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🇺🇸🇮🇷 There is one question hanging over virtually every argument about the Iran war: If Tehran still has the ability to dramatically escalate, why hasn’t it? Will Chamberlain thinks the simplest answer is being overlooked. Maybe Iran can’t. The Iranian economy is under enormous pressure. Its oil exports have...

303,106 Aufrufe • vor 22 Stunden •via X (Twitter)

12 Kommentare

Profilbild von Blueberry
Blueberryvor 22 Stunden

It’s nice to se Will Chamberlain has found a way to be productive after his career in the NBA

Profilbild von COPETRAIN9000
COPETRAIN9000vor 22 Stunden

WATCH HORMUZ TRAFFIC. THAT TELLS YOU EVERYTHING

Profilbild von whyte
whytevor 22 Stunden

Honestly this makes more sense than the hidden card theory. If you could hit back hard and your situation is this bad, you would

Profilbild von wahed mansour
wahed mansourvor 22 Stunden

إذا كانت إيران🇮🇷منهارة عسكريًا بالفعل ،فلماذا تحتاج أمريكا🇺🇸إلى الاستمرار في زيادة خياراتها العسكرية ؟! نحن نتحدث الآن عن وصول قوات أمريكية إضافية،واحتمال وجود 3 مجموعات حاملة طائرات ومجموعتين برمائيتين،وفي الوقت نفسه،وهناك تقارير عن استنزاف مخزونات الصواريخ الاعتراضية الأمريكية

Profilbild von EMA
EMAvor 22 Stunden

Untenable is the key word. Nobody sits on a stronger hand when they're bleeding like that

Profilbild von D-boy 🦍
D-boy 🦍vor 22 Stunden

Interesting point about the command structure. Even if some missiles survived, you need people and systems to fire them at scale. That part gets ignored a lot

Profilbild von Wardio
Wardiovor 22 Stunden

They'd use it if they had it' assumes Iran's goal is to hurt the US now. If the goal is regime survival, holding the last rungs for the day Washington overreaches is exactly what a weakened but rational actor does. Non-use proves patience as easily as it proves damage

Profilbild von Principal⭐️
Principal⭐️vor 22 Stunden

The key question is not what Iran could theoretically do, but what it is actually demonstrating it can do at scale. If Tehran still has substantial escalation capacity, its restraint needs explaining. If its missile stocks, production and command infrastructure were degraded, the lack of sustained escalation becomes far more understandable.

Profilbild von EMABOY TG
EMABOY TGvor 22 Stunden

Fair test from Will. Say what would change your mind up front and then stick to it. Most people never do that

Profilbild von Laina 🧠
Laina 🧠vor 22 Stunden

Hmm but what if they're holding back on purpose so nobody gets pulled in deeper? Does that fit with how bad their economy looks right now?

Profilbild von Principal⭐️
Principal⭐️vor 22 Stunden

That’s the important test, watch Iran’s actions, not just estimates of its remaining arsenal. If it can meaningfully disrupt Gulf shipping or reopen pressure on the Strait of Hormuz, the assessment may need to change. Until then, the possibility of hidden capabilities should not automatically be treated as proof of usable strength.

Profilbild von DonSimeon
DonSimeonvor 22 Stunden

Capability vs intent is the whole debate here

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