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Russian BTR-82 gets absolutely deleted at point-blank range in Kursk, October 2024 💥 One second it’s rolling like it owns the place, next second it’s a burning coffin. Ukrainian defenders cooking invaders in their own backyard. Even your armored vehicles don’t last 5 seconds when they actually meet resistance...

126,499 次观看 • 1 个月前 •via X (Twitter)

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Roger Federer broke the internet with one statistic that will change how you see every setback in your life. 1,526 singles matches. Won almost 80% of them. 20 Grand Slams. 103 titles. Now answer honestly: What percentage of total points do you think he won across his entire career? 70%? 65%? 60%? Try … 54%. He lost literally almost EVERY SECOND POINT he ever played for 24 years. And still became one of the greatest of all time. Watch him explain it himself (2:07 of pure life-changing wisdom): “In tennis, perfection is impossible… When you lose every second point on average, you teach yourself to say: ‘Okay, I double-faulted — it’s only one point.’ ‘Okay I got passed at the net — it’s only one point.’ Even a screaming overhead smash that ends up on SportsCenter Top 10… still just one point. So when you’re playing your point, it has to be the most important thing in the world. The moment it’s over — it’s behind you. That mindset frees you to attack the next point, and the next, and the next with absolute intensity and clarity.” Then he looked at the crowd and said the line that hit a billion people in the soul: “The real sign of a champion is not that they win every point. It’s that they lose again and again and again… and have learned how to deal with it. Negative energy is wasted energy. Cry it out if you have to. Then force a smile. Move on. Be relentless. Adapt. Grow. Work harder — and work smarter.” Save this post. The next time you lose a deal, bomb a presentation, get ghosted, miss a deadline, or just have “one of those days” — come back here and read it again. You’re not falling behind. You’re just in the 46%. And the 46% is exactly where every single legend has spent most of their career. Keep playing the next point. (full 2:07 clip — sound on)

Camus

4,900,889 次观看 • 7 个月前

🇺🇦⚔️🇷🇺 Ukrainian Defense Minister Fedorov announced that the Defense Forces carried out a unique operation dubbed "Auchan," in which around 1,000 UAVs destroyed nearly 800 units of Russian armored vehicles in just three days. As if that weren't enough, he decided to double down immediately. A second phase of this operation reportedly took place recently: a special munition was developed to blow up artillery barrels, and in just two nights, around 250 Russian artillery systems were destroyed. In other words, a government minister is claiming - with a straight face - that there is some sort of "miracle drone" that must hit the barrel precisely to destroy it, and that this "barrel-buster" was successfully used a staggering 250 times in a single night. And prior to that - using unknown means and at an unspecified time - the Ukrainians supposedly destroyed nearly a thousand vehicles in three days. Words fail me; how is one even supposed to comment on this? To put it in perspective: according to Western OSINT analysts - who are hardly shy about playing along with the AFU - the Russian Armed Forces lost 2,500 armored vehicles over the entire year of 2025. That means the genius Fedorov accomplished 30% of the previous year's combat tally in just three days. It is particularly amusing that this clown claims there is video evidence for every single instance, yet for some reason, none of it exists online; all we see in the videos is his highly "intellectual" mug. Let us recall that Ukraine shared updates on Operation "Spiderweb" almost in real-time, yet for some reason, they were too shy to show the 800 destroyed vehicles. In short, we are crossing Fedorov off the list of officials whose statements are worth taking seriously. russian airborne

