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Warren Buffett hinted that Berkshire Hathaway was evaluating a possible investment opportunity north of the border. “We do not feel uncomfortable in any way shape or form putting our money into Canada. In fact, we’re actually looking at one thing now,” Buffett said. Watch the 2024 Berkshire Hathaway annual...

846,784 Aufrufe • vor 2 Jahren •via X (Twitter)

10 Kommentare

Profilbild von AlmanacSun, Defend the Constitution
AlmanacSun, Defend the Constitutionvor 2 Jahren

Hopefully he’s buying the whole godforsaken country.

Profilbild von Driven Sports
Driven Sportsvor 2 Jahren

It’s got to be energy (oil or nuclear) or Canadian Pacific Railway. What else is big enough?

Profilbild von Irrational Logic
Irrational Logicvor 2 Jahren

One house in Vancouver

Profilbild von Flowseidon
Flowseidonvor 2 Jahren

Saw some interesting flow in $CP a couple days ago. 🤔

Profilbild von John Tuld
John Tuldvor 2 Jahren

Warren loves dictatorship.

Profilbild von Josh Young
Josh Youngvor 2 Jahren

👀

Profilbild von Bill Harris 🇨🇦
Bill Harris 🇨🇦vor 2 Jahren

$TD is in trouble with regulators, and I suspect Warren and Greg will pounce.

Profilbild von Mark G
Mark Gvor 2 Jahren

Since he’s an oil bull with his oxy I will say possibly back into Suncor or possibly a bucket of mid caps such as $bte $bte.to $sgy.to $tve.to $lcx.v $ath.to

Profilbild von dean
deanvor 2 Jahren

ENB?

Profilbild von Don Wharton
Don Whartonvor 2 Jahren

$fairfax_financial would be something Buffet completely gets, the float from insurance And already a proven compounder. Hmmm Also $suncor, Buffett has an appetite for this great company And invested I think 10 years ago.. and he is opportunistic when big energy goes on sale!

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Warren Buffett bought a dying textile mill out of pure spite. It became a $1 TRILLION company. He still calls it the dumbest decision of his career. > In 1962 Buffett was running a small investment partnership called Buffett Partnership Ltd > He spotted Berkshire Hathaway a failing textile mill in Massachusetts. > Every time the mill closed a factory they bought back their own shares at a small premium. > Buffett kept buying shares and flipping them back for a tiny profit. > In 1964 CEO Seabury Stanton shook hands with Buffett and verbally agreed to buy his shares at $11.50 each. > When the written offer arrived it said $11.375 exactly 12.5 cents less than agreed. > Buffett wrote later that he felt "chiseled". > Instead of selling he went and bought every single share he could find. > By May 1965 Buffett Partnership had taken control of Berkshire Hathaway. > He fired Stanton on the spot. > He had just spent $14 MILLION buying a dying textile business out of pure spite. > For years it earned almost nothing. > His partner Charlie Munger told him from day one it was a catastrophic mistake. > Buffett ignored him, then he started using Berkshire as a shell to buy insurance companies and invest the premiums. > That single pivot triggered entirely by anger over 12.5 CENTS built one of the greatest investment empires in history. > Berkshire Hathaway is now worth over $1 TRILLION. > It holds $325 BILLION in cash alone more than the GDP of most countries. > Buffett retired as CEO on December 31 2025 at age 95 after 60 years. > In a 2010 CNBC interview he called Berkshire "the dumbest stock I ever bought". > He estimated his anger over 12.5 cents cost him $200 BILLION in lost compounding. > His net worth today is $150 BILLION almost entirely from the company he bought out of spite. The most expensive argument in business history started with 12.5 cents.

Jeremy

46,370 Aufrufe • vor 4 Monaten

Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger didn't avoid real estate because they thought it was a bad asset class They stayed away because they believed they had no durable advantage in it. When asked why real estate had never become a significant part of Berkshire Hathaway's portfolio, Buffett pointed to two reasons: an unfavorable tax structure and the absence of a competitive edge. He explained that Berkshire, as a C corporation, faces an extra layer of corporate taxation on real estate income, putting it at a disadvantage against REITs, partnerships, and S corporations. As Buffett put it: "Real estate tends to be a very lousy investment for people who are taxed under subchapter C." Beyond taxes, Buffett argued that developed real estate is usually priced efficiently. Unlike public stocks, where Berkshire believes it can identify mispriced businesses, most commercial real estate transactions involve buyers and sellers who have access to similar information. According to Buffett, the best opportunities arise only when markets become highly inefficient — such as during the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) era in the early 1990s, when distressed assets, forced sellers, and scarce financing created widespread mispricing. Looking back, Buffett admitted Berkshire wasn't fully prepared to capitalize on those conditions and believed they missed an opportunity to earn substantial returns. He also recalled that one of the few major real estate deals Berkshire seriously pursued was the Irvine Company in the late 1970s, though the acquisition ultimately went to a group organized by Mobil Oil. Reflecting on his partnership with Charlie Munger, Buffett joked that Munger would often spend several minutes arguing against a deal—and the more passionate the objections, the more Buffett suspected Charlie actually liked it. Source: Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting (2003) Q&A

