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🇺🇸✈️ Two newly introduced (2024) EA-37B Compass Call electronic warfare aircraft have arrived in the UK and are being prepared for deployment to the Middle East. 🔺 These platforms will provide CENTCOM with advanced long-range electronic warfare capabilities, including disruption of enemy communications, air defense systems, and command networks,...

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NSTRIKE

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11,417 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад •via X (Twitter)

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New Mobile Electronic Warfare (EW) & Radar Systems of Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) BATTLE TESTED & WORLD STEALTH SUPERIORITY in all CLASSES ! By 𝐃𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐝 𝐙 🇷🇺🇮🇪 Thread 1 / 5 Russian MoD has been aggressively modernizing its electronic warfare & radar capabilities, particularly in response to lessons from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. These systems emphasize mobility, integration with air defense networks, & countermeasures against drones, precision-guided munitions, & enemy command-control (C2) structures. Many are designed for rapid deployment in tactical environments, often mounted on vehicles, aircraft, or even backpack-portable for infantry use. Below, I'll break down key new or upgraded systems with specifics on their features, operational roles & adaptations. Key Electronic Warfare Systems Krasukha Series (Krasukha-4 / Krasukha-2): These are multifunctional mobile jamming platforms mounted on truck chassis like the BAZ-6910, making them highly deployable across rough terrain. The Krasukha-4 can jam airborne radars, including those on AWACS aircraft, drones & satellites, at ranges up to 300 km. It uses digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) technology to create false targets & spoof enemy sensors, disrupting reconnaissance and fire-control systems. In recent operations, it's been used to create "electronic shields" over bases & troop concentrations, suppressing enemy ISR (intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance) assets. Upgrades in 2024-2025 include better integration with AI for adaptive frequency hopping, allowing it to counter advanced jamming-resistant signals from Western systems. Skovorodka (Frying Pan) System: Introduced in late 2024, this is a compact, backpack-portable EW device developed by AO "AEC" for frontline infantry. Weighing under 10 kg, it operates on dual frequencies to jam enemy reconnaissance drones (e.g., DJI models) & artillery targeting systems within a 5-10 km radius. It disrupts the "reconnaissance-fire chain" by blocking data links & GPS signals, reducing drone effectiveness by up to 70% in tested scenarios. It's integrated into broader air defense networks like the S-400 & S-500, providing ground-level offensive EW to blind hostile radars while protecting Russian assets. Its low cost (~ $5,000 per unit) allows mass deployment, with production ramped up to equip motorized rifle battalions. Leer-3 (RB-341V): A mobile EW complex integrated with Orlan-10 UAVs for remote operation. Mounted on MT-LB armored vehicles, it jams GSM, satellite communications & GPS signals within a 6 km radius, often scattering jammers via drones for area denial. Recent enhancements include PSYOPS capabilities, such as sending fake SMS to enemy troops for disinformation. In 2025 deployments, it's been paired with anti-drone interceptors to create layered defenses against UAV swarms, with ranges extended to 10-15 km through improved antennas. Borisoglebsk-2 (RB-301B): This automated jamming system is chassis-mounted on MT-LBu vehicles for high mobility. It detects, analyzes & suppresses HF/VHF/UHF communications & radar signals up to 30-50 km away. Specifics include direction-finding accuracy within 1-2 degrees & the ability to handle up to 100 simultaneous targets. 2025 updates incorporate AI-driven algorithms for real-time spectrum analysis, making it more effective against frequency-agile Western radios. Rychag-AV: A versatile EW module installable on helicopters (e.g., Mi-8), ships, or ground vehicles. It jams sensors and radars at hundreds of kilometers using DRFM to mimic echoes and create phantom threats. Recent mobile variants on KamAZ trucks allow rapid repositioning, with power outputs up to 10 kW for sustained jamming. Zhitel (R-330Zh): Mobile on Ural trucks, it jams communications, GPS, and air targets up to 200 km. It's often used in tandem with radar systems to disrupt drone data links, with 2025 models featuring modular antennas for quick setup in 15-20 minutes. PART 1 >>>
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New Mobile Electronic Warfare (EW) & Radar Systems of Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) BATTLE TESTED & WORLD STEALTH SUPERIORITY in all CLASSES ! By 𝐃𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐝 𝐙 🇷🇺🇮🇪 Thread 1 / 5 Russian MoD has been aggressively modernizing its electronic warfare & radar capabilities, particularly in response to lessons from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. These systems emphasize mobility, integration with air defense networks, & countermeasures against drones, precision-guided munitions, & enemy command-control (C2) structures. Many are designed for rapid deployment in tactical environments, often mounted on vehicles, aircraft, or even backpack-portable for infantry use. Below, I'll break down key new or upgraded systems with specifics on their features, operational roles & adaptations. Key Electronic Warfare Systems Krasukha Series (Krasukha-4 / Krasukha-2): These are multifunctional mobile jamming platforms mounted on truck chassis like the BAZ-6910, making them highly deployable across rough terrain. The Krasukha-4 can jam airborne radars, including those on AWACS aircraft, drones & satellites, at ranges up to 300 km. It uses digital radio frequency memory (DRFM) technology to create false targets & spoof enemy sensors, disrupting reconnaissance and fire-control systems. In recent operations, it's been used to create "electronic shields" over bases & troop concentrations, suppressing enemy ISR (intelligence, surveillance & reconnaissance) assets. Upgrades in 2024-2025 include better integration with AI for adaptive frequency hopping, allowing it to counter advanced jamming-resistant signals from Western systems. Skovorodka (Frying Pan) System: Introduced in late 2024, this is a compact, backpack-portable EW device developed by AO "AEC" for frontline infantry. Weighing under 10 kg, it operates on dual frequencies to jam enemy reconnaissance drones (e.g., DJI models) & artillery targeting systems within a 5-10 km radius. It disrupts the "reconnaissance-fire chain" by blocking data links & GPS signals, reducing drone effectiveness by up to 70% in tested scenarios. It's integrated into broader air defense networks like the S-400 & S-500, providing ground-level offensive EW to blind hostile radars while protecting Russian assets. Its low cost (~ $5,000 per unit) allows mass deployment, with production ramped up to equip motorized rifle battalions. Leer-3 (RB-341V): A mobile EW complex integrated with Orlan-10 UAVs for remote operation. Mounted on MT-LB armored vehicles, it jams GSM, satellite communications & GPS signals within a 6 km radius, often scattering jammers via drones for area denial. Recent enhancements include PSYOPS capabilities, such as sending fake SMS to enemy troops for disinformation. In 2025 deployments, it's been paired with anti-drone interceptors to create layered defenses against UAV swarms, with ranges extended to 10-15 km through improved antennas. Borisoglebsk-2 (RB-301B): This automated jamming system is chassis-mounted on MT-LBu vehicles for high mobility. It detects, analyzes & suppresses HF/VHF/UHF communications & radar signals up to 30-50 km away. Specifics include direction-finding accuracy within 1-2 degrees & the ability to handle up to 100 simultaneous targets. 2025 updates incorporate AI-driven algorithms for real-time spectrum analysis, making it more effective against frequency-agile Western radios. Rychag-AV: A versatile EW module installable on helicopters (e.g., Mi-8), ships, or ground vehicles. It jams sensors and radars at hundreds of kilometers using DRFM to mimic echoes and create phantom threats. Recent mobile variants on KamAZ trucks allow rapid repositioning, with power outputs up to 10 kW for sustained jamming. Zhitel (R-330Zh): Mobile on Ural trucks, it jams communications, GPS, and air targets up to 200 km. It's often used in tandem with radar systems to disrupt drone data links, with 2025 models featuring modular antennas for quick setup in 15-20 minutes. PART 1 >>>

𝐃𝐚𝐯𝐢𝐝 𝐙 🇷🇺🇮🇪

13,061 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

🇺🇸 The American military corporation Northrop Grumman has introduced the autonomous system "Jackal," where the latest small-sized cruise missiles attack targets based on the "swarm" principle, distributing them according to automatic detection, priority, and other parameters. 🔹 The operational range of JACKAL-type cruise missiles exceeds 100 km (exact distance unknown), with a flight speed of over 600 km/h... Its main advantage is that it operates effectively under strong radio-electronic GPS jamming conditions... Several missiles from the swarm may approach the target using complex maneuvering principles and strike from the rear... Their warhead weight is 4.5 kg... 🔹 This is the latest technology that allows missiles to "cooperate" with each other during flight. If one missile is shot down, the others automatically redistribute the targets. It was mainly created to overload the enemy's air defense... It is specifically designed to hunt air defense systems, radars, and REB (radio-electronic warfare) systems. 🔹 The system can independently decide which target is more important (for example, to destroy the air defense radar first and then other objects). 🚀 The aforementioned type of cruise missiles can be launched from both manned (F-35/F-15/F-16/AH-64 Apache) and unmanned (MQ-9 Reaper) aircraft, as well as from ground complexes—armored vehicles and robotic equipment. See the latest updates with us: Visioner
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🇺🇸 The American military corporation Northrop Grumman has introduced the autonomous system "Jackal," where the latest small-sized cruise missiles attack targets based on the "swarm" principle, distributing them according to automatic detection, priority, and other parameters. 🔹 The operational range of JACKAL-type cruise missiles exceeds 100 km (exact distance unknown), with a flight speed of over 600 km/h... Its main advantage is that it operates effectively under strong radio-electronic GPS jamming conditions... Several missiles from the swarm may approach the target using complex maneuvering principles and strike from the rear... Their warhead weight is 4.5 kg... 🔹 This is the latest technology that allows missiles to "cooperate" with each other during flight. If one missile is shot down, the others automatically redistribute the targets. It was mainly created to overload the enemy's air defense... It is specifically designed to hunt air defense systems, radars, and REB (radio-electronic warfare) systems. 🔹 The system can independently decide which target is more important (for example, to destroy the air defense radar first and then other objects). 🚀 The aforementioned type of cruise missiles can be launched from both manned (F-35/F-15/F-16/AH-64 Apache) and unmanned (MQ-9 Reaper) aircraft, as well as from ground complexes—armored vehicles and robotic equipment. See the latest updates with us: Visioner