dana

14,968 次观看 • 1 个月前

Ukraine’s First All-Robot Assault Force Just Won Its First Battle | David Axe, Forbes That Ukraine even needs so many unmanned weapons points to a deep manpower shortage. A Ukrainian national guard brigade just orchestrated an all-robot combined-arms operation, mixing crawling and flying drones for an assault on Russian positions in Kharkiv Oblast in northern Russia. “We are talking about dozens of units of robotic and unmanned equipment simultaneously on a small section of the front,” a spokesperson for the 13th National Guard Brigade explained. It was an impressive technological feat—and a worrying sign of weakness on the part of overstretched Ukrainian forces. Unmanned ground vehicles in particular suffer profound limitations, and still can’t fully replace human infantry. That the 13th National Guard Brigade even needed to replace all of the human beings in a ground assault speaks to how few people the brigade has compared to the Russian units it’s fighting. The 13th National Guard Brigade defends a five-mile stretch of the front line around the town of Hlyboke, just south of the Ukraine-Russia border. It’s holding back a force of no fewer than four Russian regiments. That’s no more than 2,000 Ukrainians versus 6,000 or so Russians. The manpower ratio is roughly the same all along the 800-mile front line of Russia’s 34-month wider war on Ukraine. Russian troops still greatly outnumber Ukrainian troops, despite the Russians suffering around twice as many casualties as the Ukrainians since February 2022. The Ukrainian operation involved remote-controlled flying surveillance and minelaying drones, one-way explosive robots on the ground and in the air as well as gun-armed ground ’bots. In what amounted to a smaller-scale proof of concept for the recent combined-arms robot assault, a Ukrainian ground robot cleared a Russian trench in Kursk Oblast in western Russian back in September. Russia has attempted small-scale ground ’bot assaults of its own, but less successfully. The problem, of course, is that while robots are adept at surveilling and attacking, they’re terrible at holding. To hold ground, armies put infantry in trenches. They sit, watch, wait and call for reinforcements when the enemy attacks. It’s tedious, taxing duty that requires constant vigilance. Constant vigilance is difficult when a human operator is remotely observing the battlefield through the sensors of a maintenance-hungry ground robot. Machines break down. And their radio datalinks are highly susceptible to enemy jamming, as the California think-tank RAND discovered when it gamed out a clash between hypothetical U.S. (“Blue”) and Russian (“Red”) army battalions partially equipped with armed ground drones. “Blue’s ability to operate was degraded significantly by Red’s jammers,” RAND concluded. It’s not clear the 13th National Guard Brigade even tried to hold the Russian positions it cleared in the all-robot attack. Read more:

Owen Gregorian

116,018 次观看 • 1 年前

🚨 The Second Amendment isn't about duck hunting. It's about keeping a tyrannical government in CHECK. Let me break it down for the people in the back 👇 "A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed." 🔹 That’s not a suggestion. 🔹 That’s not a loophole. 🔹 That’s a WARNING. Our Founders just finished fighting a government that taxed them, censored them, and sent soldiers into their homes. So they wrote THIS — as a BACKUP PLAN. The Second Amendment isn’t for sport. It’s not for "gun culture." It’s for when all peaceful options have failed. They gave us speech to speak. They gave us the vote to be heard. And they gave us the right to bear arms for when the voice is crushed and the vote is ignored. 🧵 Remember: “Militia” meant us, not them. “Regulated” meant trained, not controlled. “Shall not be infringed” meant exactly that. Fast forward: They federalized the militias in 1903. They started turning the people’s defense into the state’s tool. And yet the 2A still stands — like a fire alarm in a locked building. And don’t let anyone tell you this is outdated. In 2008, the Supreme Court had to remind D.C. that your right to own a firearm doesn’t disappear just because you don’t wear a uniform. They want you disarmed. They want you dependent. They want you silent. But power unchecked becomes tyranny. And tyranny doesn’t knock — it kicks down the door at 3AM. 📢 The Second Amendment isn’t a partisan issue. It’s not a talking point. It’s the final firewall between freedom and force. It’s not for chaos. It’s not for glory. It’s for when nothing else works. Never forget: The Constitution doesn’t ask permission. It commands limits. And the 2A is a reminder — they work for us.

