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Russian disinformation isn’t random. It’s organised, persistent, and run through networks that manipulate trust, opinions, and elections. Why is it so hard to counter? Because fragmented terminology and reporting blur who does what — and how. 📘 Building a Common Operational Picture of FIMI (EU DisinfoLab + EEAS, Viginum,...

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EUvsDisinfo

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16,914 просмотров • 6 месяцев назад •via X (Twitter)

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Explore the FIMI Galaxy 🌌 Our new interactive tool helps visualise and expose the networks behind foreign information manipulation and interference operations.
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Explore the FIMI Galaxy 🌌 Our new interactive tool helps visualise and expose the networks behind foreign information manipulation and interference operations.

EUvsDisinfo

12,024 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

The rise of the disinformation-for-hire industry The emergence of a global, large-scale disinformation industry has privatised influence operations, granting states strategic reach with plausible deniability. A quiet revolution has taken place in the world of propaganda. Operations that used to be run by authoritarian governments and intelligence agencies are now outsourced to private firms that sell disinformation and deception as a service. From fake social-media armies to AI-driven smear campaigns, disinformation and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) have become a global business, giving authoritarian regimes new ways to influence others – and to deny everything. From state propaganda to disinformation for hire For decades, information operations were tightly controlled by states. The Soviet Union perfected the craft of dezinformatsiya; later, Russia institutionalised it through modern digital operations such as the Internet Research Agency (IRA)(opens in a new tab). But over the past decade, this model has commercialised. Disinformation and deception have become a for-profit service offered by companies with intelligence, military, or marketing backgrounds. These firms, operating around the world, sell complete FIMI campaign packages that include fake social-media campaigns, hacking, data leaks, and ‘narrative management’ in order to spread false and manipulated content in democratic countries. Outsourcing as a shield This outsourcing provides both efficiency and deniability. Authoritarian states are now actively trying to externalise information operations to private intermediaries, while shielding themselves from diplomatic and legal consequences. Through this model, malign actors can also experiment with risky tactics such as AI-generated content, hacking, or deepfakes – operations that would be politically or diplomatically explosive if carried out directly by state institutions. In doing so, they can target foreign populations through tailored influence campaigns while maintaining plausible deniability by claiming no connection to the private entities running them. Outsourcing also enables information laundering — hiding the true origin of disinformation by passing it through private firms, fake accounts, and proxy media. As these actors repeat and amplify the message, it begins to look organic and locally produced. This lets malign actors spread targeted narratives while denying any involvement. All this is the informational equivalent of using mercenaries: the client enjoys the results without bearing the blame. Team Jorge and the commercialisation of deception The 2023 Forbidden Stories investigation(opens in a new tab) into an entity called ‘Team Jorge’ exposed the inner workings of this new influence-for-hire ecosystem. The firm claimed to have interfered in 33 presidential elections, winning 27 of them. Its clients included political parties, corporations, and, allegedly, state-linked actors. At the heart of Team Jorge’s system was Advanced Impact Media Solutions (AIMS), software capable of creating and coordinating thousands of fake social-media accounts, complete with synthetic photos, biographies, and backstories. These avatars could be mobilised to flood debates, spread narratives, or harass opponents. Russia continues to be a major player in this outsourced ecosystem. Privately owned companies such as the Social Design Agency (SDA)(opens in a new tab) and Structura(opens in a new tab) now run large-scale influence operations that mirror, and in many ways replace, the functions of the old St. Petersburg troll factories. These firms manage covert online assets, push state-aligned narratives, and provide the Kremlin with an additional layer of deniability. Undercover journalists recorded the firm demonstrating hacking techniques, media infiltration, and the planting of fabricated news stories. The scale of these operations and their accessibility to paying clients revealed how disinformation has become a global commodity. Hybrid operations: where online meets offline Modern influence campaigns no longer live solely online but operate in the hybrid space between digital and physical realities. The Internet Research Agency (IRA)(opens in a new tab) demonstrated this during the 2016 US election when Russian operatives posing as American activists organised real-world rallies, paid participants, and coordinated online amplification around them. What began as meme warfare ended as physical mobilisation.(opens in a new tab) Today’s hybrid operations blend hacking(opens in a new tab), covertly funded local influencers(opens in a new tab), and covert media fronts. Campaign operators build credible-seeming news sites(opens in a new tab) and influencer personas(opens in a new tab) to insert tailored narratives into the public sphere. Once in circulation, these narratives mix with authentic content and spread across both digital and traditional media, making manipulation difficult to detect. Automation and AI: the new force multiplier The original troll-farm model – hundreds of young workers posting manually in shifts – is being replaced by AI-driven automation(opens in a new tab). Systems like Team Jorge’s AIMS, or newer tools powered by large language models, can now manage thousands of fake accounts and generate multilingual content tailored to target audiences in real time(opens in a new tab). AI allows campaigns that once required hundreds of people to be run by a handful of operators or even a single individual. What once took a troll farm and a whole building in St. Petersburg now takes a laptop. Asymmetrical information warfare The emergence of these influence-for-hire firms has created a new strategic imbalance – asymmetrical information warfare. In this asymmetry, autocracies enjoy maximum reach with minimal risk. At home, they are protected by censorship, control, and deniability. Democracies, however, are more exposed. Bound by transparency and law, they face maximum vulnerability with limited defences. This imbalance is not just political, but structural. Authoritarian regimes can use disinformation and AI tools to shape global narratives, influence elections abroad, and undermine trust while trying to avoid direct accountability. Democracies, meanwhile, must play defence on open networks designed for free expression. The stakes for democracy and the road ahead These operations are already reshaping political realities. Influence-for-hire firms have targeted elections in Africa, Europe, and Latin America(opens in a new tab). Disinformation campaigns amplify polarisation, delegitimise media institutions, and exploit social divisions to weaken democratic cohesion. The marketisation of disinformation risks creating a global grey zone where truth is optional and accountability elusive. As AI tools become cheaper and more capable, these operations will likely only grow in scale and sophistication. Recognising this asymmetry and responding with resilience and regulation is the only way to prevent truth itself from becoming a commodity.
0:45

The rise of the disinformation-for-hire industry The emergence of a global, large-scale disinformation industry has privatised influence operations, granting states strategic reach with plausible deniability. A quiet revolution has taken place in the world of propaganda. Operations that used to be run by authoritarian governments and intelligence agencies are now outsourced to private firms that sell disinformation and deception as a service. From fake social-media armies to AI-driven smear campaigns, disinformation and Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) have become a global business, giving authoritarian regimes new ways to influence others – and to deny everything. From state propaganda to disinformation for hire For decades, information operations were tightly controlled by states. The Soviet Union perfected the craft of dezinformatsiya; later, Russia institutionalised it through modern digital operations such as the Internet Research Agency (IRA)(opens in a new tab). But over the past decade, this model has commercialised. Disinformation and deception have become a for-profit service offered by companies with intelligence, military, or marketing backgrounds. These firms, operating around the world, sell complete FIMI campaign packages that include fake social-media campaigns, hacking, data leaks, and ‘narrative management’ in order to spread false and manipulated content in democratic countries. Outsourcing as a shield This outsourcing provides both efficiency and deniability. Authoritarian states are now actively trying to externalise information operations to private intermediaries, while shielding themselves from diplomatic and legal consequences. Through this model, malign actors can also experiment with risky tactics such as AI-generated content, hacking, or deepfakes – operations that would be politically or diplomatically explosive if carried out directly by state institutions. In doing so, they can target foreign populations through tailored influence campaigns while maintaining plausible deniability by claiming no connection to the private entities running them. Outsourcing also enables information laundering — hiding the true origin of disinformation by passing it through private firms, fake accounts, and proxy media. As these actors repeat and amplify the message, it begins to look organic and locally produced. This lets malign actors spread targeted narratives while denying any involvement. All this is the informational equivalent of using mercenaries: the client enjoys the results without bearing the blame. Team Jorge and the commercialisation of deception The 2023 Forbidden Stories investigation(opens in a new tab) into an entity called ‘Team Jorge’ exposed the inner workings of this new influence-for-hire ecosystem. The firm claimed to have interfered in 33 presidential elections, winning 27 of them. Its clients included political parties, corporations, and, allegedly, state-linked actors. At the heart of Team Jorge’s system was Advanced Impact Media Solutions (AIMS), software capable of creating and coordinating thousands of fake social-media accounts, complete with synthetic photos, biographies, and backstories. These avatars could be mobilised to flood debates, spread narratives, or harass opponents. Russia continues to be a major player in this outsourced ecosystem. Privately owned companies such as the Social Design Agency (SDA)(opens in a new tab) and Structura(opens in a new tab) now run large-scale influence operations that mirror, and in many ways replace, the functions of the old St. Petersburg troll factories. These firms manage covert online assets, push state-aligned narratives, and provide the Kremlin with an additional layer of deniability. Undercover journalists recorded the firm demonstrating hacking techniques, media infiltration, and the planting of fabricated news stories. The scale of these operations and their accessibility to paying clients revealed how disinformation has become a global commodity. Hybrid operations: where online meets offline Modern influence campaigns no longer live solely online but operate in the hybrid space between digital and physical realities. The Internet Research Agency (IRA)(opens in a new tab) demonstrated this during the 2016 US election when Russian operatives posing as American activists organised real-world rallies, paid participants, and coordinated online amplification around them. What began as meme warfare ended as physical mobilisation.(opens in a new tab) Today’s hybrid operations blend hacking(opens in a new tab), covertly funded local influencers(opens in a new tab), and covert media fronts. Campaign operators build credible-seeming news sites(opens in a new tab) and influencer personas(opens in a new tab) to insert tailored narratives into the public sphere. Once in circulation, these narratives mix with authentic content and spread across both digital and traditional media, making manipulation difficult to detect. Automation and AI: the new force multiplier The original troll-farm model – hundreds of young workers posting manually in shifts – is being replaced by AI-driven automation(opens in a new tab). Systems like Team Jorge’s AIMS, or newer tools powered by large language models, can now manage thousands of fake accounts and generate multilingual content tailored to target audiences in real time(opens in a new tab). AI allows campaigns that once required hundreds of people to be run by a handful of operators or even a single individual. What once took a troll farm and a whole building in St. Petersburg now takes a laptop. Asymmetrical information warfare The emergence of these influence-for-hire firms has created a new strategic imbalance – asymmetrical information warfare. In this asymmetry, autocracies enjoy maximum reach with minimal risk. At home, they are protected by censorship, control, and deniability. Democracies, however, are more exposed. Bound by transparency and law, they face maximum vulnerability with limited defences. This imbalance is not just political, but structural. Authoritarian regimes can use disinformation and AI tools to shape global narratives, influence elections abroad, and undermine trust while trying to avoid direct accountability. Democracies, meanwhile, must play defence on open networks designed for free expression. The stakes for democracy and the road ahead These operations are already reshaping political realities. Influence-for-hire firms have targeted elections in Africa, Europe, and Latin America(opens in a new tab). Disinformation campaigns amplify polarisation, delegitimise media institutions, and exploit social divisions to weaken democratic cohesion. The marketisation of disinformation risks creating a global grey zone where truth is optional and accountability elusive. As AI tools become cheaper and more capable, these operations will likely only grow in scale and sophistication. Recognising this asymmetry and responding with resilience and regulation is the only way to prevent truth itself from becoming a commodity.

