Loading video...

Video Failed to Load

Go Home

The countdown has entered its final stretch.⏳ Only 4 days remain before the Abakkus Small Cap Fund NFO closes! Abakkus Small Cap Fund. Discovering Hidden Gems. Unearthing Value. NFO Closes: 12th March, 2026 🔗 Learn more about the Abakkus Small Cap Fund at Mutual Fund investments are subject to...

39,292 views • 5 months ago •via X (Twitter)

0 Comments

No comments available

Comments from the original post will appear here

Related Videos

Most $SUI holders know one thing about the token: total supply is capped at 10 billion. They have never read the mechanic that makes that cap matter. It is called the Storage Fund. And it is the most important thing in the $SUI tokenomics docs that nobody is talking about. Here is exactly how it works: Every time a transaction adds data to the Sui blockchain, the user pays a storage fee. That fee does not go to validators directly. It goes into the Storage Fund, a pool of SUI that never fully depletes. Here is where it gets interesting. The Storage Fund has its own stake in the network. It earns staking rewards the same way every other stakeholder does. Those rewards are then distributed to validators to compensate them for storing historical data. This solves a problem every other blockchain ignores: When a new validator joins Sui, they have to store all the historical data from transactions that happened before they existed. Why would a new validator pay to store someone else's old data? The Storage Fund pays them for it. Past users who created the storage requirements in the first place funded the pool. Future validators get compensated from that pool indefinitely. The fund pays out only the returns on its capital, never the principal. It cannot be drained. It is designed to survive forever. Now here is the part that directly connects to $SUI token value. The Sui docs state this explicitly: Deflation is a feature of Sui, not a bug. Here is why: Total supply is capped at 10 billion SUI. As network activity increases, more transactions are processed. More transactions mean more storage fees flowing into the Storage Fund. As the Storage Fund grows, it holds more SUI. More SUI held in the fund means less SUI in active circulation. Less circulating supply against the same or growing demand means the value of each SUI token increases. Network growth directly reduces circulating supply. That is not speculation. That is the economic model built into the protocol at the architecture level. One more detail worth knowing: If you delete data you stored on chain, you receive a partial refund of your original storage fees. The system charges for storage, rewards deletion, and compounds the fund's stake indefinitely. Most people holding $SUI today are pricing the speed narrative: The parallel transaction processing. The sub-second finality. The Move language safety. They have not started pricing the storage fund deflation mechanic. That gap between what the tokenomics actually does and what the market currently understands is where the long-term thesis lives. The people who read the docs always buy before the people who read the price.

2xnmore

47,695 views • 3 months ago

The NZ$2B BlackRock renewable energy fund: A failed promise for NZ’s green future? From 2023 to 2025, millions of taxpayer dollars have been lost & the promised jobs have failed to materialise. In Aug 2023, the Ardern's Labour party (led at the time by PM Hipkins) partnered with BlackRock to launch a $2 billion climate fund, aiming for 100% renewable electricity by 2030 via solar, wind, green hydrogen, & battery storage. Hailed as a world-first, it promised jobs and innovation. The fund drew on taxpayer money via NZ Green Investment Finance (NZGIF), a Crown entity funded by public resources incl: ACC, KiwiSaver, & the NZ Super Fund. By using NZGIF, the government exposed taxpayers to risks of financial loss if investments failed-& they did. The first investment was SolarZero- a high-risk company with potential. (With better due diligence, this investment would not have gone forward.) The company was first acquired by BlackRock in Nov 2022 for approximately $110M. However, BlackRock later injected a further $147.8M into the business, bringing total capital involved to roughly $257.8M. Of this, NZGIF provided a $145M debt facility, & BlackRock contributed $112.8M. SolarZero aimed to scale solar energy in NZ with a pay-over-time model. But on Nov 26, 2024, BlackRock placed it into liquidation after it missed sales targets. Of the $145M facility, only $115M had been drawn down by the time of collapse. The full $257.8M was not "lost" as a single sum; the total recovery outcome remains uncertain. The collapse left around 160 staff jobless, with $4-5M in unpaid obligations. The loss of at least $115M of taxpayer money — representing roughly 5.75% of the $2B fund ,this was a huge blow to its credibility, leaving taxpayers with little hope of full recovery. Despite SolarZero’s failure, BlackRock charges fees reported at 1.5% annually on invested capital. While the total $50.57M fee figure is (not verified in public records), it is confirmed that BlackRock charged $4.35M on NZGIF’s $145M commitment, taxpayer money for a failed project. The fund now “seems to have gone nowhere,” with no new major projects announced and roughly $1.69 billion idle. BlackRock’s Auckland office, opened in July 2023 with around 10 staff, has delivered nothing new, appearing only to manage the fallout while fees continue. MBIE, overseeing NZ’s energy strategy, has offered no public updates. The lack of transparency raises questions about the government’s choice to partner with BlackRock, potentially delaying NZ’s 100% renewable goal. The financial losses, fees charged on taxpayer money, & lack of outcomes have led to perceptions of a “renewable investment scam,” eroding trust in BlackRock and the government. January 2026: BlackRock abandoned the $2 billion NZ Climate Infrastructure Fund. The fund is now dead. With $1.69 billion left, there was potential to salvage the fund, but this remains a sad tale of risks with global asset managers & taxpayer funds. Claims have also emerged during this time-including allegations of government officials receiving kickbacks from the deal, with a Ardern being named. No evidence has been provided to support these claims. NZGIF has advanced $314,000 in taxpayer money to fund legal investigations into whether SolarZero hid money from creditors by shifting assets into separate trusts before collapsing. NZGIF's chance of recovery in drawn-down funds hinges entirely on whether the court agrees those payments were improper. If the liquidators win, some money may be clawed back. If not, money is likely gone for good.. 2026 BlackRock has abandoned NZ Climate Infrastructure Fund. The fund is now dead.

Neil Edwards

11,512 views • 3 months ago

The man who wrote the essay that started the entire AI boom just got DESTROYED by it. Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, and Bank of America teamed up to liquidate their own client overnight. Leopold Aschenbrenner left OpenAI in 2024 and published an essay called "Situational Awareness" arguing that AGI was arriving before the decade was out, and that whoever owned the compute would own everything after it. Silicon Valley read it and started spending. Then he raised a fund named after the essay and bet on his own thesis with borrowed money. The numbers he put up were the best on Wall Street: He started with roughly $225 million in late 2024. Patrick and John Collison wrote checks. So did Nat Friedman, Daniel Gross, and Jane Street. Through June 30 of this year the fund was up 439% net of fees, according to the investor letter the Financial Times reviewed. The firm had a handful of employees, and he had no prior record managing anyone's money. It also ran leverage reported as high as 4x. For every dollar of his own capital he borrowed three or four more, then bought the physical guts of the AI buildout. He owned Micron, SanDisk, CoreWeave, Nebius, and SK Hynix. In July every one of those names fell somewhere between 27% and 54%. The Kospi, home to SK Hynix, lost about a third of its value. His collateral and his position were the same thing. The stocks fell, the loans against them came due, and selling to cover those loans pushed the stocks down again. The fund finished July down 67%. But the UGLY part happened in the six days before that... On July 24 he wrote to his investors and called the selloff some of the most attractive opportunities since early 2025. He invited them to commit fresh capital, with a deadline of August 1. That deadline is today. Six days after asking for more money, he was margin called by Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan Chase, and Bank of America. He spent Wednesday trying to sell anything that would move. Millennium looked at the positions and passed. Jane Street looked and passed, and Jane Street was an investor in his own fund. Late that night he agreed to sell $3.5 billion of his Anthropic shares to a group led by Greenoaks and Sequoia Capital. The Collison brothers sat in his offices while he negotiated past midnight. Then Ken Griffin called... Before Thursday's open, Citadel bought the bulk of the public portfolio at more than 10% below market value. The same prime brokers squeezing him for cash, Goldman, JPMorgan, Bank of America, and Citigroup, helped arrange the trade that bailed him out. He used Griffin's money to pay off his lenders. And Thursday morning he walked away from the Anthropic deal. So he sold every asset that had a public price, at a discount, and kept the one asset that gets valued by whatever the last funding round said it was worth. The fund survived with about $10 billion. The Anthropic stake inside it is carried at $5 billion, off a May round that valued the company at $965 billion. No open market has ever tested that number. Anthropic could list as soon as October, and Aschenbrenner is now running a fund whose value rests almost entirely on that one line. His letter to investors blamed short sellers. What happens next: The fund is still up roughly 80% for the year, which is why half of finance spent the weekend defending him. But the other half noticed that a manager with no prior fund record ran a 4x levered book into the most telegraphed drawdown of the cycle and had to hand the whole thing to Ken Griffin before sunrise. The public book got a real price on Thursday morning. The private mark is still waiting for October. What do you think?

Ricardo

40,001 views • 28 days ago

🚨SPACEX WILL CRASH JUST LIKE TESLA DID IN 2010 The exact same setup played out 16 years ago. Rewind to 2010. Tesla goes public at $1.13. Pumps to $2.03 in days. The timeline floods with the same takes: "Elon is building the future." "This is a generational entry." "You will regret missing this." Then reality showed up. Tesla bled almost 50% in one week. $2.03 → $1.00 Retail got flushed before the real run even started. Fast forward to now. 2026: – SpaceX just printed the biggest IPO in market history – +30% from the IPO price on day one – $1.75T valuation out the gate – Retail access unlocked at the very last second – Everyone is already calling it "the next Tesla" But the setup is nothing alike. Tesla 2010 launched into: - A beaten down market - Low expectations - Small cap valuation - Zero hype tax SpaceX 2026 is launching into: - The most overvalued market on record - Peak retail euphoria - A $1.75T price tag before a single earnings report - Every fund already positioned That is not the same trade. That is the exit liquidity version of it. People hear Tesla 2010 and only remember the pump. Tesla pumped first. Then it destroyed everyone who chased it. That part always gets removed from the screenshot. Now SpaceX has the same Elon premium and the same future narrative, but much worse timing. So you have two choices: Chase the most expensive IPO in history after a +30% launch candle. Or learn from what Tesla already did. Reminder: I called Bitcoin at $16K, the top at $126K, and gold before it ran. Eight years of calls, all public. When I exit this market, I post it here first. Every move goes here too. Turn notifications on. You will understand why later.

winkle.

191,834 views • 2 months ago

Wall Street is running the same trade two Nobel Prize winners used to nearly destroy the global financial system. The Fed's OWN economists know it. They literally wrote a paper about it and named the paper after the fund that blew up. It's called "LTCM Redux?" and it ran in the Journal of Financial Economics. Here's what they are worried about repeating: Long-Term Capital Management launched in 1994 under John Meriwether, formerly head of bond trading at Salomon Brothers. Myron Scholes and Robert Merton sat on the board and won the 1997 Nobel Prize in Economics while the fund was running. A former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve Board was a partner. It returned 20% in its first year, 43% in the second, and 41% in the third. The strategy was to find nearly identical bonds priced slightly differently and bet the gap would close. The gaps were pennies, so the only way to make real money was to borrow enormous amounts against them. Entering 1998 the fund had $4.8 billion of its own capital, had borrowed more than $125 billion, and held derivatives with a notional value above $1 trillion. At the end of 1997 the partners handed capital back to investors without cutting their positions to match, which pushed their leverage higher still. Then Russia defaulted in August 1998. Money ran for safety, the gaps that were supposed to close widened instead, and every position moved against them at once. Equity fell from $4.8 billion to $2.3 billion by the first of September. Roughly $4.6 billion evaporated in under four months. On September 23 the New York Fed put 14 firms in one room and did not let them leave. By six that evening they had committed $3.6 billion and taken 90% of the fund. The Fed itself lent nothing. Those 14 firms were LTCM's own lenders, and a forced sale of more than a trillion dollars in positions into a market with no buyers would have torn through their balance sheets first. Even with the rescue in place, the chairman of Union Bank of Switzerland resigned over a $780 million loss on options it had written on the fund. And the ending of that story is what makes it matter now: The banks were repaid in full by 2000 and nobody was charged with anything. Meriwether raised a new fund the following year. The lesson the market took away was that when a leveraged fund gets big enough to threaten the plumbing, somebody convenes a room. That precedent is now sitting underneath the largest bond market on Earth. Hedge funds held $2.4 trillion of US Treasuries at the end of last year, financed with about $1.8 trillion of borrowed money in the repo market. The cash-futures basis trade alone reached $830 billion as of last September, close to double its previous peak. Leverage on it commonly runs 50x and can reach 100x. And the conditions for a disaster are already here... The 30 year yield hit its highest level since 2007 twice in the past week. The long end has been in a buyers' strike since June. Yesterday the Treasury abandoned its own published schedule and doubled its bond buybacks without warning. What killed LTCM was liquidity disappearing from the market where its borrowed money was parked. And this time the rescue is being drawn up in ADVANCE. Academics from Harvard, Columbia and Chicago have already published a proposal urging the Fed to build a standing facility to absorb these positions when they unwind. Morgan Stanley estimates these positions shrank by more than $200 billion in July as spreads compressed. On top of that, central clearing becomes mandatory at the end of this year. The trade genuinely makes Treasury markets more liquid on ordinary days. But ordinary days were never the problem. Two Nobel laureates and a former Fed vice chairman could not see it coming from inside the building. Whoever is running this version is not smarter than they were, and the position is far larger...

Ricardo

27,646 views • 9 days ago