Project Constitution

37,060 次观看 • 11 个月前

🔥 If Russia’s demands were explained to Americans in their own terms… Finnish President Alexander Stubb put it bluntly: imagine if the U.S. were told to give up Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas, Virginia — and then, for good measure, Maryland. That’s how absurd Russia’s claims on Ukraine sound. But there’s something even more crucial to understand: Russia has zero legal or historical rights to Ukrainian land. These territories are not “ethnically Russian,” as Kremlin propaganda insists. Look at pre-Soviet photos of Donetsk or Luhansk — you’ll see embroidered Ukrainian shirts, Ukrainian language, Ukrainian life. No trace of Russia until its occupation. If we talk about ethnic lands, it is Russia that holds Ukrainian ones. Kursk, Belgorod, Kuban, and even Rostov were historically Ukrainian, seized by Moscow after the 1921 Russian-Ukrainian war when Ukraine was forcibly swallowed by the USSR. When independence returned in 1991, those lands were never restored. So what “rights” does Russia claim, being already the largest country on earth — with abandoned cities, ruined infrastructure, and no capacity to govern what it has? This isn’t about culture or justice. It’s about greed. The imperial mindset that believes taking developed Ukrainian lands will magically enrich Russia. History shows otherwise: they plunder, destroy, and move on like a nomadic horde. A real state builds; Russia only consumes. And let’s be clear: under international law, territory seized by aggression cannot ever be legally transferred to the aggressor. Any attempt would not just break Ukraine’s Constitution, but shatter the global legal order. We’ve seen this before with Hitler’s “claims” — and we know where it led: World War II. The most shocking part? The blindness of some Western leaders. How can supposed strategists fail to grasp what is obvious to anyone who studies history? Trump’s ignorance is one thing, but his advisers? Jake Sullivan and others who should know better? Their failure to understand Russia, Ukraine, and the stakes of this war is more than incompetence — it’s a danger to the entire world.

Devana 🇺🇦

14,479 次观看 • 11 个月前

[STRATEGIC ANALYSIS] Part I – POKROVSK, The Fall of the Corridor Russian forces have now been geolocated controlling Rodynske, with confirmation of their presence in Krasnyi Lyman. This narrows the Ukrainian exit corridor to roughly 5 km, leaving a single road through Rivne under sustained Russian fire control. (Maps from Julian Röpcke🇺🇦 et Poulet volant ) Losses during this retreat are expected to be significant, likely resulting in a casualty ratio below two to one, unfavorable to Ukraine. This reflects a recurrent pattern of the war: Ukrainian forces end up in semi encircled positions with limited supply routes, facing an adversary with overwhelming firepower. The result is predictable: heavy attrition and diminished operational capacity. This is not deliberate strategy by Ukraine. Having lost the initiative, the Ukrainian command is fighting without a coherent grand strategy, compelled to defend the Donbas fortress belt to delay northern Donetsk’s fall. The “meatgrinder” is a Russian concept, not a Ukrainian one. Remaining in besieged pockets to “bleed” Russian troops has never been Ukraine’s objective, as these battles consistently yield unfavorable loss ratios. Historical Context of Similar Battles 2022 1. Mariupol Roughly 3.5k POWs were captured after the final surrender. Once encircled, Ukrainian losses were catastrophic with over 1.6k KIA proven and the near total loss of defending units. 2. Sieverodonetsk Marked the first battle where Ukrainian KIA exceeded Russian, reaching up to 300 KIA per day. It introduced the pattern of partial encirclement and destruction through Russian artillery dominance. 2023 1. Bakhmut UA Losses identified 12k KIA and over 10k MIA, while Russian casualties (mostly Wagner) were estimated at 20–30k KIA. Even under the most optimistic view, that is a two to one ratio at best, achieved at the cost of elite Ukrainian formations such as the 93rd Mechanized Brigade. Between Dec 2022 and Apr 2023, losses totaled 9.6k Ukrainian vs 18.8k Russian theater wide, confirming the ratio. Yet Russian losses consisted mainly of expendable conscripts, leaving Ukraine strategically weakened. Further losses followed during the May–Sept 2023 counteroffensive, especially near Klishiivka, worsening the overall balance. 2. Avdiivka The October 2023 offensive caused high casualties on both sides, continuing until the collapse in Feb 2024. Mediazona recorded 20.1k Russian KIA front wide, while UA Losses listed 9k KIA, mostly in Avdiivka.The 110th Mechanized Brigade was virtually destroyed. Even at best, the 2 to 1 ratio ended with the fall of Ukraine’s most fortified Donbas city. 2024–2025 1. Kursk (Defensive Posture) During Ukraine’s incursion and Russia’s counterattack, Ukrainian forces were trapped around Sudja, repeating the attritional pattern. Losses reached 3k KIA and 11k MIA, with 30% higher armored losses than Russia’s. Russian logistics and command ensured a tighter, lower cost victory. 2. Pokrovsk, Kupyansk, Kostyantynivka, and Others By mid 2025, siege battles across Pokrovsk, Kupyansk, and Kostyantynivka followed identical dynamics: local encirclements, exhausted defenders, restricted supply.Russian forces shifted to small assault groups and infiltration tactics, reducing casualties while sustaining pressure. Ukrainian armor losses rose sharply during the 2025 summer, reflecting logistical strain. Operationally, attrition became increasingly one sided, as Russia paired methodical advances with resource discipline and fire control. Clausewitz warned of late withdrawals: “Reason counsels not to risk the last upon the game, but to retain as much as is necessary for an orderly retreat.” #UkraineRussiaWar️ #Pokrovsk #Warfare

Delwin | Military Theorist

18,489 次观看 • 8 个月前

Finally video emerges of an actual Ukrainian attack in Toretsk, two weeks after their supposed ninja counteroffensive kicked off... or is it?⬇️ I'm referring to this video, which was published Wednesday, showing the destruction of two AFU M113s withdrawing troops from a southern suburb of Toretsk (Zabalka) that basically all mappers had placed well inside Russian lines (video 1, see figure 3 for the map). Video emerged later that day of Russian infantry destroying an apparently Ukrainian-held house in the same area with a satchel charge after suppressing the defenders with an RPG and small arms (the first segment of video 2). Interesting, I thought. So I looked at the map again, harder. And then I looked at the geolocated positions of Russian units, which the TG channel Creamy Caprice keeps a map of (figure 3, showing the location of the first video - the red and blue dots mark Russian and Ukrainian positions logged over the entire course of the battle). And that's when it struck me - Russian troops have never been spotted in the northwestern corner of the Zabalka district. They've been seen in the central part and they've been seen around the slag heaps, but not the northwest corner. And there's a relatively short route into it through the Ukrainian-held forest to the northwest, although the last mile is through an open field around the base of (and dominated by) the nearby slag heap. It would be an extremely dangerous journey. Now we come to what the video actually depicts - the withdrawal of troops. The first APC is hit while withdrawing and the escaping dismounts are effectively engaged after going to ground in the forest. The second APC then arrives in Zabalka, loads up, and is heavily hit and knocked out as it withdraws. A couple soldiers are seen heading deeper into the city on foot as it departs, but not a full squad - there may not have been room for them on the transport, or they may have (correctly) thought their chances were better on foot. Then the subsequent video emerged of Russian infantry clearing holdouts in the area, which could have very well been those men. So what happened here? Well, I pointed out earlier that it's standard practice to back-clear an urban area after taking it, to clear bypassed enemy strongholds and booby-traps and render the area safe to support further operations. I suspect there was actually a pocket of bypassed Ukrainian troops holed up in the western Zabalka District, a couple kilometers behind Russian lines, whom the AFU command tried to evacuate via APC earlier this week while they still had the chance to do so. And the Russians may very well have allowed those APCs to pull in and load up so they could - as they did - very coldly kill them while they were packed with infantry to withdraw. Why did the Ukrainian command undertake such a high-risk operation instead of simply writing these men off and telling them that it was every man for himself? Probably because these were Azov fighters and thus entitled to special treatment and consideration - one of their brigades operates in the area. In any event, far from suggesting a Ukrainian counterattack into south Toretsk, this turn of events suggests to me that the Russians are instead mopping up remaining resistance in the city. (As an addendum, the people behind Creamy Caprice think that the third segment of video 2 shows Ukrainian activity somewhat farther into the northwest corner of the Zabalka Dictrict, but that segment also doesn't show live troops - for all we know they were bombing an AFU comms repeater or something on the roof of that building. The second segment of that video is old judging by the snow on the ground.)

Armchair Warlord

15,294 次观看 • 1 年前

SEN. KELLY: I've spent 15 years working with Russian cosmonauts. Took me 5 years to understand what motivated them. Number one, appearance that they were in charge of something. Two, who to blame when something goes wrong. Three, what to steal today. Only four, mission success. I think as Ukrainians, as Americans, as Brits, we're often motivated by mission success. You want organization you work for to be successful, you want your country to be successful, you want British Army to be successful, I want US Navy to be successful, I want NASA to be successful. That wasn't my experience with Russian cosmonauts I worked with. I'm talking about dozens of people that I knew well, what motivated them when they went to work every day. At the top of the list was that they really cared about the appearance that they were in charge of something, not mission success. Now, whether they were really actually in charge of it or not didn't matter so much. Mission success wasn't even number two. Number two on the list, I would say, was whether they knew who to blame when something went wrong, like placing the blame. Russians have a position in their Mission Control Center which is called "mistakes officer." When a Russian cosmonaut makes a mistake, they keep track of it and they take money out of their pay. I would say the third thing, even before mission success, was what am I going to steal from my employer today. And we would talk about that. They were very open about this. And apparently there's a saying in Russian that if you didn't steal something at work that day, you did not have a good day. For us, and I think everybody in this room here, mission success is the thing that matters more than anything else. And for the Russians I worked with, it might have been number four on the list. So I actually was not that surprised about their incompetence.

Kate from Kharkiv

288,390 次观看 • 1 个月前

🇺🇦🇷🇺 HOW UKRAINE IS LOSING THE WAR: Russia achieved a high attrition of the Ukranian army. So that the Ukranian army has a critical shortage of manpower and can’t hold all lines. In simple words, Russia killed and injured so many soldiers, they don’t have enough people to hold the lines anymore, like they did in 2023 for example. How does the Russian advance strategy works now? 1) It’s pretty simple, Russia creates pressure across the whole front. Since it has the manpower. 2) The Ukranian lines break at some point and Russia takes advantage of this specific breakthrough. 3) Then Ukraine reshuffles the available manpower and sends troops to the breakthrough location, to prevent a catastrophe. 4) Russia, when encountering big pushback does not force it, they keep the pressure up but don’t just push forward through high resistance. This reduces casualties. 5) Because Ukraine moved troops to the breakpoint, another area of the front is now lightly manned and easy to break through. The constant troop movement exposes them to Russian drone, artillery and glide bomb fire. 6) Russia having enough manpower now, breaks that new lightly manned area. This all happens with no big offensives, but with the slight but constant pressure among the whole front. 7) Now this new point breaks, since it’s was lightly manned and Russia takes advantage of the breakthrough, but without rushing too far. -> The cycle repeats itself and restart from 3). Ukraine essentially has not enough people to prevent that and is helpless militarily. For example Russia opened two new fronts, one is Sumy and one in Dnepropetrovsk regions, previously quiet areas. First they rushed into Sumy and captured territory, then Ukraine send troops there and stopped that advance. While Ukrainian draft dodgers celebrated on X, Russian pressure pushed through into the Dnepropetrovsk region (video) 1/