EUvsDisinfo

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AI isn’t just changing tools, it’s widening the wealth gap. Most people interact with AI every day without realizing how much value their work, data, and behavior create behind the scenes for billion-dollar tech companies. As automation scales, the real question isn’t whether AI will affect jobs. It’s who controls the systems that shape that impact. Something has to change. Action Model is exploring what happens when that value is pooled, shared, and owned collectively instead of concentrated at the top. Strength in numbers isn’t a slogan, it’s a system design choice. Join the resistance and sign up to Action Model today. Link is in our bio.
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AI isn’t just changing tools, it’s widening the wealth gap. Most people interact with AI every day without realizing how much value their work, data, and behavior create behind the scenes for billion-dollar tech companies. As automation scales, the real question isn’t whether AI will affect jobs. It’s who controls the systems that shape that impact. Something has to change. Action Model is exploring what happens when that value is pooled, shared, and owned collectively instead of concentrated at the top. Strength in numbers isn’t a slogan, it’s a system design choice. Join the resistance and sign up to Action Model today. Link is in our bio.

Action Model

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Ukraine has come through its harshest wartime winter with its energy system bombarded by Russian strikes targeting civilian heat & power. At the same time, FIMI and disinformation campaigns falsely framed the blackouts as proof of Ukrainian weakness and fading European support.
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Ukraine has come through its harshest wartime winter with its energy system bombarded by Russian strikes targeting civilian heat & power. At the same time, FIMI and disinformation campaigns falsely framed the blackouts as proof of Ukrainian weakness and fading European support.

EUvsDisinfo

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These types of fashion shows lose the word fashion, and just becomes a show. And I don’t think there’s anything wrong with that because this could be its own thing and in its own the world. But it does ruin the concept of what a fashion show is like. And to someone who isn’t into fashion will run into this video that’s trending, and think fashions a joke.
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These types of fashion shows lose the word fashion, and just becomes a show. And I don’t think there’s anything wrong with that because this could be its own thing and in its own the world. But it does ruin the concept of what a fashion show is like. And to someone who isn’t into fashion will run into this video that’s trending, and think fashions a joke.

