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FEARMONGERING, CYBERATTACKS, AND THE ROAD TO ANOTHER ESCALATION As public support for the war continues to erode, alarming reports are flooding the mainstream media: Iran-linked hackers targeting critical infrastructure and claims that China breached the Federal Reserve. Some threats may be real. But when attribution remains unclear, and evidence...

16,774 просмотров • 7 дней назад •via X (Twitter)

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🇮🇷🇺🇦 What happens when a great power has no clear path to victory, but also no politically acceptable way to admit defeat? That may be the central problem facing Washington in Iran, according to Prof. Glenn Diesen. Diesen argues that Iran has effectively defeated the United States, but Tehran's demands for sanctions relief, unfrozen assets, reconstruction payments and an end to the wider regional wars create a dilemma for Washington: accepting those terms could be politically impossible, while refusing them risks trapping the U.S. in a war it has no obvious way to win. Trump may therefore try to declare victory and walk away, pointing to Iran's supposedly destroyed nuclear capabilities and arguing that the Strait of Hormuz is no longer strategically important. But Iran has leverage. Tehran can make an American withdrawal politically painful while maintaining enough pressure to prevent Washington from simply resetting the conflict and returning later. And this is where Diesen's warning matters. A great power pushed between humiliation and escalation may choose escalation. Iran therefore has to be careful not to push Trump so far that he concludes there is nothing left to lose. Meanwhile, the war is becoming harder to contain. Fighting is spreading through Yemen, with the Houthis striking Saudi-backed targets and reportedly hitting Saudi-linked shipping and infrastructure. Diesen argues that treating these groups simply as Iranian proxies misses the bigger problem: many have their own interests and conflicts that could continue even if Tehran wanted the war to end. The same applies to the emerging Middle Eastern security order. As confidence in permanent American protection declines, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan and potentially Egypt are moving toward a new regional security architecture. Diesen sees two possible futures: competing blocs, where states seek security against one another, or an inclusive system that eventually brings Iran, and perhaps even Israel, into the same framework. The first creates another cycle of escalation. The second attempts to make security indivisible, so one country's security does not require another country's permanent insecurity. And then there is Ukraine. Diesen argues that the battlefield is increasingly becoming a war of attrition that Russia is slowly winning. Ukraine faces worsening manpower and ammunition problems, while a shortage of interceptor missiles is allowing Russia to use more air power and increasingly devastating glide bombs. Russia is also expanding attacks against Ukrainian logistics, ports, bridges, warehouses and energy infrastructure, while Ukraine continues striking deeper inside Russia to create pressure for negotiations. But if Moscow sees NATO expansion and Ukraine's role as a Western frontline as an existential threat, hurting Russia may not convince it to compromise. It may convince Russia that it has even more reason to continue fighting. Diesen's conclusion is bleak: both sides want the war to end, but they fundamentally disagree over what ending it means. For Russia, that means Ukrainian neutrality, territorial concessions and a political settlement. For Ukraine and its European backers, an unconditional ceasefire risks freezing the battlefield and giving Kyiv time to rebuild. So the wars in Iran and Ukraine are beginning to reveal the same dangerous pattern. The longer a conflict continues, the harder it becomes to separate victory from survival, and the harder it becomes for either side to back down without believing it is surrendering something existential. When the off-ramp disappears, escalation starts looking less like a choice and more like the only road left. Diesen's final warning was almost an afterthought: let's hope the conflict doesn't spread to Japan. He may have been joking. But these are not particularly reassuring times. Glenn Diesen

Mario Nawfal

244,431 просмотров • 20 дней назад

Trump's Fmr. Lawyer Robert Barnes says Trump thinks he's escalating to make Iran capitulate, but in reality, Tehran has learned how to play him. That is what makes this moment so dangerous. Trump appears to believe the war can still be ended quickly if he just applies a little more pressure and moves further up the escalation ladder. Then wait for Iran to surrender, but Robert says Iran is never going to give him that. For Trump, this is a war he wants to finish on favorable terms; for Iran, it's existential. That means Washington and Tehran are not operating with the same tolerance for pain, the same timeline, or the same definition of victory. And Tehran now understands the man across the table better than he understands himself. Iran has watched Trump repeatedly convince himself that another strike will finally produce the submission the previous strikes failed to achieve. Then, when the opposite happens, he becomes frustrated and escalates again. Iran appears to be exploiting that weakness with a disciplined tit-for-tat strategy rather than random escalation or total war. Each move raises the cost without immediately giving Trump the clean pretext he might want for unlimited escalation. Robert thinks Iran is studying his psychology and asking one question before every major action: Will this provoke him too early, or will it punish and humiliate him at exactly the right moment? That distinction is crucial because humiliation may be Trump’s greatest vulnerability. Robert Barnes

Mario Nawfal

374,241 просмотров • 1 месяц назад