Lord Bebo

71,516 次观看 • 1 年前

Russian telegram channels posted videos of fiber optic cable FPV strikes on a Ukrainian Abrams tank in Kursk oblast last week. Aside from a concussion, the crew survived without injury and made it back to friendly lines. Michael Kofman and I spoke to the commander of the tank from Ukraine's 47th Mechanized Brigade about what happened, and here is what he told us: (tweeted with his permission) "That's our tank. But they only posted two of the strikes. Yesterday [from last week] was the first time that the crew survived multiple hits while inside a disabled Abrams. Actually, there were 4-6 direct hits. The crew survived, and even without injuries. God bless America. Fiber-optic FPVs. Between four and six hits within like 2 minutes. I believe that at least one more got stuck in the net. Two more missed several minutes before. They apparently hit the engine. They were unable to penetrate either the turret or the hull elsewhere while we were inside. Although they tried and had a lot of time. As I said, this tank had a unique 'cope cage' (actually, 'cope netting') and a lot more ERA than an average Abrams. We – the crew – designed the arrangement of the ERA completely on our own based on an analysis of the previous hits on all the other Abrams tanks and our own knowledge of the weak spots, and that's why we still live after so many simultaneous strikes. And that's why the Abrams rocks. Would be impossible on a [Russian/Soviet] T series tank." Russian FPV crews hit the tank with several more FPVs after it was abandoned, but the tank was not destroyed and might still be salvageable. Because of recent advances, Russian forces may capture it. When I asked how they made it back to friendly lines, "On foot. It was close to the Russian positions. We finished the combat mission and drove back just 1 km from the Russians or even less. We could not evacuate because the FPVs were coming one after another. When I finally could hear no sound, we just jumped out of the tank and ran to a treeline. They were tracking us, so a mortar started working with some more drones, but we crawled away through the treeline. In the end, in a spot still under FPV control, our company commander rushed in and took us away."

Rob Lee

1,357,535 次观看 • 1 年前

I've seen some people express incredulity over claims I've made recently that Ukrainian forces are suffering casualties an order of magnitude or more higher than the Russians in Ukraine. This is what inevitably happens when an artillery army faces a human wave army.⬇️ Contrary to the endless, unsupported claims of Ukrainian propagandists - a big lie repeated endlessly - the Russians are not constantly making mass attacks across the front and being repelled by "heroic Ukrainian defenders." The usual tactical cycle in Ukraine looks something along the lines of: 1. The Russians constantly shell, bomb, and drone all identified Ukrainian positions and forces, down to individual soldiers moving in the open, causing mass casualties. The Ukrainians have no substantial surface or aerial fires left and respond only with sporadic drone attacks, causing minor casualties. 2. The AFU continually throws press-ganged conscripts into the line to prevent outright collapse. Due to Russian fire superiority, these conscripts have to move up to front line positions on foot, over considerable distances, while under surveillance and constant attack by fire as they move from rear positions to intermediate positions to front line strongpoints. This process takes time and many don't make it. Russian forces making similar journeys to their own front line generally do so in safety. 3. Eventually some Ukrainian front line position becomes isolated in this hurricane of fire, and surveillance indicates that there are only a handful of effective combatants left in it - slated reinforcements were killed or haven't made it that far forward. 4. Russian command sends an assault platoon or even a squad forward to seize the weakened position. Generally these assaults are successful with few Russian casualties, and we only learn that the Russians have advanced because the Ukrainians publish video of drone harassment raids on the seized position. 5. Russian forces dig in on the captured position and continue bombarding the Ukrainians while monitoring for weak nodes in the front line. Damaged or disabled vehicles (if any) from the latest assault are recovered, repaired, and returned to service in days to weeks. Generally within a day or two another strongpoint or fortified zone fades and can be seized. You can immediately see how this tactical model produces casualties an order of magnitude or higher for the Ukrainian side than the Russian, and it is borne out by careful and skeptical observation of the character of fighting in Ukraine. The Russians advance a step at a time with utmost deliberation while the Ukrainians and their NATO advisors drive themselves insane trying and failing to stop them with decisive maneuver tactics in a war that the Russians have coldly shaped into a struggle of merciless, positional, lopsided attrition. The Russians have implemented and continually refined this tactical model since April 2022, seeking to maximize enemy casualties while minimizing their own. This really represents the pinnacle of data-driven Soviet fire doctrine - the application of "x" rounds into "y" specified enemy positions for "z" time can be resulted to expect in an advance of "K" kilometers and "D" enemy casualties. They've probably refined the old Soviet fire models (largely based off WWII data) to an absolutely Ptolemaic degree in this war. Eventually the Russians may change tack and resume a war of high-speed maneuver - presumably when they can do so in a relatively secure manner with minimal losses to their own forces. What is certain, however, is that they will only take this action at a time and place of their own choosing.

Armchair Warlord

65,688 次观看 • 10 个月前