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In the 1970s, the U.S. was the world’s second-largest commercial shipbuilder. Today, it accounts for less than 0.1% of global tonnage. This collapse wasn’t an accident of globalization. It was the direct result of a single policy choice: the 1981 decision to end the Construction Differential Subsidy (CDS). Here...

28,277 views • 4 days ago •via X (Twitter)

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Pierre's profile picture
Pierre3 days ago

That is not even a remotely true statement. From the 1960s to today, the US has produced an average of 4-5 commercial ships per year, being really generous. And outside the two World Wars, the US has not shown any real interest in shipbuilding for not very obvious reasons.

Brandon Sands's profile picture
Brandon Sands3 days ago

A travesty. Thank you @DA_Stockman !

CornerCarver's profile picture
CornerCarver3 days ago

If the shipyards were never subsidized by taxpayer funds (CDS) the free market would have given them feedback on costs. Having (and using) that government safety net isolated them from the repercussions of their decisions.

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When asked how we fix shipbuilding and the Merchant Marine, U.S. Maritime Administrator Steve Carmel points to the United Nations International Maritime Organization as a primary problem. Most of the world follows one set of rules: UN IMO. U.S.-flagged ships suffer under a dual regulatory burden, forced to comply with both IMO and USCG regulations simultaneously. Two bureaucracies, two sets of inspectors, two sets of standards that don’t always align . He is absolutely correct. For the Navy the problem is even worse. Warships are not required to follow UN shipbuilding rules. They never were. But the Obama administration volunteered to apply them anyway. Because IMO rules were never designed to cover warships and auxiliaries, this creates constant friction for USCG and ABS inspectors trying to enforce standards that don’t fit the ships they’re inspecting. Jettison the UN rules. The Navy side can be done immediately via POTUS or SECDEF order. No legislation required. I’ve pushed this myself. The problem is the Navy doesn’t understand commercial shipyard regulatory frameworks, and admirals are hesitant to touch regulations they don’t fully comprehend. So nothing moves. This will require a leap of faith, but not a blind one. What any admiral can verify in an afternoon: IMO rules were never written for warships. The organization itself does not claim jurisdiction over them. The U.S. voluntarily opted in, and it can voluntarily opt out. That single fact should be sufficient to kill the dual regulatory regime for naval vessels tomorrow. The merchant marine side may take legislation, but the Navy side is a signature away. And it’s not just shipbuilding. The Navy laid up 17 U.S. Navy's Military Sealift Command ships because it can’t find enough Merchant Marine Captains and Chief Engineers. The reason is we follow the USCG guidance to attend college for four years at the beginning of our careers AND the UN guidance to go back to school before becoming Chief Mates and do STCW classes regularly. Pick one USCG. Just one more of many examples: UN allows online classes. USCG does not. So we are subject to the more stringent requirement putting us at a major disadvantage to mariners in other nations who we sometimes compete with in the job market. Every day we leave these rules in place is a day we’re slowing down warship construction to comply with standards that weren’t built for warships, enforced by inspectors applying rules that don’t fit, in shipyards that are already behind schedule. We did this to ourselves. We can undo it just as fast. Cc Acting Secretary of the Navy Hung Cao Secretary of War Pete Hegseth

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