Visioner

17,162 просмотров • 6 месяцев назад

🚨🇮🇷 IRAN’S DRONE HUNTERS: A NIGHTMARE FOR U.S. AND ISRAELI UAVs Even under constant U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, Iran still intercepts enemy drones. The reason lies in a set of mobile, radar-silent air defense systems that are far harder to detect and destroy: 🔸 Missile 358 – a loitering anti-drone interceptor operating in autonomous “free hunt” mode. Flying at ~0.6 Mach with up to 100 km range and 8.5 km interception altitude, it can patrol airspace and engage targets like MQ-9 Reaper or Hermes-900 UAVs. Radio correction can improve accuracy but risks exposing the control node to enemy electronic surveillance. 🔸 AD-08 Majid – a mobile short-range air defense system using optical and thermal sensors instead of radar. Its IR-guided missiles reach ~2 Mach, with 8 km range and 6 km altitude, making the system difficult to detect for aircraft relying on radar warning receivers. 🔸 Repurposed R-73 / R-27T missiles – infrared air-to-air missiles adapted for ground launch from mobile platforms equipped with thermal sights. Similar improvised systems have previously downed UAVs and even aircraft — including a Saudi F-15S shot down by the Houthis in 2018. Unlike radar-based systems that can be quickly targeted by anti-radiation missiles, these mobile defenses are harder to detect and eliminate, allowing Iran to keep enemy UAV operations under constant pressure. Do you think radar-silent air defenses could really help Iran counter Western drones and aircraft?
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🚨🇮🇷 IRAN’S DRONE HUNTERS: A NIGHTMARE FOR U.S. AND ISRAELI UAVs Even under constant U.S. and Israeli airstrikes, Iran still intercepts enemy drones. The reason lies in a set of mobile, radar-silent air defense systems that are far harder to detect and destroy: 🔸 Missile 358 – a loitering anti-drone interceptor operating in autonomous “free hunt” mode. Flying at ~0.6 Mach with up to 100 km range and 8.5 km interception altitude, it can patrol airspace and engage targets like MQ-9 Reaper or Hermes-900 UAVs. Radio correction can improve accuracy but risks exposing the control node to enemy electronic surveillance. 🔸 AD-08 Majid – a mobile short-range air defense system using optical and thermal sensors instead of radar. Its IR-guided missiles reach ~2 Mach, with 8 km range and 6 km altitude, making the system difficult to detect for aircraft relying on radar warning receivers. 🔸 Repurposed R-73 / R-27T missiles – infrared air-to-air missiles adapted for ground launch from mobile platforms equipped with thermal sights. Similar improvised systems have previously downed UAVs and even aircraft — including a Saudi F-15S shot down by the Houthis in 2018. Unlike radar-based systems that can be quickly targeted by anti-radiation missiles, these mobile defenses are harder to detect and eliminate, allowing Iran to keep enemy UAV operations under constant pressure. Do you think radar-silent air defenses could really help Iran counter Western drones and aircraft?

NewRulesGeopolitics

119,673 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад

🚨🇻🇪🇺🇸 If Washington launches a military operation against Venezuela, the opening phase is already clear. The United States always opens with long range stand off power. The goal is simple: blind air defenses, cut command links, then dominate the skies without sending troops early. 🔹 First wave: Stand off missile saturation Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from Arleigh Burke destroyers and Virginia class submarines target radar sites, SAM batteries, command bunkers, air bases, naval bases, and electronic warfare nodes. 🔹 Air power from distance B‑52H and B‑1B bombers fire JASSM‑ER missiles without entering Venezuelan airspace. These precision strikes focus on integrated air defense systems, early warning radars, and key military infrastructure. 🔹 Electronic suppression phase EA‑18G Growler aircraft jam surveillance radars and disrupt air defense coordination. RC‑135 Rivet Joint aircraft monitor signals and locate remaining air defense nodes. 🔹 Carrier aviation pressure If a carrier strike group is positioned in the region, F/A‑18E Super Hornet and F‑35C missions begin only after air defenses are degraded. Their focus shifts to secondary military targets, ammunition depots, and coastal defense systems. 🔹 Maritime dominance US Navy assets typically enforce wide area sea control. P‑8A Poseidon aircraft track submarines and surface vessels, while destroyers stand by for missile defense and follow‑on strikes. 🔹 No early ground entry The Pentagon avoids early landings. Any ground component would come only after full air dominance. The operation remains focused on precision strikes, command paralysis, and control of the air and sea. This is the standard US playbook: overwhelm sensors, isolate command structures, neutralize air defenses, and shape the battlespace without committing forces to a long ground fight.
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🚨🇻🇪🇺🇸 If Washington launches a military operation against Venezuela, the opening phase is already clear. The United States always opens with long range stand off power. The goal is simple: blind air defenses, cut command links, then dominate the skies without sending troops early. 🔹 First wave: Stand off missile saturation Tomahawk cruise missiles launched from Arleigh Burke destroyers and Virginia class submarines target radar sites, SAM batteries, command bunkers, air bases, naval bases, and electronic warfare nodes. 🔹 Air power from distance B‑52H and B‑1B bombers fire JASSM‑ER missiles without entering Venezuelan airspace. These precision strikes focus on integrated air defense systems, early warning radars, and key military infrastructure. 🔹 Electronic suppression phase EA‑18G Growler aircraft jam surveillance radars and disrupt air defense coordination. RC‑135 Rivet Joint aircraft monitor signals and locate remaining air defense nodes. 🔹 Carrier aviation pressure If a carrier strike group is positioned in the region, F/A‑18E Super Hornet and F‑35C missions begin only after air defenses are degraded. Their focus shifts to secondary military targets, ammunition depots, and coastal defense systems. 🔹 Maritime dominance US Navy assets typically enforce wide area sea control. P‑8A Poseidon aircraft track submarines and surface vessels, while destroyers stand by for missile defense and follow‑on strikes. 🔹 No early ground entry The Pentagon avoids early landings. Any ground component would come only after full air dominance. The operation remains focused on precision strikes, command paralysis, and control of the air and sea. This is the standard US playbook: overwhelm sensors, isolate command structures, neutralize air defenses, and shape the battlespace without committing forces to a long ground fight.

Defence Index

1,201,840 просмотров • 8 месяцев назад

"We are learning from Ukraine every day." – U.S. Secretary of Defense when asked whether American bases are protected against attacks similar to the SBU’s Operation Spiderweb. So, what can NATO learn from Ukraine when it comes to the use of and defense against drones? 🔳 Counter-drone defense According to Ukrainian military officials, no NATO army is currently prepared to withstand a mass drone assault. 🔳 Camouflaging weapons ▪️ Over years of war, Ukrainian Defenders have mastered concealing weapons near the front lines under tree cover and camouflage netting. ▪️ Ukraine’s military has also developed systems for jamming Russian signals and tracking enemy drones. ▪️ NATO is considering using drones as tools for early warning and border deterrence. ▪️ NATO countries bordering Russia have initiated the creation of a Baltic Drone Wall — a network of drones, sensors, jamming systems, and surveillance equipment. 🔳 Drone production ▪️ Ukraine has significantly ramped up its capabilities and plans to produce 5 million drones in 2025. ▪️ Within NATO, Germany is working closely with Ukraine on drone development. ▪️ The EU has also announced plans to strengthen its member states’ capacity to manufacture drones. 🔳 Frontline testing Drone prototypes in Ukraine are immediately sent into combat and tested against Russian capabilities. The data gathered is then directly used to refine drone manufacturing. 🔳 Drone pilot training ▪️ This year, NATO conducted extended simulation-based drone exercises. ▪️ NATO also has a training center in Poland to study and apply Ukrainian experience. ▪️ Denmark has sent its military personnel to Ukraine to learn drone warfare tactics firsthand. 📹: DW
2:34

"We are learning from Ukraine every day." – U.S. Secretary of Defense when asked whether American bases are protected against attacks similar to the SBU’s Operation Spiderweb. So, what can NATO learn from Ukraine when it comes to the use of and defense against drones? 🔳 Counter-drone defense According to Ukrainian military officials, no NATO army is currently prepared to withstand a mass drone assault. 🔳 Camouflaging weapons ▪️ Over years of war, Ukrainian Defenders have mastered concealing weapons near the front lines under tree cover and camouflage netting. ▪️ Ukraine’s military has also developed systems for jamming Russian signals and tracking enemy drones. ▪️ NATO is considering using drones as tools for early warning and border deterrence. ▪️ NATO countries bordering Russia have initiated the creation of a Baltic Drone Wall — a network of drones, sensors, jamming systems, and surveillance equipment. 🔳 Drone production ▪️ Ukraine has significantly ramped up its capabilities and plans to produce 5 million drones in 2025. ▪️ Within NATO, Germany is working closely with Ukraine on drone development. ▪️ The EU has also announced plans to strengthen its member states’ capacity to manufacture drones. 🔳 Frontline testing Drone prototypes in Ukraine are immediately sent into combat and tested against Russian capabilities. The data gathered is then directly used to refine drone manufacturing. 🔳 Drone pilot training ▪️ This year, NATO conducted extended simulation-based drone exercises. ▪️ NATO also has a training center in Poland to study and apply Ukrainian experience. ▪️ Denmark has sent its military personnel to Ukraine to learn drone warfare tactics firsthand. 📹: DW

Anton Gerashchenko

50,401 просмотров • 1 год назад

🇧🇩 Bangladesh Must Strengthen Its Defense with Modern Warfare, Guerrilla Tactics, and Strong Alliances Against Indian Aggression. With India’s continued threats to expand its control over the Siliguri Corridor, also known as the Chicken Neck, Bangladesh must prepare for any military confrontation. To counter a potential invasion, Bangladesh must develop a comprehensive defense strategy, combining advanced weaponry, guerrilla warfare, and strategic alliances with anti India powers such as China and Pakistan. A strong defense policy will serve as a deterrent and ensure Bangladesh’s sovereignty remains intact. Bangladesh must focus on military modernization to strengthen its conventional warfare capabilities. It should acquire anti tank missiles like Javelin or equivalent systems to neutralize Indian armored units. Man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) will be crucial in targeting enemy aircraft, helicopters, and drones. Loitering munitions, or suicide drones, should be deployed for precision strikes against command centers and armored convoys. Air defense systems, both short and medium range, must be procured to safeguard key infrastructure and military bases. Electronic warfare capabilities should be enhanced to disrupt Indian communication, surveillance, and drone operations. Additionally, long range artillery and rocket systems should be developed to counter enemy advances and suppress offensive operations. In addition to conventional warfare, Bangladesh must prepare for guerrilla resistance in case of an invasion. Urban and jungle warfare training should be intensified, leveraging Bangladesh’s dense terrain for ambushes and hit and run tactics. A decentralized command structure will ensure resistance forces can operate even if key military centers are attacked. Militias and civil defense forces should be trained to disrupt enemy supply lines and carry out sabotage operations. Cyber and information warfare must also be prioritized to counter Indian propaganda and hack enemy communication networks. To strengthen its defense, Bangladesh must actively seek strategic partnerships with nations that oppose India’s regional dominance. China, as a global power with advanced military technology and a strong geopolitical interest in countering India, would be a valuable ally. Pakistan, India’s historical rival, has battlefield experience and intelligence sharing capabilities that could benefit Bangladesh. Other nations like Turkey, Russia, and Iran could serve as potential suppliers of drones, air defense systems, and electronic warfare tools. If India attempts military aggression, Bangladesh must be fully prepared to resist through a combination of modern warfare, guerrilla tactics, and strong international backing. A well equipped and strategically aligned Bangladesh will make any invasion an extremely costly endeavor for India, ensuring its territorial ambitions are effectively countered.
1:08

🇧🇩 Bangladesh Must Strengthen Its Defense with Modern Warfare, Guerrilla Tactics, and Strong Alliances Against Indian Aggression. With India’s continued threats to expand its control over the Siliguri Corridor, also known as the Chicken Neck, Bangladesh must prepare for any military confrontation. To counter a potential invasion, Bangladesh must develop a comprehensive defense strategy, combining advanced weaponry, guerrilla warfare, and strategic alliances with anti India powers such as China and Pakistan. A strong defense policy will serve as a deterrent and ensure Bangladesh’s sovereignty remains intact. Bangladesh must focus on military modernization to strengthen its conventional warfare capabilities. It should acquire anti tank missiles like Javelin or equivalent systems to neutralize Indian armored units. Man portable air defense systems (MANPADS) will be crucial in targeting enemy aircraft, helicopters, and drones. Loitering munitions, or suicide drones, should be deployed for precision strikes against command centers and armored convoys. Air defense systems, both short and medium range, must be procured to safeguard key infrastructure and military bases. Electronic warfare capabilities should be enhanced to disrupt Indian communication, surveillance, and drone operations. Additionally, long range artillery and rocket systems should be developed to counter enemy advances and suppress offensive operations. In addition to conventional warfare, Bangladesh must prepare for guerrilla resistance in case of an invasion. Urban and jungle warfare training should be intensified, leveraging Bangladesh’s dense terrain for ambushes and hit and run tactics. A decentralized command structure will ensure resistance forces can operate even if key military centers are attacked. Militias and civil defense forces should be trained to disrupt enemy supply lines and carry out sabotage operations. Cyber and information warfare must also be prioritized to counter Indian propaganda and hack enemy communication networks. To strengthen its defense, Bangladesh must actively seek strategic partnerships with nations that oppose India’s regional dominance. China, as a global power with advanced military technology and a strong geopolitical interest in countering India, would be a valuable ally. Pakistan, India’s historical rival, has battlefield experience and intelligence sharing capabilities that could benefit Bangladesh. Other nations like Turkey, Russia, and Iran could serve as potential suppliers of drones, air defense systems, and electronic warfare tools. If India attempts military aggression, Bangladesh must be fully prepared to resist through a combination of modern warfare, guerrilla tactics, and strong international backing. A well equipped and strategically aligned Bangladesh will make any invasion an extremely costly endeavor for India, ensuring its territorial ambitions are effectively countered.

Defence Index

26,326 просмотров • 1 год назад

Over the past week, Ukrainian Defenders struck and destroyed multiple Russian targets. This is a selection of several of them. Ukrainian Defense Forces are increasing middle-range and long-range strikes. Glory! ▪️ Tor SAM system - destroyed by Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in Donetsk region; ▪️ BM-21 Grad MLRS - destroyed in Zaporizhzhia region; ▪️ Kremniy El microelectronics plant in Bryansk, Russia - struck by the Ukrainian Defense Forces using Storm Shadow air-launched missiles. The plant produces key components for Russian "high-precision" weapons, including Iskander missiles; ▪️ Buk-M1 SAM system - destroyed by the USF in Zaporizhzhia region; ▪️ S-300V SAM system - destroyed by the USF in Luhansk region; ▪️ Modern Russian Nadgrobie ("Tombstone") radar system, Buk-M2 system, and a Rubicon center deployment site - struck by the USF using Ukrainian-made FP-2 drones (60-100 kg warheads) in Russian-occupied Crimea and Donetsk region; ▪️ Afipsky oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai, Russia - struck by the USF; This refinery is one of the largest oil-processing facilities in southern Russia, with a design capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year; ▪️ Tor-M2 SAM system - destroyed by the USF in Zaporizhzhia region; ▪️ Oborona-14 radar, Nebo-U radar, two radars under radomes in occupied Crimea, and a Russian command post element in Donetsk region - struck by the Special Operations Forces (SOF); ▪️ 55Zh6 Nebo radar, Buk-M1 system, and four rare Merlin-VR reconnaissance drones - destroyed by the USF in occupied Crimea, Donetsk region, and Zaporizhzhia region; ▪️ Fuel storage and distribution site in Donetsk region and Volna-3 electronic warfare station in Donetsk - struck by the SOF; ▪️ Missile and artillery ammunition depot in Donetsk region and 64N6E radar in occupied Crimea - struck by the SOF; ▪️ Iskander missile launchers and a storage site in occupied Crimea - struck by the SOF; ▪️ Deep-strike units of the SOF struck Port Kavkaz in Chushka on the Russian side of the Kerch Strait - a key logistics hub linking Russia and occupied Crimea. The port includes berths, a ferry complex, and terminals for handling grain, oil products, and chemical cargo. Russia also uses Port Kavkaz for export-import operations and offshore transshipment of large vessels; ▪️ S-300 radar in occupied Crimea and a Buk-M3 system in Luhansk region were struck; ▪️ Fuel depots were hit in Zaporizhzhia region and Crimea; ▪️ Maykop airfield in Adygea, Russia, was struck; ▪️ Nebo-U radar was hit in Russian-occupied Crimea; ▪️ Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence disabled the Russian rail ferry Slavyanin and damaged the vessel Avangard - key elements of the Kerch ferry crossing used for Russian military logistics; ▪️ 59N6-E Protivnik and 73E6 Parol radars, and an S-400 Triumf launcher in temporarily occupied Crimea were struck; ▪️ Valday radar complex was severely damaged in Crimea; ▪️ Ukrainian Navy destroyed a Russian Raptor-class patrol boat using FP‑1 drones. And these are just some of the targets. Glory!
1:12

