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Lukashenko just pointed out a pretty obvious problem with the SCO. China, Russia, India, Iran and much of Central Asia are all sitting at the same table. Together they have a huge population, enormous resources and serious economic power. But when one of them gets hit with sanctions, what...

29,353 views • 1 day ago •via X (Twitter)

16 Comments

Matthew McCracken 🇨🇮🇮🇪🇺🇸🇱🇷🇷🇺🇳🇱🇷🇴🇹🇩's profile picture
Matthew McCracken 🇨🇮🇮🇪🇺🇸🇱🇷🇷🇺🇳🇱🇷🇴🇹🇩1 day ago

He raises some very good points but how do you find the perfect equilibrium where the SCO does not become a mirror image of the EU and the members lose their sovereignty to the monster they created?

Ridiculousness Inspector's profile picture
Ridiculousness Inspector1 day ago

Future Eurasian power? It would be a nice contest to EU. SCO that is. It will be interesting to see how this develops in time.

Soran Ibrahim's profile picture
Soran Ibrahim1 day ago

@araghchi yep…starting with a nuclear umbrella for non-nuclear powers…

Join Bri , Brics & the Multipolar World .'s profile picture
Join Bri , Brics & the Multipolar World .1 day ago

whats he want ? war? the countries listed continue to trade

Merce Hanson's profile picture
Merce Hanson1 day ago

#Lukashenko is right: #SCO has potential but no teeth. Condemning #Iran is weak. Time for real defense mechanisms. #Russia and #Belarus lead. #Moscow and #Minsk will take #SCO from words to action. The West trembles.

Left Out🐀 老大's profile picture
Left Out🐀 老大1 day ago

It is a financial instrument, not a military alliance.

My Name's profile picture
My Name1 day ago

He is right. The fence-sitting has to end. Otherwise the small ones will be targeted one by one, and the big ones have a never ending stream of problems and provocations on their borders. That's why the Caucasus, the Stans, and Mongolia - and Belorus - need to be reintegrated.

leokhan313's profile picture
leokhan3131 day ago

100% Agreed, Brics is useless until it's Members can't defends each other's...

Роман's profile picture
Роман1 day ago

Ну,в общем то он прав!

M's profile picture
M1 day ago

Didnt the SCO respond to the attempted cup in Kazakistan a few years earlier. Stabilised the situation and left, seems what the operating parameters/scenarios to be explicitly expresssed and continously reiterated so usage can be an option.

Raimund O'Brien's profile picture
Raimund O'Brien1 day ago

His own man.

JESÚS's profile picture
JESÚS1 day ago

Pepe Escobar se da cuenta o es demasiado optimista...

Antonio forestal's profile picture
Antonio forestal1 day ago

Por ese motivo arabia saudi, se salio del mecanismo de pago chino, porque no ofrecen protección a sus socios, los que tienen imposición imperial mandan sobre el resto

Average Socialism enjoyer 🇰🇵🇨🇳's profile picture
Average Socialism enjoyer 🇰🇵🇨🇳1 day ago

Lukashenko is good but he l!cks b00ts of w0men too much. He is just another anti-male politician

SilverSpiritJack's profile picture
SilverSpiritJack1 day ago

Statements to mechanisms is the whole story. But mechanisms mean binding obligations, and India and China would block anything with teeth. Lukashenko knows this, which is why he's complaining from the cheap seats.

Wilemo's profile picture
Wilemo1 day ago

You seem to view the SCO as a sort of NATO (or a Warsaw Pact 2.0), but I believe it is more significant—and more complicated—to view it as the BRICS' version of UN peacekeepers.

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🇷🇺🇨🇳🇮🇳 India and Pakistan, China and India, all seated at the same table in Kyrgyzstan this week. The SCO is 25: Ten members, roughly half the planet. China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Belarus, and Central Asia are meeting while Ukraine still burns and Iran is at war. Guterres is there, and Erdoğan is around the edges. This is no longer a quiet regional club. The SCO is often described as a counterweight to Washington, but it isn’t a unified anti-U.S. bloc: its members have competing strategic interests, different relationships with the West and, in some cases, longstanding tensions with each other. That makes the summit significant, as China and Russia may want a more multipolar world with less U.S. dominance, while countries like India have strong incentives to preserve strategic independence rather than simply choose one geopolitical camp. On Monday, China and Russia pledged to push the SCO toward a bigger role in “global governance,” where Putin offered to make Russia-China visa-free travel permanent after tourism jumped 43%. Meanwhile, India is playing a different game. Modi hugged Putin, invited him to BRICS in New Delhi, and still told him the world has to leave “endless war” behind. He told Iran’s Pezeshkian India will back efforts at lasting peace. Translation: keep Russia for energy and defense, refuse to join a China-Russia camp, talk to everyone. That is the real summit; India and Pakistan in one room, China and India with an open border dispute, Iran hunting cover, Central Asia wanting Chinese cash without becoming a Chinese province, and Kyrgyzstan trying to turn anniversary talk into funds, corridors, and counterterror machinery. The SCO cannot replace the West, but they can watch three things: whether the Bishkek Declaration names terrorism and the Iran war in language everyone can live with; who actually gets time with whom; and whether any real money moves. Speeches are cheap, but routes, gas, and financing are how an order shifts. These guys ultimately may not trust each other... but they showed up anyway. Source: France 24 YT / Writer: Val

Mario Nawfal

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Alastair Crooke’s (Alastair Crooke) assessment exposes the irreversible breakdown of the petrodollar system that has sustained the Anglo-American financial oligarchy since 1973. Control of Hormuz now rests with a sovereign Iran, forcing the Gulf states to abandon the speculative casino economy and return to real production. The war’s expansion into Iraq signals the final expulsion of imperial power from Southwest Asia and the absorption of the region into the Eurasian development order. “Trump will at some point have to acknowledge that Hormuz is in the power and the possession of Iran and that they will charge fees for passage through what is not international waters but the territorial waters of Iran. The other water corridors will not be allowed. This will be the resolution. Ultimately the Gulf states, who say they won’t accept this at the moment, will not have much alternative and will have to accept it. The prospects facing them are quite dark because this is also going to end the petrodollar economy that has brought us all these gleaming skyscraper buildings in the Gulf states. That whole architecture has to go. It will go. It was based on the petrodollar. It was entirely based on the period after 1973 and the huge increase in the price of oil—something we’re seeing a little bit of now. At that point the United States encouraged the Gulf states to deal in oil providing that they traded in dollars and remitted all of their savings back to the United States. That was the fuel for the financialized economy that then broke out in the United States and became even more implanted after the 2008 great financial crisis. This is a completely different economy from a real economy. This is what I call a casino economy. It’s all about insider trading. It’s all about the margins. It’s arbitrage between the morning and afternoon rates, between what is happening in Japan today and what is happening in Japan tomorrow. It produces nothing except huge wealth for the oligarchy. There is no support for that continuing. Overall, in the non-West they want—and Iran wants—the Gulf to go back to a real economy, something that provides for the people, that provides things and food and whatever their needs, and has to produce that. Eventually Iran will be a prominent, if not a dominant, power in the Middle East, and the Gulf states will either come to terms with this and change or they will disappear. It will be a different Middle East, and that will have wide repercussions across the region. What is missing from this instinctive analysis in the White House is the other point about what he has brought about and what the White House has brought about. It doesn’t really get through in the Western press much, but the war is spreading. It’s widening. It’s not just Yemen. It’s not just Lebanon. It is not just Syria. It is now Iraq.”

🅰pocalypsis 🅰pocalypseos 🇷🇺 🇨🇳 🅉

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Alastair Crooke (Alastair Crooke): What happened in Yemen is a revolution, not a tit-for-tat over a blockade. Ansar Allah spent seven to nine years preparing it. The fight is with the Saudi state the British and Americans built on a narrow Wahhabi pillar. “What happened in Yemen is not just a sort of tit-for-tat against Saudi Arabia or about a certain blockade. It is a revolution. I think it should be understood as a revolution. It has been planned for at least 7 years, more like 9 years. They have been working on this. It is thought through by Ansar Allah, who are always deprecated in the West because they’re barefooted tribesmen and things, but it has been well planned. And so Saudi Arabia, if it goes down the path of conceding to Ansar Allah, it means they’ll have to return the three provinces that they stole in the 1930s. In 1934, they stole three provinces of the Yemenis. And the Houthis have strong tribal connections with those provinces, which are now generally sort of assumed to be within Saudi Arabia, but they will want them back. They will want an end to the blockade, and they will also want payments which were due to them on certain transactions. And they will demand the end of the UAE and the Saudi forces in the south. In fact, they are being destroyed anyway. They’ve been literally driven out because they’re mercenaries. They’re not Saudi forces; they’re mercenary forces. And the mercenary forces have all been fleeing as the Houthis have used ballistic missiles against them. And you can see they’ve just fled from the area. There’s a slight interaction: actually, the UAE mercenaries are not letting the Saudi mercenaries pass at the moment until they pay them. But I mean, they’re both mercenaries, and the Houthis will drop a few ballistic missiles on them just to make up their mind more quickly. So why do I say it’s a revolution? Because really it goes back to: what is Saudi Arabia? Saudi has been imposing on Yemen really for all these years since the founding of Saudi Arabia, trying to change its style of Islam, which is an esoteric either Ismaili or Zaidi type of Islam, but it’s an esoteric type of Islam. I’m not talking sectarianism. I’m just talking about the nature of Islam in Yemen being much more esoteric. It’s much more inwardness rather than the literal extremist Puritan idea of the Wahhabi of the Najd form of Islam that was weaponized by Abdulaziz and by Ibn Saud in the 1930s. They were a Puritan sort of militia that ran amok through the Middle East. They attacked Mecca; they attacked Karbala; they killed thousands—tens of thousands in Karbala. And eventually Abdulaziz was forced to try to contain them and to stop this because, first of all, it was the beginnings of the petrol—the fuel oil bonanza taking place in Saudi Arabia and he wanted to convince the British and the Americans that it could become a state. But that movement was never entirely retired. It was just put on standby. But this was the sort of incompatibility, the contradiction that takes place in Saudi Arabia. It claims to represent all of Sunni Islam. But actually it is based on the very narrow pillar of this very violently Puritan component—desert Islam—that regarded any change from their tradition as bid‘a, as heresy by innovation. And that anyone who did not subscribe to their view of Islam deserved death. This was the progenitor of ISIS, just to make clear. What’s the difference between this Wahhabism from the desert and ISIS? Nothing. They were the same. It was just a different formulation of them. So what happened with this was that eventually he had to take on these people because they were threatening the whole of the project of building a Saudi power that would be acceptable to Britain and to the United States and the outside world. So the British machine-gunned them for him. And they killed most of them. But the point is they never represented the main tribes of Saudi Arabia, who also were attacked and destroyed. And then Ibn Saud then married all their wives—married a wife from each tribe that he had defeated. So he ended up with 22 wives. Because he thought this was a way of preventing them from attacking him further. But they’re still there. And they still remain resentful of the sort of one-family formula which guides Saudi Arabia, because that’s what it is. There were old sort of traditions that riches had to be spread in some sort of way that was fair between the tribes, that their territories and their perquisites were respected. Some of the tribes, like the Shammar, have more than a million members. They’re not just tiny little militias. These are big tribes. They extend beyond the boundaries of Saudi Arabia. All the finance, all the money, all the essence of the Saudis’ kingdom project was all focused in one family. And so the resentment still continues about that. So the idea that Saudi Arabia is a sort of a strong modern political state is, to a certain extent, a myth. Yes, it had money. It doesn’t today. But also, it either makes concessions to the Houthis and risks the revolution gaining more oxygen and becoming bigger and spreading to Iraq and to other parts, which is happening. There is a real sense, a feeling in the air of revolution in the Middle East at the moment. Because a small group of people have just taken over and shown the hollowness of Saudi power, much as Iran has shown the hollowness of US power during this period. And of course this is animating people. And don’t forget Iraq. We’ve had Iran; now the shoe has dropped in Yemen. And remember that when the last supreme leader was assassinated by Israel, the funeral that followed in Iraq, millions turned out there in Karbala, even in Najaf, which is more conservative. Millions turned out. Across Iran, people walked miles to pay their respects to this. So what we’re playing with is revolutionary fire. I’m emphasizing it because it all tends to be viewed from the Western perspective that this is all about Saudi relations and Gulf relations with the United States, and it’s all about oil, and are we going to have to pay so much for diesel. But actually, what is happening is there’s a big reversion taking place. The whole region is sort of on the cusp of reverting to the old power paradigm that used to exist until the fall of the Shah, in which the big civilizational powers historically have always been Mesopotamia and Persia/Iran, whatever you want to call it. But these were real powers in the real sense. I mean, functional, functioning powers with big populations and riches, and were the powers in the region really until, first of all, the Clean Break document, which was written by Richard Perle and David Wurmser in ’96, recommended this inversion. We’re going to change the whole power structure, and the new pillars of American energy dominance and power are going to be Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, and all of the allies of Iran are going to be eliminated, and this new power structure would then also be the basis for normalization with Israel, i.e. the beginnings of the Abraham Accords. And then in 2006, after the war of Israel against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Dick Cheney was complaining bitterly that the war was supposed to weaken Iran and instead it strengthened Iran. And he was talking with Prince Bandar, who was then the intelligence leader, and we have the details of this meeting exactly because John Hannah, who was the aide of Cheney wrote it and even published it. And what Bandar said was, listen, the king believes that the weak point of Iran is Syria. Syria is the pipeline, their emergency routes. We take out Syria, and Iran is weakened, if not lost. And Cheney, at that point, said, well, hold on. Hold on. How are you going to take out Syria? And Bandar replied to him with one word: Islamism, extreme Islamism. And that was the Wahhabis coming back in. And what Cheney was doing was legitimizing the use of this extreme current of Najdi Islam, Wahhabism, which then transformed into the various components of ISIS and Nusra and everything else as a sectarian tool to weaken Iran and to complete the power shift that now the Sunni Gulf states were the pillar of power and the pillar of Israeli substance in the region and Iran was kicked out. And that’s why this thing is so important, because what we’re seeing with Iran and now with the Houthis, and we may see more components to this happening, is a complete turnaround back to the old system. Iran has power and the Houthis have power.” The City and Washington built a garrison on a desert militia and called it a pillar of order. Ansar Allah is treating that construction as what it was: colonial. The exit is development and a settlement the dollar cannot switch off. More garrisons will not restore 1934.

🅰pocalypsis 🅰pocalypseos 🇷🇺 🇨🇳 🅉

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