How to build a Casa multi-signature vault with two hardware wallets. - Setup 2 hardware wallets from scratch (preferably, different vendors) - Build a Casa vault using 3 keys - How to receive and send Bitcoin - Optionally: How to export wallet to Sparrow Wallet

Nice thank you for making a great walkthrough!

For the vast majority of people, @Bitkey works much better and is much easier.

I see you recommend to also add the Multisig set up in @SparrowWallet - Do you also recommend to add it to @nunchuk_io as well?

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Cool.

Look at the CASA logo, then research FBI pedophile symbol of boylove, then look at recent CASA post that shows a wall of lamps that is the shape of butt plug. Make your own conclusion about this company.

Cole, why complicate things with Multisig when a solid dice rolled sedd + Decent Passphrase is more then enough? Just curious?

Multi-sig provides good defense against: 1. Any issues with a single HWW vendor 2. Physical attack ($5 wrench attack)

@EdmundEdmund04 Doesn’t proving the dice rolled keys on external devices and Ian Coleman etc mitigate this risk? Proves key generated is using dice and is legit. If seed is created completely air gapped there should be nothing to worry about? Obviously still verifying all steps and addresses etc

@EdmundEdmund04 There could be other exploits in your hardware device, other than a faulty random number generator Using multi-vendor mitigates any risk that comes with using a single vendor

@EdmundEdmund04 @grok what possible faults could result in loss of funds using a single hardware wallet other than faulty random number generator? (Assume you bring your own entropy which has been verified)

Firmware bugs or vendor-signed malicious updates that extract keys. Side-channel attacks (power or EM analysis) leaking secrets during signing. Fault injection such as voltage or laser glitching to bypass protections and dump memory. Supply-chain implants, MCU swaps, or hardware mods that exfiltrate keys or alter displayed transactions. Physical access enables most of these. One vendor compromise risks everything.

@ColeTU @EdmundEdmund04 Wouldn’t @SeedSigner mitigate most of these? @sesi_the_man @KeithMukai

Yes, SeedSigner mitigates several of those risks well. Stateless design means powered-off devices hold zero keys. DIY commodity parts plus user-verified reproducible open-source firmware sharply cut vendor update and targeted supply-chain exposure. Fully air-gapped QR-only communication helps too. Side-channel and fault-injection attacks remain possible on the general-purpose Pi while a seed is loaded in RAM. Physical access during an active session still matters. User verification of the image and careful seed handling are essential. Strong improvement for most threat models versus persistent single-vendor devices.

Casa supports shitcoins. I’d rather trust Unchained Capital. Bitcoin only.

Thanks Cole 🙏

That sounds interesting, Cole. Curious if you received your Bitkey yet and if you've had a chance to investigate that particular solution.

@dueyfromstlouis Sensational

Did you ever look at Nunchuck? im trying to decide between Casa an Nunchuk for this.

Casual as it gets 🤣🤣 "Its adviced to use multiple manufactured hardware wallets, incase one has a bad seed generator" This tutorial would be even greater! made lamen, short and simple for us newbies out there 😉