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It sounds like a prank call. It plays like a prank call. But the punchline is geopolitics. Kremlin-linked “pranksters” stage, edit, and amplify calls to push misleading narratives. It’s FIMI with a comedic filter: part theatre, part manipulation.

EUvsDisinfo

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Storm-1516 is Russia's big information war project targeting Europe. Disinformation, lies, fake websites, forged documentaries and AI-generated deepfakes... sounds scary, right? So far, this massively funded project has mostly produced a lot of noise with minimal impact.
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Storm-1516 is Russia's big information war project targeting Europe. Disinformation, lies, fake websites, forged documentaries and AI-generated deepfakes... sounds scary, right? So far, this massively funded project has mostly produced a lot of noise with minimal impact.

EUvsDisinfo

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Life under Russian occupation is not only a military reality – it is an information siege. An estimated 5–6 million Ukrainians in temporarily occupied territories (TOT) are being cut off from Ukrainian media, flooded with Kremlin propaganda, subjected to internet shutdowns and messenger bans, and pushed into silence by fear. How does this system of digital control actually work – and what does it do to people forced to live inside it?
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Life under Russian occupation is not only a military reality – it is an information siege. An estimated 5–6 million Ukrainians in temporarily occupied territories (TOT) are being cut off from Ukrainian media, flooded with Kremlin propaganda, subjected to internet shutdowns and messenger bans, and pushed into silence by fear. How does this system of digital control actually work – and what does it do to people forced to live inside it?

EUvsDisinfo

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Long before election day, another battle is already taking place online. Russia’s election playbook targets voters before they even reach the ballot box: fake accounts, fake news sites, influencers, AI-generated content, and narratives designed to promote pro-Kremlin candidates and destroy trust in democracy. In this mini-documentary, we at EUvsDisinfo break down: - How Russian influence operations are created and amplified - How narratives spread through state media, Telegram, fake websites, social media, messaging apps, and even video games - How pro-EU, pro-Western, and pro-Ukraine candidates are targeted with outrageous false claims - Why artificial intelligence makes these campaigns faster, cheaper, and harder to detect - How fake accounts, deepfakes, and automated content can shape public opinion - Why the bigger, long-term goal is to make people lose trust in policymakers, journalists, institutions, and democracy itself This is Russia's election playbook.

EUvsDisinfo

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3:00

This clip of Ashton Kutcher handing over $4M to Ellen DeGeneres on behalf of Ripple and Brad Garlinghouse is making the rounds again… and it raises a bigger question: Why are we expected to trust closed-door networks and “vague” initiatives involving people who are aligned with Jeffery Epstein? This system claims to be transparent but what exactly are we seeing here? This is exactly why the next phase of crypto matters. It’s about proof, identity, and accountability baked into the tech. Platforms like Metallicus and the XPR Network are building toward that reality… where transactions, identities, and compliance are verifiable on-chain, not dependent on what millionaires you work with behind the scenes. The future belongs to systems that don’t ask for trust… they prove it.

Maero𝕏

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Lyn Alden gave one of the clearest breakdowns of why the U.S. is on an unstoppable fiscal path—and why Bitcoin matters more than ever because of it. Lyn Alden walks through the numbers behind the federal deficit, interest expenses, Social Security, and the structural changes that happened post-2008. The short version? We’re in a new era. One where the government can’t slow down even if it wanted to. The debt is compounding. The interest expense is rising. The trust funds are running dry. And the political will to do anything about it doesn’t exist. Her phrase: “Nothing stops this train.” Not because of ideology, but because of math—and human nature. This isn’t hyperinflation doom-talk. It’s a sober look at what happens when a system built on ever-growing debt reaches its limits—and why Bitcoin, with its fixed supply and transparent rules, is the opposite of that system. Highly recommend watching this one all the way through.
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Lyn Alden gave one of the clearest breakdowns of why the U.S. is on an unstoppable fiscal path—and why Bitcoin matters more than ever because of it. Lyn Alden walks through the numbers behind the federal deficit, interest expenses, Social Security, and the structural changes that happened post-2008. The short version? We’re in a new era. One where the government can’t slow down even if it wanted to. The debt is compounding. The interest expense is rising. The trust funds are running dry. And the political will to do anything about it doesn’t exist. Her phrase: “Nothing stops this train.” Not because of ideology, but because of math—and human nature. This isn’t hyperinflation doom-talk. It’s a sober look at what happens when a system built on ever-growing debt reaches its limits—and why Bitcoin, with its fixed supply and transparent rules, is the opposite of that system. Highly recommend watching this one all the way through.

Lysander

417,342 просмотров • 1 год назад

WOW: Jake Tapper identifies what some might say is the main problem plaguing the Democratic Party, and he does it in a way that every single sane American should understand. They're so out of touch that even his 15 year-old son wanting to become a police officer is called into question as racist. "You’re deciding he’s a racist because he wants to be a cop? And why does he want to be a cop? He wants to be a cop because he wants to help people, you know, and and he thinks that’s the best way he can help people. And that’s how the Democratic Party talks to men, not just white men, but men." "The idea that he wants to be a policeman, therefore he’s — he’s racist, my son. And like, you know that was the big laugh and then I got dragged in the comments and all that stuff. And — and I thought to myself this is why you f***ers are losing elections.”
2:00

WOW: Jake Tapper identifies what some might say is the main problem plaguing the Democratic Party, and he does it in a way that every single sane American should understand. They're so out of touch that even his 15 year-old son wanting to become a police officer is called into question as racist. "You’re deciding he’s a racist because he wants to be a cop? And why does he want to be a cop? He wants to be a cop because he wants to help people, you know, and and he thinks that’s the best way he can help people. And that’s how the Democratic Party talks to men, not just white men, but men." "The idea that he wants to be a policeman, therefore he’s — he’s racist, my son. And like, you know that was the big laugh and then I got dragged in the comments and all that stuff. And — and I thought to myself this is why you f***ers are losing elections.”

DeVory Darkins

749,238 просмотров • 1 год назад

The Wikipedia wars As Wikipedia approaches its 25th anniversary in 2026, its open editing model faces a growing challenge: coordinated edit wars. In these campaigns, Kremlin-aligned actors try to rewrite history, launder disinformation, and lock distorted narratives into one of the world’s most trusted reference platforms. Founded on the idea that volunteers could collaboratively build a neutral, reliable encyclopaedia, Wikipedia has become one of the most influential information platforms ever created. It is often described as the world’s largest crowd-sourced knowledge project, built on consensus and verifiable sources. In recent years, however, it has also become a frontline in geopolitical information warfare. This is most visible in so-called edit wars: prolonged conflicts where opposing groups repeatedly overwrite and revise articles to control historical narratives. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, these battles have intensified. Kremlin-aligned actors have systematically targeted articles related to Eastern Europe, the Soviet past, and contemporary political leaders. Estonia and especially EU leader Kaja Kallas, Estonia’s former prime minister, have been frequent targets. What are edit wars? An edit war happens when editors repeatedly change the same content instead of resolving disputes through discussion. Wikipedia officially discourages this behaviour and emphasises consensus, neutrality, and reliable sources. In practice, however, edit wars can and do break out. Coordinated editors can use endurance, procedural rules, and administrator complaints to exhaust good faith contributors. The goal is rarely to win a single argument. Instead, it is to wear down opposition, freeze pages at favourable moments, and normalise contested language. Once a page is locked or protected, the version in place gains a sense of legitimacy, even if it reflects a distorted view. Edit wars exploit open systems, operate over long periods, and aim to embed manipulated narratives into reference material rather than spreading short-lived falsehoods. Multiple investigations show that Wikipedia manipulation increased sharply after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russian-language Wikipedia and parts of the English version became arenas for systematic narrative control, especially as independent Russian media was shut down. Wikipedia’s openness, once a strength, had suddenly become a vulnerability. Coordinated editor networks have worked to soften descriptions of Russian aggression, reframe invasions as ‘conflicts’, and question the legitimacy of post-Soviet states. These efforts rely on subtle wording changes, selective sourcing, and procedural tactics rather than obvious vandalism. Estonia and EU officials as targets Estonia shows how edit wars are used for historical revisionism and political influence. Since 2022, English-language Wikipedia articles about Estonia’s history, statehood, and politics have faced sustained pressure. One recurring tactic has been changing the birthplaces of hundreds of Estonian public figures from ‘Estonia’ to ‘Estonian SSR, Soviet Union’, despite the legal consensus that Estonia was occupied, not legitimately incorporated, by the USSR between 1940 and 1991. This is not a minor wording issue. Calling Estonia a ‘Soviet republic’ supports the Russian claim that the Baltic states voluntarily joined the USSR and directly contradicts the position of Estonia, the EU, NATO countries, and international law. Historical topics have also been targeted. The Estonian War of Independence between 1918 and 1920 has at times been reframed as an ‘offensive campaign’ or ‘separatism from Russia’, language that closely mirrors contemporary Kremlin rhetoric. High-profile figures are especially vulnerable because their pages attract constant attention and frequent administrative action. The Wikipedia article on Kaja Kallas has repeatedly been edited to reflect Russian-aligned interpretations of history and geopolitics. At key moments, the page was locked while these contested narratives were in place, blocking corrective edits. Page protection, meant to prevent disruption, instead helped freeze a favourable version of the article. This shows how procedural tools can be exploited as effectively as false information. Why Wikipedia matters Wikipedia is not just another website. It ranks highly in search results and serves as a default reference for journalists, students, policymakers, and the public. Winning an edit war on Wikipedia helps turn contested narratives into global ‘common knowledge’. For Kremlin-aligned actors, this makes Wikipedia a valuable target. Making small wording changes, downplaying occupation, reframing wars, and questioning democratic legitimacy can slowly erode our understanding of history and present-day aggression. Estonia’s experience shows how smaller states are especially exposed. Because Wikipedia is also a core source for AI systems, the stakes are even higher. Recent studies indicate that Wikipedia is one of the most cited sources for ChatGPT, effectively serving as a foundational knowledge base for how the AI understands and retrieves information. Manipulating articles today can therefore shape how future technologies understand, reproduce, and repeat history. This practice is referred to as LLM grooming, the deliberate attempt to influence large language models by seeding biased or distorted narratives into the sources they rely on. The rise in Wikipedia edit wars since 2022 reflects a broader shift in information warfare. Instead of loud propaganda, actors now use procedural, platform-native manipulation. Estonian history and Kaja Kallas are not isolated cases but targets of coordinated action. And as long as open-knowledge platforms shape how societies understand history and politics, sites like Wikipedia will remain contested ground.
0:32

