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Kurdish origin&distribution along Zagros mountains in #IRAN before invading Iraq’s northern territory as illegal migrants,declare rebellion&then illegally claim ownership. Interactive map.

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𝔇𝔯 𝔄𝔡𝔑𝔞𝔧𝔦

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18,974 görüntüleme • 8 ay önce •via X (Twitter)

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🎆 Newroz celebrations in Qandil draw large crowds as Kurds mark holiday in PKK-held mountains Drop Site’s correspondent Alexis Daloumis (new account) shares footage from the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq, near the Iran–Iraq border, showing large Newroz celebrations marking the Kurdish new year, a central holiday tied to identity, heritage, and resistance across Kurdish communities. Bonfires, music, and crowds in traditional dress filled the mountainous region. The event took place in PKK-held territory, with security provided by armed guerrillas. A contemporary legend tied to the holiday holds that Newroz is one of the rare moments when fighters come down from mountain positions, as families gather and celebrations unfold. “It relates to the soul of the Kurdish nation,” a local told Daloumis.
1:07

🎆 Newroz celebrations in Qandil draw large crowds as Kurds mark holiday in PKK-held mountains Drop Site’s correspondent Alexis Daloumis (new account) shares footage from the Qandil Mountains in northern Iraq, near the Iran–Iraq border, showing large Newroz celebrations marking the Kurdish new year, a central holiday tied to identity, heritage, and resistance across Kurdish communities. Bonfires, music, and crowds in traditional dress filled the mountainous region. The event took place in PKK-held territory, with security provided by armed guerrillas. A contemporary legend tied to the holiday holds that Newroz is one of the rare moments when fighters come down from mountain positions, as families gather and celebrations unfold. “It relates to the soul of the Kurdish nation,” a local told Daloumis.

Drop Site

35,358 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce

The BBC is at war with the British people. In an act of political sabotage, Question Time planted illegal migrants in the audience. One of the criminals even had an earpiece in, as he spouted off about the ECHR & Northern Ireland protocol despite barely speaking English.
20:16

The BBC is at war with the British people. In an act of political sabotage, Question Time planted illegal migrants in the audience. One of the criminals even had an earpiece in, as he spouted off about the ECHR & Northern Ireland protocol despite barely speaking English.

Dan Wootton

50,993 görüntüleme • 10 ay önce

#Kukis r not qualified for ST Status in Manipur. We have enough proof👇 that they r not indigenous people. Since 1960s, there have been multiple instances of #Kukis entering Manipur. They hv immigrated illegally frm Myanmar & now claim it as their own territory. Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Govt. of India
2:08

#Kukis r not qualified for ST Status in Manipur. We have enough proof👇 that they r not indigenous people. Since 1960s, there have been multiple instances of #Kukis entering Manipur. They hv immigrated illegally frm Myanmar & now claim it as their own territory. Ministry of Tribal Affairs, Govt. of India

Laimujam D

24,064 görüntüleme • 2 yıl önce

I laid it all on the table last night on GB News , who else says it as it is on tv, who else represents YOU ? I do not want these illegal migrants here, many are dangerous to our women & children, many will never work a day in their lives, all entered ILLEGALLY. DEPORT.
1:08

I laid it all on the table last night on GB News , who else says it as it is on tv, who else represents YOU ? I do not want these illegal migrants here, many are dangerous to our women & children, many will never work a day in their lives, all entered ILLEGALLY. DEPORT.

Adam Brooks AKA EssexPR 🇬🇧

166,826 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce

The UAE calling the 3 Iranian islands “Occupied UAE territory” is a JOKE Iran’s claim did NOT begin in 1971. The islands were treated as Persian territory on 19th-century British maps and records, DECADES before the UAE even existed. Britain later backed competing Arab claims and helped establish control over the islands in the early 1900s. Iran NEVER accepted that transfer and repeatedly asserted sovereignty afterward. Then in 1971, Iran re-established control. The UAE was not even founded until two days later. You cannot invent a country in 1971 and then pretend centuries of Persian history started that week.
0:33

The UAE calling the 3 Iranian islands “Occupied UAE territory” is a JOKE Iran’s claim did NOT begin in 1971. The islands were treated as Persian territory on 19th-century British maps and records, DECADES before the UAE even existed. Britain later backed competing Arab claims and helped establish control over the islands in the early 1900s. Iran NEVER accepted that transfer and repeatedly asserted sovereignty afterward. Then in 1971, Iran re-established control. The UAE was not even founded until two days later. You cannot invent a country in 1971 and then pretend centuries of Persian history started that week.

Ryan Rozbiani

69,448 görüntüleme • 5 gün önce

Why Iran's Kurds Are the Most Divided Kurdish Population, and Why That Matters Now They speak at least four major dialect groups. They are split along sectarian lines far more deeply than Kurds elsewhere. Kurdish and Persian are both Iranian languages with no sharp linguistic wall between them. And they have lived inside an Iranian state for five centuries. In Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, Kurdish identity confronts Arabic or Turkish across a clear frontier. In Iran, it sits inside a graded continuum of dialect, sect, and civilisation that the state has always found easier to segment and absorb. Linguistically, they are not a compact Sorani-Kurmanji bloc. They are a mosaic. Central Kurdish (Sorani) accounts for roughly 35 to 40% of Iran's Kurds. Southern Kurdish and Laki together make up another 35 to 40%. Kurmanji accounts for about 22 to 27%. Gorani and Hawrami make up a smaller but historically significant remainder. Kurmanji itself is split across radically different settings. The Kurmanji speakers of Khorasan in the northeast are mostly Shia and long integrated into the Iranian state. The Kurmanji speakers of the Urmia belt are overwhelmingly Sunni and tied into the borderland world shaped by proximity to Turkey. Religiously, Iranian Kurds are not overwhelmingly Sunni the way Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey are. The best estimate is roughly half Sunni, around two-fifths Twelver Shia, and about a tenth Yarsani. The Sunni core is concentrated in the northwest. Kermanshah, Ilam, and Khorasan pull heavily in the other direction. The deepest difference is linguistic. In Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, Kurdish confronts Arabic or Turkish across a sharp civilisational wall: Indo-European versus Semitic or Turkic. In Iran, Kurdish and Persian are both Western Iranian languages with a common origin. The boundary is not a wall but a slope. Lori forms a continuum between Kurdish and Persian. Laki sits near that transition. As you move south through the Zagros, speech forms become less like northern Kurdish and more entangled with neighbouring Iranian varieties. Iranian Kurds have also lived inside an Iranian state framework for roughly five centuries since the Safavid consolidation, not inside a new nation-state barely a century old like Iraq or Syria. Iran is closer to a civilisational state than a standard nation-state, and Kurdish identity inside that frame is old, layered, and in many parts of the country deeply woven into the wider Iranian fabric. All of this is why Kurdish cohesion is structurally weakest in Iran. The divisions are not just multiple but mutually reinforcing: dialect, sect, geography, linguistic proximity to Persian, and centuries of state absorption. In the other three countries, Kurdish identity confronts the state-bearing identity across a sharper frontier. In Iran, it sits inside a graded continuum that the state has always found easier to segment, absorb, and contain. More details:
1:59

Why Iran's Kurds Are the Most Divided Kurdish Population, and Why That Matters Now They speak at least four major dialect groups. They are split along sectarian lines far more deeply than Kurds elsewhere. Kurdish and Persian are both Iranian languages with no sharp linguistic wall between them. And they have lived inside an Iranian state for five centuries. In Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, Kurdish identity confronts Arabic or Turkish across a clear frontier. In Iran, it sits inside a graded continuum of dialect, sect, and civilisation that the state has always found easier to segment and absorb. Linguistically, they are not a compact Sorani-Kurmanji bloc. They are a mosaic. Central Kurdish (Sorani) accounts for roughly 35 to 40% of Iran's Kurds. Southern Kurdish and Laki together make up another 35 to 40%. Kurmanji accounts for about 22 to 27%. Gorani and Hawrami make up a smaller but historically significant remainder. Kurmanji itself is split across radically different settings. The Kurmanji speakers of Khorasan in the northeast are mostly Shia and long integrated into the Iranian state. The Kurmanji speakers of the Urmia belt are overwhelmingly Sunni and tied into the borderland world shaped by proximity to Turkey. Religiously, Iranian Kurds are not overwhelmingly Sunni the way Kurds in Iraq, Syria, and Turkey are. The best estimate is roughly half Sunni, around two-fifths Twelver Shia, and about a tenth Yarsani. The Sunni core is concentrated in the northwest. Kermanshah, Ilam, and Khorasan pull heavily in the other direction. The deepest difference is linguistic. In Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, Kurdish confronts Arabic or Turkish across a sharp civilisational wall: Indo-European versus Semitic or Turkic. In Iran, Kurdish and Persian are both Western Iranian languages with a common origin. The boundary is not a wall but a slope. Lori forms a continuum between Kurdish and Persian. Laki sits near that transition. As you move south through the Zagros, speech forms become less like northern Kurdish and more entangled with neighbouring Iranian varieties. Iranian Kurds have also lived inside an Iranian state framework for roughly five centuries since the Safavid consolidation, not inside a new nation-state barely a century old like Iraq or Syria. Iran is closer to a civilisational state than a standard nation-state, and Kurdish identity inside that frame is old, layered, and in many parts of the country deeply woven into the wider Iranian fabric. All of this is why Kurdish cohesion is structurally weakest in Iran. The divisions are not just multiple but mutually reinforcing: dialect, sect, geography, linguistic proximity to Persian, and centuries of state absorption. In the other three countries, Kurdish identity confronts the state-bearing identity across a sharper frontier. In Iran, it sits inside a graded continuum that the state has always found easier to segment, absorb, and contain. More details:

The National Context

96,149 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce

The Demographics That Doomed a Kurdish National Project in Syria A micro-level look at the demographics of northern Syria reveals how much Kurdish nationalist expectations have diverged from ground realities, and why the broader territorial collapse of the SDF polity was, in many respects, foreseeable. In the debate that has followed, Kurdish nationalists have largely moved to blame the SDF and its ideological backers in the PKK for what went wrong, while the SDF has found itself on the defensive. But this framing disregards the demographic complexity of northern Syria, which differs sharply from the contiguous and compact Kurdish populations in Turkey, Iraq, or Iran. In Syria, Kurds are distributed across three geographically disconnected pockets: Afrin, Kobani, and Hasakah. More Kurds likely live outside what became SDF territory than inside it. Any strategy that prioritised consolidating control over those zones at the expense of the broader Kurdish population in Syria would have been short-sighted. Hasakah, where the SDF's self-rule ambitions were most far-reaching, is also the most demographically complicated for a Kurdish nationalist agenda. The governorate contains a large Arab rural population, and its major cities are deeply mixed. In Hasakah city, Kurds are likely a sizable minority, with Arabs and Christians together forming a majority. In Qamishli, Kurds likely constitute either a plurality or slim majority within the city itself, but the surrounding villages, particularly to the south, are solidly Arab, making any exclusively Kurdish project in the pocket inherently unstable. Afrin, by contrast, has been consistently underweighted in Kurdish strategic thinking despite carrying arguably greater long-term importance. Its proximity to the Mediterranean gives it geopolitical weight that neither Kobani nor the demographically fractured Hasakah pocket can match, and trading a more balanced position there for the sake of self-rule in Hasakah would have been a poor bargain. The argument that a different Kurdish party might have achieved better outcomes is also unconvincing. A more overtly nationalist party would have pushed harder for an explicitly Kurdish project and collided even more directly with demographic realities. What the SDF achieved is unprecedented in the Syrian context; a more nationalist posture would likely have produced less, not more. None of this strips the SDF of responsibility for its governance failures, which were severe - basic service provision in key cities such as Hasakah remained chronically poor throughout its rule. But the core criticism levelled by Kurdish nationalists has not been over governance. It has been, ostensibly, that the SDF was too accommodating of Arabs and Christians: precisely the accommodation that the demographic reality demanded. The current integration framework reflects a realistic accommodation of these constraints. It preserves certain layers of local self-administration while transferring coercive authority over the judiciary and security sector to institutions with legitimacy across Kurdish, Arab, and Christian communities alike. In an environment this mixed, that division of competencies is a structural necessity rather than a retreat. It also explains the differential approach Damascus has taken across the three pockets. In Kobani, which is more ethnically homogenous, the Syrian government has moved more aggressively to dismantle SDF structures, appointing a mix of politically diverse Kurdish figures and pro-Damascus elements in their place. In Hasakah, it has adopted a more measured posture, aware that the demographic complexity limits the viability of any exclusionary project and reduces the urgency of forced dismantlement. The practical terms of the deal are now taking shape. Both sides have agreed that state courts will be reactivated in Hasakah city this week and in Qamishli the following week, resolving a deadlock that had persisted for several weeks. Under the agreed formula, former state judges will be reinstated alongside select SDF-appointed judicial figures: those holding recognised legal qualifications will be integrated directly, while others will be required to complete the necessary certification before being absorbed into state institutions. The parties have also agreed to further prisoner exchanges in preparation for the transfer of detention facilities to the Syrian Interior Ministry. Beyond the SDF's core military structure, auxiliary forces including self-defence fighters are reported to have agreed to integration into the Syrian Defence Ministry as border guards, serving as individuals within the state military chain of command rather than as a collective formation. More, and an interactive map to explore, at the full article:
0:58

The Demographics That Doomed a Kurdish National Project in Syria A micro-level look at the demographics of northern Syria reveals how much Kurdish nationalist expectations have diverged from ground realities, and why the broader territorial collapse of the SDF polity was, in many respects, foreseeable. In the debate that has followed, Kurdish nationalists have largely moved to blame the SDF and its ideological backers in the PKK for what went wrong, while the SDF has found itself on the defensive. But this framing disregards the demographic complexity of northern Syria, which differs sharply from the contiguous and compact Kurdish populations in Turkey, Iraq, or Iran. In Syria, Kurds are distributed across three geographically disconnected pockets: Afrin, Kobani, and Hasakah. More Kurds likely live outside what became SDF territory than inside it. Any strategy that prioritised consolidating control over those zones at the expense of the broader Kurdish population in Syria would have been short-sighted. Hasakah, where the SDF's self-rule ambitions were most far-reaching, is also the most demographically complicated for a Kurdish nationalist agenda. The governorate contains a large Arab rural population, and its major cities are deeply mixed. In Hasakah city, Kurds are likely a sizable minority, with Arabs and Christians together forming a majority. In Qamishli, Kurds likely constitute either a plurality or slim majority within the city itself, but the surrounding villages, particularly to the south, are solidly Arab, making any exclusively Kurdish project in the pocket inherently unstable. Afrin, by contrast, has been consistently underweighted in Kurdish strategic thinking despite carrying arguably greater long-term importance. Its proximity to the Mediterranean gives it geopolitical weight that neither Kobani nor the demographically fractured Hasakah pocket can match, and trading a more balanced position there for the sake of self-rule in Hasakah would have been a poor bargain. The argument that a different Kurdish party might have achieved better outcomes is also unconvincing. A more overtly nationalist party would have pushed harder for an explicitly Kurdish project and collided even more directly with demographic realities. What the SDF achieved is unprecedented in the Syrian context; a more nationalist posture would likely have produced less, not more. None of this strips the SDF of responsibility for its governance failures, which were severe - basic service provision in key cities such as Hasakah remained chronically poor throughout its rule. But the core criticism levelled by Kurdish nationalists has not been over governance. It has been, ostensibly, that the SDF was too accommodating of Arabs and Christians: precisely the accommodation that the demographic reality demanded. The current integration framework reflects a realistic accommodation of these constraints. It preserves certain layers of local self-administration while transferring coercive authority over the judiciary and security sector to institutions with legitimacy across Kurdish, Arab, and Christian communities alike. In an environment this mixed, that division of competencies is a structural necessity rather than a retreat. It also explains the differential approach Damascus has taken across the three pockets. In Kobani, which is more ethnically homogenous, the Syrian government has moved more aggressively to dismantle SDF structures, appointing a mix of politically diverse Kurdish figures and pro-Damascus elements in their place. In Hasakah, it has adopted a more measured posture, aware that the demographic complexity limits the viability of any exclusionary project and reduces the urgency of forced dismantlement. The practical terms of the deal are now taking shape. Both sides have agreed that state courts will be reactivated in Hasakah city this week and in Qamishli the following week, resolving a deadlock that had persisted for several weeks. Under the agreed formula, former state judges will be reinstated alongside select SDF-appointed judicial figures: those holding recognised legal qualifications will be integrated directly, while others will be required to complete the necessary certification before being absorbed into state institutions. The parties have also agreed to further prisoner exchanges in preparation for the transfer of detention facilities to the Syrian Interior Ministry. Beyond the SDF's core military structure, auxiliary forces including self-defence fighters are reported to have agreed to integration into the Syrian Defence Ministry as border guards, serving as individuals within the state military chain of command rather than as a collective formation. More, and an interactive map to explore, at the full article:

The National Context

46,212 görüntüleme • 5 ay önce

The Pipeline Deal That Could Remake Iraq’s Oil Map As the Turkey-Iraq pipeline agreement is set to expire in July, the two countries have started negotiations on a new agreement. The treaty lapses during the sharpest contraction in Gulf energy shipping in recent memory, and that has turned a technical renewal into a contest over the shape of Iraq’s export map. The legal background shapes every Iraqi position in the talks. The pipeline went dark in 2023 after Iraq won arbitration against Turkey over unauthorized Kurdish exports between 2014 and 2018, with Turkey ordered to pay about $1.5 billion. Baghdad will not sign a successor agreement that leaves ownership of the crude, the marketing channel, or the payment route open to a parallel Erbil-Ankara reading. Ankara, for its part, is not negotiating a simple renewal. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has argued repeatedly that the line carries a nominal capacity of nearly 1.5 million bpd and has never been used at scale. Any new agreement, he says, must include a mechanism to guarantee fuller use. Reaching that volume requires extending the line south toward Basra, since northern production cannot fill it. Turkey folds this into the wider Development Road from Faw to Turkey, reframed as an energy corridor carrying oil, gas, petrochemicals, refining, and electricity alongside road and rail. Baghdad’s instrument is the Basra-Haditha pipeline, which the Oil Ministry calls the backbone of the northern export system. Baghdad has chosen a turnkey, state-financed model with full Oil Ministry ownership after rejecting an investment structure that would have handed an outside party long-term transit rights. If Turkey is seeking ownership leverage under the heading of investment, that is the Iraqi red line. The decisive feature of the Iraqi design is that Basra-Haditha is multidirectional. From Haditha, crude could move north to Ceyhan. In theory, it could also support future western exits toward Baniyas and Tartus on the Syrian coast, or southwest toward Aqaba in Jordan. These branches should not be read as equally imminent projects. Their immediate value is strategic optionality. They give Baghdad a map of alternatives, even before all of them become physical export routes. For the Kurdistan Region, the trajectory is unfavourable. Its 2014-built line, with a design capacity of nearly 900,000 bpd, remains physically useful in the short term while the ministry-controlled Kirkuk-Fishkhabur line, rated at nearly 1.5 million bpd, is rehabilitated as a federal bypass. Once that bypass and Basra-Haditha are in place, the KRG pipeline becomes a feeder rather than a strategic bottleneck. Baghdad’s aim is not necessarily to shut it. The aim is to strip it of independent commercial authority. Turkey signs with Baghdad alone, SOMO markets the crude, and revenue runs through the federal treasury. The KRG line may remain part of the infrastructure, but not as the basis for a parallel political economy. Whatever the structure, a deal struck before the deadline will not restore the pre-2023 model. The likeliest endpoint is Ceyhan returning as a federal corridor under SOMO and the treasury, the KRG line being tolerated as infrastructure without political-commercial autonomy, and Turkey gaining volume guarantees and investment access but not a chokehold over Iraqi oil. Baghdad’s wager is that holding the Syrian and Jordanian options open is what keeps Ceyhan a corridor rather than a second Hormuz. More details:
0:41

The Pipeline Deal That Could Remake Iraq’s Oil Map As the Turkey-Iraq pipeline agreement is set to expire in July, the two countries have started negotiations on a new agreement. The treaty lapses during the sharpest contraction in Gulf energy shipping in recent memory, and that has turned a technical renewal into a contest over the shape of Iraq’s export map. The legal background shapes every Iraqi position in the talks. The pipeline went dark in 2023 after Iraq won arbitration against Turkey over unauthorized Kurdish exports between 2014 and 2018, with Turkey ordered to pay about $1.5 billion. Baghdad will not sign a successor agreement that leaves ownership of the crude, the marketing channel, or the payment route open to a parallel Erbil-Ankara reading. Ankara, for its part, is not negotiating a simple renewal. Turkish Energy Minister Alparslan Bayraktar has argued repeatedly that the line carries a nominal capacity of nearly 1.5 million bpd and has never been used at scale. Any new agreement, he says, must include a mechanism to guarantee fuller use. Reaching that volume requires extending the line south toward Basra, since northern production cannot fill it. Turkey folds this into the wider Development Road from Faw to Turkey, reframed as an energy corridor carrying oil, gas, petrochemicals, refining, and electricity alongside road and rail. Baghdad’s instrument is the Basra-Haditha pipeline, which the Oil Ministry calls the backbone of the northern export system. Baghdad has chosen a turnkey, state-financed model with full Oil Ministry ownership after rejecting an investment structure that would have handed an outside party long-term transit rights. If Turkey is seeking ownership leverage under the heading of investment, that is the Iraqi red line. The decisive feature of the Iraqi design is that Basra-Haditha is multidirectional. From Haditha, crude could move north to Ceyhan. In theory, it could also support future western exits toward Baniyas and Tartus on the Syrian coast, or southwest toward Aqaba in Jordan. These branches should not be read as equally imminent projects. Their immediate value is strategic optionality. They give Baghdad a map of alternatives, even before all of them become physical export routes. For the Kurdistan Region, the trajectory is unfavourable. Its 2014-built line, with a design capacity of nearly 900,000 bpd, remains physically useful in the short term while the ministry-controlled Kirkuk-Fishkhabur line, rated at nearly 1.5 million bpd, is rehabilitated as a federal bypass. Once that bypass and Basra-Haditha are in place, the KRG pipeline becomes a feeder rather than a strategic bottleneck. Baghdad’s aim is not necessarily to shut it. The aim is to strip it of independent commercial authority. Turkey signs with Baghdad alone, SOMO markets the crude, and revenue runs through the federal treasury. The KRG line may remain part of the infrastructure, but not as the basis for a parallel political economy. Whatever the structure, a deal struck before the deadline will not restore the pre-2023 model. The likeliest endpoint is Ceyhan returning as a federal corridor under SOMO and the treasury, the KRG line being tolerated as infrastructure without political-commercial autonomy, and Turkey gaining volume guarantees and investment access but not a chokehold over Iraqi oil. Baghdad’s wager is that holding the Syrian and Jordanian options open is what keeps Ceyhan a corridor rather than a second Hormuz. More details:

The National Context

13,412 görüntüleme • 4 ay önce

Many Palestinian clans, and families descend from Kurdish settlers who arrived during the Ayyubid period, beginning with Saladin’s wars against the Crusaders and continuing into the Mamluk and Ottoman eras. An approximate 150,000 Palestinians could be stated to be of Kurdish origins, although it’s hard to gauge with precision. These communities are concentrated primarily in Hebron, who form the most important community, but are also found in Acre, Nablus, and Jerusalem. The earliest Ayyubid-era Kurdish migrants are collectively referred to as the “Ayyubid family,” a term that does not include later Kurdish arrivals. Numerous prominent Palestinians are of Kurdish origin, including Ghassan Kanafani (who is playing in the video), one of the leading figures of the Palestinian national movement, as well as Mohammed El-Kurd and his sister Muna El-Kurd who are prominent activists. Although Palestinian Kurds largely integrated into the Arabic-speaking population through intermarriage and the adoption of Arabic as a mother tongue, most retain a distinct micro-identity linked to their Kurdish heritage. Genetic results reflect these roots. Without delving into politics, it is interesting that Kurds have forgotten about some Kurdish remnants in Palestine, while Kurdish Jews have not been forgotten about, despite the fact there is almost nothing Kurdish about Kurdish Jews in roots, history, genetics, language, customs, religion, etc. Kurdish Jews are one of the many major misappellations of ethnic groups that reside in the middle east and central Asia, that are applied and asserted by foreigners due to political agendas, misunderstandings, etc. It should be noted that the Ayyubid confederation in Palestine today does not descend from Saladin himself, but from various Ayyubid affiliates who served under the dynasty. Moreover, the founding Ayyubid clans were not exclusively Kurdish and included close allies who operated within the Ayyubid system. Three clans within this confederation trace descent from major Kurdish figures. The Abū al-Hayjāʾ clan, descended from Abū al-Hayjāʾ himself. The Qaymari clan, descended from Hussam al-Din who was the governor of Palestine under the Mamluk Sultan Baibars. Hussam al-Din was also the son of law of Al-Ashraf Musa ibn Adil, the nephew of Saladin, who ruled over the Jazira and the Levant. The al-Imam clan descended from Badr al-Din al-Hakkari. Across the Levant, claims of direct descent from Saladin are widespread but generally unsupported by historical evidence. In the absence of identifiable modern descendants, confirmation would require testing Saladin’s remains in Damascus, which is not feasible. Via AncestryDNA, one Palestinian Kurd scores 40 percent Iranian ancestry (which is obviously mediated through Kurds), while others show lower but still notable levels, with the remainder largely Levantine. Despite linguistic Arabization after the Islamic period, Palestinians of this region have largely preserved a local genetic profile. The Zalloum clan, numbering approximately 2,000 people, descends from elite Berber soldiers of Saladin who maintained close ties with Ayyubid Kurds after the dynasty’s collapse. Two independent Y-DNA results place the clan within haplogroup E-M81, a major Berber paternal lineage. One Zalloum individual shows 24.1 percent Iranian ancestry on 23andMe, while another shows 15 percent Iranian ancestry on G25. Unfortunately, the remaining samples lack autosomal data. Palestinian Kurds of the Abū al-Hayjāʾ clan, numbering at least 4,000 people, carry the Y-DNA haplogroup Q-YP1228, a lineage of Kurdish origin. They descend from Abū al-Hayjāʾ, one of Saladin’s leading generals and the Ispahsalar of the Mihrāniyya corps. Abu Halawa clan, carries Y-DNA haplogroup R1a-Z93 with an unresolved deep clade, an Indo-Iranian lineage likely transmitted through Kurdish intermediaries. Abu Khalaf belongs to haplogroup T-CTS6280, which probably corresponds to a Zaza individual from Muş under the mutation T-M9513. History There is a substantial historical record regarding the Kurds of Palestine. Within the stronghold of Hebron itself, Kurdish tribes and the Bedouin Arab Tamimi alliance were frequently in conflict. One particularly notable clash culminated in the intervention of Sultan Qaitbay, the eighteenth Mamluk ruler of Egypt, in 878 AH / 1473 CE. This horrific clash resulted in the dispersal of both groups to different parts of Palestine. The Kurds scattered to Nablus, Lod, Jerusalem, and Khan Yunis. Kurdish influence in Hebron weakened in the nineteenth century due to Ibrahim Pasha’s campaign in the Levant in 1830 CE. In Nablus, Kurdish settlement dates back to the period when Sultan Saladin granted the city to his nephew, Hussam al-Din Lajin, after he conquered it and expelled the Crusaders. Nablus became his fiefdom, and after his death it passed to Kurdish princes such as Saif al-Din Ali ibn Ahmad al-Hakkari. The Kurds of Nablus later formed a major component of the Mamluk army, and among them were prominent administrators and rulers. The arrival of Kurdish scholars and religious figures to Palestinian cities continued during the Mamluk era. Sheikh Ibrahim ibn al-Hadma al-Kurdi, known for his holy aura, settled in the village of Sa‘ir, located between Jerusalem and Hebron, and remained there until his death in 730 AH / 1329 CE. Similarly, the scholar Badr al-Din al-Hakkari al-Salti and his sons settled in Jerusalem after arriving from the city of Salt in eastern Jordan. They established the al-Salti Quarter, named after their hometown of Salt, where many Kurdish descendants still reside today. His descendants served as imams of the Al-Aqsa Mosque for many decades and became known as the Imam family, many of whom continue to live in Jerusalem today. The Kurdish population of Jerusalem was substantial, and they formed a distinct quarter known as the Kurdish Quarter, located west of the Mughrabi Quarter and known today as the Sharaf Quarter. Jerusalem also attracted many Kurdish scholars, including Sheikh Ahmad Muhammad al-Kurdi al-Bastami, the sheikh of the Bastamiyya, who taught at the Salahiyya Sufi School until his death in 881 AH / 1400 CE. Other notable figures included Sheikh Yusuf al-Kurdi, a student of the Salahiyya School; Sheikh Jibril al-Kurdi, a companion of Sheikh al-Islam al-Kamali; Sheikh Najm al-Din Dawud al-Kurdi, also trained at the Salahiyya School; and Sheikh Darbas al-Kurdi al-Hakkari, who taught at the Jawliyya School. Within the courtyard of the Noble Sanctuary stands the Qaymariyya Dome, named after Kurdish mujahideen who came from Qaymar Castle in the mountains between Mosul and Khilat. Several Kurdish princes were associated with this group, whose leader was known as Abu al-Fawaris. Buried in the Qaymariyya Dome are Prince Husam al-Din Abu al-Hasan ibn Abi al-Fawaris al-Qaymari and Prince Diya al-Din Musa ibn Abi al-Faris, both of whom died in 648 AH / 1250 CE, as well as Prince Husam al-Din Khidr al-Qaymari and Prince Nasir al-Din Abu al-Hasan al-Qaymari, who died in 665 AH / 1262 CE and 665 AH / 1266 CE respectively. The descendants of these princes, known as the al-Qaymari family, still live in Jerusalem and in the town of Dura in the Hebron region. Some migrated to Amman and Zarqa after the June 1967 war. During the Ottoman period, Kurds also settled in Jerusalem after completing the Hajj pilgrimage, forming a community in the Azbakia neighbourhood. Some served in the army and security forces, including Ahmed Muhammad al-Kurdi and Muhammad Fayrouz al-Kurdi in security roles, and Hassan Qawas al-Barzani al-Kurdi in the army. Ottoman-era records from the Jaffa Sharia Court document Kurdish settlement in the Jaffa district between 1864 and 1914 CE. Many served in the army and security forces and later remained in the area, as shown by inheritance records. Hassan Agha al-Kurdi of the Arshid quarter served in the Ottoman army in Jaffa, Hajj Bakir Agha al-Kurdi was a sergeant in the local troops, and Hajj Ahmad Agha ibn Muhammad al-Qawas al-Kurdi of Ramla held the rank of Yuzbashi Zandirma, serving as a commander in the Benghazi district. Kurdish soldiers also formed their own quarter in Gaza City, the seat of the Ottoman Sanjak of Gaza, as early as the sixteenth century CE. When Evliya Çelebi visited Safed in 1671 CE, he recorded that most of its inhabitants were Kurdish soldiers living in a Kurdish Quarter of around 200 houses. Throughout the Ottoman era, Kurds continued to migrate to Palestinian cities and villages from the Kurdish Quarter of Damascus, as well as from al-Jazira and Diyarbakir, seeking trade, administrative work, employment, or service in the Ottoman army. Prominent Kurdish Clans and Families in Palestine The Great Ayyubid Family Document, published in 1946, records the families descending from the Great Ayyubid Family. These families are Ayyubid Kurds whose origins trace back to the Ayyubid state. They were among those who settled in Palestine following its liberation from Crusader occupation. The majority of these families today reside in Hebron, with others living across various Palestinian cities. The Great Ayyubid Family includes the following Kurdish clans and families: Abu Khalaf, Salah, Hashlamoun, Tablat, Juwailis, al-Bitar, Hammour, Zalloum, Hariz, al-Rabihiya, al-Baradʿi, Ahmarou, al-Jabreeni, Amheisin, Abu Zaʿrour, Arʿar, Sahyoun, al-Hazin, Burqan, Sidr, the Abu Salem / Marqa clan, al-Mahlous, Ruwaished, Abu Halawa, al-Hashim, Mutʿeb, and Qafisha. These families collectively constituted approximately one third to one half of the population of Hebron. Some of their members later settled in Jenin, Nablus, Jerusalem, and Jaffa, as well as in Egypt and Jordan. Major Lineage-Based Families The Imam Family The Imam family resides around the Al-Aminiya School, north of the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound. Their lineage traces back to the scholar Diyaʾ al-Din Muhammad Abu Issa al-Hakkari al-Salti, who arrived in Hebron from the Kurdish Quarter in the city of Salt (Jordan) during the Mamluk era. His descendants served as imams of the Al-Aqsa Mosque for centuries, which led to their adoption of the title Imam, a designation they retain to this day. The Zaarour Family The Zaarour family is among the largest Kurdish families. They trace their origins to the Ayyubids and currently reside in Al-Eizariya, east of Jerusalem, as well as in Hebron. The Mulla Family The Mulla family descends from Mulla, or Mulla Ali, the ruler of Nazareth. They continue to reside in Nazareth and trace their lineage to this Kurdish ruler. The Saif Family The Saif family is said to descend from the Kurdish Saifa family, rulers of Tripoli and Akkar in northern Lebanon during the 16th century. They settled in Palestine following their historical conflict with the Maʿan family of Mount Lebanon. The Musa and Issa Families (Barqawi) The Musa and Issa families are today known as the Barqawi, named after the town of Barqa near Nablus. They descend from the Kurdish Saifa family, rulers of Tripoli and Akkar in northern Lebanon during the 16th century. They currently reside in the villages of Shufa and Kafr al-Labad. The Qaymari Family The Qaymari family descends from Kurdish princes who came to Palestine from the Qaymar region, located in the mountains between Mosul and Khilat in Iraqi Kurdistan. They settled in Hebron during the Ayyubid era as mujahideen in the army of Saladin. Their ancestors are buried within the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, where the Qaymari Dome (Qubbat al-Qaymariyya) stands. The dome contains the remains of several Qaymari princes who were martyred in those wars. Today, the Qaymari family primarily resides in the town of Dura, near Hebron, with some members having emigrated to Amman, Jordan. Kurdish Families of Jerusalem Other Kurdish families originating from or residing in Jerusalem include: Abu al-Lutf, al-Kurd, al-Kurdi, al-Bastami, Aliko, and Ayyubid families such as al-Sayeh, Abu Ghalyoun, Akka, Qafisha, Gharab, Abu Hamid, al-Ayyubi, al-Hazin, Sidr, Marqa, Alloush, al-Jabrini, al-Baradʿi, Farah, Amhaysin, Mutʿab, Zalloum, Hariz, and Asila. Additional Kurdish Families by Location Additional Kurdish families include: Al-Agha in the city of Safed Al-Kurdi in the village of Deir al-Balah Al-Kurdi and al-Kanafani in the city of Acre Al-Kurdi and Fashri (from the Ayyubid dynasty) in the city of Lod Ayyubid Kurds in the village of al-Rabihiya (Hebron district) Al-Lahham in the town of Surif Al-Kurdi in the city of Tiberias Al-Zaza in the city of Beisan In Tira (Haifa), the families of al-Naji, Bakir, and Alwa are of Kurdish origin. They came from Diyarbakir and descend from three relatives: Bakir, Alwa, and Bakir Ali, as well as Hassouh (Hassan). These families lived in Tira and migrated to Jordan after 1948. There are also the Murad al-Kurdi family, the Agha, Zaza, and Kurdi families in the Gaza Strip; the Kurdi family in Aida Camp near Bethlehem; the Agha family in Khan Yunis; the Kurdi family in Beersheba; the Kurds of al-Baqara and al-Ghannama in the Tiberias district; the Kurdi family in the villages of Hawara and Hawasa; the Kurdi family in Ramla; the Kurdi family in the village of Ein Arik; and Kurdish families in Jerusalem, Hebron, Deir al-Balah, and Beit Tima. Additionally, the Ayyubi and Saadiyya families of Ayyubid origin reside in the city of Jaffa, as does the Abu al-Haija family in the village of Ein Hawd. Gaza City: The al-Zaza Family The al-Zaza family originally lived in the village of al-Kufkha in the Beersheba area until 1948. After the village was demolished and bulldozed, they relocated to Gaza City. According to one member of the family, their origins trace back to the Kurds of Kurdistan. Their grandfather, Hajj Mustafa al-Zaza, came to Gaza during the Ottoman era due to his work. He had two sons, Abdul Hamid and Abd Rabbo. Abd Rabbo and his sons, Abdul Rahman and Deeb, lived in al-Kufkha, where they worked in agriculture and raised sheep and camels. Following the village’s destruction in 1948, the family permanently settled in Gaza City. Tiberias The Kurdi family, belonging to the Kurdish Izoli clan of Syria, resided in Tiberias. During the British Mandate period, the government appointed Muhammad Ayyub Zaza (Abu Ayyub al-Kurdi) as the mukhtar (headman) for Muslims in the city. Other Kurdish families in Tiberias included the Bakdash family, the Khalil al-Kurdi (Jaras) family, the Zaza family (descended from Hajj Darwish Zaza), and the Bakr Agha (Izoli) family, descended from Bakr Sidqi Agha (Izoli). Jaffa Records from the Jaffa Sharia Court indicate the settlement of a number of Kurds in the Jaffa district during the Ottoman era (1864–1914). Many served in the army and security forces both within and outside the district. Some chose to remain after completing their military service, as evidenced by inheritance records. Examples include: Hassan Agha al-Kurdi, residing in the Arshid neighbourhood of Jaffa, who served in the Ottoman army stationed in the district Hajj Bakir Agha al-Kurdi, a sergeant in the Ottoman troops stationed there Hajj Ahmad Agha bin Muhammad al-Qawas al-Kurdi of Ramla, who served as a Yuzbashi Zandirma (commander) in the Benghazi Brigade
2:23

