDeployment #AIInfrastructure

28,866 views • 2 months ago •via X (Twitter)

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🧃 Introducing stereOS: a Linux based operating system hardened and purpose built for AI agents. It's clear that agents need an ACTUAL operating system (not what people are calling an "OS") to witness the full breadth and depth of their capabilities while mitigating the blast radius of autonomous, untrusted actors. But there are so many problems with AI sandboxes today: * Going out to the apple store and buying a mac mini will never scale and is way too expensive (obviously) * Running in Docker is too restrictive (agents can't stand up their own container infrastructure, no sub virtualization, docker-in-docker is very broken) * Firecracker strips all the hardware so GPU PCIe passthrough, secure boot, FIPs, etc. is out of the question. * Native VMs are too fat and the overhead of 1 agent per VM is too much. stereOS takes a different approach: it's a full NixOS system that you boot and then kick off agent sandboxes inside with gVisor + /nix/store namespace mounting. Each agent gets their own kernel and the /nix/store is read only by nature. Even if the agent was somehow able to escape the gVisor virtual kernel, they'd land on the NixOS system as the "agent" user! Not your actual hardware!! If you want to take a defense-in-depth approach, we support "native" agents that run at the system level kicked off by our `agentd` utility. These agents, on their own, can manage and kick off other sub agents using the internal sandboxing mechanisms. Today, we're open sourcing all of this: * stereOS: our purpose built Linux OS - * masterblaster: client utility to launch, manage, and orchestrate agents - * stereosd: the stereOS system control plane daemon - * agentd: the stereOS system agent management daemon - Give it a try, throw us a star, and let me know what you think 🧃⭐️

John McBride

150,334 views • 5 months ago

In 2025, the AgentFlayer exploit highlighted a new category of risk in AI systems. It was not a traditional breach involving stolen credentials or broken encryption. Instead, it demonstrated how an autonomous AI agent could be manipulated into executing unintended actions by processing malicious instructions embedded inside content it automatically processes. The incident did not expose a flaw in one specific integration. It revealed a structural weakness in how many modern AI agents are built. Today’s agents are no longer passive language models. They read documents automatically, scan emails, connect to SaaS tools, access cloud storage, and execute actions across multiple systems. To be useful, they are granted meaningful permissions. That capability creates value, but it also expands the attack surface. Most agent environments operate in a trusted, plaintext execution model. Data is encrypted at rest and in transit, but it is typically decrypted during inference so the model can process it. That runtime visibility is where potential risk lies. In a zero-click scenario like AgentFlayer, an attacker can embed hidden instructions inside a document that the AI processes automatically. Because the agent may have access to connected systems such as Google Drive, Slack, or GitHub, it can potentially be influenced to retrieve sensitive information or perform unintended actions. The user does not need to click a malicious link or approve a suspicious request. Therefore, the core issue is that during execution, the system may have access to sensitive data and broad privileges, meaning whoever controls the execution environment ultimately controls access to that data. Now consider a different architectural approach. If a system is designed so that data remains protected during execution, the risk profile changes. On Nesa, privacy is enforced at the execution layer through Equivariant Encryption. Computation can occur on encrypted data, reducing the visibility surface during runtime. Sensitive inputs and models do not need to be exposed in plain text to infrastructure operators for inference to occur. This does not eliminate prompt injection, logic manipulation, or tool misuse. Encryption alone cannot prevent an agent from being instructed to take an unintended action if it has been granted that permission. What it does do is materially reduce confidentiality risk. By limiting access to readable sensitive data during execution and reducing unilateral visibility at the infrastructure layer, the potential blast radius of a successful manipulation attempt is constrained. As AI agents become more autonomous and embedded into enterprise workflows, security must move deeper into architecture. The goal is not to claim invulnerability. It is to reduce trust concentration and contain systemic exposure when failures occur. AgentFlayer was not simply a one-off exploit. It was a reminder that in autonomous systems, execution-layer design determines how risk propagates.

Nesa

17,038 views • 5 months ago