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🚨 Last call for 110+ lb gentle giant amazing Kong, now under kill command. Surrendered b/c owner having housing issues. Wiggly, young, beautiful, calm, quiet, playful. Loves tug, fetch & walks.

11,040 views • 7 months ago •via X (Twitter)

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Leaks, Lies, and Lessons: Taliban, This One’s for You Over the last week, the Taliban decided to run a ridiculous social media campaign accusing me of being a Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) spy and by supporting other misinformation campaigns—a feeble attempt to distract from the fact that they still can’t figure out how I compromised their General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) and their Ministries of Interior and Defense. As most people know, I’m not one to get mad. I’m one to get even. So, if the Taliban are begging me to help Pakistan, for example, why not give them exactly what they’re asking for? Let’s do this, shall we? Honestly, I just do not want to see a military wasting perfectly good munitions made by great American companies on the wrong locations. That seems utterly foolish. What We Observed On November 27, 2025, we monitored the movements of American-made Navistar 7000 military trucks loaded with light and heavy weapons and ammunition departing the central depots of the Taliban’s three principal military and intelligence institutions: the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and the GDI. Attached are videos so the Taliban understands that I am serious here. These trucks were ferrying weapons left behind by the United States, along with ammunition from Taliban-controlled depots in the Central and Eastern Zones, to newly constructed “classified” (oops, classified no longer) storage sites in Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Helmand provinces. These locations were chosen due to the Taliban’s historic strongholds during their twenty-year insurgency, but they forget that some of us made friends there, too. Why They Moved the Arsenal The relocation plan began immediately after recent Pakistani Air Force strikes on terrorist camps belonging to designated foreign terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), as well as on Taliban weapons stockpiles across Kabul, Nangarhar, Khost, Paktia, Paktika, Kunar, and Kandahar. The strikes rattled the Taliban’s leadership, and I enjoyed every second of the internal implosions, as they couldn’t find the source of the leak(s) that compromised their weapons depots. It finally hit them that their entire storage network had a massive vulnerability and was no longer safe or secure. The Order From Haibatullah The Taliban’s Supreme Leader Mullah Haibatullah personally ordered the redistribution of these weapons on Wednesday, October 15, 2025, during a meeting of the Taliban Cabinet’s Leadership Council at Mandigak Palace in Kandahar’s 2nd security district. While the meeting addressed other issues, including appointing a delegation led by Mullah Yaqoob for “peace” talks with Pakistan in Doha, Qatar, the core agenda was simple: secure the arsenal, move it far from Pakistan’s targeting reach, and hide it where outsiders (a reference to people like me) cannot locate it. They were so close to meeting all these objectives. The Transfer Plan Again, fearing that Pakistan had acquired precise coordinates for their long-standing depots, they devised a multi-layered, compartmented transfer system designed to eliminate tracking and shield the operation from internal leaks. Well, I guess there is no better time than now to leak it. The plan relied on three groups of drivers: let’s call them what the Taliban did—Group A, Group B, and Group C. Group A: These drivers transported the weapon-loaded trucks from Kabul’s central depots to the Salar area of Maidan Wardak, where the trucks were handed off to Group B. The drivers were not given each other’s identities and were barred from seeing each other’s physical features. The handover occurred only after Group B confirmed a rotating codeword issued directly by the Ministry of Defense and Haibatullah’s Leadership Council. You don’t really need to know this part, but it’s very important for the Taliban to understand that I know it. Group B: These drivers then moved the cargo to the end of Shah Joy also known as Shahr-e-Safa between Zabul and Kandahar, and onward to the entrance of Daman district. The first two videos are evidence from the Group B movement. There, another codeword-verified the handover and transfer of the weapons to Group C. It's just like the movies, isn't it?! Group C: These drivers were no ordinary unit. How could they be? They were supposed to be the only individuals who knew the final weapons storage locations. Video evidence from the Group C transport is the third attachment. This segment of the movement was carried out by Omari Lashkar, a special forces unit tasked with protecting Haibatullah. The unit also received transport support from the Al-Badr Force, a special forces unit under the command of Mullah Yaqoob. These fighters-turned-drivers were originally trained as suicide operatives who were never selected for missions (not the best look boys, you couldn’t even hack it as a suicide bomber) and have now been reorganized into parts of the Taliban’s special operations units. For this move, both units fell under the direct command of Mawlawi Abdul Ahad Talib, the current Taliban Police Chief in Kandahar. Group C’s overall mission was to deliver the U.S. weapons and ammunition into newly carved tunnel complexes in the remote, mountainous regions of Kandahar, Uruzgan, and Helmand. These tunnels were dug out after 2022 on Haibatullah’s verbal order and built by the Taliban’s Ministry of Defense as hardened, covert weapons depots. Their locations were meant to be isolated, inaccessible, and fortified—a model of next-generation strategic storage by terrorists. The Monitoring System Along the route, observation posts were established about every 60 miles on mountain tops and high ridges to monitor the entire process (see the last attached video showcasing one of these posts). Each post had three purposes: (1) To monitor the weapon-transporting trucks in real time and ensure they did not deviate from their assigned route; (2) To host liaison officers from the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior, and GDI who monitored the trucks' movements when they entered their zone; and (3) To communicate and maintain constant contact with the truck drivers to solve any issues immediately. And here is the part the Taliban will really hate: every one of these movements was tracked. Every handoff. Every convoy. Every tunnel entrance. If you think you buried those locations so deep that no one knows where you’re hiding your arsenal now, you are sorely mistaken. A Final Message for the Taliban For My Dear Friends in the Taliban: You wanted a reaction. What you got was a lesson. I really hate having to make you move your weapons again, just kidding, I don't give a damn!

Sarah Adams

126,589 views • 9 months ago