Over the past week, Ukrainian Defenders struck and destroyed multiple Russian targets. This is a selection of several of them. Ukrainian Defense Forces are increasing middle-range and long-range strikes. Glory! ▪️ Tor SAM system - destroyed by Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) in Donetsk region; ▪️ BM-21 Grad MLRS - destroyed in Zaporizhzhia region; ▪️ Kremniy El microelectronics plant in Bryansk, Russia - struck by the Ukrainian Defense Forces using Storm Shadow air-launched missiles. The plant produces key components for Russian "high-precision" weapons, including Iskander missiles; ▪️ Buk-M1 SAM system - destroyed by the USF in Zaporizhzhia region; ▪️ S-300V SAM system - destroyed by the USF in Luhansk region; ▪️ Modern Russian Nadgrobie ("Tombstone") radar system, Buk-M2 system, and a Rubicon center deployment site - struck by the USF using Ukrainian-made FP-2 drones (60-100 kg warheads) in Russian-occupied Crimea and Donetsk region; ▪️ Afipsky oil refinery in Krasnodar Krai, Russia - struck by the USF; This refinery is one of the largest oil-processing facilities in southern Russia, with a design capacity of 6.25 million tons of oil per year; ▪️ Tor-M2 SAM system - destroyed by the USF in Zaporizhzhia region; ▪️ Oborona-14 radar, Nebo-U radar, two radars under radomes in occupied Crimea, and a Russian command post element in Donetsk region - struck by the Special Operations Forces (SOF); ▪️ 55Zh6 Nebo radar, Buk-M1 system, and four rare Merlin-VR reconnaissance drones - destroyed by the USF in occupied Crimea, Donetsk region, and Zaporizhzhia region; ▪️ Fuel storage and distribution site in Donetsk region and Volna-3 electronic warfare station in Donetsk - struck by the SOF; ▪️ Missile and artillery ammunition depot in Donetsk region and 64N6E radar in occupied Crimea - struck by the SOF; ▪️ Iskander missile launchers and a storage site in occupied Crimea - struck by the SOF; ▪️ Deep-strike units of the SOF struck Port Kavkaz in Chushka on the Russian side of the Kerch Strait - a key logistics hub linking Russia and occupied Crimea. The port includes berths, a ferry complex, and terminals for handling grain, oil products, and chemical cargo. Russia also uses Port Kavkaz for export-import operations and offshore transshipment of large vessels; ▪️ S-300 radar in occupied Crimea and a Buk-M3 system in Luhansk region were struck; ▪️ Fuel depots were hit in Zaporizhzhia region and Crimea; ▪️ Maykop airfield in Adygea, Russia, was struck; ▪️ Nebo-U radar was hit in Russian-occupied Crimea; ▪️ Ukraine’s Defense Intelligence disabled the Russian rail ferry Slavyanin and damaged the vessel Avangard - key elements of the Kerch ferry crossing used for Russian military logistics; ▪️ 59N6-E Protivnik and 73E6 Parol radars, and an S-400 Triumf launcher in temporarily occupied Crimea were struck; ▪️ Valday radar complex was severely damaged in Crimea; ▪️ Ukrainian Navy destroyed a Russian Raptor-class patrol boat using FP‑1 drones. And these are just some of the targets. Glory!

Anton Gerashchenko

28,469 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад

According to military experts, Venezuela had the most powerful and multi-layered air defense network in Latin America. There are also reports that Russia has transferred its air defense systems to Venezuela in the fall of 2025. In this video, Maduro speaks about 5,000 Russian Igla MANPADS protecting Venezuela's borders. None of them did their job, it seems. The main tasks of protecting the country's airspace were carried out by the Bolivarian Military Aviation (Aviación Militar Bolivariana), which includes all branches of aviation, air defense forces, and other structures. There are six joint aerospace defense commands (Comando de Defensa Aeroespacial Integral) responsible for different areas. CODAI oversees surveillance units, combat aviation, and air defense systems. The Bolivarian Navy also had its own capabilities for protection against an air attack. According to publicly available data, a radar field has been established along Venezuela's borders for the rapid detection of an air attack. At the most critical areas, modern Chinese-made JYL-1 and JY-11B 3D radars are deployed (from 8 to 10 units). Bolivarian Military Aviation also has the following in service: 🔹 Russian S-300VM Antey-2500 system: two divisions, including radars, a command post, up to six launchers each, and anti-aircraft missiles, received by Caracas from Moscow in 2013; 🔹 Russian Buk-M2E surface-to-air missile system: according to open sources, nine combat vehicles; 🔹 S-125 Pechora-2M SAM system: outdated equipment that has been actively decommissioned, but around 24 launchers remain in service; 🔹 Tor-M1 SAM systems: between 10 and 12 units; 🔹 Small-caliber artillery systems of various types: at least 400 units, half of which are Soviet/Russian 23-mm ZU-23-2 autocannons; 🔹 Man-portable air-defense systems: Russian Igla systems and similar foreign-made MANPADS; 🔹 Anti-aircraft artillery: approximately 260 guns, including Swedish Bofors L70. And if we add fighter aircraft (at least 20 Russian Su-30MKVs and up to 10 operational American F-16s) and naval equipment to this, it becomes clear that Venezuela does have air defense capabilities. However, none of this did its job.
1:04

According to military experts, Venezuela had the most powerful and multi-layered air defense network in Latin America. There are also reports that Russia has transferred its air defense systems to Venezuela in the fall of 2025. In this video, Maduro speaks about 5,000 Russian Igla MANPADS protecting Venezuela's borders. None of them did their job, it seems. The main tasks of protecting the country's airspace were carried out by the Bolivarian Military Aviation (Aviación Militar Bolivariana), which includes all branches of aviation, air defense forces, and other structures. There are six joint aerospace defense commands (Comando de Defensa Aeroespacial Integral) responsible for different areas. CODAI oversees surveillance units, combat aviation, and air defense systems. The Bolivarian Navy also had its own capabilities for protection against an air attack. According to publicly available data, a radar field has been established along Venezuela's borders for the rapid detection of an air attack. At the most critical areas, modern Chinese-made JYL-1 and JY-11B 3D radars are deployed (from 8 to 10 units). Bolivarian Military Aviation also has the following in service: 🔹 Russian S-300VM Antey-2500 system: two divisions, including radars, a command post, up to six launchers each, and anti-aircraft missiles, received by Caracas from Moscow in 2013; 🔹 Russian Buk-M2E surface-to-air missile system: according to open sources, nine combat vehicles; 🔹 S-125 Pechora-2M SAM system: outdated equipment that has been actively decommissioned, but around 24 launchers remain in service; 🔹 Tor-M1 SAM systems: between 10 and 12 units; 🔹 Small-caliber artillery systems of various types: at least 400 units, half of which are Soviet/Russian 23-mm ZU-23-2 autocannons; 🔹 Man-portable air-defense systems: Russian Igla systems and similar foreign-made MANPADS; 🔹 Anti-aircraft artillery: approximately 260 guns, including Swedish Bofors L70. And if we add fighter aircraft (at least 20 Russian Su-30MKVs and up to 10 operational American F-16s) and naval equipment to this, it becomes clear that Venezuela does have air defense capabilities. However, none of this did its job.

Anton Gerashchenko

244,043 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

❗️❗️❗️🇺🇦🇫🇷 GOOD NEWS | “Following yesterday’s agreement with Emmanuel Macron, Ukraine will test a new SAMP/T air defense system capable of intercepting ballistic targets. At the moment, it is the only European alternative to the Patriot system. We expect to receive it from France this year,” — Zelensky said. 🔵 To clarify the situation: 🔹 According to previous reports, Ukraine has already received two SAMP/T air defense batteries from France and Italy, but they cannot currently intercept ballistic missiles, as they lack the latest anti-ballistic interceptors and modern radars required for that mission. The previously supplied ASTER-15 air defense missiles, with a range of about 30 km, are mainly designed to intercept aerodynamic targets such as cruise missiles, aircraft, helicopters, and drones. 🔸 Zelensky’s latest statement suggests two important developments regarding the upgrade of these SAMP/T systems to counter Russian ballistic missiles: 1️⃣ The deployment of the modern AESA radar Ground Fire 300 — a multifunctional radar capable of detection and target tracking at distances of 400–450 km, allowing effective engagement of ballistic targets. 2️⃣ The delivery of ASTER-30 interceptor missiles, equipped with active radar seekers. •Against aerodynamic targets, the range reaches up to 120 km. •Against ballistic missiles: ▪️ ASTER-30 Block 1 can intercept targets at 30–35 km. ▪️ ASTER-30 Block 1NT can intercept ballistic missiles at 45–55 km. 📌 Interceptions are performed at altitudes of approximately 20–22 km.
0:21

❗️❗️❗️🇺🇦🇫🇷 GOOD NEWS | “Following yesterday’s agreement with Emmanuel Macron, Ukraine will test a new SAMP/T air defense system capable of intercepting ballistic targets. At the moment, it is the only European alternative to the Patriot system. We expect to receive it from France this year,” — Zelensky said. 🔵 To clarify the situation: 🔹 According to previous reports, Ukraine has already received two SAMP/T air defense batteries from France and Italy, but they cannot currently intercept ballistic missiles, as they lack the latest anti-ballistic interceptors and modern radars required for that mission. The previously supplied ASTER-15 air defense missiles, with a range of about 30 km, are mainly designed to intercept aerodynamic targets such as cruise missiles, aircraft, helicopters, and drones. 🔸 Zelensky’s latest statement suggests two important developments regarding the upgrade of these SAMP/T systems to counter Russian ballistic missiles: 1️⃣ The deployment of the modern AESA radar Ground Fire 300 — a multifunctional radar capable of detection and target tracking at distances of 400–450 km, allowing effective engagement of ballistic targets. 2️⃣ The delivery of ASTER-30 interceptor missiles, equipped with active radar seekers. •Against aerodynamic targets, the range reaches up to 120 km. •Against ballistic missiles: ▪️ ASTER-30 Block 1 can intercept targets at 30–35 km. ▪️ ASTER-30 Block 1NT can intercept ballistic missiles at 45–55 km. 📌 Interceptions are performed at altitudes of approximately 20–22 km.

NSTRIKE

70,401 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад

🇺🇸 At the Fort Hood training ground in Texas, the US Army is conducting one of the first live-fire tests of the latest Sgt Stout short-range air defense systems, built on the basis of the Stryker A1 combat vehicles already in service with the US Army. The complex, developed under the M-SHORAD program, is equipped with a 30mm XM914 cannon with programmable ammunition and a dual launcher for Stinger MANPADS, thereby providing protection against a wide range of targets at its effective range. Additionally, it features thermal imaging and electro-optical sensors, a radar from L3Harris, and a fire control system from the Italian Leonardo DRS, allowing the vehicle to independently detect, track, and engage targets without external targeting, relying solely on its own sensors. The exercises themselves include day and night firing drills simulating attacks by drones, helicopters, and low-flying munitions such as glide bombs, as well as cruise missiles. According to requirements, the vehicle must be capable of operating on the move and provide all-around defense for troops, and its modular design allows for the future installation of additional laser and electronic warfare systems against UAVs. With serial production starting in 2026, the "Sgt Stout" will become the backbone of mobile air defense for the US Army and National Guard, replacing the rapidly aging Avenger systems and forming an updated line of defense against short-range threats. See the latest updates with us: Visioner
0:26

🇺🇸 At the Fort Hood training ground in Texas, the US Army is conducting one of the first live-fire tests of the latest Sgt Stout short-range air defense systems, built on the basis of the Stryker A1 combat vehicles already in service with the US Army. The complex, developed under the M-SHORAD program, is equipped with a 30mm XM914 cannon with programmable ammunition and a dual launcher for Stinger MANPADS, thereby providing protection against a wide range of targets at its effective range. Additionally, it features thermal imaging and electro-optical sensors, a radar from L3Harris, and a fire control system from the Italian Leonardo DRS, allowing the vehicle to independently detect, track, and engage targets without external targeting, relying solely on its own sensors. The exercises themselves include day and night firing drills simulating attacks by drones, helicopters, and low-flying munitions such as glide bombs, as well as cruise missiles. According to requirements, the vehicle must be capable of operating on the move and provide all-around defense for troops, and its modular design allows for the future installation of additional laser and electronic warfare systems against UAVs. With serial production starting in 2026, the "Sgt Stout" will become the backbone of mobile air defense for the US Army and National Guard, replacing the rapidly aging Avenger systems and forming an updated line of defense against short-range threats. See the latest updates with us: Visioner

Visioner

95,867 просмотров • 10 месяцев назад

🇷🇺 Russia’s Starlink killers showcase new era of electronic battlefield warfare Russia has ramped-up EW use to detect and jam Elon Musk’s Starlink terminals and satellites, Ukrainian media reports. 👉 Meet Russia’s key counter-Starlink systems: 🔸 Volna Kupol Garant Russia’s latest electronic warfare system reportedly uses a directed high-frequency radio beam to disrupt Starlink operations. Rather than damaging satellites orbiting roughly 500 kilometers above Earth, the system blinds them – cutting their ability to connect with ground terminals while they remain under attack. According to reports, Volna is a mobile system built around six trailers. Each carries a pair of steerable satellite dishes mounted on rotating platforms. A single battery is reportedly capable of denying Starlink coverage across an area of up to 20 sq km. Some analysts say the system was previously referenced under the designation Peresvet-M, although this has not been independently confirmed. Ukrainian sources claim Volna was first deployed during Russia's offensive in the Kharkov region in 2024. They also say its use has increased significantly in recent months. 🔸 Tobol The secretive Russian EW complex is reportedly used to disrupt signals from NATO-linked satellite networks, including GPS, Galileo, and Starlink. Reports claim that Tobol attacks satellite communications on both ends of the link – jamming downlinks from satellites to ground receivers and uplinks from Earth to orbit. Its power and range also allegedly allow it to create an electromagnetic "umbrella." 🔸 Kalinka The system is designed to hunt down satellite communications signals, including those transmitted by Starlink terminals at distances of up to 15 km. It can reportedly track and lock onto even Starshield – SpaceX’s hardened military variant of Starlink. Western media warns that while Tobol disrupts GPS signals on a broad scale, the Kalinka’s precision-targeting capabilities could pose a more direct threat to specific military operations. 🔸 Krasukha The Krasukha-S4 is designed to neutralize reconnaissance satellites, ground-based radar installations, and airborne surveillance systems. It does so by emitting powerful electronic jamming signals that disrupt key radar bands and other radio-frequency emissions. A standard Krasukha-S4 battery consists of two vehicles and has an operational range exceeding 300 kilometers. 🔸 Borshchevik The light mobile system is designed to detect and geolocate Starlink terminals within a 180-degree sector at ranges of up to 10 km, with a reported accuracy of five meters. Using direction-finding and biangulation algorithms, it can locate a target in less than three minutes at a single scanning position. The Borshchevik-2 airborne system hunts Starlink signals from the sky, with reported accuracy down to 0.4 m.
0:20

🇷🇺 Russia’s Starlink killers showcase new era of electronic battlefield warfare Russia has ramped-up EW use to detect and jam Elon Musk’s Starlink terminals and satellites, Ukrainian media reports. 👉 Meet Russia’s key counter-Starlink systems: 🔸 Volna Kupol Garant Russia’s latest electronic warfare system reportedly uses a directed high-frequency radio beam to disrupt Starlink operations. Rather than damaging satellites orbiting roughly 500 kilometers above Earth, the system blinds them – cutting their ability to connect with ground terminals while they remain under attack. According to reports, Volna is a mobile system built around six trailers. Each carries a pair of steerable satellite dishes mounted on rotating platforms. A single battery is reportedly capable of denying Starlink coverage across an area of up to 20 sq km. Some analysts say the system was previously referenced under the designation Peresvet-M, although this has not been independently confirmed. Ukrainian sources claim Volna was first deployed during Russia's offensive in the Kharkov region in 2024. They also say its use has increased significantly in recent months. 🔸 Tobol The secretive Russian EW complex is reportedly used to disrupt signals from NATO-linked satellite networks, including GPS, Galileo, and Starlink. Reports claim that Tobol attacks satellite communications on both ends of the link – jamming downlinks from satellites to ground receivers and uplinks from Earth to orbit. Its power and range also allegedly allow it to create an electromagnetic "umbrella." 🔸 Kalinka The system is designed to hunt down satellite communications signals, including those transmitted by Starlink terminals at distances of up to 15 km. It can reportedly track and lock onto even Starshield – SpaceX’s hardened military variant of Starlink. Western media warns that while Tobol disrupts GPS signals on a broad scale, the Kalinka’s precision-targeting capabilities could pose a more direct threat to specific military operations. 🔸 Krasukha The Krasukha-S4 is designed to neutralize reconnaissance satellites, ground-based radar installations, and airborne surveillance systems. It does so by emitting powerful electronic jamming signals that disrupt key radar bands and other radio-frequency emissions. A standard Krasukha-S4 battery consists of two vehicles and has an operational range exceeding 300 kilometers. 🔸 Borshchevik The light mobile system is designed to detect and geolocate Starlink terminals within a 180-degree sector at ranges of up to 10 km, with a reported accuracy of five meters. Using direction-finding and biangulation algorithms, it can locate a target in less than three minutes at a single scanning position. The Borshchevik-2 airborne system hunts Starlink signals from the sky, with reported accuracy down to 0.4 m.

Sputnik

25,422 просмотров • 17 дней назад

🛰️ Two Russian electronic warfare systems "Volna Kupol Garant" designed to suppress the Starlink satellite communication system have been destroyed. These are the systems that the Russians use to combat one of the most important elements of modern warfare - Starlink satellite communication. "Volna Kupol Garant" works on a fairly simple principle: the system emits powerful interference towards Starlink satellites, trying to "jam" signals from Ukrainian terminals. To do this, the complex uses 8 communication channels in the 14–14.5 GHz range at once. In fact, the satellite receives such a powerful stream of interference that it stops "hearing" legitimate terminals. One such complex is capable of covering an area of ​​about 20 km². "Volna Kupol Garant" consists of six trailers, on which 12 antennas are located. Each antenna is hidden in a characteristic radio-transparent casing and is equipped with a mechanism for pointing at satellites flying over the area of ​​operation of the complex. Due to the high power consumption, the system can operate both from its own generators and from external power supply. The first cases of the use of such electronic warfare means were recorded back in 2024 in the Kharkiv direction. Today, the Russians are increasingly trying to use them to protect logistics and rear facilities from Ukrainian long-range strikes. However, as practice shows, any active electronic warfare sooner or later becomes a target itself.
0:52

🛰️ Two Russian electronic warfare systems "Volna Kupol Garant" designed to suppress the Starlink satellite communication system have been destroyed. These are the systems that the Russians use to combat one of the most important elements of modern warfare - Starlink satellite communication. "Volna Kupol Garant" works on a fairly simple principle: the system emits powerful interference towards Starlink satellites, trying to "jam" signals from Ukrainian terminals. To do this, the complex uses 8 communication channels in the 14–14.5 GHz range at once. In fact, the satellite receives such a powerful stream of interference that it stops "hearing" legitimate terminals. One such complex is capable of covering an area of ​​about 20 km². "Volna Kupol Garant" consists of six trailers, on which 12 antennas are located. Each antenna is hidden in a characteristic radio-transparent casing and is equipped with a mechanism for pointing at satellites flying over the area of ​​operation of the complex. Due to the high power consumption, the system can operate both from its own generators and from external power supply. The first cases of the use of such electronic warfare means were recorded back in 2024 in the Kharkiv direction. Today, the Russians are increasingly trying to use them to protect logistics and rear facilities from Ukrainian long-range strikes. However, as practice shows, any active electronic warfare sooner or later becomes a target itself.