Black Edge

20,087 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat

Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger were asked in 2008 why Berkshire Hathaway wasn't investing in India A 12-year-old named Sabrina Chug stood up at the Berkshire annual meeting and made the case: India represents 17% of the world's population. Its economy had been growing at 7-8% per year. At that pace, she argued, India's total GDP would surpass the United States by 2043. Buffett's answer was revealing. He didn't dismiss India. In fact, he shared that Berkshire's Iscar business was already performing well there, and that he had agreed to visit the country the following March to explore expanding it further. "We do not rule out India, believe me, in looking at either direct investments or marketable securities." But then he named the structural constraint that had kept Berkshire on the sidelines: India's insurance regulations severely limited what a foreign-owned company could own and operate. "I really hate to take some of our managerial talent and put them to work for something we only own 25% of. I'd rather have them working on something we own 100% of." This is a window into how Buffett thinks about market entry. Fast growth alone is not enough. You need the legal and structural conditions that allow you to deploy capital in the way you actually operate, at full ownership, with your best people running the business. Charlie Munger went further. He traced India's investment constraints not to economics, but to governance: "Its governments tend to have a fair amount of paralysis. Endless due process, endless objection, zoning is hard, planning permissions are hard." He noted that Lee Kuan Yew, the founder of modern Singapore, had argued China would outpace India for exactly this reason. Less bureaucratic friction meant faster compounding of capital and infrastructure. But Buffett pushed back on the idea that current conditions are permanent: "If you looked at China 40 years ago you wouldn't have dreamt of what would happen. Countries do learn from each other and they should. I don't think I would feel that any impediment to growth that existed now are necessarily ones that have to be permanent." That nuance matters to long-term investors. Buffett wasn't writing India off. He was saying the opportunity wasn't yet structured in a way that fit Berkshire's model. And he was leaving the door open for that to change. His final line said everything: "People in India are going to be living a lot better 20 years from now than they are now." Source: 2010 Berkshire Hathaway Annual Shareholders Meeting

Black Edge

17,526 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat

Warren Buffett explains why great investing isn't about comparing every new opportunity to your greatest success. At a Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, a shareholder asked why several major Berkshire investments were structured so differently. Goldman Sachs received $5 billion at 10% plus warrants. General Electric got similar terms. Dow Chemical's deal came with an 8.5% convertible structure. Mars/Wrigley paid 11.45%, while Swiss Re paid 12%. Why weren't the deals priced the same? Buffett's answer was simple. Each investment was made at a different point in time, under different market conditions, with different alternatives available. As he explained: "Our opportunity costs were different in every single one of those five transactions." The deciding factor wasn't the company itself. It was what Berkshire could have done with its capital at that specific moment. Buffett also acknowledged that capital allocation is never perfect. "We could have done a much better, I could have done a much better job of allocating our money." And with characteristic humility, he added: "We not only don't have perfect foresight, sometimes it's pretty, it's pretty bad." When Buffett evaluates an investment, he doesn't compare it to decisions he made years earlier. He compares it to the alternatives available today. Discussing Berkshire's investment in Swiss Re, he said: "I was thinking about what else I could do with $2.7 billion dollars. And that, that's the way all the decisions are made." Every investment passes through the same filter: What opportunities exist right now? What is the best use of capital today? Which option offers the most attractive balance of risk and reward? Past wins don't factor into the decision. As Buffett put it, previous deals "don't really make any difference." That leads to one of the biggest mistakes he believes investors make. "One of the errors people make in business, and sometimes it can be a huge error, is that they try and measure every deal against the best deal that they've ever made." The problem is psychological. Once people anchor themselves to their greatest investment, acquisition, or trade, every future opportunity can seem disappointing by comparison. Instead of making solid decisions, they wait endlessly for another perfect one. Eventually, they stop acting altogether. Buffett warns that by doing so, "they, in effect, sometimes they take themselves out of the game." His philosophy is far more practical. "The goal is not to make a better deal than you've ever made before; the goal is to make a satisfactory deal. It's the best deal that you can make at the time." Investing isn't about constantly setting new personal records. It's about allocating capital intelligently based on the information and opportunities available today. In Buffett's view, there's only one rational way to judge a decision: Did you make the best choice you could with what you knew at the time? As he concludes: "There's no other rational way to make deals." Source: Berkshire Hathaway Annual Shareholders Meeting (2009) – Warren Buffett & Charlie Munger Q&A

Black Edge

12,029 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat