Загрузка видео...

Не удалось загрузить видео

На главную

How the Binance hack worked: The attacker exploited EIP-7702 - an Ethereum Pectra upgrade That lets a regular wallet temporarily act as a smart contract with a valid private key signature. Hacker pre-collected 50 EIP-7702 authorizations with sequential nonces Not knowing the exact nonce at attack time. Sent them...

383,619 просмотров • 9 дней назад •via X (Twitter)

Комментарии: 0

Нет доступных комментариев

Здесь появятся комментарии из оригинального поста

Похожие видео

🚨 MASSIVE: DNA Protocol ZKGuard shows how the $6,300,000,000 Binance hack could have been stopped, with proof before movement on the $XRP Ledger. On October 29, the largest theft in crypto history: → ~$6,300,000,000 drained from Binance hot wallets across ~10 blockchains, most of it in about 20 minutes → Binance says no private key leaked. Its own withdrawal infrastructure signed the transfers → Blockaid traced the entry point to one successful Ethereum EIP-7702 authorization that redirected the Binance 14 hot wallet to a malicious contract → Chainalysis attributes the attack to North Korea's TraderTraitor group No key leaked. Control did. Whatever got signed, moved. One day later, DNA Protocol published ZKGuard: Proof Before Movement, an authorization architecture for exchanges and institutions designed to close exactly this gap. How ZKGuard's design answers each failure: → Preparing is not authorizing. Operations can build a transaction, but signatures are released only after a zero-knowledge proof shows the institution's policy is satisfied for that exact transaction → Approved destinations only. The proof must show the destination is in the institution's approved set. A fresh attacker address fails → Approved transaction types only. Handing a wallet's control to an outside contract is an authority change, and authority changes need their own governance approvals → Independent approvers on separate devices and credentials, each bound to that one request → Hard spending limits. Per-transfer ceilings and one shared daily allowance across every spending path → Every authorization expires and can be used once. No open-ended access → Settlement on the XRP Ledger, where native multi-signing requires a weighted quorum of independent keys Privacy stays intact. Approver lists, counterparties and internal rules stay private. Only the proof gets verified. $6,300,000,000 left because a signature was trusted without proof. ZKGuard flips the order: no proof, no signature, no movement. Part of DNA Protocol's zkPrivacy infrastructure on the XRP Ledger, all powered by $XDNA (

RippleXity

10,525 просмотров • 7 дней назад

I made a visualization of EIP-8288 aka "recursive mempool aggregation," my new favorite EIP of all time because it perfectly encapsulates the thesis of the "cryptographic world computer" -- a system whose scalability *increases*, not decreases, with the level of decentralization. In a previous tweet I explained how EIP-8288 achieved this seemingly impossible feat, but one gif is worth a thousand words. Essentially, EIP-8288 leverages Ethereum's decentralized mempool as a parallel ZK proving cluster. Clients send signatures and proofs to the mempool, which over multiple rounds progressively aggregate them into fewer and fewer proofs, until the block builder finally aggregates them into one SINGLE proof. This design accomplishes five things at once: - The more nodes we add to the decentralized mempool, the more signatures/proofs Ethereum can process as a whole. This is obvious if you look at the animation and imagine more nodes in the mempool ring, which would "fan out" to more signatures/proofs. - By aggregating over multiple rounds (aka "recursive aggregation"), the bandwidth consumed by proofs remains constant for each node even as the network processes more proofs. As a result, the network stays decentralized even as capacity increases. - By aggregating proofs before one final aggregation by the builder, as opposed to requiring the builder to aggregate everything, the network can process more proofs without increasing hardware requirements for the builder. - By aggregating everything to a single block-level proof, validators can verify thousands of signatures/proofs by checking just one aggregated proof. Hardware requirements for validators can therefore stay low, keeping the network decentralized. - By aggregating not just native signatures but also STARKs, Ethereum can support any signature scheme by wrapping them in STARKs. So once again, this is how Ethereum will: - scale to process tens of thousands of PQ and private transactions per second - charge a tiny amount of gas to validate each txn, even though the original signature/proof may be huge (up to hundreds of KBs in size) - all while decentralizing even MORE. You are not bullish enough.

Derek Chiang | Ethlabs

19,414 просмотров • 19 дней назад

I can’t stop thinking about this… before hackers stole $6.4 billion from Binance, they spent days rehearsing the attack in public. The test transactions on Ethereum were worth only a few dollars. Nobody stopped them. Bloomberg reconstructed what happened. Once the code worked, the hackers launched the real attack across multiple blockchains. Then I reached the detail that doesn’t feel real. Some of the compromised wallets kept receiving fresh funds from Binance while the hackers were draining them. The attackers emptied a wallet, Binance refilled it, and they emptied it again. For a period of time, the exchange was effectively feeding new money into its own robbery. Binance co-founder Yi He was at home in Abu Dhabi. She reportedly discovered the breach while scrolling X before bed. Imagine opening Twitter and learning that billions of dollars are disappearing from your own exchange. Within minutes, Binance assembled a 100 person crisis team. The FBI, the U.S. Secret Service and blockchain analysts around the world joined the response. Meanwhile, some employees were reportedly already worried about losing their annual bonuses. But the most disturbing detail came later. According to the investigation, the hackers used valid permissions to execute the transfers. To the blockchain, everything looked authorized. There was no transaction labeled “hack” just legitimate-looking operations moving billions out of wallets the system still trusted. The $6.4 billion heist didn’t begin when billions started moving. It began days earlier with transactions worth a few dollars, too small for anyone to care about. By the time it looked dangerous, the blockchain was still saying: authorized.

exit

413,227 просмотров • 8 дней назад