Military Summary

12,235 просмотров • 1 месяц назад

🇮🇷 Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal and the Regional Counter Strategy Fateh Series (SRBM) The Fateh family represents Iran’s core short range ballistic missile capability. These missiles use solid fuel, allowing rapid launch with minimal preparation time. Estimated range is around 300 km, designed for battlefield and regional targets. Later variants emphasize higher accuracy through improved guidance and terminal maneuvering, making them more difficult to intercept than older systems. Sejjil (MRBM) Sejjil is a two stage, solid fuel medium range ballistic missile with an estimated range of 2,000 to 2,500 km. Its solid fuel design significantly improves survivability by reducing launch detection time. Sejjil is intended as a strategic missile capable of reaching targets across the Middle East, including major military bases and infrastructure. Kheibar Shekan (Advanced MRBM) Kheibar Shekan is a newer generation solid fuel missile with a reported range of around 1,450 km. It features a maneuverable reentry vehicle, enabling mid course and terminal phase adjustments to complicate interception. This missile is optimized to penetrate modern missile defense systems rather than relying purely on range or payload. Why these missiles challenge air and missile defenses? Solid fuel propulsion shortens warning time. Maneuverable reentry vehicles reduce interception probability. High speed terminal phases compress response windows. When launched in salvos, these missiles are designed to stress and saturate defensive systems. How regional and allied forces aim to counter this threat Surrounding states and allied bases rely on layered missile defense. Patriot PAC 3 MSE addresses short range and terminal phase threats. THAAD provides high altitude interception against medium range missiles. Israeli systems such as Arrow complement regional coverage. Early warning radars, space based sensors, and shared command networks extend detection and response time. Base hardening, dispersal of assets, and redundancy reduce damage if interception fails. Intelligence driven preemptive strike capability remains a key deterrent factor. Strategic assessment Iran’s missile program emphasizes survivability and defense penetration rather than sheer numbers. In response, regional allies focus on integration, layered defense, and intelligence dominance. The outcome in any future conflict would likely depend less on individual missiles and more on coordination, saturation levels, and decision speed.. Can layered missile defense realistically stay ahead of evolving maneuverable ballistic threats?
0:49

🇮🇷 Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal and the Regional Counter Strategy Fateh Series (SRBM) The Fateh family represents Iran’s core short range ballistic missile capability. These missiles use solid fuel, allowing rapid launch with minimal preparation time. Estimated range is around 300 km, designed for battlefield and regional targets. Later variants emphasize higher accuracy through improved guidance and terminal maneuvering, making them more difficult to intercept than older systems. Sejjil (MRBM) Sejjil is a two stage, solid fuel medium range ballistic missile with an estimated range of 2,000 to 2,500 km. Its solid fuel design significantly improves survivability by reducing launch detection time. Sejjil is intended as a strategic missile capable of reaching targets across the Middle East, including major military bases and infrastructure. Kheibar Shekan (Advanced MRBM) Kheibar Shekan is a newer generation solid fuel missile with a reported range of around 1,450 km. It features a maneuverable reentry vehicle, enabling mid course and terminal phase adjustments to complicate interception. This missile is optimized to penetrate modern missile defense systems rather than relying purely on range or payload. Why these missiles challenge air and missile defenses? Solid fuel propulsion shortens warning time. Maneuverable reentry vehicles reduce interception probability. High speed terminal phases compress response windows. When launched in salvos, these missiles are designed to stress and saturate defensive systems. How regional and allied forces aim to counter this threat Surrounding states and allied bases rely on layered missile defense. Patriot PAC 3 MSE addresses short range and terminal phase threats. THAAD provides high altitude interception against medium range missiles. Israeli systems such as Arrow complement regional coverage. Early warning radars, space based sensors, and shared command networks extend detection and response time. Base hardening, dispersal of assets, and redundancy reduce damage if interception fails. Intelligence driven preemptive strike capability remains a key deterrent factor. Strategic assessment Iran’s missile program emphasizes survivability and defense penetration rather than sheer numbers. In response, regional allies focus on integration, layered defense, and intelligence dominance. The outcome in any future conflict would likely depend less on individual missiles and more on coordination, saturation levels, and decision speed.. Can layered missile defense realistically stay ahead of evolving maneuverable ballistic threats?

Defense Intelligence

22,048 просмотров • 6 месяцев назад

🚨🇷🇺 NATO IN PANIC: RUSSIA’S SU-57 STEALTH FIGHTER GETS NEW MISSILE THAT HUNTS THROUGH JAMMING Russia has unveiled the RVV-SDM, a new medium-range air-to-air missile developed for the Su-57 and other Russian combat aircraft. The first official image shows two missiles inside the fighter’s internal weapons bay, preserving the aircraft’s stealth while expanding its ability to attack targets beyond visual range. 🔸 The RVV-SDM is designed to destroy fighters, helicopters, drones and other aerial targets day or night, in difficult weather and under heavy electronic warfare. 🔸 Its guidance system combines inertial navigation, mid-course radio correction and an active radar seeker for the final attack. A passive channel allows the missile to track an emitting target without broadcasting its own radar signal. 🔸 That creates a serious problem for enemy aircraft using powerful electronic countermeasures. Instead of breaking the lock, a jammer can become the signal that guides the missile toward its target. 🔸 The missile uses an upgraded solid-fuel motor with greater energy than the earlier RVV-SD. Russia has not disclosed its exact maximum range, but confirms that it exceeds the predecessor’s 110 km reach. 🔸 Internal carriage is central to the design. Folding aerodynamic surfaces allow the RVV-SDM to fit inside the Su-57, avoiding external pylons that would increase radar visibility and drag. 🔸 The “fire-and-forget” capability allows the Su-57 to launch, change course and leave the threatened area while the missile independently completes the final stage of the interception. 🔸 RVV-SDM fills the middle layer of the Su-57’s air-combat arsenal between the short-range RVV-MD2 and long-range RVV-BD. The fighter can therefore carry different weapons for close combat, conventional beyond-visual-range engagements and attacks against high-value aircraft at much greater distances. Rosoboronexport is also offering the missile with the Su-57E and says it can be integrated onto other Russian-made fighters after modification. That gives foreign Su-57 operators access to the same combination of internal carriage, improved range and guidance built to operate through electronic warfare. For NATO pilots, switching on the jammer may no longer provide a clean escape route. The signal intended to protect the aircraft could instead help the Russian missile find it. Do you think NATO has an answer to the Su-57’s new missile?
0:29

🚨🇷🇺 NATO IN PANIC: RUSSIA’S SU-57 STEALTH FIGHTER GETS NEW MISSILE THAT HUNTS THROUGH JAMMING Russia has unveiled the RVV-SDM, a new medium-range air-to-air missile developed for the Su-57 and other Russian combat aircraft. The first official image shows two missiles inside the fighter’s internal weapons bay, preserving the aircraft’s stealth while expanding its ability to attack targets beyond visual range. 🔸 The RVV-SDM is designed to destroy fighters, helicopters, drones and other aerial targets day or night, in difficult weather and under heavy electronic warfare. 🔸 Its guidance system combines inertial navigation, mid-course radio correction and an active radar seeker for the final attack. A passive channel allows the missile to track an emitting target without broadcasting its own radar signal. 🔸 That creates a serious problem for enemy aircraft using powerful electronic countermeasures. Instead of breaking the lock, a jammer can become the signal that guides the missile toward its target. 🔸 The missile uses an upgraded solid-fuel motor with greater energy than the earlier RVV-SD. Russia has not disclosed its exact maximum range, but confirms that it exceeds the predecessor’s 110 km reach. 🔸 Internal carriage is central to the design. Folding aerodynamic surfaces allow the RVV-SDM to fit inside the Su-57, avoiding external pylons that would increase radar visibility and drag. 🔸 The “fire-and-forget” capability allows the Su-57 to launch, change course and leave the threatened area while the missile independently completes the final stage of the interception. 🔸 RVV-SDM fills the middle layer of the Su-57’s air-combat arsenal between the short-range RVV-MD2 and long-range RVV-BD. The fighter can therefore carry different weapons for close combat, conventional beyond-visual-range engagements and attacks against high-value aircraft at much greater distances. Rosoboronexport is also offering the missile with the Su-57E and says it can be integrated onto other Russian-made fighters after modification. That gives foreign Su-57 operators access to the same combination of internal carriage, improved range and guidance built to operate through electronic warfare. For NATO pilots, switching on the jammer may no longer provide a clean escape route. The signal intended to protect the aircraft could instead help the Russian missile find it. Do you think NATO has an answer to the Su-57’s new missile?

NewRulesGeopolitics

56,975 просмотров • 10 дней назад

The U.S. just deployed a weapon that was supposed to stay classified for another decade 🚨🚨🚨 THE US JUST DEPLOYED "SOFT KILL" ELECTRONIC WARFARE IN IRAN → NO BULLETS, NO BOMBS, TOTAL DESTRUCTION 🚨🚨🚨 America just revealed a capability most people didn't know existed. Electronic warfare systems mounted on Black Hawks that can shut down an ENTIRE battlefield without firing a single round. Process that. WHAT "SOFT KILL" DOES: → Shuts down ALL enemy communications instantly → Disables drones MID-AIR — they fall from the sky like dead birds → Directed energy BLINDS every sensor, radar, and targeting system in range → Collapses entire command networks in SECONDS → No gunfire. No explosions. Just silence. HOW IT WORKS: → Electromagnetic pulse disrupts every electronic signal within range → Frequency jamming cuts off radio, satellite, and GPS simultaneously → Directed energy overloads sensors — radar screens go BLACK → Iran's drones can't navigate. Their missiles can't lock. Their troops can't communicate. 💀 Iran's $5B Chinese radar systems = BLIND 💀 Iran's Shahed drone swarms = falling out of the sky 💀 Iran's entire command structure = DEAF 💀 Every piece of electronics on the battlefield = DEAD ⚠️ The US used decoy drones to make Iran's radar "hallucinate" fake fighter squadrons ⚠️ Iran wasted interceptors shooting at targets that didn't exist ⚠️ This is why Iran's 31 missile waves keep missing — they're firing BLIND They're showing you explosions and airstrikes. They're NOT showing you that the US already won the electronic war before the first bomb dropped. Iran's entire defense network was NEUTRALIZED by systems that don't even make a sound. You don't deploy soft-kill systems for a 2-week war → you deploy them when you're rewriting the rules of warfare → and you only rewrite the rules when you plan to STAY. Prepare accordingly. 🚨🚨🚨 They don't want you seeing this. Follow + RT to beat the algorithm. 🚨
2:22

The U.S. just deployed a weapon that was supposed to stay classified for another decade 🚨🚨🚨 THE US JUST DEPLOYED "SOFT KILL" ELECTRONIC WARFARE IN IRAN → NO BULLETS, NO BOMBS, TOTAL DESTRUCTION 🚨🚨🚨 America just revealed a capability most people didn't know existed. Electronic warfare systems mounted on Black Hawks that can shut down an ENTIRE battlefield without firing a single round. Process that. WHAT "SOFT KILL" DOES: → Shuts down ALL enemy communications instantly → Disables drones MID-AIR — they fall from the sky like dead birds → Directed energy BLINDS every sensor, radar, and targeting system in range → Collapses entire command networks in SECONDS → No gunfire. No explosions. Just silence. HOW IT WORKS: → Electromagnetic pulse disrupts every electronic signal within range → Frequency jamming cuts off radio, satellite, and GPS simultaneously → Directed energy overloads sensors — radar screens go BLACK → Iran's drones can't navigate. Their missiles can't lock. Their troops can't communicate. 💀 Iran's $5B Chinese radar systems = BLIND 💀 Iran's Shahed drone swarms = falling out of the sky 💀 Iran's entire command structure = DEAF 💀 Every piece of electronics on the battlefield = DEAD ⚠️ The US used decoy drones to make Iran's radar "hallucinate" fake fighter squadrons ⚠️ Iran wasted interceptors shooting at targets that didn't exist ⚠️ This is why Iran's 31 missile waves keep missing — they're firing BLIND They're showing you explosions and airstrikes. They're NOT showing you that the US already won the electronic war before the first bomb dropped. Iran's entire defense network was NEUTRALIZED by systems that don't even make a sound. You don't deploy soft-kill systems for a 2-week war → you deploy them when you're rewriting the rules of warfare → and you only rewrite the rules when you plan to STAY. Prepare accordingly. 🚨🚨🚨 They don't want you seeing this. Follow + RT to beat the algorithm. 🚨

JinWoo Kim, IQ 289

2,390,675 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад

Denys Shtilierman confirmed the combat use of a rocket-carrying drone by Fire Point 🔹 Denys Shtilierman Denys Shtilierman, Chief Designer and co-owner of Fire Point, told NV that one of the reasons for modifying a kamikaze drone into a rocket carrier was a surplus of Soviet S-5 aviation rockets. Ukrainian aviation frequently used these rockets, particularly from helicopters, but this tactic eventually had to be abandoned due to significant risks to pilots and aircraft. ❗️ In turn, the FP rocket-carrying drone is capable of carrying 8 S-5 rockets, flying at a range of up to 500 km, and launching strikes from a distance of 1.5 to 3 km. Fire Point notes that the targets for these rockets can include: ▪️ enemy logistics, such as trains with oil tankers; ▪️ oil depots; ▪️ oil refineries with a large number of pipes and storage tanks. 🔹 However, the primary mission of the rocket-carrying drone is to counter Russian air defense units. The developers claim that creating the rocket-carrying drone requires almost no additional financial costs or complex engineering solutions. Denys Shtilierman notes that this drone is already a serial production item and can be manufactured in the required quantities. 🔹 Furthermore, Fire Point is working on a version of the rocket-carrying drone that will be capable of launching strikes in automatic mode, without operator intervention, and at significantly greater distances. 📹: NV
1:31

Denys Shtilierman confirmed the combat use of a rocket-carrying drone by Fire Point 🔹 Denys Shtilierman Denys Shtilierman, Chief Designer and co-owner of Fire Point, told NV that one of the reasons for modifying a kamikaze drone into a rocket carrier was a surplus of Soviet S-5 aviation rockets. Ukrainian aviation frequently used these rockets, particularly from helicopters, but this tactic eventually had to be abandoned due to significant risks to pilots and aircraft. ❗️ In turn, the FP rocket-carrying drone is capable of carrying 8 S-5 rockets, flying at a range of up to 500 km, and launching strikes from a distance of 1.5 to 3 km. Fire Point notes that the targets for these rockets can include: ▪️ enemy logistics, such as trains with oil tankers; ▪️ oil depots; ▪️ oil refineries with a large number of pipes and storage tanks. 🔹 However, the primary mission of the rocket-carrying drone is to counter Russian air defense units. The developers claim that creating the rocket-carrying drone requires almost no additional financial costs or complex engineering solutions. Denys Shtilierman notes that this drone is already a serial production item and can be manufactured in the required quantities. 🔹 Furthermore, Fire Point is working on a version of the rocket-carrying drone that will be capable of launching strikes in automatic mode, without operator intervention, and at significantly greater distances. 📹: NV

Anton Gerashchenko

15,659 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

🇺🇸🇷🇺 THAAD vs S-400: TWO VERY DIFFERENT AIR DEFENSE PHILOSOPHIES THAAD and Russia’s S-400 are often compared as if they perform the same mission. Technically, that is misleading. THAAD is primarily a dedicated ballistic missile defense system. Its interceptor uses hit to kill technology, meaning it destroys the incoming warhead through direct kinetic impact rather than relying on a conventional explosive warhead. It is designed to engage ballistic missiles during their terminal phase, including both inside and just outside the atmosphere. Its AN/TPY-2 X band radar provides high resolution tracking and target discrimination, allowing the system to distinguish the actual reentry vehicle from other objects and continuously update the interceptor with precise tracking data. S-400 follows a different philosophy. It is a multi role long range air defense architecture designed to engage aircraft, cruise missiles and selected ballistic missile threats using different interceptor missiles. Its strength is not simply the advertised maximum range, but the combination of multiple radars, command and control, mobile launchers and different missile types. This creates a major technical distinction: THAAD = specialized upper tier ballistic missile defense S-400 = broader long range integrated air defense THAAD's interceptor is optimized for the difficult terminal ballistic missile problem, where the target may be travelling at extremely high velocity and descending rapidly toward the defended area. S-400's architecture is optimized for flexibility, allowing commanders to select different interceptors depending on target type, altitude and engagement geometry. The real question therefore isn't "Which system has the longer range?" It is: Which system is better suited to the threat? Against ballistic missile warheads, THAAD's architecture is specifically optimized for the mission. Against a mixed package of aircraft, cruise missiles and other aerial targets, S-400 offers a much broader engagement envelope. And in a modern war, neither system is supposed to operate alone. The real advantage comes from layered defense, where long range sensors, command networks, THAAD, Patriot or other systems work together. Range is only one number. Radar architecture, target discrimination, interceptor kinematics, engagement altitude, reaction time, saturation capacity and network integration ultimately determine whether an air defense system survives a real missile raid.
6:31

🇺🇸🇷🇺 THAAD vs S-400: TWO VERY DIFFERENT AIR DEFENSE PHILOSOPHIES THAAD and Russia’s S-400 are often compared as if they perform the same mission. Technically, that is misleading. THAAD is primarily a dedicated ballistic missile defense system. Its interceptor uses hit to kill technology, meaning it destroys the incoming warhead through direct kinetic impact rather than relying on a conventional explosive warhead. It is designed to engage ballistic missiles during their terminal phase, including both inside and just outside the atmosphere. Its AN/TPY-2 X band radar provides high resolution tracking and target discrimination, allowing the system to distinguish the actual reentry vehicle from other objects and continuously update the interceptor with precise tracking data. S-400 follows a different philosophy. It is a multi role long range air defense architecture designed to engage aircraft, cruise missiles and selected ballistic missile threats using different interceptor missiles. Its strength is not simply the advertised maximum range, but the combination of multiple radars, command and control, mobile launchers and different missile types. This creates a major technical distinction: THAAD = specialized upper tier ballistic missile defense S-400 = broader long range integrated air defense THAAD's interceptor is optimized for the difficult terminal ballistic missile problem, where the target may be travelling at extremely high velocity and descending rapidly toward the defended area. S-400's architecture is optimized for flexibility, allowing commanders to select different interceptors depending on target type, altitude and engagement geometry. The real question therefore isn't "Which system has the longer range?" It is: Which system is better suited to the threat? Against ballistic missile warheads, THAAD's architecture is specifically optimized for the mission. Against a mixed package of aircraft, cruise missiles and other aerial targets, S-400 offers a much broader engagement envelope. And in a modern war, neither system is supposed to operate alone. The real advantage comes from layered defense, where long range sensors, command networks, THAAD, Patriot or other systems work together. Range is only one number. Radar architecture, target discrimination, interceptor kinematics, engagement altitude, reaction time, saturation capacity and network integration ultimately determine whether an air defense system survives a real missile raid.

Defense Intelligence

12,393 просмотров • 8 дней назад

🚨🇷🇺 UKRAINE'S NIGHTMARE: RUSSIA BUILDS YAK-130M LIGHT FIGHTER TO HUNT UKRAINIAN AIR AND SEA DRONES Russia is turning the Yak-130M into a light fighter for two of the most urgent battlefield missions: hunting heavy UAVs and unmanned attack boats. During Vladimir Putin’s visit to the Irkutsk Aviation Plant, the prototype was shown with a new radar, modern avionics and guided air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons. 🔸 The BRLS-130R active electronically scanned array radar can reportedly detect aerial targets at up to 100 km, giving the aircraft its own search and targeting capability. 🔸 With a top speed of 960 km/h and good handling at low speeds, the Yak-130M can close on slow drones without the extreme speed mismatch faced by heavier fighters. Its two-seat cockpit allows one crew member to fly while the other manages sensors and weapons. 🔸 The aircraft is intended to destroy heavy UAVs in any weather, day or night. Putin also singled out unmanned surface vessels as a priority target, giving the jet a role in protecting naval bases, ports and coastal infrastructure. 🔸 Using a light fighter for these missions preserves the flight hours of Su-30SMs and other high-end aircraft. The Yak-130M does not need their range, speed or payload to intercept a slow drone, making it a more economical platform for routine patrols. 🔸 The aircraft can operate inside a wider air-defense network alongside ground radars, Pantsir and Tor systems, electronic warfare units and attack helicopters. 🔸 The first Yak-130M prototype flew in June 2026. Three aircraft are now undergoing trials, with deliveries planned after testing is completed in late 2028. Russia does not need a top-tier fighter to chase every slow target. A smaller jet with radar, missiles and a second crew member can handle the routine hunt while heavier aircraft remain available for harder missions. What should Russia prioritize: more Yak-130Ms, more helicopters or more ground-based air defenses?
0:41

🚨🇷🇺 UKRAINE'S NIGHTMARE: RUSSIA BUILDS YAK-130M LIGHT FIGHTER TO HUNT UKRAINIAN AIR AND SEA DRONES Russia is turning the Yak-130M into a light fighter for two of the most urgent battlefield missions: hunting heavy UAVs and unmanned attack boats. During Vladimir Putin’s visit to the Irkutsk Aviation Plant, the prototype was shown with a new radar, modern avionics and guided air-to-air and air-to-surface weapons. 🔸 The BRLS-130R active electronically scanned array radar can reportedly detect aerial targets at up to 100 km, giving the aircraft its own search and targeting capability. 🔸 With a top speed of 960 km/h and good handling at low speeds, the Yak-130M can close on slow drones without the extreme speed mismatch faced by heavier fighters. Its two-seat cockpit allows one crew member to fly while the other manages sensors and weapons. 🔸 The aircraft is intended to destroy heavy UAVs in any weather, day or night. Putin also singled out unmanned surface vessels as a priority target, giving the jet a role in protecting naval bases, ports and coastal infrastructure. 🔸 Using a light fighter for these missions preserves the flight hours of Su-30SMs and other high-end aircraft. The Yak-130M does not need their range, speed or payload to intercept a slow drone, making it a more economical platform for routine patrols. 🔸 The aircraft can operate inside a wider air-defense network alongside ground radars, Pantsir and Tor systems, electronic warfare units and attack helicopters. 🔸 The first Yak-130M prototype flew in June 2026. Three aircraft are now undergoing trials, with deliveries planned after testing is completed in late 2028. Russia does not need a top-tier fighter to chase every slow target. A smaller jet with radar, missiles and a second crew member can handle the routine hunt while heavier aircraft remain available for harder missions. What should Russia prioritize: more Yak-130Ms, more helicopters or more ground-based air defenses?

NewRulesGeopolitics

24,477 просмотров • 18 дней назад

Trump prepares to invade Cuba. Can the island Resist? Following the difficulties encountered in Iran, despite expenditures exceeding $100 billion, Donald Trump is betting on a victory through military action against Cuba. On the 20th, the USS Nimitz and its carrier strike group, which includes the destroyer USS Gridley, officially arrived in the Caribbean. The official justification was that the movement is part of Operation Southern Seas 2026, but U.S. Southern Command emphasized that the presence serves as a strategic advantage and combat readiness. The arrival occurred on the same day the U.S. formally indicted former Cuban leader Raúl Castro for homicide, escalating fears of a military intervention similar to the one in Venezuela months earlier. This aligns with flight tracking data confirming that the U.S. has established a constant surveillance siege of Cuba with MQ-4C Triton drones; at least three of these high-altitude, long-endurance drones were detected operating near the island. At least five P-8A Poseidon aircraft are also participating in patrols, alongside Rivet Joint (RC-135) planes used for electronic eavesdropping to intercept communications and radar signals from Cuban defenses. The Trump administration justified this mobilization by citing intelligence that Cuba had acquired over 300 military drones from Russia and Iran. According to Washington, these drones could be used to attack the Guantanamo base or even U.S. territory, a fanciful claim that rings the alarm for a military operation. The intended action is expected to unfold similarly to what happened in Venezuela, but can Cuba resist? Cuba is going through a difficult period, marked by power outages, a high cost of living, fuel shortages, and low tourism activity, in addition to the strangulation caused by the Trump administration’s embargo. Regarding air defenses, the Cubans recently contracted the Belarusian company ALEVKURP to upgrade their Pechora systems to the S-125-2BM standard, replacing old analog components with modern digital processors. The system can now attack not only aircraft but also land and maritime targets with known coordinates. There have also been improvements to radars for operation under heavy electronic warfare and the capability to track targets using thermal and TV cameras. This allows for firing without turning on the radar, avoiding detection by anti-radiation missiles. Furthermore, the upgrade allows the system to identify drones visually or by heat without emitting radar signals, much like Iranian systems. The Pechora-2BM standard uses radars mounted on high-mobility vehicles; the idea is to activate the radar, fire the missile, and change positions in less than 25 minutes. Despite all these improvements, the Pechora remains a limited system. I would say Cuba will face great difficulty in containing U.S. aviation, but it will force caution upon enemy pilots. The Cuban strategy focuses on being an aerial guerrilla defense: not trying to defeat the U.S. Air Force, but rather increasing the political cost of an invasion by imposing losses. Cuban forces are also betting on Electronic Warfare. They possess many Cold War-era systems that were also recently modernized by Russian and Belarusian companies. Cuba tested these systems to perform spoofing and jamming of satellite signals, generating magnetic anomalies in the Caribbean reported this May 2026. Several mobile EW units are scattered across the island and camouflaged, making it difficult for spy planes and drones to locate them. Full article:
0:43

Trump prepares to invade Cuba. Can the island Resist? Following the difficulties encountered in Iran, despite expenditures exceeding $100 billion, Donald Trump is betting on a victory through military action against Cuba. On the 20th, the USS Nimitz and its carrier strike group, which includes the destroyer USS Gridley, officially arrived in the Caribbean. The official justification was that the movement is part of Operation Southern Seas 2026, but U.S. Southern Command emphasized that the presence serves as a strategic advantage and combat readiness. The arrival occurred on the same day the U.S. formally indicted former Cuban leader Raúl Castro for homicide, escalating fears of a military intervention similar to the one in Venezuela months earlier. This aligns with flight tracking data confirming that the U.S. has established a constant surveillance siege of Cuba with MQ-4C Triton drones; at least three of these high-altitude, long-endurance drones were detected operating near the island. At least five P-8A Poseidon aircraft are also participating in patrols, alongside Rivet Joint (RC-135) planes used for electronic eavesdropping to intercept communications and radar signals from Cuban defenses. The Trump administration justified this mobilization by citing intelligence that Cuba had acquired over 300 military drones from Russia and Iran. According to Washington, these drones could be used to attack the Guantanamo base or even U.S. territory, a fanciful claim that rings the alarm for a military operation. The intended action is expected to unfold similarly to what happened in Venezuela, but can Cuba resist? Cuba is going through a difficult period, marked by power outages, a high cost of living, fuel shortages, and low tourism activity, in addition to the strangulation caused by the Trump administration’s embargo. Regarding air defenses, the Cubans recently contracted the Belarusian company ALEVKURP to upgrade their Pechora systems to the S-125-2BM standard, replacing old analog components with modern digital processors. The system can now attack not only aircraft but also land and maritime targets with known coordinates. There have also been improvements to radars for operation under heavy electronic warfare and the capability to track targets using thermal and TV cameras. This allows for firing without turning on the radar, avoiding detection by anti-radiation missiles. Furthermore, the upgrade allows the system to identify drones visually or by heat without emitting radar signals, much like Iranian systems. The Pechora-2BM standard uses radars mounted on high-mobility vehicles; the idea is to activate the radar, fire the missile, and change positions in less than 25 minutes. Despite all these improvements, the Pechora remains a limited system. I would say Cuba will face great difficulty in containing U.S. aviation, but it will force caution upon enemy pilots. The Cuban strategy focuses on being an aerial guerrilla defense: not trying to defeat the U.S. Air Force, but rather increasing the political cost of an invasion by imposing losses. Cuban forces are also betting on Electronic Warfare. They possess many Cold War-era systems that were also recently modernized by Russian and Belarusian companies. Cuba tested these systems to perform spoofing and jamming of satellite signals, generating magnetic anomalies in the Caribbean reported this May 2026. Several mobile EW units are scattered across the island and camouflaged, making it difficult for spy planes and drones to locate them. Full article:

Patricia Marins

106,889 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад