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hedge funds pay $50,000/year for data that's been free on SEC. gov since 2003 Form 4 filings every stock purchase a CEO makes, every share a CFO sells, filed within 48 hours and sitting there searchable for free nobody built a screener around it for two decades one guy...

10,172 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад •via X (Twitter)

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since 1993, hedge funds over $100M have been legally required to publish every position they hold 4 times a year, exact stocks and exact share counts, all of it free on the SEC website i spent 6 months asking one question with python: what happens when 4 or more separate funds all show up with new positions in the same small-cap stock in the same quarter - before the price has moved? backtested 2,400 signals from 2019 to 2025 67% win rate, 18.4% average gain per trade, 31 day average hold the reason the edge exists is the same reason the funds themselves can't collect it an $8B fund building a position in a $400M company moves the price against itself the second it starts buying so they file 45 days after the fact, the window opens, and nobody's standing in it running it live since february - 11 closed trades, 9 winners, +31% while the s&p returned 8% in the same period setup cost: a free API key from SEC EDGAR and one saturday morning this isn't an edge i found by being smart. it's an edge that only exists because the people publishing it are too large to use it themselves Bookmark before it get losted the filing requirement has been law since the clinton administration, sitting in a public federal database for 30 years most retail traders pay monthly subscriptions to signal services built by people who just learned to read a government XML file the data was never hidden. it just required knowing where to look

Livsun

32,072 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

HOW RETAIL INVESTORS CAUSED THE WORLD’S BEST-PERFORMING HEDGE FUND TO CRASH 50% IN JUST TWO WEEKS! $OPEN $OKLO $BTQ $GME $IONQ $RGTI $PLTR $BBAI $QUBT $ACHR $JOBY Michael Barton - a trader from Coatue, arguably the top-performing hedge fund today with $70B under management - was recently interviewed on Molly O’Shea ’s YouTube channel. The insights were wild: - “Before I worked at Coatue, I worked at Melvin Capital.” Yes, the hedge fund that shorted $GME. - “We went from the best-performing hedge fund in the world… to down 50% in two weeks.” Retail traders forced one of the most sophisticated funds on the planet into a historic drawdown! - “We underestimated how powerful Retail could be. When they focus all their energy on a single stock. You’re seeing the same thing now with Opendoor.” - “Investing has changed - we track everything, how often stocks are mentioned on Reddit, Twitter, internet trends… all of it.” What this really means: 1. Retail is now a legitimate force in the markets. When retail traders concentrate on specific sectors or tickers - like Quantum or Nuclear plays right now -hedge funds ride the wave up… and then short it on the way down. 2. You’re being tracked. Every major retail community - unusual_whales , zerohedge , WallStreetBets, all the trending Reddit stock groups - hedge funds scrape and analyze all of your posts. They front-run Retail sentiment and monetize it. 3. Don’t be left holding the bag. A lot of “timely” news articles that come out during hype cycles? Often funded or influenced by the same players who need exit liquidity after riding the move up with Retail. Retail piles in at the top, hedge funds exit - then short - and Retail capitulates while moving on to the next hype wave. 4. Know what you’re buying. Is it a real business with long-term fundamentals? Or just a momentum-driven hype play that hedge funds are exploiting? Don’t be the one left holding the bag. Full video linked in the comments.

Common Sense Investor (CSI)

140,629 просмотров • 9 месяцев назад

BREAKING: Bill Ackman just IPO'd his hedge fund. He targeted $25 billion two years ago. He raised $5 billion yesterday. And the retail investors he spent two years courting on X didn't show up. Here's what actually happened, and why it matters for every investor who thinks following a famous name is a strategy. Wednesday, April 29. Bill Ackman rang the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange. Two listed entities hit the market. Pershing Square USA (PSUS), the closed-end fund. Pershing Square Inc. (PS), the asset manager. PSUS priced at $50 a share. It opened at $42. It closed at $40.90. Down 18% on debut. One of the most famous hedge fund managers on the planet went public, and his fund lost nearly a fifth of its value in a single trading session. Now look at how the money actually came in. Of the $5 billion raised, $2.8 billion came from a private placement. Family offices took 30% of that. Pension funds took 25%. Insurance companies took 22%. Ultra-high-net-worth investors took 12%. Institutional investors accounted for over 85% of total orders. The remaining $2.2 billion came from a public offering of 44 million PSUS shares. Some of that was retail. Most of it was not. Ackman has 2 million followers on X. He spent two years marketing this fund as a way for regular people to access hedge fund returns at $50 a share. He even said it on CNBC the morning of the IPO: "Hedge funds are sort of known for managing money for rich people. And now we have the opportunity for someone with $50, could be a long-term shareholder. Usually, the retail gets cut massively back, the institutions are favored. We did the opposite." The retail audience he was talking to didn't believe him. The institutions did. Two years ago, the original target was $25 billion. Yesterday, the final number was $5 billion. That's an 80% downsize. This is one of the most watched investors in the world. He gets booked on every major financial network. He posts daily to millions of followers. He has been pitching this exact deal since 2024. And the deal still came in 80% smaller than planned. Here's the part nobody is connecting: The retail audience for hedge fund products is fundamentally different from the retail audience for personality content. Ackman built a following by being loud on X. Loud on takeovers. Loud on politics. Loud on universities. Loud on ETFs. Loud on macro calls. Followers love that. They follow. They reply. They retweet. But following someone is free. Wiring money into their closed-end fund at NAV with no performance fees and a fee structure most retail investors can't even read is an entirely different decision. The market just made that distinction for him. Now zoom out, because this is the structural lesson. The $2.8 billion private placement was wrapped up before retail even saw the deal. Family offices. Pension funds. Insurance companies. Sovereign wealth. These are the buyers who get the call before the IPO is announced. They get the term sheet. They negotiate. They commit. By the time the public sees the listing on a Wednesday morning, the institutions have already locked in their allocation. The retail investor sees the same news, gets the same prospectus, and reads the same ticker. Different game. Same name on the door. And then PSUS opened down 16% and closed down 18%. Every retail buyer who put in $50 at the IPO price was sitting on a $9 paper loss before lunch. The institutions had locked in better terms in the private placement. Same fund. Same manager. Two completely different starting positions. This is how the structure of capital markets actually works. Every. Single. Time. The brochure says democratization. The cap table says the institutions got there first. This is the same lesson the Blue Owl and BlackRock private credit stories taught us last year. When a famous money manager opens a vehicle to retail, the fine print and the fee structure and the timing of the allocation all favor the people who already have access. You can have a manager with no performance fee, with bonus shares attached, with two million social followers, and a stage on CNBC. The math of who gets in first and at what price is still the math. So what does this mean for you? It means a famous name on the cover is not a strategy. It means following an investor on X is not the same as being invested with them. It means the retail audience for entertaining finance content is enormous, and the retail audience for actually deploying capital into a complex product is not. The wealthy don't pay famous investors for personality. They build systems that don't depend on a single human being having a good year, or a good fund debut, or a good narrative on social media. Ackman's reputation got him on the front page. It didn't get the stock above its IPO price. The math always catches up. The personality doesn't change the math. Boring? Yes. Effective when a $25 billion vision becomes a $5 billion raise that opens down 18%? Also yes. This is exactly why we built Surmount. Automated, rules-based investment strategies. Built for the retail investor who doesn't want to bet a portfolio on whether a famous fund manager has a good debut:
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BREAKING: Bill Ackman just IPO'd his hedge fund. He targeted $25 billion two years ago. He raised $5 billion yesterday. And the retail investors he spent two years courting on X didn't show up. Here's what actually happened, and why it matters for every investor who thinks following a famous name is a strategy. Wednesday, April 29. Bill Ackman rang the opening bell at the New York Stock Exchange. Two listed entities hit the market. Pershing Square USA (PSUS), the closed-end fund. Pershing Square Inc. (PS), the asset manager. PSUS priced at $50 a share. It opened at $42. It closed at $40.90. Down 18% on debut. One of the most famous hedge fund managers on the planet went public, and his fund lost nearly a fifth of its value in a single trading session. Now look at how the money actually came in. Of the $5 billion raised, $2.8 billion came from a private placement. Family offices took 30% of that. Pension funds took 25%. Insurance companies took 22%. Ultra-high-net-worth investors took 12%. Institutional investors accounted for over 85% of total orders. The remaining $2.2 billion came from a public offering of 44 million PSUS shares. Some of that was retail. Most of it was not. Ackman has 2 million followers on X. He spent two years marketing this fund as a way for regular people to access hedge fund returns at $50 a share. He even said it on CNBC the morning of the IPO: "Hedge funds are sort of known for managing money for rich people. And now we have the opportunity for someone with $50, could be a long-term shareholder. Usually, the retail gets cut massively back, the institutions are favored. We did the opposite." The retail audience he was talking to didn't believe him. The institutions did. Two years ago, the original target was $25 billion. Yesterday, the final number was $5 billion. That's an 80% downsize. This is one of the most watched investors in the world. He gets booked on every major financial network. He posts daily to millions of followers. He has been pitching this exact deal since 2024. And the deal still came in 80% smaller than planned. Here's the part nobody is connecting: The retail audience for hedge fund products is fundamentally different from the retail audience for personality content. Ackman built a following by being loud on X. Loud on takeovers. Loud on politics. Loud on universities. Loud on ETFs. Loud on macro calls. Followers love that. They follow. They reply. They retweet. But following someone is free. Wiring money into their closed-end fund at NAV with no performance fees and a fee structure most retail investors can't even read is an entirely different decision. The market just made that distinction for him. Now zoom out, because this is the structural lesson. The $2.8 billion private placement was wrapped up before retail even saw the deal. Family offices. Pension funds. Insurance companies. Sovereign wealth. These are the buyers who get the call before the IPO is announced. They get the term sheet. They negotiate. They commit. By the time the public sees the listing on a Wednesday morning, the institutions have already locked in their allocation. The retail investor sees the same news, gets the same prospectus, and reads the same ticker. Different game. Same name on the door. And then PSUS opened down 16% and closed down 18%. Every retail buyer who put in $50 at the IPO price was sitting on a $9 paper loss before lunch. The institutions had locked in better terms in the private placement. Same fund. Same manager. Two completely different starting positions. This is how the structure of capital markets actually works. Every. Single. Time. The brochure says democratization. The cap table says the institutions got there first. This is the same lesson the Blue Owl and BlackRock private credit stories taught us last year. When a famous money manager opens a vehicle to retail, the fine print and the fee structure and the timing of the allocation all favor the people who already have access. You can have a manager with no performance fee, with bonus shares attached, with two million social followers, and a stage on CNBC. The math of who gets in first and at what price is still the math. So what does this mean for you? It means a famous name on the cover is not a strategy. It means following an investor on X is not the same as being invested with them. It means the retail audience for entertaining finance content is enormous, and the retail audience for actually deploying capital into a complex product is not. The wealthy don't pay famous investors for personality. They build systems that don't depend on a single human being having a good year, or a good fund debut, or a good narrative on social media. Ackman's reputation got him on the front page. It didn't get the stock above its IPO price. The math always catches up. The personality doesn't change the math. Boring? Yes. Effective when a $25 billion vision becomes a $5 billion raise that opens down 18%? Also yes. This is exactly why we built Surmount. Automated, rules-based investment strategies. Built for the retail investor who doesn't want to bet a portfolio on whether a famous fund manager has a good debut:

Logan Weaver

220,960 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

A man invested $53,000 of his family's savings into a dying video game store. Hedge funds laughed. He turned it into $48 MILLION and made Wall Street beg Congress to stop him. > Keith Gill was a 34 year old financial analyst at a Boston insurance firm in 2019. His salary was ordinary but his conviction was not. > He believed GameStop, a struggling mall video game retailer trading at $5 a share, was one of the most undervalued companies in America. > Wall Street disagreed. Hedge funds had shorted the stock so aggressively that more shares were shorted than actually existed. They were certain it was going to zero. > Gill invested $53,000 of his family's savings and started posting his analysis online under the name DeepFuckingValue on Reddit and Roaring Kitty on YouTube. > Nobody took him seriously. He kept posting anyway, week after week, with nothing but spreadsheets and conviction. > In January 2021 retail traders on Reddit's WallStreetBets discovered his posts. > They started buying. The stock went from $5 to $483 in three weeks. A 9,600% move. > Hedge funds that shorted the stock lost BILLIONS. One firm alone lost $6.8 BILLIO and had to be bailed out by other hedge funds. > By January 27 2021 Gill's $53,000 investment was worth $48 MILLION. > He lost $13 MILLION in a single day when the stock fell. He held anyway, without flinching, without selling a share. > Robinhood restricted buying of GameStop without warning. Retail traders were furious. Congress summoned Gill to testify. > He showed up in his Roaring Kitty headband and said three words that became the most quoted phrase in finance that year: "I like the stock." > His employer fired him and paid a $4 MILLION fine for failing to supervise his trading. > He went quiet for three years. Then in May 2024 he posted a single image on X. GameStop surged 50% the next morning before he said a word. > By June 2024 his position was worth $289 MILLION. > A Hollywood film called Dumb Money was made about the saga, starring Paul Dano. He has never spoken publicly about it. He invested $53,000 into a stock Wall Street had already written off for dead. Hedge funds lost BILLIONS.

Comet

1,835,290 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

Michael Saylor spent 2025 telling people to sell a kidney before selling Bitcoin. Then he literally dumped $323 million of it since May. He just went on Diary of a CEO and exposed himself as a hypocrite in his own words: His company holds 842,138 Bitcoin. That is roughly 4% of every coin that will ever exist, which makes it the largest corporate holder on Earth. In February 2025 he posted "Sell a kidney if you must, but keep the Bitcoin." Weeks earlier he had written that selling weakens the network. But here is what his own filings show since May: - 32 Bitcoin sold between May 26 and May 31 for $2.5 million - 3,588 Bitcoin sold between June 29 and July 5 for $216 million, the largest disposal in company history - 1,638 Bitcoin sold between July 27 and August 2 for $104.73 million That last batch went out at an average of $63,957 a coin. His average purchase price is around $75,400. He sold at a LOSS. New Bitcoin purchases are currently paused. So why is the loudest Bitcoin bull alive selling coins for less than he paid? The answer is a bill he built himself, and he walked through the whole thing on that podcast without once connecting it to the selling. He went to ChatGPT and asked it to design a security nobody had ever built, a preferred stock where he could change the dividend rate every month. He says the lawyers and bankers told him it had never been done before. He brought it to market as a $2.5 billion IPO, then sold another $8 billion off a shelf registration. His own framing of that: Selling $15 billion of credit "kind of equates to the company making about $15 billion." Selling credit is borrowing. Every dollar came attached to a dividend he now has to pay in cash, forever, whether Bitcoin goes up or not. Strategy owes over $1.7 billion a year across five preferred instruments and its debt. The software business does not come close to covering that. So the Bitcoin covers it. The break-even is 3.2%. So if Bitcoin appreciates 3.2% a year, they can pay those dividends indefinitely by selling Bitcoin to do it. He called the sale a one-time demonstration to break a short seller narrative and said selling is not the primary strategy. His own CEO Phong Le told the Q2 earnings call that Strategy will sell whenever management finds it advantageous, and that investors should expect more going forward. Now look at who ends up holding the bag: That preferred stock is majority owned by retail investors, and it dropped to $89 against a $100 par value in June. Retail Bitcoin holders get told to hold through anything while retail preferred holders get paid a yield funded by selling that same Bitcoin at a loss. He opened that same episode explaining that Bitcoin lets you own something nobody more powerful can take away from you. In 2024 he paid $40 million to settle what the DC Attorney General called the LARGEST income tax fraud recovery in the city's history. The complaint said he claimed residency in Florida while his own security logs placed him in Washington for 1,397 days against 449 in Florida. He settled without admitting wrongdoing and still disputes living there. In 2000 he settled SEC accounting fraud charges after his company reported profits during years it was actually losing money. He disgorged $8.28 million and admitted nothing. Strategy lost $12.54 billion in the first quarter and another $8.22 billion in the second. And this week he sat there and told a 25 year old with a few hundred dollars to buy Bitcoin and hold it for a decade. But he is not doing that himself. His company just SOLD $105 million of it. What do you think of Saylor?

Ricardo

20,623 просмотров • 25 дней назад