The Wikipedia wars As Wikipedia approaches its 25th anniversary in 2026, its open editing model faces a growing challenge: coordinated edit wars. In these campaigns, Kremlin-aligned actors try to rewrite history, launder disinformation, and lock distorted narratives into one of the world’s most trusted reference platforms. Founded on the idea that volunteers could collaboratively build a neutral, reliable encyclopaedia, Wikipedia has become one of the most influential information platforms ever created. It is often described as the world’s largest crowd-sourced knowledge project, built on consensus and verifiable sources. In recent years, however, it has also become a frontline in geopolitical information warfare. This is most visible in so-called edit wars: prolonged conflicts where opposing groups repeatedly overwrite and revise articles to control historical narratives. Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, these battles have intensified. Kremlin-aligned actors have systematically targeted articles related to Eastern Europe, the Soviet past, and contemporary political leaders. Estonia and especially EU leader Kaja Kallas, Estonia’s former prime minister, have been frequent targets. What are edit wars? An edit war happens when editors repeatedly change the same content instead of resolving disputes through discussion. Wikipedia officially discourages this behaviour and emphasises consensus, neutrality, and reliable sources. In practice, however, edit wars can and do break out. Coordinated editors can use endurance, procedural rules, and administrator complaints to exhaust good faith contributors. The goal is rarely to win a single argument. Instead, it is to wear down opposition, freeze pages at favourable moments, and normalise contested language. Once a page is locked or protected, the version in place gains a sense of legitimacy, even if it reflects a distorted view. Edit wars exploit open systems, operate over long periods, and aim to embed manipulated narratives into reference material rather than spreading short-lived falsehoods. Multiple investigations show that Wikipedia manipulation increased sharply after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russian-language Wikipedia and parts of the English version became arenas for systematic narrative control, especially as independent Russian media was shut down. Wikipedia’s openness, once a strength, had suddenly become a vulnerability. Coordinated editor networks have worked to soften descriptions of Russian aggression, reframe invasions as ‘conflicts’, and question the legitimacy of post-Soviet states. These efforts rely on subtle wording changes, selective sourcing, and procedural tactics rather than obvious vandalism. Estonia and EU officials as targets Estonia shows how edit wars are used for historical revisionism and political influence. Since 2022, English-language Wikipedia articles about Estonia’s history, statehood, and politics have faced sustained pressure. One recurring tactic has been changing the birthplaces of hundreds of Estonian public figures from ‘Estonia’ to ‘Estonian SSR, Soviet Union’, despite the legal consensus that Estonia was occupied, not legitimately incorporated, by the USSR between 1940 and 1991. This is not a minor wording issue. Calling Estonia a ‘Soviet republic’ supports the Russian claim that the Baltic states voluntarily joined the USSR and directly contradicts the position of Estonia, the EU, NATO countries, and international law. Historical topics have also been targeted. The Estonian War of Independence between 1918 and 1920 has at times been reframed as an ‘offensive campaign’ or ‘separatism from Russia’, language that closely mirrors contemporary Kremlin rhetoric. High-profile figures are especially vulnerable because their pages attract constant attention and frequent administrative action. The Wikipedia article on Kaja Kallas has repeatedly been edited to reflect Russian-aligned interpretations of history and geopolitics. At key moments, the page was locked while these contested narratives were in place, blocking corrective edits. Page protection, meant to prevent disruption, instead helped freeze a favourable version of the article. This shows how procedural tools can be exploited as effectively as false information. Why Wikipedia matters Wikipedia is not just another website. It ranks highly in search results and serves as a default reference for journalists, students, policymakers, and the public. Winning an edit war on Wikipedia helps turn contested narratives into global ‘common knowledge’. For Kremlin-aligned actors, this makes Wikipedia a valuable target. Making small wording changes, downplaying occupation, reframing wars, and questioning democratic legitimacy can slowly erode our understanding of history and present-day aggression. Estonia’s experience shows how smaller states are especially exposed. Because Wikipedia is also a core source for AI systems, the stakes are even higher. Recent studies indicate that Wikipedia is one of the most cited sources for ChatGPT, effectively serving as a foundational knowledge base for how the AI understands and retrieves information. Manipulating articles today can therefore shape how future technologies understand, reproduce, and repeat history. This practice is referred to as LLM grooming, the deliberate attempt to influence large language models by seeding biased or distorted narratives into the sources they rely on. The rise in Wikipedia edit wars since 2022 reflects a broader shift in information warfare. Instead of loud propaganda, actors now use procedural, platform-native manipulation. Estonian history and Kaja Kallas are not isolated cases but targets of coordinated action. And as long as open-knowledge platforms shape how societies understand history and politics, sites like Wikipedia will remain contested ground.

