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#Hypersonic missiles exhibit a brief detectability window during their boost phase, which can be captured by satellite-based early warning systems. Following this, they descend to lower altitudes than traditional ballistic trajectories, significantly reducing their radar signature and rendering them effectively undetectable for much of their flight. Detection becomes feasible...

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Defence Decode®

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38,006 просмотров • 1 год назад •via X (Twitter)

Новости и политикаНаука и технологии#Hypersonic
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Фото профиля Krishna Ramesh
Krishna Ramesh1 год назад

Very good and informative YouTube video. Small correction. Objects generating Plasma(HSV) are difficult or impossible to track via Radar. Plasma = ionised gas = free electron’s/ion’s = Absorption = less/no signal reflection. Thank you.

Фото профиля VistaShares
VistaShares1 год назад

The global AI sector is evolving rapidly, supported by advancements in technology and infrastructure. AIS offers targeted exposure to key players driving these developments.

Фото профиля Tsukuyomi
Tsukuyomi1 год назад

Sir anything on Aircraft carriers

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🇮🇷 Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal and the Regional Counter Strategy Fateh Series (SRBM) The Fateh family represents Iran’s core short range ballistic missile capability. These missiles use solid fuel, allowing rapid launch with minimal preparation time. Estimated range is around 300 km, designed for battlefield and regional targets. Later variants emphasize higher accuracy through improved guidance and terminal maneuvering, making them more difficult to intercept than older systems. Sejjil (MRBM) Sejjil is a two stage, solid fuel medium range ballistic missile with an estimated range of 2,000 to 2,500 km. Its solid fuel design significantly improves survivability by reducing launch detection time. Sejjil is intended as a strategic missile capable of reaching targets across the Middle East, including major military bases and infrastructure. Kheibar Shekan (Advanced MRBM) Kheibar Shekan is a newer generation solid fuel missile with a reported range of around 1,450 km. It features a maneuverable reentry vehicle, enabling mid course and terminal phase adjustments to complicate interception. This missile is optimized to penetrate modern missile defense systems rather than relying purely on range or payload. Why these missiles challenge air and missile defenses? Solid fuel propulsion shortens warning time. Maneuverable reentry vehicles reduce interception probability. High speed terminal phases compress response windows. When launched in salvos, these missiles are designed to stress and saturate defensive systems. How regional and allied forces aim to counter this threat Surrounding states and allied bases rely on layered missile defense. Patriot PAC 3 MSE addresses short range and terminal phase threats. THAAD provides high altitude interception against medium range missiles. Israeli systems such as Arrow complement regional coverage. Early warning radars, space based sensors, and shared command networks extend detection and response time. Base hardening, dispersal of assets, and redundancy reduce damage if interception fails. Intelligence driven preemptive strike capability remains a key deterrent factor. Strategic assessment Iran’s missile program emphasizes survivability and defense penetration rather than sheer numbers. In response, regional allies focus on integration, layered defense, and intelligence dominance. The outcome in any future conflict would likely depend less on individual missiles and more on coordination, saturation levels, and decision speed.. Can layered missile defense realistically stay ahead of evolving maneuverable ballistic threats?
0:49

🇮🇷 Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal and the Regional Counter Strategy Fateh Series (SRBM) The Fateh family represents Iran’s core short range ballistic missile capability. These missiles use solid fuel, allowing rapid launch with minimal preparation time. Estimated range is around 300 km, designed for battlefield and regional targets. Later variants emphasize higher accuracy through improved guidance and terminal maneuvering, making them more difficult to intercept than older systems. Sejjil (MRBM) Sejjil is a two stage, solid fuel medium range ballistic missile with an estimated range of 2,000 to 2,500 km. Its solid fuel design significantly improves survivability by reducing launch detection time. Sejjil is intended as a strategic missile capable of reaching targets across the Middle East, including major military bases and infrastructure. Kheibar Shekan (Advanced MRBM) Kheibar Shekan is a newer generation solid fuel missile with a reported range of around 1,450 km. It features a maneuverable reentry vehicle, enabling mid course and terminal phase adjustments to complicate interception. This missile is optimized to penetrate modern missile defense systems rather than relying purely on range or payload. Why these missiles challenge air and missile defenses? Solid fuel propulsion shortens warning time. Maneuverable reentry vehicles reduce interception probability. High speed terminal phases compress response windows. When launched in salvos, these missiles are designed to stress and saturate defensive systems. How regional and allied forces aim to counter this threat Surrounding states and allied bases rely on layered missile defense. Patriot PAC 3 MSE addresses short range and terminal phase threats. THAAD provides high altitude interception against medium range missiles. Israeli systems such as Arrow complement regional coverage. Early warning radars, space based sensors, and shared command networks extend detection and response time. Base hardening, dispersal of assets, and redundancy reduce damage if interception fails. Intelligence driven preemptive strike capability remains a key deterrent factor. Strategic assessment Iran’s missile program emphasizes survivability and defense penetration rather than sheer numbers. In response, regional allies focus on integration, layered defense, and intelligence dominance. The outcome in any future conflict would likely depend less on individual missiles and more on coordination, saturation levels, and decision speed.. Can layered missile defense realistically stay ahead of evolving maneuverable ballistic threats?

Defense Intelligence

22,048 просмотров • 6 месяцев назад

Iran could possess anti-ship hypersonic missiles with a range of up to 2,500 km Iran has several anti-ship missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, but what few people realize is that Iran has also conducted guidance tests to convert its large ballistic missiles into anti-ship variants. In addition, in the early 2000s, Iran acquired at least 12 Kh-22 missiles from Ukraine; though limited to a 700 km range, these are notoriously hard to intercept. Iran’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) strike from above at very high speeds. Adapted from land-based systems for naval targets, they feature maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV) to evade defenses. Attention has focused on the Shahab-3 and its variants, such as the Emad. A demonstration came during the “Great Prophet 15” exercise in 2021, when Iran claimed hits on simulated targets 1,800 km away in the Indian Ocean, near the USS Nimitz using MaRV for precision. The exercise also included the Sejjil and its variants (including the reported Sejjil-3, with potential range up to 2,500 km), with impact points reportedly as close as 160 km to a U.S. carrier strike group and 32 km to a ship. Although some critics point out the lack of independent evidence, the missiles’ maneuverability clearly gives them real anti-ship potential. I remain skeptical of many Iranian announcements, but when it comes to their missiles, I’m more inclined to be less skeptical. Iran is a big player regarding missile technology, more advanced than any western country.
0:23

Iran could possess anti-ship hypersonic missiles with a range of up to 2,500 km Iran has several anti-ship missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, but what few people realize is that Iran has also conducted guidance tests to convert its large ballistic missiles into anti-ship variants. In addition, in the early 2000s, Iran acquired at least 12 Kh-22 missiles from Ukraine; though limited to a 700 km range, these are notoriously hard to intercept. Iran’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) strike from above at very high speeds. Adapted from land-based systems for naval targets, they feature maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV) to evade defenses. Attention has focused on the Shahab-3 and its variants, such as the Emad. A demonstration came during the “Great Prophet 15” exercise in 2021, when Iran claimed hits on simulated targets 1,800 km away in the Indian Ocean, near the USS Nimitz using MaRV for precision. The exercise also included the Sejjil and its variants (including the reported Sejjil-3, with potential range up to 2,500 km), with impact points reportedly as close as 160 km to a U.S. carrier strike group and 32 km to a ship. Although some critics point out the lack of independent evidence, the missiles’ maneuverability clearly gives them real anti-ship potential. I remain skeptical of many Iranian announcements, but when it comes to their missiles, I’m more inclined to be less skeptical. Iran is a big player regarding missile technology, more advanced than any western country.

Patricia Marins

160,529 просмотров • 6 месяцев назад

🇺🇸 The American military corporation Northrop Grumman has introduced the autonomous system "Jackal," where the latest small-sized cruise missiles attack targets based on the "swarm" principle, distributing them according to automatic detection, priority, and other parameters. 🔹 The operational range of JACKAL-type cruise missiles exceeds 100 km (exact distance unknown), with a flight speed of over 600 km/h... Its main advantage is that it operates effectively under strong radio-electronic GPS jamming conditions... Several missiles from the swarm may approach the target using complex maneuvering principles and strike from the rear... Their warhead weight is 4.5 kg... 🔹 This is the latest technology that allows missiles to "cooperate" with each other during flight. If one missile is shot down, the others automatically redistribute the targets. It was mainly created to overload the enemy's air defense... It is specifically designed to hunt air defense systems, radars, and REB (radio-electronic warfare) systems. 🔹 The system can independently decide which target is more important (for example, to destroy the air defense radar first and then other objects). 🚀 The aforementioned type of cruise missiles can be launched from both manned (F-35/F-15/F-16/AH-64 Apache) and unmanned (MQ-9 Reaper) aircraft, as well as from ground complexes—armored vehicles and robotic equipment. See the latest updates with us: Visioner
1:31

🇺🇸 The American military corporation Northrop Grumman has introduced the autonomous system "Jackal," where the latest small-sized cruise missiles attack targets based on the "swarm" principle, distributing them according to automatic detection, priority, and other parameters. 🔹 The operational range of JACKAL-type cruise missiles exceeds 100 km (exact distance unknown), with a flight speed of over 600 km/h... Its main advantage is that it operates effectively under strong radio-electronic GPS jamming conditions... Several missiles from the swarm may approach the target using complex maneuvering principles and strike from the rear... Their warhead weight is 4.5 kg... 🔹 This is the latest technology that allows missiles to "cooperate" with each other during flight. If one missile is shot down, the others automatically redistribute the targets. It was mainly created to overload the enemy's air defense... It is specifically designed to hunt air defense systems, radars, and REB (radio-electronic warfare) systems. 🔹 The system can independently decide which target is more important (for example, to destroy the air defense radar first and then other objects). 🚀 The aforementioned type of cruise missiles can be launched from both manned (F-35/F-15/F-16/AH-64 Apache) and unmanned (MQ-9 Reaper) aircraft, as well as from ground complexes—armored vehicles and robotic equipment. See the latest updates with us: Visioner