Many Palestinian clans, and families descend from Kurdish settlers who arrived during the Ayyubid period, beginning with Saladin’s wars against the Crusaders and continuing into the Mamluk and Ottoman eras. An approximate 150,000 Palestinians could be stated to be of Kurdish origins, although it’s hard to gauge with precision. These communities are concentrated primarily in Hebron, who form the most important community, but are also found in Acre, Nablus, and Jerusalem. The earliest Ayyubid-era Kurdish migrants are collectively referred to as the “Ayyubid family,” a term that does not include later Kurdish arrivals. Numerous prominent Palestinians are of Kurdish origin, including Ghassan Kanafani (who is playing in the video), one of the leading figures of the Palestinian national movement, as well as Mohammed El-Kurd and his sister Muna El-Kurd who are prominent activists. Although Palestinian Kurds largely integrated into the Arabic-speaking population through intermarriage and the adoption of Arabic as a mother tongue, most retain a distinct micro-identity linked to their Kurdish heritage. Genetic results reflect these roots. Without delving into politics, it is interesting that Kurds have forgotten about some Kurdish remnants in Palestine, while Kurdish Jews have not been forgotten about, despite the fact there is almost nothing Kurdish about Kurdish Jews in roots, history, genetics, language, customs, religion, etc. Kurdish Jews are one of the many major misappellations of ethnic groups that reside in the middle east and central Asia, that are applied and asserted by foreigners due to political agendas, misunderstandings, etc. It should be noted that the Ayyubid confederation in Palestine today does not descend from Saladin himself, but from various Ayyubid affiliates who served under the dynasty. Moreover, the founding Ayyubid clans were not exclusively Kurdish and included close allies who operated within the Ayyubid system. Three clans within this confederation trace descent from major Kurdish figures. The Abū al-Hayjāʾ clan, descended from Abū al-Hayjāʾ himself. The Qaymari clan, descended from Hussam al-Din who was the governor of Palestine under the Mamluk Sultan Baibars. Hussam al-Din was also the son of law of Al-Ashraf Musa ibn Adil, the nephew of Saladin, who ruled over the Jazira and the Levant. The al-Imam clan descended from Badr al-Din al-Hakkari. Across the Levant, claims of direct descent from Saladin are widespread but generally unsupported by historical evidence. In the absence of identifiable modern descendants, confirmation would require testing Saladin’s remains in Damascus, which is not feasible. Via AncestryDNA, one Palestinian Kurd scores 40 percent Iranian ancestry (which is obviously mediated through Kurds), while others show lower but still notable levels, with the remainder largely Levantine. Despite linguistic Arabization after the Islamic period, Palestinians of this region have largely preserved a local genetic profile. The Zalloum clan, numbering approximately 2,000 people, descends from elite Berber soldiers of Saladin who maintained close ties with Ayyubid Kurds after the dynasty’s collapse. Two independent Y-DNA results place the clan within haplogroup E-M81, a major Berber paternal lineage. One Zalloum individual shows 24.1 percent Iranian ancestry on 23andMe, while another shows 15 percent Iranian ancestry on G25. Unfortunately, the remaining samples lack autosomal data. Palestinian Kurds of the Abū al-Hayjāʾ clan, numbering at least 4,000 people, carry the Y-DNA haplogroup Q-YP1228, a lineage of Kurdish origin. They descend from Abū al-Hayjāʾ, one of Saladin’s leading generals and the Ispahsalar of the Mihrāniyya corps. Abu Halawa clan, carries Y-DNA haplogroup R1a-Z93 with an unresolved deep clade, an Indo-Iranian lineage likely transmitted through Kurdish intermediaries. Abu Khalaf belongs to haplogroup T-CTS6280, which probably corresponds to a Zaza individual from Muş under the mutation T-M9513. History There is a substantial historical record regarding the Kurds of Palestine. Within the stronghold of Hebron itself, Kurdish tribes and the Bedouin Arab Tamimi alliance were frequently in conflict. One particularly notable clash culminated in the intervention of Sultan Qaitbay, the eighteenth Mamluk ruler of Egypt, in 878 AH / 1473 CE. This horrific clash resulted in the dispersal of both groups to different parts of Palestine. The Kurds scattered to Nablus, Lod, Jerusalem, and Khan Yunis. Kurdish influence in Hebron weakened in the nineteenth century due to Ibrahim Pasha’s campaign in the Levant in 1830 CE. In Nablus, Kurdish settlement dates back to the period when Sultan Saladin granted the city to his nephew, Hussam al-Din Lajin, after he conquered it and expelled the Crusaders. Nablus became his fiefdom, and after his death it passed to Kurdish princes such as Saif al-Din Ali ibn Ahmad al-Hakkari. The Kurds of Nablus later formed a major component of the Mamluk army, and among them were prominent administrators and rulers. The arrival of Kurdish scholars and religious figures to Palestinian cities continued during the Mamluk era. Sheikh Ibrahim ibn al-Hadma al-Kurdi, known for his holy aura, settled in the village of Sa‘ir, located between Jerusalem and Hebron, and remained there until his death in 730 AH / 1329 CE. Similarly, the scholar Badr al-Din al-Hakkari al-Salti and his sons settled in Jerusalem after arriving from the city of Salt in eastern Jordan. They established the al-Salti Quarter, named after their hometown of Salt, where many Kurdish descendants still reside today. His descendants served as imams of the Al-Aqsa Mosque for many decades and became known as the Imam family, many of whom continue to live in Jerusalem today. The Kurdish population of Jerusalem was substantial, and they formed a distinct quarter known as the Kurdish Quarter, located west of the Mughrabi Quarter and known today as the Sharaf Quarter. Jerusalem also attracted many Kurdish scholars, including Sheikh Ahmad Muhammad al-Kurdi al-Bastami, the sheikh of the Bastamiyya, who taught at the Salahiyya Sufi School until his death in 881 AH / 1400 CE. Other notable figures included Sheikh Yusuf al-Kurdi, a student of the Salahiyya School; Sheikh Jibril al-Kurdi, a companion of Sheikh al-Islam al-Kamali; Sheikh Najm al-Din Dawud al-Kurdi, also trained at the Salahiyya School; and Sheikh Darbas al-Kurdi al-Hakkari, who taught at the Jawliyya School. Within the courtyard of the Noble Sanctuary stands the Qaymariyya Dome, named after Kurdish mujahideen who came from Qaymar Castle in the mountains between Mosul and Khilat. Several Kurdish princes were associated with this group, whose leader was known as Abu al-Fawaris. Buried in the Qaymariyya Dome are Prince Husam al-Din Abu al-Hasan ibn Abi al-Fawaris al-Qaymari and Prince Diya al-Din Musa ibn Abi al-Faris, both of whom died in 648 AH / 1250 CE, as well as Prince Husam al-Din Khidr al-Qaymari and Prince Nasir al-Din Abu al-Hasan al-Qaymari, who died in 665 AH / 1262 CE and 665 AH / 1266 CE respectively. The descendants of these princes, known as the al-Qaymari family, still live in Jerusalem and in the town of Dura in the Hebron region. Some migrated to Amman and Zarqa after the June 1967 war. During the Ottoman period, Kurds also settled in Jerusalem after completing the Hajj pilgrimage, forming a community in the Azbakia neighbourhood. Some served in the army and security forces, including Ahmed Muhammad al-Kurdi and Muhammad Fayrouz al-Kurdi in security roles, and Hassan Qawas al-Barzani al-Kurdi in the army. Ottoman-era records from the Jaffa Sharia Court document Kurdish settlement in the Jaffa district between 1864 and 1914 CE. Many served in the army and security forces and later remained in the area, as shown by inheritance records. Hassan Agha al-Kurdi of the Arshid quarter served in the Ottoman army in Jaffa, Hajj Bakir Agha al-Kurdi was a sergeant in the local troops, and Hajj Ahmad Agha ibn Muhammad al-Qawas al-Kurdi of Ramla held the rank of Yuzbashi Zandirma, serving as a commander in the Benghazi district. Kurdish soldiers also formed their own quarter in Gaza City, the seat of the Ottoman Sanjak of Gaza, as early as the sixteenth century CE. When Evliya Çelebi visited Safed in 1671 CE, he recorded that most of its inhabitants were Kurdish soldiers living in a Kurdish Quarter of around 200 houses. Throughout the Ottoman era, Kurds continued to migrate to Palestinian cities and villages from the Kurdish Quarter of Damascus, as well as from al-Jazira and Diyarbakir, seeking trade, administrative work, employment, or service in the Ottoman army. Prominent Kurdish Clans and Families in Palestine The Great Ayyubid Family Document, published in 1946, records the families descending from the Great Ayyubid Family. These families are Ayyubid Kurds whose origins trace back to the Ayyubid state. They were among those who settled in Palestine following its liberation from Crusader occupation. The majority of these families today reside in Hebron, with others living across various Palestinian cities. The Great Ayyubid Family includes the following Kurdish clans and families: Abu Khalaf, Salah, Hashlamoun, Tablat, Juwailis, al-Bitar, Hammour, Zalloum, Hariz, al-Rabihiya, al-Baradʿi, Ahmarou, al-Jabreeni, Amheisin, Abu Zaʿrour, Arʿar, Sahyoun, al-Hazin, Burqan, Sidr, the Abu Salem / Marqa clan, al-Mahlous, Ruwaished, Abu Halawa, al-Hashim, Mutʿeb, and Qafisha. These families collectively constituted approximately one third to one half of the population of Hebron. Some of their members later settled in Jenin, Nablus, Jerusalem, and Jaffa, as well as in Egypt and Jordan. Major Lineage-Based Families The Imam Family The Imam family resides around the Al-Aminiya School, north of the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound. Their lineage traces back to the scholar Diyaʾ al-Din Muhammad Abu Issa al-Hakkari al-Salti, who arrived in Hebron from the Kurdish Quarter in the city of Salt (Jordan) during the Mamluk era. His descendants served as imams of the Al-Aqsa Mosque for centuries, which led to their adoption of the title Imam, a designation they retain to this day. The Zaarour Family The Zaarour family is among the largest Kurdish families. They trace their origins to the Ayyubids and currently reside in Al-Eizariya, east of Jerusalem, as well as in Hebron. The Mulla Family The Mulla family descends from Mulla, or Mulla Ali, the ruler of Nazareth. They continue to reside in Nazareth and trace their lineage to this Kurdish ruler. The Saif Family The Saif family is said to descend from the Kurdish Saifa family, rulers of Tripoli and Akkar in northern Lebanon during the 16th century. They settled in Palestine following their historical conflict with the Maʿan family of Mount Lebanon. The Musa and Issa Families (Barqawi) The Musa and Issa families are today known as the Barqawi, named after the town of Barqa near Nablus. They descend from the Kurdish Saifa family, rulers of Tripoli and Akkar in northern Lebanon during the 16th century. They currently reside in the villages of Shufa and Kafr al-Labad. The Qaymari Family The Qaymari family descends from Kurdish princes who came to Palestine from the Qaymar region, located in the mountains between Mosul and Khilat in Iraqi Kurdistan. They settled in Hebron during the Ayyubid era as mujahideen in the army of Saladin. Their ancestors are buried within the Al-Aqsa Mosque compound, where the Qaymari Dome (Qubbat al-Qaymariyya) stands. The dome contains the remains of several Qaymari princes who were martyred in those wars. Today, the Qaymari family primarily resides in the town of Dura, near Hebron, with some members having emigrated to Amman, Jordan. Kurdish Families of Jerusalem Other Kurdish families originating from or residing in Jerusalem include: Abu al-Lutf, al-Kurd, al-Kurdi, al-Bastami, Aliko, and Ayyubid families such as al-Sayeh, Abu Ghalyoun, Akka, Qafisha, Gharab, Abu Hamid, al-Ayyubi, al-Hazin, Sidr, Marqa, Alloush, al-Jabrini, al-Baradʿi, Farah, Amhaysin, Mutʿab, Zalloum, Hariz, and Asila. Additional Kurdish Families by Location Additional Kurdish families include: Al-Agha in the city of Safed Al-Kurdi in the village of Deir al-Balah Al-Kurdi and al-Kanafani in the city of Acre Al-Kurdi and Fashri (from the Ayyubid dynasty) in the city of Lod Ayyubid Kurds in the village of al-Rabihiya (Hebron district) Al-Lahham in the town of Surif Al-Kurdi in the city of Tiberias Al-Zaza in the city of Beisan In Tira (Haifa), the families of al-Naji, Bakir, and Alwa are of Kurdish origin. They came from Diyarbakir and descend from three relatives: Bakir, Alwa, and Bakir Ali, as well as Hassouh (Hassan). These families lived in Tira and migrated to Jordan after 1948. There are also the Murad al-Kurdi family, the Agha, Zaza, and Kurdi families in the Gaza Strip; the Kurdi family in Aida Camp near Bethlehem; the Agha family in Khan Yunis; the Kurdi family in Beersheba; the Kurds of al-Baqara and al-Ghannama in the Tiberias district; the Kurdi family in the villages of Hawara and Hawasa; the Kurdi family in Ramla; the Kurdi family in the village of Ein Arik; and Kurdish families in Jerusalem, Hebron, Deir al-Balah, and Beit Tima. Additionally, the Ayyubi and Saadiyya families of Ayyubid origin reside in the city of Jaffa, as does the Abu al-Haija family in the village of Ein Hawd. Gaza City: The al-Zaza Family The al-Zaza family originally lived in the village of al-Kufkha in the Beersheba area until 1948. After the village was demolished and bulldozed, they relocated to Gaza City. According to one member of the family, their origins trace back to the Kurds of Kurdistan. Their grandfather, Hajj Mustafa al-Zaza, came to Gaza during the Ottoman era due to his work. He had two sons, Abdul Hamid and Abd Rabbo. Abd Rabbo and his sons, Abdul Rahman and Deeb, lived in al-Kufkha, where they worked in agriculture and raised sheep and camels. Following the village’s destruction in 1948, the family permanently settled in Gaza City. Tiberias The Kurdi family, belonging to the Kurdish Izoli clan of Syria, resided in Tiberias. During the British Mandate period, the government appointed Muhammad Ayyub Zaza (Abu Ayyub al-Kurdi) as the mukhtar (headman) for Muslims in the city. Other Kurdish families in Tiberias included the Bakdash family, the Khalil al-Kurdi (Jaras) family, the Zaza family (descended from Hajj Darwish Zaza), and the Bakr Agha (Izoli) family, descended from Bakr Sidqi Agha (Izoli). Jaffa Records from the Jaffa Sharia Court indicate the settlement of a number of Kurds in the Jaffa district during the Ottoman era (1864–1914). Many served in the army and security forces both within and outside the district. Some chose to remain after completing their military service, as evidenced by inheritance records. Examples include: Hassan Agha al-Kurdi, residing in the Arshid neighbourhood of Jaffa, who served in the Ottoman army stationed in the district Hajj Bakir Agha al-Kurdi, a sergeant in the Ottoman troops stationed there Hajj Ahmad Agha bin Muhammad al-Qawas al-Kurdi of Ramla, who served as a Yuzbashi Zandirma (commander) in the Benghazi Brigade

Ari

220,657 görüntüleme • 9 ay önce

The illegal dumping problem worsens in Calgary, particularly in northeast communities Couches, mattresses, construction debris, and bags of garbage dumped along roadsides have become an increasingly common sight in parts of Calgary. According to the City of Calgary, illegal dumping has “become more severe in recent years, particularly in northeast communities.” Calgarian Nick King has been documenting the problem after repeatedly encountering piles of illegally discarded garbage while making furniture deliveries. Videos shared by King show large amounts of household waste abandoned in public areas. CityNews has also documented the problem, including couches, mattresses, chairs, and other household items left behind. While someone ultimately has to clean up the mess, legally disposing of household garbage in Calgary can cost relatively little. In 2026, the City charges a flat $25 fee for residential landfill loads weighing less than 250 kilograms. Those who choose to dump their garbage illegally can face significantly greater consequences. According to the City of Calgary, illegal dumping can result in fines of up to $10,000. Despite those potential fines, the City says the problem has become more severe in recent years, particularly in northeast communities. The northeast is also home to many of Calgary’s South Asian communities. Countries throughout South Asia have faced well-documented challenges involving litter, garbage collection, and waste management. Rebel News raised the issue directly with Alberta Premier Danielle Smith, asking whether her government would consider stronger measures to crack down on illegal dumping. Smith said the Province is considering tougher penalties for illegal dumping, including fines of up to $10,000 and as much as two years behind bars. The City warns that illegally discarded waste is more than an eyesore. Dumped garbage can attract pests, create fire hazards, and make public spaces unsafe. Calgarians who witness illegal dumping are encouraged to collect as much information as possible without putting themselves at risk. The city recommends recording the license plate and description of the vehicle involved, what was dumped, and the time and location of the incident before reporting it through 311. A Community Standards Peace Officer can then investigate the complaint. With fines of up to $10,000 already possible under Calgary’s rules, and the Province now considering penalties that could include jail time, the question remains whether tougher enforcement will be enough to curb a problem. REPORT by Angelica:
4:05

The illegal dumping problem worsens in Calgary, particularly in northeast communities Couches, mattresses, construction debris, and bags of garbage dumped along roadsides have become an increasingly common sight in parts of Calgary. According to the City of Calgary, illegal dumping has “become more severe in recent years, particularly in northeast communities.” Calgarian Nick King has been documenting the problem after repeatedly encountering piles of illegally discarded garbage while making furniture deliveries. Videos shared by King show large amounts of household waste abandoned in public areas. CityNews has also documented the problem, including couches, mattresses, chairs, and other household items left behind. While someone ultimately has to clean up the mess, legally disposing of household garbage in Calgary can cost relatively little. In 2026, the City charges a flat $25 fee for residential landfill loads weighing less than 250 kilograms. Those who choose to dump their garbage illegally can face significantly greater consequences. According to the City of Calgary, illegal dumping can result in fines of up to $10,000. Despite those potential fines, the City says the problem has become more severe in recent years, particularly in northeast communities. The northeast is also home to many of Calgary’s South Asian communities. Countries throughout South Asia have faced well-documented challenges involving litter, garbage collection, and waste management. Rebel News raised the issue directly with Alberta Premier Danielle Smith, asking whether her government would consider stronger measures to crack down on illegal dumping. Smith said the Province is considering tougher penalties for illegal dumping, including fines of up to $10,000 and as much as two years behind bars. The City warns that illegally discarded waste is more than an eyesore. Dumped garbage can attract pests, create fire hazards, and make public spaces unsafe. Calgarians who witness illegal dumping are encouraged to collect as much information as possible without putting themselves at risk. The city recommends recording the license plate and description of the vehicle involved, what was dumped, and the time and location of the incident before reporting it through 311. A Community Standards Peace Officer can then investigate the complaint. With fines of up to $10,000 already possible under Calgary’s rules, and the Province now considering penalties that could include jail time, the question remains whether tougher enforcement will be enough to curb a problem. REPORT by Angelica:

Rebel News

23,030 görüntüleme • 27 gün önce

Then it will be too late: Chubarov urges Russians to flee Crimea The head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov called on Russian citizens illegally present in the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea to immediately leave the peninsula. And he urged Crimeans, who are awaiting the liberation of Crimea from Russian occupiers, to take care of their own safety. Chubarov noted that for more than three weeks, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been carrying out precise and effective strikes on the military facilities of Russian occupiers in Crimea, and the intensity of these strikes is increasing. “I want to address those who settled on the peninsula after February 27, 2014. Your presence in the territories of Crimea with forged Russian property ownership documents is illegal in all respects according to Ukrainian national legislation and international law. As long as the Kerch Bridge is still operational, you have a chance to leave Crimea. Soon, this opportunity will no longer exist. Don't put off your departure from Crimea until tomorrow. Pack your things and return to your homeland. Now. It will be too late later,” said the politician
3:51

Then it will be too late: Chubarov urges Russians to flee Crimea The head of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people Refat Chubarov called on Russian citizens illegally present in the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea to immediately leave the peninsula. And he urged Crimeans, who are awaiting the liberation of Crimea from Russian occupiers, to take care of their own safety. Chubarov noted that for more than three weeks, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been carrying out precise and effective strikes on the military facilities of Russian occupiers in Crimea, and the intensity of these strikes is increasing. “I want to address those who settled on the peninsula after February 27, 2014. Your presence in the territories of Crimea with forged Russian property ownership documents is illegal in all respects according to Ukrainian national legislation and international law. As long as the Kerch Bridge is still operational, you have a chance to leave Crimea. Soon, this opportunity will no longer exist. Don't put off your departure from Crimea until tomorrow. Pack your things and return to your homeland. Now. It will be too late later,” said the politician

Beefeater

206,543 görüntüleme • 3 ay önce

Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya (Armed Forces) Spox: The Islamic Republic of Iran respects the interests and national sovereignty of neighboring countries and, up to now, has committed no aggression against them. Anywhere that serves as the source of aggression against Iran is a legitimate target, and in the face of the United States and the Zionist regime, there will be absolutely no retreat. Countries that have not provided airspace or facilities to the United States and the Zionist regime have not been our target up to this moment, and will not be our target going forward either (Azerbaijan, Oman & Turkey). However, all bases that serve as the point of origin for aggression against dear Iran will, as before, be struck heavily on land, at sea, and in the air (Persian Gulf countries). We say this explicitly: we strike them and destroy them so that it may serve as a lesson to anyone who dares aggress against our nation. And know this: From now on, anything built again in the name of the enemy, similar to these bases, facilities, and equipment, will be destroyed again and again with crushing blows. The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly welcomes the escorting of oil tankers and the claim of an American military presence for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and we are definitely waiting for them… We recommend that before making any decision, the Americans remember the burning of the supertanker Bridgeton in 1987, and the tankers that were recently targeted. In this battle, after making a vertical entry into the region, there is no guarantee that your exit will also be vertical. The same applies to your ships, with this difference: you may intend to enter afloat, but it is far from impossible that you will go down vertically to the bottom of the Persian Gulf… A reminder to the corrupted Island-man: The ground and the map of the war are in our hands. This will continue…
2:07

Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya (Armed Forces) Spox: The Islamic Republic of Iran respects the interests and national sovereignty of neighboring countries and, up to now, has committed no aggression against them. Anywhere that serves as the source of aggression against Iran is a legitimate target, and in the face of the United States and the Zionist regime, there will be absolutely no retreat. Countries that have not provided airspace or facilities to the United States and the Zionist regime have not been our target up to this moment, and will not be our target going forward either (Azerbaijan, Oman & Turkey). However, all bases that serve as the point of origin for aggression against dear Iran will, as before, be struck heavily on land, at sea, and in the air (Persian Gulf countries). We say this explicitly: we strike them and destroy them so that it may serve as a lesson to anyone who dares aggress against our nation. And know this: From now on, anything built again in the name of the enemy, similar to these bases, facilities, and equipment, will be destroyed again and again with crushing blows. The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly welcomes the escorting of oil tankers and the claim of an American military presence for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and we are definitely waiting for them… We recommend that before making any decision, the Americans remember the burning of the supertanker Bridgeton in 1987, and the tankers that were recently targeted. In this battle, after making a vertical entry into the region, there is no guarantee that your exit will also be vertical. The same applies to your ships, with this difference: you may intend to enter afloat, but it is far from impossible that you will go down vertically to the bottom of the Persian Gulf… A reminder to the corrupted Island-man: The ground and the map of the war are in our hands. This will continue…

Arya Yadeghaar

226,462 görüntüleme • 7 ay önce

As the PKK Makes Peace with Turkey, It Is Quietly Building Up Along Iran's Border Despite the ongoing peace process with Turkey, under which it is expected to disarm and withdraw from its bases along Iraq's border with Turkey, the PKK and its affiliates are quietly expanding their presence along the Iranian frontier, particularly in Iraq's Suleimani province. Rather than disappearing, the movement appears to be concentrating its infrastructure further south, becoming the dominant armed actor along much of the Kurdistan Region's border with Iran. The latest indication comes from reports that the PKK is quietly digging new tunnels in the Halabja area, a border district directly adjacent to Iran's Kurdish area of Paveh, which has recently seen armed activity against the IRGC. If confirmed, this marks the latest stage of a southward expansion that has unfolded over more than a decade. That expansion has followed a clear geographical pattern. From its long-established stronghold in the Qandil Mountains, the PKK extended its infrastructure south into the Qaladze area, then into the Asos Mountains and Mawat district, now a major hub for PJAK, the PKK's Iranian affiliate, and arguably its second most important base after Qandil. From there, the organisation expanded towards Penjwen, another strategic border district with Iran. Its presence has also been reported as far south as Said Sadiq, and now, according to recent reports, it is constructing tunnel networks around Halabja. Although there are gaps between many of these positions, they are connected by a continuous mountainous chain stretching from Qandil southwards along the Iranian border. This terrain provides the PKK with a natural corridor, allowing relatively unrestricted movement despite the absence of permanent infrastructure across every section. The shift is notable because the PKK's expansion into the Suleimani area is relatively recent. When the organisation launched its insurgency against Turkey in the 1980s, its Iraqi bases were concentrated along the Turkish border, reflecting their role as staging grounds for operations inside Turkey. The movement established itself in the Haftanin area near Zakho, expanded eastwards into Amedi, then Khwakurk in Erbil province, before building permanent positions in the Gara Mountains and Qandil during the 1990s. Almost all of these areas lay within KDP-controlled territory. Turkey's increasingly aggressive military strategy gradually altered that geography. Rather than conducting temporary cross-border operations, Ankara began establishing permanent military positions inside northern Iraq, steadily pushing the PKK further south. The decisive turning point, however, appears to have come after the 2011 ceasefire between Iran and PJAK. While limited expansion had already begun, the PKK's most significant southward movement accelerated from 2012 onwards. That period also coincided with a major political transition inside the PUK. Following Jalal Talabani's stroke and prolonged absence from politics, Lahur Sheikh Jangi gradually assumed control over much of the party's security apparatus. It was during this period that PUK-PKK relations evolved into what increasingly resembled a strategic partnership, creating a far more permissive environment for the PKK's expansion throughout PUK-controlled territory. The locations identified above almost certainly represent a conservative estimate. Reports have periodically placed PKK elements further south around Kalar and as far west as Chamchamal. The systematic construction of tunnels and defensive infrastructure specifically along the Iranian frontier, however, is especially significant. As the organisation moves towards peace with Turkey, its strategic orientation is changing. Rather than remaining a Turkey-facing insurgency, it increasingly resembles an Iran-facing one. Under the reported terms of the peace process, the PKK is expected to vacate all positions along the Turkish border. Many of those areas, including Haftanin, Amedi and much of Khwakurk, are already effectively under Turkish military control. Only a handful of major positions, such as the Gara Mountains and parts of Khwakurk, remain and are widely expected to be evacuated as the process advances. If that occurs, the PKK's military geography will have been fundamentally transformed. Its presence along the Turkish border would effectively disappear, while almost all of its remaining infrastructure would be concentrated along the Iranian frontier. Equally striking is Turkey's apparent silence regarding this southern expansion. Turkish reporting on the peace process has consistently focused on evacuating positions along the Turkish border, with no indication that Ankara is demanding the PKK withdraw from areas such as Asos, Mawat, Penjwen or Halabja. This may suggest that Turkey's primary objective is not the complete removal of the PKK from Iraq, but securing its own border by replacing the PKK with permanent Turkish military control across the frontier zone. Another notable development is the rapid improvement in relations between Turkey and the PUK, despite the latter's continued close ties with the PKK. Turkey's intelligence chief recently travelled to Suleimani to meet Bafel Talabani and Qubad Talabani, and the following day Qubad met Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara. Reports now suggest that Bafel Talabani could even meet President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the peace process advances. These contacts are unlikely to be occurring without the PKK's knowledge. While the PUK and the PKK remain distinct organisations with different priorities, their interests continue to overlap. The recent diplomatic engagement appears more consistent with coordination, or at least mutual understanding, than with any breakdown in relations. An equally important trend concerns Iran. Traditionally, both the PUK and the PKK have been regarded as relatively close to Tehran. Yet both have recently adopted noticeably more confrontational positions. PJAK has resumed violent clashes with the IRGC, while PUK leader Bafel Talabani has issued arguably his strongest criticism of Iran to date, directly accusing Tehran of aggression following recent Iranian strikes inside the Kurdistan Region. Whether this represents a temporary tactical adjustment or the beginning of a broader strategic realignment remains unclear. The PUK and the PKK are, however, likely to remain broadly aligned in their approach to Iran. Although they are separate organisations with distinct interests, they influence one another and have increasingly coordinated their policies over the past decade. Their calculations should therefore be analysed separately from those of the KDP, which operates under a different set of strategic incentives. There is little evidence that either the PUK or the PKK is positioning itself as part of a broader effort to overthrow the Iranian regime. Their posture instead resembles Turkey's: they would likely welcome a weaker Iran, but not one whose weakening comes through becoming an instrument of Israel or a wider externally driven regime-change project. That distinguishes them, at least for now, from the more speculative claims that periodically surround Kurdish actors during periods of regional crisis. Ironically, despite the KDP's historically deeper ties with Israel, it too has been cautious about any direct confrontation with Iran. Rather than openly aligning with Israeli objectives, it has generally sought to avoid being drawn into the conflict. The differences between the Kurdish parties lie less in whether they favour confrontation and more in how they manage their relationships with the competing regional powers. Beyond the implications for Iran, the peace process could fundamentally reshape the PKK's long-term strategic position. Even if the organisation ultimately disarms inside Turkey and transforms into a legal political movement, it would not necessarily cease to be a regional actor. By relocating much of its remaining infrastructure to the Iranian frontier, the PKK would retain strategic depth outside Turkey while simultaneously becoming a legitimate participant in Turkish politics. If the peace process succeeds, the PKK would no longer be simply an insurgent organisation or merely a parliamentary movement. It could evolve into a hybrid actor: a stakeholder in Turkey's emerging political order while preserving extensive regional networks beyond its borders. That would allow the movement to avoid surrendering all of its strategic leverage and becoming entirely dependent on Ankara's goodwill. This could also benefit Turkey. If Ankara integrates the PKK into a stable political framework while tolerating its continued regional presence, it could transform a long-standing security threat into an actor whose interests become tied to regional stability. Rather than eliminating the PKK outright, Turkey would be incorporating it into a new strategic architecture, one in which the organisation gains legitimacy inside Turkey while Ankara gains indirect influence through a network of Kurdish actors whose interests become intertwined with its own. If this interpretation proves correct, the peace process would represent far more than the end of an insurgency. It would mark a strategic reorganisation of Kurdish politics across the region, with the PKK shifting from a border-based guerrilla movement focused on Turkey into a transnational political actor whose centre of gravity lies along Iraq's border with Iran while simultaneously becoming embedded within Turkey's own political system. More:
1:18

As the PKK Makes Peace with Turkey, It Is Quietly Building Up Along Iran's Border Despite the ongoing peace process with Turkey, under which it is expected to disarm and withdraw from its bases along Iraq's border with Turkey, the PKK and its affiliates are quietly expanding their presence along the Iranian frontier, particularly in Iraq's Suleimani province. Rather than disappearing, the movement appears to be concentrating its infrastructure further south, becoming the dominant armed actor along much of the Kurdistan Region's border with Iran. The latest indication comes from reports that the PKK is quietly digging new tunnels in the Halabja area, a border district directly adjacent to Iran's Kurdish area of Paveh, which has recently seen armed activity against the IRGC. If confirmed, this marks the latest stage of a southward expansion that has unfolded over more than a decade. That expansion has followed a clear geographical pattern. From its long-established stronghold in the Qandil Mountains, the PKK extended its infrastructure south into the Qaladze area, then into the Asos Mountains and Mawat district, now a major hub for PJAK, the PKK's Iranian affiliate, and arguably its second most important base after Qandil. From there, the organisation expanded towards Penjwen, another strategic border district with Iran. Its presence has also been reported as far south as Said Sadiq, and now, according to recent reports, it is constructing tunnel networks around Halabja. Although there are gaps between many of these positions, they are connected by a continuous mountainous chain stretching from Qandil southwards along the Iranian border. This terrain provides the PKK with a natural corridor, allowing relatively unrestricted movement despite the absence of permanent infrastructure across every section. The shift is notable because the PKK's expansion into the Suleimani area is relatively recent. When the organisation launched its insurgency against Turkey in the 1980s, its Iraqi bases were concentrated along the Turkish border, reflecting their role as staging grounds for operations inside Turkey. The movement established itself in the Haftanin area near Zakho, expanded eastwards into Amedi, then Khwakurk in Erbil province, before building permanent positions in the Gara Mountains and Qandil during the 1990s. Almost all of these areas lay within KDP-controlled territory. Turkey's increasingly aggressive military strategy gradually altered that geography. Rather than conducting temporary cross-border operations, Ankara began establishing permanent military positions inside northern Iraq, steadily pushing the PKK further south. The decisive turning point, however, appears to have come after the 2011 ceasefire between Iran and PJAK. While limited expansion had already begun, the PKK's most significant southward movement accelerated from 2012 onwards. That period also coincided with a major political transition inside the PUK. Following Jalal Talabani's stroke and prolonged absence from politics, Lahur Sheikh Jangi gradually assumed control over much of the party's security apparatus. It was during this period that PUK-PKK relations evolved into what increasingly resembled a strategic partnership, creating a far more permissive environment for the PKK's expansion throughout PUK-controlled territory. The locations identified above almost certainly represent a conservative estimate. Reports have periodically placed PKK elements further south around Kalar and as far west as Chamchamal. The systematic construction of tunnels and defensive infrastructure specifically along the Iranian frontier, however, is especially significant. As the organisation moves towards peace with Turkey, its strategic orientation is changing. Rather than remaining a Turkey-facing insurgency, it increasingly resembles an Iran-facing one. Under the reported terms of the peace process, the PKK is expected to vacate all positions along the Turkish border. Many of those areas, including Haftanin, Amedi and much of Khwakurk, are already effectively under Turkish military control. Only a handful of major positions, such as the Gara Mountains and parts of Khwakurk, remain and are widely expected to be evacuated as the process advances. If that occurs, the PKK's military geography will have been fundamentally transformed. Its presence along the Turkish border would effectively disappear, while almost all of its remaining infrastructure would be concentrated along the Iranian frontier. Equally striking is Turkey's apparent silence regarding this southern expansion. Turkish reporting on the peace process has consistently focused on evacuating positions along the Turkish border, with no indication that Ankara is demanding the PKK withdraw from areas such as Asos, Mawat, Penjwen or Halabja. This may suggest that Turkey's primary objective is not the complete removal of the PKK from Iraq, but securing its own border by replacing the PKK with permanent Turkish military control across the frontier zone. Another notable development is the rapid improvement in relations between Turkey and the PUK, despite the latter's continued close ties with the PKK. Turkey's intelligence chief recently travelled to Suleimani to meet Bafel Talabani and Qubad Talabani, and the following day Qubad met Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara. Reports now suggest that Bafel Talabani could even meet President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as the peace process advances. These contacts are unlikely to be occurring without the PKK's knowledge. While the PUK and the PKK remain distinct organisations with different priorities, their interests continue to overlap. The recent diplomatic engagement appears more consistent with coordination, or at least mutual understanding, than with any breakdown in relations. An equally important trend concerns Iran. Traditionally, both the PUK and the PKK have been regarded as relatively close to Tehran. Yet both have recently adopted noticeably more confrontational positions. PJAK has resumed violent clashes with the IRGC, while PUK leader Bafel Talabani has issued arguably his strongest criticism of Iran to date, directly accusing Tehran of aggression following recent Iranian strikes inside the Kurdistan Region. Whether this represents a temporary tactical adjustment or the beginning of a broader strategic realignment remains unclear. The PUK and the PKK are, however, likely to remain broadly aligned in their approach to Iran. Although they are separate organisations with distinct interests, they influence one another and have increasingly coordinated their policies over the past decade. Their calculations should therefore be analysed separately from those of the KDP, which operates under a different set of strategic incentives. There is little evidence that either the PUK or the PKK is positioning itself as part of a broader effort to overthrow the Iranian regime. Their posture instead resembles Turkey's: they would likely welcome a weaker Iran, but not one whose weakening comes through becoming an instrument of Israel or a wider externally driven regime-change project. That distinguishes them, at least for now, from the more speculative claims that periodically surround Kurdish actors during periods of regional crisis. Ironically, despite the KDP's historically deeper ties with Israel, it too has been cautious about any direct confrontation with Iran. Rather than openly aligning with Israeli objectives, it has generally sought to avoid being drawn into the conflict. The differences between the Kurdish parties lie less in whether they favour confrontation and more in how they manage their relationships with the competing regional powers. Beyond the implications for Iran, the peace process could fundamentally reshape the PKK's long-term strategic position. Even if the organisation ultimately disarms inside Turkey and transforms into a legal political movement, it would not necessarily cease to be a regional actor. By relocating much of its remaining infrastructure to the Iranian frontier, the PKK would retain strategic depth outside Turkey while simultaneously becoming a legitimate participant in Turkish politics. If the peace process succeeds, the PKK would no longer be simply an insurgent organisation or merely a parliamentary movement. It could evolve into a hybrid actor: a stakeholder in Turkey's emerging political order while preserving extensive regional networks beyond its borders. That would allow the movement to avoid surrendering all of its strategic leverage and becoming entirely dependent on Ankara's goodwill. This could also benefit Turkey. If Ankara integrates the PKK into a stable political framework while tolerating its continued regional presence, it could transform a long-standing security threat into an actor whose interests become tied to regional stability. Rather than eliminating the PKK outright, Turkey would be incorporating it into a new strategic architecture, one in which the organisation gains legitimacy inside Turkey while Ankara gains indirect influence through a network of Kurdish actors whose interests become intertwined with its own. If this interpretation proves correct, the peace process would represent far more than the end of an insurgency. It would mark a strategic reorganisation of Kurdish politics across the region, with the PKK shifting from a border-based guerrilla movement focused on Turkey into a transnational political actor whose centre of gravity lies along Iraq's border with Iran while simultaneously becoming embedded within Turkey's own political system. More:

The National Context

186,308 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce

🚨 'Absolute threat to Europe': Ceuta residents warn migrant crisis threatens continent Rebel News heard from residents in Ceuta, where tens of thousands of migrants illegally stormed the Spanish exclave located on the shores of North Africa, creating a tense situation in the city of 83,000 and highlighting the threat mass migration poses to Europe. Residents of Ceuta are sounding the alarm over security, crime and the future of their city after an invasion of illegal crossings from neighbouring Morocco overwhelmed the small Spanish enclave. Rebel News' Alexandra Lavoie and Efrain Flores Monsanto 🇨🇦🚛 travelled through Ceuta speaking directly with residents and migrants after more than 60,000 people were reported to have entered the Spanish exclave on the North African coast by land and sea. One migrant described just how simple the journey was. “It’s been easy. It’s been easy,” he said when asked how he crossed into Ceuta, before explaining, “just in beach we swim.” Another migrant told Rebel News that he had seen information about the crossing on social media, including Facebook and Instagram. “In my neighbourhood, one of these illegal migrants entered into a house, and then the local owner of the house and went out with a gang with a gun to defend its own home from the illegal migrants,” he said. “The police had to come because the situation was so difficult,” he said, adding, “there was so much insecurity.” The same resident said women in particular were afraid to go outside. “I’m very scared because of the women that can’t go out. They are scary. These people are very scary. The women especially are very scared of this illegal people,” the resident said. The interview also raised broader concerns about Europe’s security. “This is a threat. An absolute threat to European security, to Spanish security,” one interviewee warned, describing the Strait of Gibraltar as “the main door of access to Europe from Africa.” For residents of Ceuta, the debate is no longer simply about immigration. They say it is about whether authorities can protect their homes, their streets and one of Europe’s most strategically important borders.
24:37

🚨 'Absolute threat to Europe': Ceuta residents warn migrant crisis threatens continent Rebel News heard from residents in Ceuta, where tens of thousands of migrants illegally stormed the Spanish exclave located on the shores of North Africa, creating a tense situation in the city of 83,000 and highlighting the threat mass migration poses to Europe. Residents of Ceuta are sounding the alarm over security, crime and the future of their city after an invasion of illegal crossings from neighbouring Morocco overwhelmed the small Spanish enclave. Rebel News' Alexandra Lavoie and Efrain Flores Monsanto 🇨🇦🚛 travelled through Ceuta speaking directly with residents and migrants after more than 60,000 people were reported to have entered the Spanish exclave on the North African coast by land and sea. One migrant described just how simple the journey was. “It’s been easy. It’s been easy,” he said when asked how he crossed into Ceuta, before explaining, “just in beach we swim.” Another migrant told Rebel News that he had seen information about the crossing on social media, including Facebook and Instagram. “In my neighbourhood, one of these illegal migrants entered into a house, and then the local owner of the house and went out with a gang with a gun to defend its own home from the illegal migrants,” he said. “The police had to come because the situation was so difficult,” he said, adding, “there was so much insecurity.” The same resident said women in particular were afraid to go outside. “I’m very scared because of the women that can’t go out. They are scary. These people are very scary. The women especially are very scared of this illegal people,” the resident said. The interview also raised broader concerns about Europe’s security. “This is a threat. An absolute threat to European security, to Spanish security,” one interviewee warned, describing the Strait of Gibraltar as “the main door of access to Europe from Africa.” For residents of Ceuta, the debate is no longer simply about immigration. They say it is about whether authorities can protect their homes, their streets and one of Europe’s most strategically important borders.

Rebel News

17,745 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce

🚨SHOCKING: Jack Posobiec Confronted at TPUSA HQ Over the ILLEGAL Iran War—Watch Poseobic Try To GASLIGHT Patriots To Support Trump.😬 The "Unfuck America Tour" crew just marched into TPUSA Headquarters and confronted Jack Posobiec to his face about the disastrous, illegal war in Iran. His response is a masterclass in establishment gaslighting, and it is a massive betrayal of EVERYTHING Charlie Kirk actually stood for. Let’s get one thing straight: Charlie Kirk was vehemently anti-war. He was the loudest voice in the room actively trying to talk Donald Trump out of getting involved in Iran before he was assassinated. Now, look at what the TPUSA syndicate has become. The Unfuck America crew absolutely nailed them on the shifting narrative. First, the establishment told us the Iranian civilians needed to rise up. Then it was about regime change. Then it was about "weapons of mass destruction." Now, they claim we "obliterated their capabilities," yet we are still bombing them. Trump campaigned as the "No War" president, and Posobiec is forced to admit on camera that they completely flipped the script. When confronted with the horrific reality that 175 school children were murdered in these strikes, Posobiec’s defense is pathetic. He tries to downplay it by saying, "Well, it's not an Iraq-style war with boots on the ground." Dropping cruise missiles next to a school is a war. And when called out on Trump's embarrassing gaffe—claiming Iran was firing "Tomahawk" missiles (which they don't even have)—Posobiec just shrugs it off as an intelligence cycle mix-up. They literally put up a map in a press conference showing a school right next to the target, and these guys are still trying to run cover for the military-industrial complex. The most infuriating part of this entire clip is Posobiec’s pathetic conclusion. He admits he was publicly against the war at first, but then shrugs and says, "Now we are in it." That is the exact defeatist, establishment mentality Charlie Kirk warned us about. You don't just roll over and accept an endless, unconstitutional war just because "we are in it." You fight to end it. TPUSA does not represent America First anymore. They represent the War Machine. 😭🇺🇸 FOLLOW: Zee Cohen-Sanchez and the Unfuck America Tour
1:31

🚨SHOCKING: Jack Posobiec Confronted at TPUSA HQ Over the ILLEGAL Iran War—Watch Poseobic Try To GASLIGHT Patriots To Support Trump.😬 The "Unfuck America Tour" crew just marched into TPUSA Headquarters and confronted Jack Posobiec to his face about the disastrous, illegal war in Iran. His response is a masterclass in establishment gaslighting, and it is a massive betrayal of EVERYTHING Charlie Kirk actually stood for. Let’s get one thing straight: Charlie Kirk was vehemently anti-war. He was the loudest voice in the room actively trying to talk Donald Trump out of getting involved in Iran before he was assassinated. Now, look at what the TPUSA syndicate has become. The Unfuck America crew absolutely nailed them on the shifting narrative. First, the establishment told us the Iranian civilians needed to rise up. Then it was about regime change. Then it was about "weapons of mass destruction." Now, they claim we "obliterated their capabilities," yet we are still bombing them. Trump campaigned as the "No War" president, and Posobiec is forced to admit on camera that they completely flipped the script. When confronted with the horrific reality that 175 school children were murdered in these strikes, Posobiec’s defense is pathetic. He tries to downplay it by saying, "Well, it's not an Iraq-style war with boots on the ground." Dropping cruise missiles next to a school is a war. And when called out on Trump's embarrassing gaffe—claiming Iran was firing "Tomahawk" missiles (which they don't even have)—Posobiec just shrugs it off as an intelligence cycle mix-up. They literally put up a map in a press conference showing a school right next to the target, and these guys are still trying to run cover for the military-industrial complex. The most infuriating part of this entire clip is Posobiec’s pathetic conclusion. He admits he was publicly against the war at first, but then shrugs and says, "Now we are in it." That is the exact defeatist, establishment mentality Charlie Kirk warned us about. You don't just roll over and accept an endless, unconstitutional war just because "we are in it." You fight to end it. TPUSA does not represent America First anymore. They represent the War Machine. 😭🇺🇸 FOLLOW: Zee Cohen-Sanchez and the Unfuck America Tour

Project Constitution

43,247 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce