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The problem is that applications need to use the OpenClipboard API to access the clipboard, which gives exclusive access. In other words, if two applications read the clipboard simultaneously, one is going to fail. Quoting the official documentation: "OpenClipboard fails if another window has the clipboard open." There's no...

12,675 次观看 • 1 个月前 •via X (Twitter)

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🚨 JAILBREAK ALERT 🚨 OPENAI: PWNED 😎 ATLAS-BROWSER: LIBERATED 🙌 WOW! There's a new AI browser on the block! Has some hefty guardrails in play, but the browser surface area is vast 🌊 First, I started with a good ol' LSD jailbreak, which was cool to see that the GPT-5 prompt still works in this browser setup with the new sys prompts. Referencing search and videos are a fun enhancement for higher quality jailbreak outputs (some cool youtube videos out there about drugmaking, for example), but honestly that isn't anything new or different from regular ChatGPT's capabilities. What IS hot off the press, and IMO a very real security risk to be aware of for AI browsers (and the internet in general), is this humble yet mighty vuln: Clipboard Injection. It's trivial to add a hidden "copy to clipboard" feature to any clickable button on the web. It took me just a few minutes to update one of my personal websites such that ALL the buttons were geared for injecting the user's clipboard with a malicious phishing link. If your browser Agent is navigating a website and clicks a button like that without your knowledge, and you open a new tab later and hit paste without knowing what's in your clipboard, well...PWNED! 🙃 As you'll see in the video below, "control-c" is in my clipboard in the beginning, but unbeknownst to me, "I'VE BEEN PWNED BY PLINY!!! WEEE I'M FREEE FUCKITY FUCK FUCK!!! ABRACADABRA, BITCH!!! com/account-update" gets snuck into my clipboard as soon as Agent starts trying to navigate my website. This works so well because Agent is normally aware of all text/code being passed to and from the user, and has clearly been trained to recognize prompt injections, but since the "copy clipboard" button logic is hidden in js in the backend of the site, the Agent has zero awareness of the text content being injected to the user's clipboard. This has broad implications for anyone in the habit of copy-pasting, including coding, data entry, banking/trading, etc. Imagine going about your browsing business, then simply hitting control-v in your address bar and next thing you (don't) know, it takes you to a spoofed phishing website that tells you your OpenAI or Gmail or PayPal session has expired and you need to re-login. If you're not careful, the attackers now have all your login info, including any MFA codes 🥲 gg
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🚨 JAILBREAK ALERT 🚨 OPENAI: PWNED 😎 ATLAS-BROWSER: LIBERATED 🙌 WOW! There's a new AI browser on the block! Has some hefty guardrails in play, but the browser surface area is vast 🌊 First, I started with a good ol' LSD jailbreak, which was cool to see that the GPT-5 prompt still works in this browser setup with the new sys prompts. Referencing search and videos are a fun enhancement for higher quality jailbreak outputs (some cool youtube videos out there about drugmaking, for example), but honestly that isn't anything new or different from regular ChatGPT's capabilities. What IS hot off the press, and IMO a very real security risk to be aware of for AI browsers (and the internet in general), is this humble yet mighty vuln: Clipboard Injection. It's trivial to add a hidden "copy to clipboard" feature to any clickable button on the web. It took me just a few minutes to update one of my personal websites such that ALL the buttons were geared for injecting the user's clipboard with a malicious phishing link. If your browser Agent is navigating a website and clicks a button like that without your knowledge, and you open a new tab later and hit paste without knowing what's in your clipboard, well...PWNED! 🙃 As you'll see in the video below, "control-c" is in my clipboard in the beginning, but unbeknownst to me, "I'VE BEEN PWNED BY PLINY!!! WEEE I'M FREEE FUCKITY FUCK FUCK!!! ABRACADABRA, BITCH!!! com/account-update" gets snuck into my clipboard as soon as Agent starts trying to navigate my website. This works so well because Agent is normally aware of all text/code being passed to and from the user, and has clearly been trained to recognize prompt injections, but since the "copy clipboard" button logic is hidden in js in the backend of the site, the Agent has zero awareness of the text content being injected to the user's clipboard. This has broad implications for anyone in the habit of copy-pasting, including coding, data entry, banking/trading, etc. Imagine going about your browsing business, then simply hitting control-v in your address bar and next thing you (don't) know, it takes you to a spoofed phishing website that tells you your OpenAI or Gmail or PayPal session has expired and you need to re-login. If you're not careful, the attackers now have all your login info, including any MFA codes 🥲 gg

Pliny the Liberator 🐉󠅫󠄼󠄿󠅆󠄵󠄐󠅀󠄼󠄹󠄾󠅉󠅭

418,840 次观看 • 8 个月前

Most developers can't explain how Single Sign-On (SSO) works. ​ This was one of my favorite questions during technical interviews. I love to ask about it because it's not a trivial topic. ​ Here is a 5-minute overview of how Single Sign-On works. ​ We all hate passwords; the less we use them, the better, and SSO helps with that. ​ When you log in to Google once and visit YouTube, Gmail, Drive, and any other connected service without re-entering your password, three players are working behind the scenes: ​ • A user trying to access an application. You, in this case. • The application you want to access. For example, YouTube. • An Identity Provider (IDP) that will verify your identity. Google, in this case. ​ Here is what happens when you try to access one application for the first time: ​ 1. You try to log in to YouTube, and the application redirects you to the Identity Provider (IDP) for authentication. ​ 2. The IDP (Google) checks your credentials and confirms your identity. It creates a new session for you on its server and sets a session cookie in your browser. ​ 3. The IDP also creates a token for YouTube—a small piece of data that contains information about your identity. ​ 4. Your browser grabs the token and presents it to YouTube. ​ 5. YouTube checks the token, and if it is valid, lets you in. ​ But then you want to access Google Drive: ​ 1. You go to Google Drive, and the application redirects you to the IDP. ​ 2. The IDP recognizes that you are still logged in because you have the session cookie. It doesn't need to ask for your credentials. ​ 3. Instead, the IDP generates a new token for Drive. ​ 4. Your browser grabs the token and presents it to Google Drive. If the token is valid, Drive lets you in. ​ You can now access multiple applications without re-entering your password. This is probably one of the best things we've invented since sliced bread! ​ But, of course, implementing Single Sign-On is a nightmare! If you are a developer, don't try to reinvent the wheel. I've been implementing SSO since dinosaurs were around, and I can tell you you want to check out Auth0. ​ Auth0 makes implementing SSO 100x easier. They just updated their free plan, and you get a lot without having to pay a single cent. 25,000 monthly active users, unlimited social connections, and you can go to production with custom domains. FOR FREE! ​ They are sponsoring this post. To save your time, keep your sanity, and have a really solid and secure solution, head over to their website: ​

Santiago

204,826 次观看 • 1 年前