Visioner

17,162 просмотров • 6 месяцев назад

The Nordic Trio: A Tough Match for Russian Corvettes Russian corvettes are among the most heavily armed on the planet, but they would run into trouble against their Nordic counterparts. The Russian corvettes of the Karakurt class are the most heavily armed ones I know of. They carry Kalibr missiles with a range of 2,500 km and hypersonic Zircon missiles. They would be capable of inflicting significant damage on the entire European fleet, which lacks defenses against the Zircon. The Karakurt also features a version of the Pantsir system with a range of 40 km, tested for intercepting ballistic missiles. Yes, the Karakurt demonstrates how the concept of sea dominance can shift with even small vessels capable of projecting power over long distances. However, there is a trio that would serve as a formidable barrier to the Russian corvettes: the Skjold, Hamina, and Visby. The stealth corvettes from Finland, Sweden, and Norway would be a massive headache for the Karakurt, precisely because of their small size and stealth architecture. The Karakurt may possess Kalibr missiles with a 2,500 km range or Zircons capable of reaching nearly 1,000 km, but to locate their targets, the Karakurt relies on drones like the Altius-U, equipped with a multimode sensor suite and multiple capabilities. Facing this trio would not be an easy match for the Altius, precisely because these vessels are designed for operations in contested environments, with an emphasis on low observability. Imagine trying to locate the Skjold, with its advanced stealth design featuring radar-absorbent materials, angular shapes, and a drastically reduced RCS, weighing only 270 tons? On the Altius's radar, it might appear as a small fishing boat under good conditions. And what about the Hamina? Built with aluminum and a composite superstructure (Kevlar and absorbent materials), it reduces radar, thermal, magnetic, and acoustic signatures. With a very low RCS, it would blend into maritime clutter (waves and small objects), operating in silent mode with electronic jamming. And the Visby? This is the stealthiest of all. Made from carbon fiber composites, with angular shapes, retractable/embedded weapons, and reductions in all signatures (RCS up to 99% lower, IR, acoustic, magnetic, hydrodynamic wake), plus advanced jamming and optimized operations to deny aerial sensors. All of them leverage integration with archipelagos for natural camouflage. What could the Altius-U do? Its active radar would need to operate in high-resolution modes, with drastically reduced range (possibly just a few dozen km); EO/IR for optical/thermal identification at extreme close range; SIGINT/ELINT to capture any residual emissions. This would require multiple drones operating in a coordinated manner with much greater exposure, putting the drones at risk from anti-air defenses, plus a bit of luck. By this point, larger vessels might have already been turned into fish habitats by the Zircons and Kalibrs, but this trio would still be standing. The resilience of this trio would force the Karakurt to risk approaching and entering the range of the Nordic corvettes, which are well armed with modern missiles. To make it even harder, all three have ASW capabilities, which would require attention from submarines. The truth is that the Karakurt's target acquisition would only face difficulties in Nordic waters or regions within range of coastal batteries, putting the corvettes themselves at risk. But with greater range and lower visibility, the Russian corvettes would terrorize larger vessels. The Karakurt are capable of providing area denial over thousands of kilometers, demonstrating a new concept in naval area denial. Specifically at this case, The Altius-U would prioritize radar for wide-area scanning, followed by EO/IR and SIGINT for refinement, but the stealth of these corvettes reduces effective ranges and increases failure risks.
0:43

The Nordic Trio: A Tough Match for Russian Corvettes Russian corvettes are among the most heavily armed on the planet, but they would run into trouble against their Nordic counterparts. The Russian corvettes of the Karakurt class are the most heavily armed ones I know of. They carry Kalibr missiles with a range of 2,500 km and hypersonic Zircon missiles. They would be capable of inflicting significant damage on the entire European fleet, which lacks defenses against the Zircon. The Karakurt also features a version of the Pantsir system with a range of 40 km, tested for intercepting ballistic missiles. Yes, the Karakurt demonstrates how the concept of sea dominance can shift with even small vessels capable of projecting power over long distances. However, there is a trio that would serve as a formidable barrier to the Russian corvettes: the Skjold, Hamina, and Visby. The stealth corvettes from Finland, Sweden, and Norway would be a massive headache for the Karakurt, precisely because of their small size and stealth architecture. The Karakurt may possess Kalibr missiles with a 2,500 km range or Zircons capable of reaching nearly 1,000 km, but to locate their targets, the Karakurt relies on drones like the Altius-U, equipped with a multimode sensor suite and multiple capabilities. Facing this trio would not be an easy match for the Altius, precisely because these vessels are designed for operations in contested environments, with an emphasis on low observability. Imagine trying to locate the Skjold, with its advanced stealth design featuring radar-absorbent materials, angular shapes, and a drastically reduced RCS, weighing only 270 tons? On the Altius's radar, it might appear as a small fishing boat under good conditions. And what about the Hamina? Built with aluminum and a composite superstructure (Kevlar and absorbent materials), it reduces radar, thermal, magnetic, and acoustic signatures. With a very low RCS, it would blend into maritime clutter (waves and small objects), operating in silent mode with electronic jamming. And the Visby? This is the stealthiest of all. Made from carbon fiber composites, with angular shapes, retractable/embedded weapons, and reductions in all signatures (RCS up to 99% lower, IR, acoustic, magnetic, hydrodynamic wake), plus advanced jamming and optimized operations to deny aerial sensors. All of them leverage integration with archipelagos for natural camouflage. What could the Altius-U do? Its active radar would need to operate in high-resolution modes, with drastically reduced range (possibly just a few dozen km); EO/IR for optical/thermal identification at extreme close range; SIGINT/ELINT to capture any residual emissions. This would require multiple drones operating in a coordinated manner with much greater exposure, putting the drones at risk from anti-air defenses, plus a bit of luck. By this point, larger vessels might have already been turned into fish habitats by the Zircons and Kalibrs, but this trio would still be standing. The resilience of this trio would force the Karakurt to risk approaching and entering the range of the Nordic corvettes, which are well armed with modern missiles. To make it even harder, all three have ASW capabilities, which would require attention from submarines. The truth is that the Karakurt's target acquisition would only face difficulties in Nordic waters or regions within range of coastal batteries, putting the corvettes themselves at risk. But with greater range and lower visibility, the Russian corvettes would terrorize larger vessels. The Karakurt are capable of providing area denial over thousands of kilometers, demonstrating a new concept in naval area denial. Specifically at this case, The Altius-U would prioritize radar for wide-area scanning, followed by EO/IR and SIGINT for refinement, but the stealth of these corvettes reduces effective ranges and increases failure risks.

Patricia Marins

30,064 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

What Yamato and Iowa Teach Us The Yamato was grandiose, the largest guns ever designed for a warship, with nine 46 cm (18.1-inch) main guns capable of firing shells up to 42 km, the farthest of their era. A thick hull, with belt armor up to 410 mm thick, protected that giant. On the other side, the Iowa boasted more agile turret traversal, a more powerful engine delivering speeds of 33 knots, and precise radar (Mark 8 and Mark 13 fire-control systems) capable of directing accurate shots beyond 30 km, even in poor visibility. Despite Yamato's bigger guns, its effective firing range was actually shorter than Iowa's, since it relied primarily on optical sighting, limiting engagements to around 25-30 km in good conditions. In fact, Yamato was built without radar and only received a basic, imprecise one in the final year of the war. What a disservice to a historical giant. In a confrontation, the Iowa would not only dictate the speed and establish the engagement range but also extend that range further thanks to its superior sensors. What do the Americans need to learn from this? It doesn't help to increase size when you lack the technology to impose and sustain that advantage. Actually the Chinese have at least 9 models of hypersonic missiles that are very difficult to defend against. Sure, plenty of folks don’t like reading about that, but until the GPI (Glide Phase Interceptor, a ship-launched missile designed to intercept hypersonic threats during their glide phase) is completed and the SM-6 sees significant maturation for reliable hypersonic defense, including ongoing upgrades and real tests, I'd say the bigger the ships, the bigger the targets. And if equipment-based countermeasures don't arrive in time, a total fleet reorganization becomes necessary, preferably decentralizing C2 to reduce vulnerability, as I've written before. Beyond that, US need to accelerate and take seriously the research and development of more capable missiles. Missiles became one of the most important factor in naval warfare. The lesson remains: Only increase size when the technology can ensure the ship's survival and combat efficiency.
0:33

What Yamato and Iowa Teach Us The Yamato was grandiose, the largest guns ever designed for a warship, with nine 46 cm (18.1-inch) main guns capable of firing shells up to 42 km, the farthest of their era. A thick hull, with belt armor up to 410 mm thick, protected that giant. On the other side, the Iowa boasted more agile turret traversal, a more powerful engine delivering speeds of 33 knots, and precise radar (Mark 8 and Mark 13 fire-control systems) capable of directing accurate shots beyond 30 km, even in poor visibility. Despite Yamato's bigger guns, its effective firing range was actually shorter than Iowa's, since it relied primarily on optical sighting, limiting engagements to around 25-30 km in good conditions. In fact, Yamato was built without radar and only received a basic, imprecise one in the final year of the war. What a disservice to a historical giant. In a confrontation, the Iowa would not only dictate the speed and establish the engagement range but also extend that range further thanks to its superior sensors. What do the Americans need to learn from this? It doesn't help to increase size when you lack the technology to impose and sustain that advantage. Actually the Chinese have at least 9 models of hypersonic missiles that are very difficult to defend against. Sure, plenty of folks don’t like reading about that, but until the GPI (Glide Phase Interceptor, a ship-launched missile designed to intercept hypersonic threats during their glide phase) is completed and the SM-6 sees significant maturation for reliable hypersonic defense, including ongoing upgrades and real tests, I'd say the bigger the ships, the bigger the targets. And if equipment-based countermeasures don't arrive in time, a total fleet reorganization becomes necessary, preferably decentralizing C2 to reduce vulnerability, as I've written before. Beyond that, US need to accelerate and take seriously the research and development of more capable missiles. Missiles became one of the most important factor in naval warfare. The lesson remains: Only increase size when the technology can ensure the ship's survival and combat efficiency.

Patricia Marins

132,846 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

🚨🇮🇷 IRAN'S DRONES ARE THE WEST'S WORST NIGHTMARE: Hadid 110 vs Shahed 136 Iran's drone technology has evolved significantly, with its first combat use of the new Hadid 110 last month—a high-speed, stealth drone that enhances Iran's offensive capabilities. While the Shahed 136 was revolutionary for its low-cost, mass-saturation approach, the Hadid 110 marks a shift towards more advanced, precise, and faster loitering munitions. 🔸 Hadid 110’s turbojet engine hits speeds of 510 km/h, far outpacing the Shahed 136’s 185 km/h. This speed gives it a clear advantage against traditional missile defense systems. 🔸 Shahed 136 pioneered cost-efficient swarm tactics, flooding defenses with overwhelming numbers — but the Hadid 110 now breaks through with stealth features and precision strikes, proving speed and survival matter more than sheer volume. 🔸 Iran’s Hadid 110 has cutting-edge radar evasion, designed to penetrate advanced defense systems, making it a lethal high-speed missile that even Israel and the US struggle to intercept. 🔸 While Shaheds still play a crucial role in mass attacks, the Hadid 110 takes on high-value, heavily-defended targets, like radar stations and military infrastructure, with its 30 kg payload and 350 km range — a far cry from its predecessor’s capabilities. US and Israel’s reliance on outdated interception methods is increasingly obsolete as Iran adapts its drones to counter these systems. How can the West win if Iran’s drones evolve faster than their defenses?
0:48

🚨🇮🇷 IRAN'S DRONES ARE THE WEST'S WORST NIGHTMARE: Hadid 110 vs Shahed 136 Iran's drone technology has evolved significantly, with its first combat use of the new Hadid 110 last month—a high-speed, stealth drone that enhances Iran's offensive capabilities. While the Shahed 136 was revolutionary for its low-cost, mass-saturation approach, the Hadid 110 marks a shift towards more advanced, precise, and faster loitering munitions. 🔸 Hadid 110’s turbojet engine hits speeds of 510 km/h, far outpacing the Shahed 136’s 185 km/h. This speed gives it a clear advantage against traditional missile defense systems. 🔸 Shahed 136 pioneered cost-efficient swarm tactics, flooding defenses with overwhelming numbers — but the Hadid 110 now breaks through with stealth features and precision strikes, proving speed and survival matter more than sheer volume. 🔸 Iran’s Hadid 110 has cutting-edge radar evasion, designed to penetrate advanced defense systems, making it a lethal high-speed missile that even Israel and the US struggle to intercept. 🔸 While Shaheds still play a crucial role in mass attacks, the Hadid 110 takes on high-value, heavily-defended targets, like radar stations and military infrastructure, with its 30 kg payload and 350 km range — a far cry from its predecessor’s capabilities. US and Israel’s reliance on outdated interception methods is increasingly obsolete as Iran adapts its drones to counter these systems. How can the West win if Iran’s drones evolve faster than their defenses?

NewRulesGeopolitics

17,494 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

A maritime conflict in Iran could bring new paradigms Iran has decided to invest in small submarines instead of large, expensive models. Despite their size, these submarines are highly armed, with mines, torpedoes, and even anti-ship missiles. On the surface, there is a whole fleet of dozens of highly agile speedboats equipped with anti-ship missiles that can reach 180 km. Other catamaran vessels carry anti-ship missiles with ranges of over 300 km, have the capacity to launch drones, and feature modern radar systems. These vessels, armed with 4-8 VLS cells, represent a new concept in naval warfare, far from traditional large ships. Some of these speedboats and catamarans also have air defense systems capable of reaching up to 40 km, inhibiting drone actions, which would threaten this kind of strategy. Considering all the models and sizes of these boats, it's evident that Iran has more than 1,000 such vessels in its military inventory. The Iranians also successfully tested two models of UUVs (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles) two years ago, suggesting these models are now part of their arsenal. Iran introduces a new naval warfare concept: decentralizing the power of large ships into a swarm of highly equipped speedboats and catamarans, operating together with drones and UUVs. We are not far from a scenario where large ships could be targeted by swarms of UUVs- an area where they could do very little, since there is practically no defense. Could large ships survive attacks from swarms in the air, on the surface, and underwater? Is Iran right about the future of naval warfare?
0:30

A maritime conflict in Iran could bring new paradigms Iran has decided to invest in small submarines instead of large, expensive models. Despite their size, these submarines are highly armed, with mines, torpedoes, and even anti-ship missiles. On the surface, there is a whole fleet of dozens of highly agile speedboats equipped with anti-ship missiles that can reach 180 km. Other catamaran vessels carry anti-ship missiles with ranges of over 300 km, have the capacity to launch drones, and feature modern radar systems. These vessels, armed with 4-8 VLS cells, represent a new concept in naval warfare, far from traditional large ships. Some of these speedboats and catamarans also have air defense systems capable of reaching up to 40 km, inhibiting drone actions, which would threaten this kind of strategy. Considering all the models and sizes of these boats, it's evident that Iran has more than 1,000 such vessels in its military inventory. The Iranians also successfully tested two models of UUVs (Unmanned Underwater Vehicles) two years ago, suggesting these models are now part of their arsenal. Iran introduces a new naval warfare concept: decentralizing the power of large ships into a swarm of highly equipped speedboats and catamarans, operating together with drones and UUVs. We are not far from a scenario where large ships could be targeted by swarms of UUVs- an area where they could do very little, since there is practically no defense. Could large ships survive attacks from swarms in the air, on the surface, and underwater? Is Iran right about the future of naval warfare?

Patricia Marins

59,082 просмотров • 10 месяцев назад

The Lessons from Vietnam Twenty years ago, the Ukrainian company Vizar was producing air defense missiles for the S-300 systems. With underground facilities and years of expertise, the company was bombed by Russian forces merely two months after the onset of the war. Vizar, along with other Ukrainian companies, had ample opportunity to relocate their production to new sites, yet they did not take this action. This reflects a series of missteps by the Ukrainian MoD and their Western advisors. Between 2014 and 2021, Ukraine received billions in support aimed at modernizing its armed forces. This funding was sufficient to upgrade significant portions of its arsenal, including the T-64 tanks. At that time, in a strategic decision, Ukraine opted for modernization rather than procuring new tanks. However, a similar process was required in their domestic factories to produce missiles and upgrade the Soviet-designed systems that in 2022 constituted 80% of their military inventory, but the Ukrainian MoD was able only to refurbish some weapons. It is in this context that Vietnam offers important lessons for Ukraine. Vietnam boasts more than three factories capable of producing and upgrading Soviet systems. Their S-300 systems, including radars, are being enhanced at the engineering department of the A29 Factory. The A31 and A41 factories are also engaged in processing surface-to-air missiles and producing spare parts for the S-75, S-125, S-300, and various other surface-to-air missile systems. Notably, the same factory successfully upgraded the S-125 "Pechora" surface-to-air missiles, resulting in the creation of the S-125 2TM "Pechora-M" variant, which offers superior performance compared to the original model. These Vietnamese factories are adept at repairing, assembling, and upgrading their weaponry. Currently, Vietnam is also engaged in upgrading its Scud missiles. Vietnam implemented a strategic approach that Ukraine should have adopted, a necessity that was overlooked by Western advisors, whether intentionally or not. Before the conflict, Ukraine possessed approximately 4,500 defense missiles but failed to establish a network of companies capable of upgrading and organizing the constant supply of these Soviet missiles. Despite Ukraine's significant legacy in missile development during the Soviet era, there was no strategic planning for a sustainable military supply chain, resulting in a reliance on Western systems, which are also experiencing ammunition shortages. The current Ukrainian arsenal contains numerous short-range air defense systems that are now abandoned and inactive. NATO's assessments regarding Russian military and industrial capabilities were flawed, as was their analysis of the repair logistics for Western equipment supplied to Ukraine. Additionally, there was a lack of planning aimed at creating a sustainable military framework for Ukraine. This occurred despite the existence of companies with a long-standing tradition and underground facilities specifically designed to operate during wartime. Currently, only a few Ukrainian companies are responsible for the limited production of missiles, such as the Neptune, along with some drones. This output is merely a fraction of what it could have been at this stage. The Lessons from Vietnam? The capacity for supply must be established as a cohesive chain, capable of supporting both modern and old equipment that requires upgrades within a domestic production framework.
2:17

The Lessons from Vietnam Twenty years ago, the Ukrainian company Vizar was producing air defense missiles for the S-300 systems. With underground facilities and years of expertise, the company was bombed by Russian forces merely two months after the onset of the war. Vizar, along with other Ukrainian companies, had ample opportunity to relocate their production to new sites, yet they did not take this action. This reflects a series of missteps by the Ukrainian MoD and their Western advisors. Between 2014 and 2021, Ukraine received billions in support aimed at modernizing its armed forces. This funding was sufficient to upgrade significant portions of its arsenal, including the T-64 tanks. At that time, in a strategic decision, Ukraine opted for modernization rather than procuring new tanks. However, a similar process was required in their domestic factories to produce missiles and upgrade the Soviet-designed systems that in 2022 constituted 80% of their military inventory, but the Ukrainian MoD was able only to refurbish some weapons. It is in this context that Vietnam offers important lessons for Ukraine. Vietnam boasts more than three factories capable of producing and upgrading Soviet systems. Their S-300 systems, including radars, are being enhanced at the engineering department of the A29 Factory. The A31 and A41 factories are also engaged in processing surface-to-air missiles and producing spare parts for the S-75, S-125, S-300, and various other surface-to-air missile systems. Notably, the same factory successfully upgraded the S-125 "Pechora" surface-to-air missiles, resulting in the creation of the S-125 2TM "Pechora-M" variant, which offers superior performance compared to the original model. These Vietnamese factories are adept at repairing, assembling, and upgrading their weaponry. Currently, Vietnam is also engaged in upgrading its Scud missiles. Vietnam implemented a strategic approach that Ukraine should have adopted, a necessity that was overlooked by Western advisors, whether intentionally or not. Before the conflict, Ukraine possessed approximately 4,500 defense missiles but failed to establish a network of companies capable of upgrading and organizing the constant supply of these Soviet missiles. Despite Ukraine's significant legacy in missile development during the Soviet era, there was no strategic planning for a sustainable military supply chain, resulting in a reliance on Western systems, which are also experiencing ammunition shortages. The current Ukrainian arsenal contains numerous short-range air defense systems that are now abandoned and inactive. NATO's assessments regarding Russian military and industrial capabilities were flawed, as was their analysis of the repair logistics for Western equipment supplied to Ukraine. Additionally, there was a lack of planning aimed at creating a sustainable military framework for Ukraine. This occurred despite the existence of companies with a long-standing tradition and underground facilities specifically designed to operate during wartime. Currently, only a few Ukrainian companies are responsible for the limited production of missiles, such as the Neptune, along with some drones. This output is merely a fraction of what it could have been at this stage. The Lessons from Vietnam? The capacity for supply must be established as a cohesive chain, capable of supporting both modern and old equipment that requires upgrades within a domestic production framework.

Patricia Marins

451,618 просмотров • 1 год назад

Strategic Bombers Are More Relevant Than Ever Decades ago, these aircraft had to fly directly over their targets to drop bombs. That era is over, and things have only gotten easier for them. Now they are standoff platforms capable of launching modern, heavy, long-range missiles (thousands of kilometers), including hypersonics, in large quantities, without ever entering contested airspace. This proves they are far from obsolete and have become massive flying weapons platforms. These bombers operate in squadrons, with missile ranges of 1,000–5,500 km (cruise) or around 2,000 km (hypersonic), devastating warheads, and launched in high numbers. Hypersonics like Kinzhal, YJ-21, and the future ARRW can evade modern defenses, while cruise missiles like JASSM and Kh-101 achieve saturation at a much lower cost. Russian glide bombs are being motorized to become an even cheaper option, and there are already configurations where bombers carry up to 20 glide bombs. Imagine 5 B-52H Stratofortress launching 20–24 stealth AGM-158 JASSM-ER missiles with 1,000 km range each. That’s over 100 missiles in a single salvo. Or 5 Tu-160M2 launching 6 Kh-47M2 Kinzhal each, or in another configuration up to 12 Kh-101 missiles per aircraft. If you want to go further: what navy could survive a squadron salvo from Chinese H-6 or H-20 launching 4–6 anti-ship hypersonic missiles with 1,500–2,000 km range? Strategic bombers are more relevant than ever and now operate much more safely. In the future, in possible larger conflicts, we’ll see waves of 20 bombers launching salvos of 150–250 missiles, overwhelming defenses and causing immense destruction. These platforms provide extended reach at a far lower cost than medium- or long-range ground launched missiles. Not to mention the low operating costs of the B-52, Tu-95, and H-6, with the latter probably having even lower costs. The trend is toward missiles and bombs with ever-greater range, lower cost, and modular designs to be launched from bombers. We can expect these aircraft to remain in service for at least another 20–30 years.
0:58

Strategic Bombers Are More Relevant Than Ever Decades ago, these aircraft had to fly directly over their targets to drop bombs. That era is over, and things have only gotten easier for them. Now they are standoff platforms capable of launching modern, heavy, long-range missiles (thousands of kilometers), including hypersonics, in large quantities, without ever entering contested airspace. This proves they are far from obsolete and have become massive flying weapons platforms. These bombers operate in squadrons, with missile ranges of 1,000–5,500 km (cruise) or around 2,000 km (hypersonic), devastating warheads, and launched in high numbers. Hypersonics like Kinzhal, YJ-21, and the future ARRW can evade modern defenses, while cruise missiles like JASSM and Kh-101 achieve saturation at a much lower cost. Russian glide bombs are being motorized to become an even cheaper option, and there are already configurations where bombers carry up to 20 glide bombs. Imagine 5 B-52H Stratofortress launching 20–24 stealth AGM-158 JASSM-ER missiles with 1,000 km range each. That’s over 100 missiles in a single salvo. Or 5 Tu-160M2 launching 6 Kh-47M2 Kinzhal each, or in another configuration up to 12 Kh-101 missiles per aircraft. If you want to go further: what navy could survive a squadron salvo from Chinese H-6 or H-20 launching 4–6 anti-ship hypersonic missiles with 1,500–2,000 km range? Strategic bombers are more relevant than ever and now operate much more safely. In the future, in possible larger conflicts, we’ll see waves of 20 bombers launching salvos of 150–250 missiles, overwhelming defenses and causing immense destruction. These platforms provide extended reach at a far lower cost than medium- or long-range ground launched missiles. Not to mention the low operating costs of the B-52, Tu-95, and H-6, with the latter probably having even lower costs. The trend is toward missiles and bombs with ever-greater range, lower cost, and modular designs to be launched from bombers. We can expect these aircraft to remain in service for at least another 20–30 years.

Patricia Marins

19,267 просмотров • 6 месяцев назад

Russian fighter jets, renowned for their engineering prowess and combat effectiveness, stand as a testament to the nation’s storied aerospace legacy. Models like the Sukhoi Su-57, MiG-35, and Su-35S exemplify a blend of cutting-edge technology, raw power, and battlefield versatility, often regarded as some of the finest in the world. Their majesty lies not only in their sleek, aerodynamic designs but also in their ability to dominate the skies through superior performance, advanced systems, and adaptability to modern warfare. The Sukhoi Su-57, Russia’s fifth-generation stealth fighter, is a pinnacle of innovation. Its angular design minimizes radar cross-section, while supercruise capability allows sustained supersonic flight without afterburners, conserving fuel and extending range. Equipped with advanced avionics, including AI-driven systems and 360-degree sensor fusion, the Su-57 can detect and engage targets with precision, even in contested environments. Its thrust-vectoring engines enable unmatched maneuverability, allowing it to perform complex aerobatic maneuvers like the Pugachev Cobra, showcasing agility that outclasses many Western counterparts. The Su-35S, a 4.5-generation multirole fighter, is another jewel in Russia’s crown. Powered by AL-41F1S engines, it boasts exceptional speed (Mach 2.25) and a combat radius exceeding 1,500 kilometers. Its Irbis-E radar can track up to 30 targets simultaneously, while its weapon suite, including long-range air-to-air missiles and precision-guided munitions, ensures dominance in both air superiority and ground-attack roles. The jet’s robust airframe and electronic countermeasures make it resilient against modern threats, earning it respect in global exercises and conflicts. The MiG-35, an evolution of the legendary MiG-29, combines affordability with lethality. Its lightweight design, coupled with RD-33MK engines, delivers a thrust-to-weight ratio that rivals heavier fighters. Advanced optronics and helmet-mounted displays enhance pilot situational awareness, while its compatibility with a wide array of munitions makes it a versatile platform for diverse missions.Russian jets excel due to their design philosophy: ruggedness, cost-effectiveness, and adaptability. Unlike some Western fighters, which rely heavily on stealth, Russian aircraft prioritize maneuverability and firepower, allowing them to engage in dogfights or long-range strikes with equal proficiency. Their ability to operate from austere airfields and withstand harsh conditions further enhances their global appeal. Exported to nations like India, China, and Vietnam, these jets have proven their reliability in varied climates and combat scenarios, cementing Russia’s reputation for building some of the world’s most formidable fighter aircraft. Their blend of innovation, power, and combat-proven performance makes them a majestic force in the skies.
1:29

Russian fighter jets, renowned for their engineering prowess and combat effectiveness, stand as a testament to the nation’s storied aerospace legacy. Models like the Sukhoi Su-57, MiG-35, and Su-35S exemplify a blend of cutting-edge technology, raw power, and battlefield versatility, often regarded as some of the finest in the world. Their majesty lies not only in their sleek, aerodynamic designs but also in their ability to dominate the skies through superior performance, advanced systems, and adaptability to modern warfare. The Sukhoi Su-57, Russia’s fifth-generation stealth fighter, is a pinnacle of innovation. Its angular design minimizes radar cross-section, while supercruise capability allows sustained supersonic flight without afterburners, conserving fuel and extending range. Equipped with advanced avionics, including AI-driven systems and 360-degree sensor fusion, the Su-57 can detect and engage targets with precision, even in contested environments. Its thrust-vectoring engines enable unmatched maneuverability, allowing it to perform complex aerobatic maneuvers like the Pugachev Cobra, showcasing agility that outclasses many Western counterparts. The Su-35S, a 4.5-generation multirole fighter, is another jewel in Russia’s crown. Powered by AL-41F1S engines, it boasts exceptional speed (Mach 2.25) and a combat radius exceeding 1,500 kilometers. Its Irbis-E radar can track up to 30 targets simultaneously, while its weapon suite, including long-range air-to-air missiles and precision-guided munitions, ensures dominance in both air superiority and ground-attack roles. The jet’s robust airframe and electronic countermeasures make it resilient against modern threats, earning it respect in global exercises and conflicts. The MiG-35, an evolution of the legendary MiG-29, combines affordability with lethality. Its lightweight design, coupled with RD-33MK engines, delivers a thrust-to-weight ratio that rivals heavier fighters. Advanced optronics and helmet-mounted displays enhance pilot situational awareness, while its compatibility with a wide array of munitions makes it a versatile platform for diverse missions.Russian jets excel due to their design philosophy: ruggedness, cost-effectiveness, and adaptability. Unlike some Western fighters, which rely heavily on stealth, Russian aircraft prioritize maneuverability and firepower, allowing them to engage in dogfights or long-range strikes with equal proficiency. Their ability to operate from austere airfields and withstand harsh conditions further enhances their global appeal. Exported to nations like India, China, and Vietnam, these jets have proven their reliability in varied climates and combat scenarios, cementing Russia’s reputation for building some of the world’s most formidable fighter aircraft. Their blend of innovation, power, and combat-proven performance makes them a majestic force in the skies.

𝐃𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐝 𝐙 🇷🇺 🇮🇪

53,160 просмотров • 9 месяцев назад

🇷🇺 Russia’s Starlink killers showcase new era of electronic battlefield warfare Russia has ramped-up EW use to detect and jam Elon Musk’s Starlink terminals and satellites, Ukrainian media reports. 👉 Meet Russia’s key counter-Starlink systems: 🔸 Volna Kupol Garant Russia’s latest electronic warfare system reportedly uses a directed high-frequency radio beam to disrupt Starlink operations. Rather than damaging satellites orbiting roughly 500 kilometers above Earth, the system blinds them – cutting their ability to connect with ground terminals while they remain under attack. According to reports, Volna is a mobile system built around six trailers. Each carries a pair of steerable satellite dishes mounted on rotating platforms. A single battery is reportedly capable of denying Starlink coverage across an area of up to 20 sq km. Some analysts say the system was previously referenced under the designation Peresvet-M, although this has not been independently confirmed. Ukrainian sources claim Volna was first deployed during Russia's offensive in the Kharkov region in 2024. They also say its use has increased significantly in recent months. 🔸 Tobol The secretive Russian EW complex is reportedly used to disrupt signals from NATO-linked satellite networks, including GPS, Galileo, and Starlink. Reports claim that Tobol attacks satellite communications on both ends of the link – jamming downlinks from satellites to ground receivers and uplinks from Earth to orbit. Its power and range also allegedly allow it to create an electromagnetic "umbrella." 🔸 Kalinka The system is designed to hunt down satellite communications signals, including those transmitted by Starlink terminals at distances of up to 15 km. It can reportedly track and lock onto even Starshield – SpaceX’s hardened military variant of Starlink. Western media warns that while Tobol disrupts GPS signals on a broad scale, the Kalinka’s precision-targeting capabilities could pose a more direct threat to specific military operations. 🔸 Krasukha The Krasukha-S4 is designed to neutralize reconnaissance satellites, ground-based radar installations, and airborne surveillance systems. It does so by emitting powerful electronic jamming signals that disrupt key radar bands and other radio-frequency emissions. A standard Krasukha-S4 battery consists of two vehicles and has an operational range exceeding 300 kilometers. 🔸 Borshchevik The light mobile system is designed to detect and geolocate Starlink terminals within a 180-degree sector at ranges of up to 10 km, with a reported accuracy of five meters. Using direction-finding and biangulation algorithms, it can locate a target in less than three minutes at a single scanning position. The Borshchevik-2 airborne system hunts Starlink signals from the sky, with reported accuracy down to 0.4 m.
0:20

🇷🇺 Russia’s Starlink killers showcase new era of electronic battlefield warfare Russia has ramped-up EW use to detect and jam Elon Musk’s Starlink terminals and satellites, Ukrainian media reports. 👉 Meet Russia’s key counter-Starlink systems: 🔸 Volna Kupol Garant Russia’s latest electronic warfare system reportedly uses a directed high-frequency radio beam to disrupt Starlink operations. Rather than damaging satellites orbiting roughly 500 kilometers above Earth, the system blinds them – cutting their ability to connect with ground terminals while they remain under attack. According to reports, Volna is a mobile system built around six trailers. Each carries a pair of steerable satellite dishes mounted on rotating platforms. A single battery is reportedly capable of denying Starlink coverage across an area of up to 20 sq km. Some analysts say the system was previously referenced under the designation Peresvet-M, although this has not been independently confirmed. Ukrainian sources claim Volna was first deployed during Russia's offensive in the Kharkov region in 2024. They also say its use has increased significantly in recent months. 🔸 Tobol The secretive Russian EW complex is reportedly used to disrupt signals from NATO-linked satellite networks, including GPS, Galileo, and Starlink. Reports claim that Tobol attacks satellite communications on both ends of the link – jamming downlinks from satellites to ground receivers and uplinks from Earth to orbit. Its power and range also allegedly allow it to create an electromagnetic "umbrella." 🔸 Kalinka The system is designed to hunt down satellite communications signals, including those transmitted by Starlink terminals at distances of up to 15 km. It can reportedly track and lock onto even Starshield – SpaceX’s hardened military variant of Starlink. Western media warns that while Tobol disrupts GPS signals on a broad scale, the Kalinka’s precision-targeting capabilities could pose a more direct threat to specific military operations. 🔸 Krasukha The Krasukha-S4 is designed to neutralize reconnaissance satellites, ground-based radar installations, and airborne surveillance systems. It does so by emitting powerful electronic jamming signals that disrupt key radar bands and other radio-frequency emissions. A standard Krasukha-S4 battery consists of two vehicles and has an operational range exceeding 300 kilometers. 🔸 Borshchevik The light mobile system is designed to detect and geolocate Starlink terminals within a 180-degree sector at ranges of up to 10 km, with a reported accuracy of five meters. Using direction-finding and biangulation algorithms, it can locate a target in less than three minutes at a single scanning position. The Borshchevik-2 airborne system hunts Starlink signals from the sky, with reported accuracy down to 0.4 m.

Sputnik

25,365 просмотров • 7 дней назад

🚨🇮🇷Real Reason Pentagon Is Losing Sleep: Iranian Top Drones Tehran has developed a diverse fleet of strike drones designed for different combat roles. In addition to the famous Shaheds, here are the top-notch Iranian drones that keep Pentagon planners awake at night: 1️⃣ Mohajer-6 — The tactical backbone of Iran's proxy forces. This drone is a battlefield multiplier, equipped with electro-optical sensors and capable of firing the Almas anti-tank missile with pinpoint accuracy. It has been exported and used in conflicts from the Caucasus to the Red Sea, systematically destroying armored vehicles and fortifications; 2️⃣ Mohajer-10 — The next evolution in strike capability. It boasts triple the range (2,000 km) and double the flight endurance (24 hours) of its predecessor. Most critically, it can carry a 300 kg payload, including up to six smart bombs or cruise missiles, allowing it to saturate small sections of an air defense network; 3️⃣ Kaman-22 — Iran's "wide-body" combat drone. With a 3,000 km range, it can reach the furthest US outposts. It carries a 300 kg payload of air-to-ground missiles and glide bombs, designed to hit command centers and radar sites deep behind enemy lines, far from the front; 4️⃣ Karrar — The jet-powered speed demon. Unlike propeller drones, the Karrar races to its target at high subsonic speeds. It can be configured as a swarm leader or as a "mini-cruise missile" itself, carrying a 225 kg warhead to strike time-sensitive targets before defenses can react; 5️⃣ Fotros — The heavy hitter. With a 2,000 km range and a 30-hour flight time, it carries up to six missiles. Its large airframe allows for powerful, advanced communication relays, meaning it can guide other drones or missiles to their targets while staying outside the immediate kill zone; 6️⃣ Arash-2 — A loitering munition specifically designed to hunt radars. Once a US Patriot or THAAD battery turns on its radar, the Arash-2, with a range exceeding 1,000 km, can home in on that emission and destroy the system, effectively blinding the base's air defense; 7️⃣ Hadid-110 (Dalaho) — A jet-powered stealth loitering munition fresh from real combat. It hits 510 km/h with a radar cross-section below 0.02 square meters, evading F-15E and E-3C detection. With a 350 km range and a 30 kg warhead, it precisely targets Persian Gulf infrastructure, slipping past Western defenses silently; 8️⃣ Meraj-521 — A man-portable loitering munition that fits in a backpack. With a 5 km range and interchangeable 500g-1kg warheads, it silently strikes bunkers and armor via live video feed. Launched in swarms from ground or air, it dismantles fortified positions without exposing a single soldier to return fire.
1:06

🚨🇮🇷Real Reason Pentagon Is Losing Sleep: Iranian Top Drones Tehran has developed a diverse fleet of strike drones designed for different combat roles. In addition to the famous Shaheds, here are the top-notch Iranian drones that keep Pentagon planners awake at night: 1️⃣ Mohajer-6 — The tactical backbone of Iran's proxy forces. This drone is a battlefield multiplier, equipped with electro-optical sensors and capable of firing the Almas anti-tank missile with pinpoint accuracy. It has been exported and used in conflicts from the Caucasus to the Red Sea, systematically destroying armored vehicles and fortifications; 2️⃣ Mohajer-10 — The next evolution in strike capability. It boasts triple the range (2,000 km) and double the flight endurance (24 hours) of its predecessor. Most critically, it can carry a 300 kg payload, including up to six smart bombs or cruise missiles, allowing it to saturate small sections of an air defense network; 3️⃣ Kaman-22 — Iran's "wide-body" combat drone. With a 3,000 km range, it can reach the furthest US outposts. It carries a 300 kg payload of air-to-ground missiles and glide bombs, designed to hit command centers and radar sites deep behind enemy lines, far from the front; 4️⃣ Karrar — The jet-powered speed demon. Unlike propeller drones, the Karrar races to its target at high subsonic speeds. It can be configured as a swarm leader or as a "mini-cruise missile" itself, carrying a 225 kg warhead to strike time-sensitive targets before defenses can react; 5️⃣ Fotros — The heavy hitter. With a 2,000 km range and a 30-hour flight time, it carries up to six missiles. Its large airframe allows for powerful, advanced communication relays, meaning it can guide other drones or missiles to their targets while staying outside the immediate kill zone; 6️⃣ Arash-2 — A loitering munition specifically designed to hunt radars. Once a US Patriot or THAAD battery turns on its radar, the Arash-2, with a range exceeding 1,000 km, can home in on that emission and destroy the system, effectively blinding the base's air defense; 7️⃣ Hadid-110 (Dalaho) — A jet-powered stealth loitering munition fresh from real combat. It hits 510 km/h with a radar cross-section below 0.02 square meters, evading F-15E and E-3C detection. With a 350 km range and a 30 kg warhead, it precisely targets Persian Gulf infrastructure, slipping past Western defenses silently; 8️⃣ Meraj-521 — A man-portable loitering munition that fits in a backpack. With a 5 km range and interchangeable 500g-1kg warheads, it silently strikes bunkers and armor via live video feed. Launched in swarms from ground or air, it dismantles fortified positions without exposing a single soldier to return fire.

𝐃𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐝 𝐙 🇷🇺🇮🇪

63,109 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

Key statements by chief designer of Fire Point company Denys Shtilerman Denys Shtilierman on the Ukrainian FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles: ▪️ The FP-7 ballistic missile will soon be tested against targets in Russia. ▪️ A clone of the S-300 missile has been developed for existing launchers. After integration with radar systems - a complex process - it could form the basis of an anti-ballistic shield under the Freya project. ▪️ The missiles are cheaper than the original S-300 due to simplification and the use of new manufacturing technologies. ▪️ The missile can also be used as a cheaper analogue of ATACMS. This is how the FP-7 missile with a range of up to 300 km, depending on the warhead, was developed. ▪️ The FP-7 warhead is expected to be larger than that of ATACMS, while the missile itself will cost 2.5 times less. ▪️ The developers say they are ready to produce as many FP-7 missiles as ordered. Unlike Flamingo, which currently faces engine production issues, FP-7 has no manufacturing bottlenecks. ▪️ Combat use of the FP-7 is expected to begin before summer. ▪️ The longer-range FP-9 ballistic missile is also intended, among other things, for strikes on Moscow - according to the developers, attacks on provincial targets do not impress Russia’s top leadership. ▪️ Tests of the FP-9 are expected to begin in early summer. The engine is currently being finalized. The missile’s range is up to 800 km. ▪️ FP-9 will be difficult to intercept: the speed of the Iskander-M is about 800 m/s, while FP-9 is expected to reach 1200 m/s. ▪️ The goal is for 25% of the missiles to penetrate Moscow’s air defenses and hit their targets. Cruise missiles and drones cannot reach targets in Moscow because they are intercepted. ▪️ Our luck is that in Russia the cost of missile production is inflated several times over because of theft.
4:40

Key statements by chief designer of Fire Point company Denys Shtilerman Denys Shtilierman on the Ukrainian FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles: ▪️ The FP-7 ballistic missile will soon be tested against targets in Russia. ▪️ A clone of the S-300 missile has been developed for existing launchers. After integration with radar systems - a complex process - it could form the basis of an anti-ballistic shield under the Freya project. ▪️ The missiles are cheaper than the original S-300 due to simplification and the use of new manufacturing technologies. ▪️ The missile can also be used as a cheaper analogue of ATACMS. This is how the FP-7 missile with a range of up to 300 km, depending on the warhead, was developed. ▪️ The FP-7 warhead is expected to be larger than that of ATACMS, while the missile itself will cost 2.5 times less. ▪️ The developers say they are ready to produce as many FP-7 missiles as ordered. Unlike Flamingo, which currently faces engine production issues, FP-7 has no manufacturing bottlenecks. ▪️ Combat use of the FP-7 is expected to begin before summer. ▪️ The longer-range FP-9 ballistic missile is also intended, among other things, for strikes on Moscow - according to the developers, attacks on provincial targets do not impress Russia’s top leadership. ▪️ Tests of the FP-9 are expected to begin in early summer. The engine is currently being finalized. The missile’s range is up to 800 km. ▪️ FP-9 will be difficult to intercept: the speed of the Iskander-M is about 800 m/s, while FP-9 is expected to reach 1200 m/s. ▪️ The goal is for 25% of the missiles to penetrate Moscow’s air defenses and hit their targets. Cruise missiles and drones cannot reach targets in Moscow because they are intercepted. ▪️ Our luck is that in Russia the cost of missile production is inflated several times over because of theft.

Anton Gerashchenko

38,060 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

“We basically invented this from scratch”: Yarmak on how Shahed drones are shot down. Ukrainian rapper and commander of the Dark Note unit of the Nemesis brigade, Oleksandr Yarmak, said in an interview with Liuba Shypovych (Dignitas Foundation) how his unit learned to effectively destroy drones. Oleksandr notes that intercepting these drones had to be invented from scratch. When they started doing this nearly two years ago, intercepting a Shahed was considered an extremely difficult task. “Even at the tactical level, there weren’t many teams that could effectively work with thermal imaging against ground targets. And here you have 200 km/h speed, night, sky - you’re basically flying into space, with no reference points at all. You were just flying into a black screen. And you had to find that Shahed there.” Yarmak emphasizes that the key to destroying drones was a combination of technologies. Proper radar operation is crucial - especially their placement and ability to detect targets at low altitudes. Radars detect the target in advance and transmit coordinates, after which interceptor drones equipped with thermal cameras are launched. Once in the air, they locate the Shahed and strike it. At the same time, mobile fire groups and air defense systems operate in parallel, providing backup for the interception. Yarmak notes that by spring 2025, they were already shooting down Shaheds in the dozens, and later in the hundreds. As of January, according to him, his unit accounted for about a third of all destroyed targets. Yarmak also highlights the value of everyone contributing to quiet skies. When Ukrainians sleep peacefully, they often don’t realize that the threat has already burned out in a field because someone intercepted it. Security doesn’t come from nowhere - it is provided by people. 📹 Dignitas
2:37

“We basically invented this from scratch”: Yarmak on how Shahed drones are shot down. Ukrainian rapper and commander of the Dark Note unit of the Nemesis brigade, Oleksandr Yarmak, said in an interview with Liuba Shypovych (Dignitas Foundation) how his unit learned to effectively destroy drones. Oleksandr notes that intercepting these drones had to be invented from scratch. When they started doing this nearly two years ago, intercepting a Shahed was considered an extremely difficult task. “Even at the tactical level, there weren’t many teams that could effectively work with thermal imaging against ground targets. And here you have 200 km/h speed, night, sky - you’re basically flying into space, with no reference points at all. You were just flying into a black screen. And you had to find that Shahed there.” Yarmak emphasizes that the key to destroying drones was a combination of technologies. Proper radar operation is crucial - especially their placement and ability to detect targets at low altitudes. Radars detect the target in advance and transmit coordinates, after which interceptor drones equipped with thermal cameras are launched. Once in the air, they locate the Shahed and strike it. At the same time, mobile fire groups and air defense systems operate in parallel, providing backup for the interception. Yarmak notes that by spring 2025, they were already shooting down Shaheds in the dozens, and later in the hundreds. As of January, according to him, his unit accounted for about a third of all destroyed targets. Yarmak also highlights the value of everyone contributing to quiet skies. When Ukrainians sleep peacefully, they often don’t realize that the threat has already burned out in a field because someone intercepted it. Security doesn’t come from nowhere - it is provided by people. 📹 Dignitas

Anton Gerashchenko

39,279 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

Long $MCB.TO — oilfield automation and services, $90mm CAD market cap. This is a 111 year old company that’s been providing oilfield equipment for over 50 years. The current CEO has been with the company since 2002. Profitable, growing, trading at 9x TTM earnings backing out net cash, and beginning to introduce a pretty revolutionary full product suite to automate casing running - the process of lowering sections of steel casing into an open wellbore to act as a liner, reinforcing the wellbore and acting as a channel through which oil and gas can be extracted. This is a pretty critical step in drilling any new well, and has applications in both onshore and offshore oil and gas. If you guys have seen those viral videos of oilfield workers running casing, you know how dangerous and physically demanding this job looks. It’s extremely tough stuff — comes with a lot of injuries, it’s very difficult to hire for, and because the work sucks so much and nobody wants to do it, the pay needs to be fantastic. It’s a painful and expensive process for operators and oilfield workers alike, see the attached content. $MCB.TO has spent 6 years developing a product suite that can effectively automate this process, more than halving the usual need for skilled workers, with labour costs typically making up 50% of casing running costs. $MCB.TO ‘s automated product suite increases safety, efficiency, and cuts costs significantly for oilfield operators to complete this process. Their automated product suite here includes a SaaS package, without which none of the other equipment works. Their software facilities communication between all the necessary pieces of equipment, monitors torque levels, analyzes casing rotation speed, and it includes a sensor suite that can monitor for various extreme conditions during a casing run — all of this automation significantly decreases the workload for casing crews and eliminates a significant chunk of the involved labor. It can also ensure higher wellbore integrity. They’re first to market with this stuff — competitors have bits and pieces of separate equipment, but they’ve got the full package, and it’s a much better offering. It would likely take a similar amount of time and investment for competitors to copy this suite, and some of their new high-tech equipment is specifically IP protected. The margins on their software system will be sweet, much higher than current mid-30s gross margin. So you’ve got high incremental margin expansion baked into every product suite these guys sell, and they’re going to see significant topline growth given the scale of the problem they’re addressing and the willingness with which operators are going to integrate this tech. The existing business is already solid. No debt, $10mm CAD cash position, enough working capital to fund their new system. They’ve stayed in business for over a century, I’m sure they know what they’re doing. Current revenues are a 50/50 split between Americas and ROW, shipping to 50 countries any given year. They’ve already got a 40% recurring/repeat revenue split selling oilfield consumables, replacement products, and servicing equipment. They’ve already begun rolling out their new product suite and receiving SaaS contracts. I’m expecting them to see significant topline growth from their new products with a lot of margin expansion to boot. They pay a 3% dividend and are buying back shares here. Dwindling rig counts are a risk. I can’t forecast where the price of oil will go or how the drilling process will shake out, but in previous years they have increased sales despite dwindling rig counts simply because their technology is a better solution — I don’t see why they couldn’t do that again. When oil prices eventually head back up, rig counts will follow suit, and many oil operators will likely go straight to $MCB.TO ‘s product suite. Still some more research I need to do but I think these guys will do well. Long 12% allocation @ $3.26 CAD.
0:49

Long $MCB.TO — oilfield automation and services, $90mm CAD market cap. This is a 111 year old company that’s been providing oilfield equipment for over 50 years. The current CEO has been with the company since 2002. Profitable, growing, trading at 9x TTM earnings backing out net cash, and beginning to introduce a pretty revolutionary full product suite to automate casing running - the process of lowering sections of steel casing into an open wellbore to act as a liner, reinforcing the wellbore and acting as a channel through which oil and gas can be extracted. This is a pretty critical step in drilling any new well, and has applications in both onshore and offshore oil and gas. If you guys have seen those viral videos of oilfield workers running casing, you know how dangerous and physically demanding this job looks. It’s extremely tough stuff — comes with a lot of injuries, it’s very difficult to hire for, and because the work sucks so much and nobody wants to do it, the pay needs to be fantastic. It’s a painful and expensive process for operators and oilfield workers alike, see the attached content. $MCB.TO has spent 6 years developing a product suite that can effectively automate this process, more than halving the usual need for skilled workers, with labour costs typically making up 50% of casing running costs. $MCB.TO ‘s automated product suite increases safety, efficiency, and cuts costs significantly for oilfield operators to complete this process. Their automated product suite here includes a SaaS package, without which none of the other equipment works. Their software facilities communication between all the necessary pieces of equipment, monitors torque levels, analyzes casing rotation speed, and it includes a sensor suite that can monitor for various extreme conditions during a casing run — all of this automation significantly decreases the workload for casing crews and eliminates a significant chunk of the involved labor. It can also ensure higher wellbore integrity. They’re first to market with this stuff — competitors have bits and pieces of separate equipment, but they’ve got the full package, and it’s a much better offering. It would likely take a similar amount of time and investment for competitors to copy this suite, and some of their new high-tech equipment is specifically IP protected. The margins on their software system will be sweet, much higher than current mid-30s gross margin. So you’ve got high incremental margin expansion baked into every product suite these guys sell, and they’re going to see significant topline growth given the scale of the problem they’re addressing and the willingness with which operators are going to integrate this tech. The existing business is already solid. No debt, $10mm CAD cash position, enough working capital to fund their new system. They’ve stayed in business for over a century, I’m sure they know what they’re doing. Current revenues are a 50/50 split between Americas and ROW, shipping to 50 countries any given year. They’ve already got a 40% recurring/repeat revenue split selling oilfield consumables, replacement products, and servicing equipment. They’ve already begun rolling out their new product suite and receiving SaaS contracts. I’m expecting them to see significant topline growth from their new products with a lot of margin expansion to boot. They pay a 3% dividend and are buying back shares here. Dwindling rig counts are a risk. I can’t forecast where the price of oil will go or how the drilling process will shake out, but in previous years they have increased sales despite dwindling rig counts simply because their technology is a better solution — I don’t see why they couldn’t do that again. When oil prices eventually head back up, rig counts will follow suit, and many oil operators will likely go straight to $MCB.TO ‘s product suite. Still some more research I need to do but I think these guys will do well. Long 12% allocation @ $3.26 CAD.

Welfare Capital (Jack)

23,524 просмотров • 1 год назад

What is your earliest memory? Memory in young children is a fascinating - and complex - topic. On one hand, newborns exhibit immediate recognition of their mothers’ voices and music played regularly while they were in utero. And within days they can recall their mother’s faces and distinguish them from those of others. Clearly newborns have some capacity for memory. But this early sensory memory is different from the long term, autobiographical memory we depend on to recall our lives’ most significant events. Indeed, few adults can claim memories earlier than 2-3 years of age. Why don’t we remember our earliest years? Researchers point to a couple of potential factors, beginning with language. As adults we rely heavily on language to organize our autobiographical memories into narratives, but this capacity is still developing during infancy. In addition, there is the issue of the hippocampus, the region of the brain responsible for converting short-term memories into long-term memories - which, during infancy, is still very much in development itself. The result is a phenomenon sometimes called infantile amnesia. So take plenty of videos to share with your child as they get older, because the most vivid memories of their early years are likely to be yours. How about you? What is your earliest memory and how old would you have been at the time? This adorable father/son conversation was shared to IG by Owens.Shaun.
0:29

What is your earliest memory? Memory in young children is a fascinating - and complex - topic. On one hand, newborns exhibit immediate recognition of their mothers’ voices and music played regularly while they were in utero. And within days they can recall their mother’s faces and distinguish them from those of others. Clearly newborns have some capacity for memory. But this early sensory memory is different from the long term, autobiographical memory we depend on to recall our lives’ most significant events. Indeed, few adults can claim memories earlier than 2-3 years of age. Why don’t we remember our earliest years? Researchers point to a couple of potential factors, beginning with language. As adults we rely heavily on language to organize our autobiographical memories into narratives, but this capacity is still developing during infancy. In addition, there is the issue of the hippocampus, the region of the brain responsible for converting short-term memories into long-term memories - which, during infancy, is still very much in development itself. The result is a phenomenon sometimes called infantile amnesia. So take plenty of videos to share with your child as they get older, because the most vivid memories of their early years are likely to be yours. How about you? What is your earliest memory and how old would you have been at the time? This adorable father/son conversation was shared to IG by Owens.Shaun.

Dan Wuori

169,702 просмотров • 2 лет назад

Excited to announce UtilitySat, the world’s first multi-mission geostationary satellite, that we're launching at the end of this year. This is a first of its kind. And a new product line-- providing on-demand connectivity for disaster relief, bridge capacity, and other missions. We started Astranis to build something new: small communications satellites that provide dedicated broadband capacity for our customers. At the end of this year we’re launching four more of them on a dedicated Falcon 9 rocket, with many more to come after that. That launch of four satellites includes one satellite for Peru, two satellites for in-flight connectivity, and a fourth satellite that had been previously kept under wraps. Until now. Introducing UtilitySat, the Swiss Army Knife of satellites This is a new product— the world’s first multi-mission commercial GEO satellite, capable of conducting multiple fully-operational broadband connectivity missions. And it is just the first of many. We’ll plan to launch many UtilitySats in the years to come. UtilitySat can provide connectivity on standard Ku, Ka, and Q/V bands, and has the flexibility to dial in exact frequencies using Astranis’s proprietary ultra-wideband software-defined radio. It can also relocate dozens of times around the GEO belt over its lifetime. It does this using our unique on-board dual-propulsion architecture, which includes both a chemical monopropellant system and an electric ion thruster. A new mission every year, or every month When we first began development of UtilitySat almost 2 years ago, we had many different missions in mind. UtilitySat can serve as bridge capacity for a customer that is waiting for a dedicated satellite, as an on-orbit spare, or as extra, surge capacity that can be brought in to supplement the broadband service we’re providing to one of our customers. There are acute needs as well — a natural disaster can wipe out terrestrial connectivity over a huge geographic area. One of the top priorities for first responders and during disaster relief is reliable comms on the ground. With multiple UtilitySats on orbit, Astranis can bring in extra capacity on incredibly short notice. Capacity that is compatible with existing, low-cost GEO ground terminals. In initial conversations with customers for UtilitySat, we’ve seen huge demand — these customers often want to lease the entire capacity of the satellite once they learn what UtilitySat can offer. Customers need all the capacity they can get, and new capacity that can be deployed on short notice is a huge deal and a huge departure from traditional GEO satellites. We see a future where customers will be able to call up extra capacity on demand to augment their existing capacity needs, and we’re making that future a reality. US Government applications The first UtilitySat mission will be a commercial one, but we are seeing enormous demand from both from commercial companies and from our government customers. The US Government has unique needs — Combatant Commanders need to be able to task dedicated satellites to specific AORs at a moment’s notice — and surge communications would give them a new tool in their toolbox, helping them win even in a contested environment. And more broadly speaking our military leaders have said the one priority in national security space is to add resiliency to our fleets, using larger numbers of smaller, flexible, and maneuverable satellites so we’re not dependent on just a handful of huge satellites in GEO. UtilitySat shows that Astranis can do just that. Not traditional GEO satellites UtilitySat is only possible because of Astranis’s unique technology — including our proprietary software–defined radio. The flexibility of having on-board digital signal processing allows us to build a standardized satellite design, and move a lot of what used to be done in hardware, into software. UtilitySat uses the standard Astranis MicroGEO platform, adding more frequency bands and some new software capabilities to make maximum use of the available spectrum, no matter where the satellite is on orbit. Traditional geostationary satellites are designed to sit in one orbital slot for up to 20 years, with a set of frequency bands that is hardwired in at the factory. Their single mission must be predetermined many years before they are launched. Astranis does not build traditional GEO satellites. From day one we knew there had to be a better way, and we’re doing it.
1:34

Excited to announce UtilitySat, the world’s first multi-mission geostationary satellite, that we're launching at the end of this year. This is a first of its kind. And a new product line-- providing on-demand connectivity for disaster relief, bridge capacity, and other missions. We started Astranis to build something new: small communications satellites that provide dedicated broadband capacity for our customers. At the end of this year we’re launching four more of them on a dedicated Falcon 9 rocket, with many more to come after that. That launch of four satellites includes one satellite for Peru, two satellites for in-flight connectivity, and a fourth satellite that had been previously kept under wraps. Until now. Introducing UtilitySat, the Swiss Army Knife of satellites This is a new product— the world’s first multi-mission commercial GEO satellite, capable of conducting multiple fully-operational broadband connectivity missions. And it is just the first of many. We’ll plan to launch many UtilitySats in the years to come. UtilitySat can provide connectivity on standard Ku, Ka, and Q/V bands, and has the flexibility to dial in exact frequencies using Astranis’s proprietary ultra-wideband software-defined radio. It can also relocate dozens of times around the GEO belt over its lifetime. It does this using our unique on-board dual-propulsion architecture, which includes both a chemical monopropellant system and an electric ion thruster. A new mission every year, or every month When we first began development of UtilitySat almost 2 years ago, we had many different missions in mind. UtilitySat can serve as bridge capacity for a customer that is waiting for a dedicated satellite, as an on-orbit spare, or as extra, surge capacity that can be brought in to supplement the broadband service we’re providing to one of our customers. There are acute needs as well — a natural disaster can wipe out terrestrial connectivity over a huge geographic area. One of the top priorities for first responders and during disaster relief is reliable comms on the ground. With multiple UtilitySats on orbit, Astranis can bring in extra capacity on incredibly short notice. Capacity that is compatible with existing, low-cost GEO ground terminals. In initial conversations with customers for UtilitySat, we’ve seen huge demand — these customers often want to lease the entire capacity of the satellite once they learn what UtilitySat can offer. Customers need all the capacity they can get, and new capacity that can be deployed on short notice is a huge deal and a huge departure from traditional GEO satellites. We see a future where customers will be able to call up extra capacity on demand to augment their existing capacity needs, and we’re making that future a reality. US Government applications The first UtilitySat mission will be a commercial one, but we are seeing enormous demand from both from commercial companies and from our government customers. The US Government has unique needs — Combatant Commanders need to be able to task dedicated satellites to specific AORs at a moment’s notice — and surge communications would give them a new tool in their toolbox, helping them win even in a contested environment. And more broadly speaking our military leaders have said the one priority in national security space is to add resiliency to our fleets, using larger numbers of smaller, flexible, and maneuverable satellites so we’re not dependent on just a handful of huge satellites in GEO. UtilitySat shows that Astranis can do just that. Not traditional GEO satellites UtilitySat is only possible because of Astranis’s unique technology — including our proprietary software–defined radio. The flexibility of having on-board digital signal processing allows us to build a standardized satellite design, and move a lot of what used to be done in hardware, into software. UtilitySat uses the standard Astranis MicroGEO platform, adding more frequency bands and some new software capabilities to make maximum use of the available spectrum, no matter where the satellite is on orbit. Traditional geostationary satellites are designed to sit in one orbital slot for up to 20 years, with a set of frequency bands that is hardwired in at the factory. Their single mission must be predetermined many years before they are launched. Astranis does not build traditional GEO satellites. From day one we knew there had to be a better way, and we’re doing it.

John Gedmark

122,069 просмотров • 3 лет назад

Iran announces a new wave of large-scale strikes against U.S. military infrastructure in the Middle East According to statements from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian army, within the 24th wave of Operation "Nasr-2," as well as the 18th and 19th stages of Operation "Saegheh," strikes were carried out against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. Bahrain According to Tehran, the following were targeted by missile and drone strikes: ✔️ A U.S. anti-missile radar station; ✔️ Another U.S. radar facility in the Muharraq area; ✔️ A Patriot anti-aircraft missile system in the Ar-Rifa'a area; ✔️ An Amazon data center, which, according to Iran, was used to support U.S. military infrastructure. In addition, Iran reported that two oil tankers in the southern part of the Strait of Hormuz were damaged. Explosions and fires occurred on the vessels, after which the crews were evacuated by rescue services. Kuwait The following were targeted: ✔️ Long-range radar stations; ✔️ A communications center; ✔️ Satellite communication complexes; ✔️ A U.S. radar system for missile defense. At the Al-Salim air base, a hangar containing MQ-9 Reaper drones was hit, where several drones were destroyed or severely damaged. At the Ahmad al-Jaber air base, the following were reportedly destroyed: ✔️ An early warning radar station; ✔️ A missile defense radar; ✔️ An AN/FPS-117 radar; ✔️ A Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery; ✔️ A satellite communication node of the U.S. air defense system. Within the framework of Operation "Saegheh," the Iranian army also announced that it had struck positions of M142 HIMARS rocket systems located at Camp Arifjan with ballistic missiles. Later, attack drones were launched against U.S. facilities. Their targets included: ✔️ Administrative buildings and antenna complexes at Camp Arifjan; ✔️ Army helicopter parking areas at Camp Buehring; ✔️ A U.S. military facility at Ahmad al-Jaber air base. Jordan Iran announced the destruction of: ✔️ A U.S. anti-missile radar station; ✔️ An F-15 fighter jet located in a protected aircraft shelter; ✔️ A U.S. military housing complex in the Al-Rukban area, where, according to Tehran, there were casualties among U.S. military personnel. Objective of the operation According to the Iranian command, the main task of the series of strikes was to suppress the U.S. air and missile defense system, disable radar detection systems, disrupt communications, and create conditions for further use of missile weapons and attack drones against U.S. facilities in the region.
0:26

Iran announces a new wave of large-scale strikes against U.S. military infrastructure in the Middle East According to statements from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and the Iranian army, within the 24th wave of Operation "Nasr-2," as well as the 18th and 19th stages of Operation "Saegheh," strikes were carried out against U.S. military facilities in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan. Bahrain According to Tehran, the following were targeted by missile and drone strikes: ✔️ A U.S. anti-missile radar station; ✔️ Another U.S. radar facility in the Muharraq area; ✔️ A Patriot anti-aircraft missile system in the Ar-Rifa'a area; ✔️ An Amazon data center, which, according to Iran, was used to support U.S. military infrastructure. In addition, Iran reported that two oil tankers in the southern part of the Strait of Hormuz were damaged. Explosions and fires occurred on the vessels, after which the crews were evacuated by rescue services. Kuwait The following were targeted: ✔️ Long-range radar stations; ✔️ A communications center; ✔️ Satellite communication complexes; ✔️ A U.S. radar system for missile defense. At the Al-Salim air base, a hangar containing MQ-9 Reaper drones was hit, where several drones were destroyed or severely damaged. At the Ahmad al-Jaber air base, the following were reportedly destroyed: ✔️ An early warning radar station; ✔️ A missile defense radar; ✔️ An AN/FPS-117 radar; ✔️ A Patriot anti-aircraft missile battery; ✔️ A satellite communication node of the U.S. air defense system. Within the framework of Operation "Saegheh," the Iranian army also announced that it had struck positions of M142 HIMARS rocket systems located at Camp Arifjan with ballistic missiles. Later, attack drones were launched against U.S. facilities. Their targets included: ✔️ Administrative buildings and antenna complexes at Camp Arifjan; ✔️ Army helicopter parking areas at Camp Buehring; ✔️ A U.S. military facility at Ahmad al-Jaber air base. Jordan Iran announced the destruction of: ✔️ A U.S. anti-missile radar station; ✔️ An F-15 fighter jet located in a protected aircraft shelter; ✔️ A U.S. military housing complex in the Al-Rukban area, where, according to Tehran, there were casualties among U.S. military personnel. Objective of the operation According to the Iranian command, the main task of the series of strikes was to suppress the U.S. air and missile defense system, disable radar detection systems, disrupt communications, and create conditions for further use of missile weapons and attack drones against U.S. facilities in the region.

𝕊𝕡𝕣𝕚𝕟𝕥𝕖𝕣 𝕻𝕣𝕖𝕤𝕤

21,925 просмотров • 16 дней назад

A relatively new so-called "biker tactic" has emerged among Russian forward units. This is partly because the Russians' stocks of heavy military equipment have been partially depleted, and they have much less capacity to form a column of tanks or armored combat vehicles than they did last year or at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. But this is also due to the Russians' search for new tactical methods of organizing "meat assaults." ◾️ The Russians are actively equipping their assault (forward) units with light vehicles and motorcycles, trying to strengthen their ability to quickly and with minimal losses overcome the so-called "kill zone" (the area between the positions of their and Ukrainian troops, where the bulk of the firepower of the advanced units of the AFU, including FPV drones, as well as the fire of the bulk of their artillery and mortars, is concentrated). ◾️ According to the Russian command, with the massive use of individual motorized means by assault infantry, the number of targets that Ukrainian firepower needs to hit increases many times over. ◾️ Also, the Russian leadership believes that high-speed and maneuverable motorized means dramatically increase the chances of survival of an attacking/assaulting unit by significantly reducing the time spent by its personnel in the "kill zone." ◾️ The Russian command believes that in this way, the Ukrainian defending unit simply "will not have time to strike" each such fast and agile "biker," especially when they sometimes become more or less numerous. ◾️ Based on this, Russian units involved in attack/assault operations are equipped with motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies. The AFU is also effectively adapting to these Russian tactics, increasing statistics of killed and wounded Russians. This video was filmed near Toretsk. Russian soldiers attached flags to the motorcycles in honor of May 9 and launched an assault. The motorcycle rally ended in a complete defeat. The assault was repelled by the joint efforts of the 12th Azov Special Operations Brigade as part of the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine and the 49th Carpathian Sich Separate Assault Battalion.
4:19

A relatively new so-called "biker tactic" has emerged among Russian forward units. This is partly because the Russians' stocks of heavy military equipment have been partially depleted, and they have much less capacity to form a column of tanks or armored combat vehicles than they did last year or at the beginning of the full-scale invasion. But this is also due to the Russians' search for new tactical methods of organizing "meat assaults." ◾️ The Russians are actively equipping their assault (forward) units with light vehicles and motorcycles, trying to strengthen their ability to quickly and with minimal losses overcome the so-called "kill zone" (the area between the positions of their and Ukrainian troops, where the bulk of the firepower of the advanced units of the AFU, including FPV drones, as well as the fire of the bulk of their artillery and mortars, is concentrated). ◾️ According to the Russian command, with the massive use of individual motorized means by assault infantry, the number of targets that Ukrainian firepower needs to hit increases many times over. ◾️ Also, the Russian leadership believes that high-speed and maneuverable motorized means dramatically increase the chances of survival of an attacking/assaulting unit by significantly reducing the time spent by its personnel in the "kill zone." ◾️ The Russian command believes that in this way, the Ukrainian defending unit simply "will not have time to strike" each such fast and agile "biker," especially when they sometimes become more or less numerous. ◾️ Based on this, Russian units involved in attack/assault operations are equipped with motorcycles, ATVs, and buggies. The AFU is also effectively adapting to these Russian tactics, increasing statistics of killed and wounded Russians. This video was filmed near Toretsk. Russian soldiers attached flags to the motorcycles in honor of May 9 and launched an assault. The motorcycle rally ended in a complete defeat. The assault was repelled by the joint efforts of the 12th Azov Special Operations Brigade as part of the 1st Azov Corps of the National Guard of Ukraine and the 49th Carpathian Sich Separate Assault Battalion.

Anton Gerashchenko

235,160 просмотров • 1 год назад