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🇬🇷⚠️ Greek official warns: "In a potential war with Turkey, even Greece itself could be at risk, not just the islands. Turkey’s power is immense, and we must not be swayed by the games of the US, Israel, or the West. Right now, Turkey is executing a massive, large-scale...

717,713 次观看 • 9 个月前 •via X (Twitter)

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Due to srael-Greece-Cyprus alliance Turkey may consider moving toward a new version of the “2.5 War” strategic logic that shaped Turkish defence thinking during the 1990s and early 2000s. The original concept, articulated by Şükrü Elekdağ in 1994, rested on the assumption that Turkey might have to confront Greece and Syria simultaneously while also fighting the PKK insurgency. In simplified terms, this meant two conventional interstate wars (“2”) plus one major counterinsurgency (“0.5”). The central assumption was not simply that Turkey had several adversaries, but that these threats could emerge simultaneously and exploit crises on different fronts. Ankara therefore had to maintain sufficient land, air and naval capabilities to operate across multiple theatres at the same time. Today the actors have changed but a similar strategic logic may be re-emerging. PKK has announced its dissolution, while the Assad government in Syria has been overthrown and the new Syrian authorities have developed much closer relations with Ankara. At the same time, Greece, Israel and the Greek Cypriot administration are developing an increasingly institutionalized strategic and military alignment in the Eastern Mediterranean. Balancing Turkey is becoming an increasingly important dimension of the relationship, particularly in defence cooperation, military exercises, intelligence, air defence and maritime security. The Turkish Navy is especially important in this context. Recent Israeli reporting portraying Turkish naval power as a potential future security challenge illustrates growing Israeli attention to Turkey’s maritime capabilities. The Turkish Navy should not be considered the original cause of the Greek-Israeli-Greek Cypriot partnership, which developed for broader geopolitical, energy and security reasons. However, Turkey’s rapid naval modernization, domestic shipbuilding capacity, expanding defence industry and increasing operational presence in the Eastern Mediterranean may now be accelerating this alignment. Unlike the Israeli Air Force, which possesses major qualitative advantages in the regional air domain, the maritime balance is considerably more competitive. Turkey possesses a large navy, extensive infrastructure, geographical proximity and a rapidly expanding domestic naval-industrial base. Individually, Greece, Israel and the Greek Cypriot forces would face important limitations in balancing Turkey. Their combined capabilities, however, could create a substantially more difficult strategic environment. Such cooperation would not automatically produce air supremacy over Turkey. However significantly reduce Turkey’s freedom of action and potentially create localized air superiority in particular operational theatres. Similarly, simply adding Israeli, Greek and Greek Cypriot land forces together and comparing the total with the Turkish Land Forces would be misleading. Israel does not share a land border with Turkey and its most important contribution in such a scenario would likely come from airpower, intelligence, missile defence, electronic warfare, long-range strike and naval capabilities rather than large-scale ground operations. This brings us back to the “2.5-war” analogy. A hypothetical contemporary formulation could be: Greece = 1 Israel = 1 Greek Cypriot front = 0.5 However, the meaning of the “0.5” would be different from Elekdağ’s original formulation. The PKK represented a qualitatively different form of warfare: a domestic and cross-border insurgency rather than a weaker conventional army. In a contemporary version, the “0.5” would instead refer to the smaller military weight of the Greek Cypriot National Guard and Cyprus’s potential role as a supporting military and logistical theatre. The deeper similarity lies in the return of a strategic problem Turkey has faced before: the possibility of coordinated pressure from several directions that forces Ankara to divide military attention and resources among multiple theatres simultaneously. Greece would represent the western/Aegean theatre. Israel would introduce an Eastern Mediterranean, air and long-range-strike dimension. Cyprus could become a supporting forward theatre connecting the two. The strategic logic of Elekdağ’s doctrine may therefore be returning in a very different geopolitical form. There is also a striking historical irony. During the 1990s, Turkey developed close strategic cooperation with Israel partly to counter what Ankara perceived as Greek-Syrian pressure and regional encirclement. Three decades later, Israel itself may increasingly occupy the position that Syria occupied in Turkey’s original “2.5-war” threat geometry.

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