EUvsDisinfo

343,369 просмотров • 6 месяцев назад

Haha, the Somali daycare, which falsely claimed that thieves stole their “important documentation,” said that the burglars got into the facility through the cinder blocks. How tiny and skinny must these thieves have been to cut through a wall with another wall just two inches behind it? And why does it look like the cuts were made from the inside, not the outside? Who even breaks into a childcare facility just to get the names of employees and rip up a checkbook? What a shit show! 😂😭😂
0:43

Haha, the Somali daycare, which falsely claimed that thieves stole their “important documentation,” said that the burglars got into the facility through the cinder blocks. How tiny and skinny must these thieves have been to cut through a wall with another wall just two inches behind it? And why does it look like the cuts were made from the inside, not the outside? Who even breaks into a childcare facility just to get the names of employees and rip up a checkbook? What a shit show! 😂😭😂

I Meme Therefore I Am 🇺🇸

288,126 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

In response to EU sanctions on Russian state media, the Kremlin in 2023 began targeting Western audiences through Euromore, a multi-platform outlet operating via a network of subdomains that translated and republished RT, Sputnik, and TASS content in more than 40 languages
0:57

In response to EU sanctions on Russian state media, the Kremlin in 2023 began targeting Western audiences through Euromore, a multi-platform outlet operating via a network of subdomains that translated and republished RT, Sputnik, and TASS content in more than 40 languages

EUvsDisinfo

11,515 просмотров • 3 месяцев назад

To the $XRP Community, watch this video and genuinely answer me this: 1. Why has Ripple been dumping XRP on retail? 2. If Ripple can change the rules, isn’t that TradFi with blockchain branding and how is it different from SWIFT or PayPal? 3. Why is RippleNet run by a centralized set of validators controlled mostly by Ripple Labs and so, why does Ripple call the XRPL “decentralized?” 4. Ripple is heavily focused on banks, central banks, and payment networks. Where does the public use case for XRP come in? Wouldn’t it be right to say that Jed left Ripple because he envisioned a decentralized, public protocol and not just a tool for banks?
2:41

To the $XRP Community, watch this video and genuinely answer me this: 1. Why has Ripple been dumping XRP on retail? 2. If Ripple can change the rules, isn’t that TradFi with blockchain branding and how is it different from SWIFT or PayPal? 3. Why is RippleNet run by a centralized set of validators controlled mostly by Ripple Labs and so, why does Ripple call the XRPL “decentralized?” 4. Ripple is heavily focused on banks, central banks, and payment networks. Where does the public use case for XRP come in? Wouldn’t it be right to say that Jed left Ripple because he envisioned a decentralized, public protocol and not just a tool for banks?

Stellar Expert

199,696 просмотров • 1 год назад

"And so sometimes like God speaks to me, I think primarily God speaks through me through action. And I think he speaks through everyone through action. You know, we like to talk a lot, but not a lot of people like to live it out. And I make mistakes, but I want to try to live it out to the best of my ability. I think secondly, through the way of communication, I've always had a heart to make complex ideas simpler to understand because I'm not a smart guy. I have a hard time reading Shakespeare and complex literature, so I like doing that. But sometimes I'll be sitting and talking with someone, and I feel like God tells me something about the person. They're struggling with something or if they've got a physical ailment and I'll ask. And sometimes it's true. Sometimes it's not. I'm not not discouraged if it's right or wrong, but if it's right, sometimes God speaks through that way. Those are a few ways God speaks through me, but, but the intrusive thing is so beautiful because I think he can speak to everyone intrusively and it is so sweet when it happens. And it was, it was happening this morning to me in the shower, which is so sweet and beautiful, you know. I struggle a lot with what people think about me because I've always struggled with people pleasing before being a Christian. And so, you know, if I'm misunderstood or someone takes something in the way that I didn't say it, I get hurt because I'm like, oh, I didn't mean it that way. Or, you know, whatever. So I'm kind of talking to Jesus and I'm in the shower praying and I'm going, man, God, I want to be more like you. I want to be how you want me to be. I want to love you. And I want to be your son. And I just want to focus on being yours. And I don't want to care what other people think. And this, this and that. And Jesus was speaking to me about some practical things I needed to do. Like it would help you if you, you know, stopped looking at what people say online. It would help if you deleted Instagram. And it would help if you did this. And, it would help if you would just trust other people to do what they're supposed to do. So you can focus on being mine. And I'm sitting there in the shower going like, wow, this is so good. And it's so hard, but it's so good." Bryce Crawford, Minister
1:52

"And so sometimes like God speaks to me, I think primarily God speaks through me through action. And I think he speaks through everyone through action. You know, we like to talk a lot, but not a lot of people like to live it out. And I make mistakes, but I want to try to live it out to the best of my ability. I think secondly, through the way of communication, I've always had a heart to make complex ideas simpler to understand because I'm not a smart guy. I have a hard time reading Shakespeare and complex literature, so I like doing that. But sometimes I'll be sitting and talking with someone, and I feel like God tells me something about the person. They're struggling with something or if they've got a physical ailment and I'll ask. And sometimes it's true. Sometimes it's not. I'm not not discouraged if it's right or wrong, but if it's right, sometimes God speaks through that way. Those are a few ways God speaks through me, but, but the intrusive thing is so beautiful because I think he can speak to everyone intrusively and it is so sweet when it happens. And it was, it was happening this morning to me in the shower, which is so sweet and beautiful, you know. I struggle a lot with what people think about me because I've always struggled with people pleasing before being a Christian. And so, you know, if I'm misunderstood or someone takes something in the way that I didn't say it, I get hurt because I'm like, oh, I didn't mean it that way. Or, you know, whatever. So I'm kind of talking to Jesus and I'm in the shower praying and I'm going, man, God, I want to be more like you. I want to be how you want me to be. I want to love you. And I want to be your son. And I just want to focus on being yours. And I don't want to care what other people think. And this, this and that. And Jesus was speaking to me about some practical things I needed to do. Like it would help you if you, you know, stopped looking at what people say online. It would help if you deleted Instagram. And it would help if you did this. And, it would help if you would just trust other people to do what they're supposed to do. So you can focus on being mine. And I'm sitting there in the shower going like, wow, this is so good. And it's so hard, but it's so good." Bryce Crawford, Minister

Tetragrammaton

98,771 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

Ben McCollum is a great example of how culture isn’t just a buzzword, it’s a competitive advantage. His success shows that systems and strategies matter, but they only really come alive when the right people buy in and reinforce those standards every day. What stands out with leaders like him is the clarity of expectations—players know what’s required, and more importantly, they choose to be part of it. That kind of alignment creates consistency, accountability, and trust, which is hard to beat over time. It’s a good reminder that talent alone doesn’t build something special—fit, mindset, and shared purpose are just as important.
0:49

Ben McCollum is a great example of how culture isn’t just a buzzword, it’s a competitive advantage. His success shows that systems and strategies matter, but they only really come alive when the right people buy in and reinforce those standards every day. What stands out with leaders like him is the clarity of expectations—players know what’s required, and more importantly, they choose to be part of it. That kind of alignment creates consistency, accountability, and trust, which is hard to beat over time. It’s a good reminder that talent alone doesn’t build something special—fit, mindset, and shared purpose are just as important.

Jordan M. Montgomery

22,405 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад