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Some thoughts. President Trump's Board of Peace initiative looks like an attempt to reassign the source of international legitimacy. In Trump's concept, this boils down to the principle that whoever has the resources and control determines the terms of peace, without lengthy UN procedures. This approach automatically undermines two things that have usually worked in the past: first, the rules and procedures of the UN, where everyone is formally equal; second, the need to coordinate decisions with allies, in Europe in particular. In this sense, the Board of Peace can be understood as a way to weaken China by bypassing the UN. China builds much of its international influence not only on the economy, but also on its role as a "responsible great power" in the UN system - through mandates, resolutions, procedures, principles of sovereignty and non-interference, participation in peacekeeping missions and agencies. If a parallel body emerges where decisions on "stabilization" and "reconstruction" are made outside the UN, China loses an important tool: the ability to influence decisions through universal rules and use the UN language as a defense against pressure. Beijing would then be faced with a choice: either it joins this organization on US terms, thereby recognizing American leadership in "peace management," or it refuses, allowing Washington to present this as proof that "China does not want peace and stability." The second line of pressure is to transform "peace" into a system of contracts and permits. In such a "market" architecture, peacebuilding becomes a platform that decides who will have access to reconstruction, logistics, licenses, ports, infrastructure projects, and financing. This directly competes with the Chinese model of economic presence and makes it dependent on whether China is politically accepted. This is risky for Beijing because its main tool - long-term investment and infrastructure - only works where it is given a place in a system that someone else controls. If the "control center" is American, then the US effectively gains leverage to include or exclude China from key post-conflict markets and routes. This also undermines the European and liberal approach, as the EU is accustomed to basing its foreign policy on rules and procedures: international law, multilateral formats, the UN, accountability, and restrictions on power. A "parallel" organization, where legitimacy is based not on rules but on who pays more and faster and controls the process, normalizes the logic of "peace as a business deal." If Europe joins the Board of Peace in this format, it will effectively confirm the bypassing of the UN and weaken its own principles. If it does not join, it risks losing influence over key decisions: how reconstruction will be organized, what standards, humanitarian rules, and accountability mechanisms will be in place. Finally, this model could be an attempt to reassemble the West: not as an alliance based on common rules and institutions, but as a coalition where the main thing is loyalty to the American center and a willingness to "chip in" and join operations. This undermines the very idea of liberal institutionalism: that even the strongest state voluntarily plays by the rules and restricts itself with procedures. If the US shows "when the UN or allies get in the way, we just create a new organization as we see fit," then the message to partners is simple: the rules only apply as long as they are convenient. In such a world, Europe is strategically weakened because its main strength lies precisely in rules and procedures. And China receives an additional incentive not to integrate into the old post-war order, but to build parallel institutions and contours of influence in response. The country that may benefit from this initiative is Russia. Russia creates chaos and the logic of "managed instability," and its strategy is to multiply centers of power and rules of the game. Instead of a single UN with procedures and accountability, a parallel "control center" emerges. This leads to fragmentation: different countries recognize different mandates, standards diverge, chains of command are duplicated, and responsibility is blurred. The result - more "fog," bargaining, and gray zones. It is in this environment that Russia feels stronger. Its practice of "chaos theory" is not so much about building its own order as it is about disrupting the coordination of others: increasing transaction costs, sowing mistrust, and fragmenting coalitions. Parallel architecture creates more "seams" between the US, Europe, the UN, and regional players - and these are ideal entry points for disinformation, sabotage, and diplomatic wedging. Therefore, the initiative could give Moscow a strategic advantage: less unity in the West, less influence from China, and more room to play in the gray zone. 📹: Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun stated that China will firmly defend the central role of the UN in the international relations system.

Anton Gerashchenko

299,220 görüntüleme • 4 ay önce