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🚨 We're disclosing a macOS security bug that Apple says is not an issue.
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🚨 We're disclosing a macOS security bug that Apple says is not an issue.

Mysk 🇨🇦🇩🇪

@mysk_co21K followers

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🚨 We're disclosing a macOS security bug that Apple says is not an issue. Using a simple archive-and-restore trick, an attacker can silently replace the main executable of virtually any application downloaded from the web—no password or warning is required. Here's a demo using Signal to steal its encryption key. 📝 Blog with technical details: link in the replies. Do you think this should be considered a security bug? 🎬👇

23 Comments

Comments from the original post on X (Twitter)

  • Watch This Space's profile picture

    @wtsdev

    Your original post said: > The modified binaries can then access the original app's keychain records and protected containers. Your blog then conditions that on prompts. While I agree the social-engineering aspect is troublesome, I think the original post overstated the bug.

    21 likes

  • Mysk 🇨🇦🇩🇪's profile picture

    @mysk_co

    The original post had to be vague because we couldn't disclose the bug at the time. The system prompts show the original app's name and icon. The prompts are created and shown by macOS not the modified executable.

    6 likes

  • Watch This Space's profile picture

    @wtsdev

    I understand the desire to be vague. But to be vague to the point of overstatement is an error, in my opinion.

    6 likes

  • Mysk 🇨🇦🇩🇪's profile picture

    @mysk_co

    No, the original post isn't an overstatement. You can still access Keychain, TCC protected folders. We just used the standard APIs as an example. However, a more sophisticated attack would use an executable that is more malicious than this, like this one:

    1 like

  • Watch This Space's profile picture

    @wtsdev

    > You can still access Keychain, TCC protected folders. Can you do so unconditionally (e.g. *without* prompts)? If not, then I would still personally classify your original post as an overstatement.

    4 likes

  • ClassicMain's profile picture

    @ClassicMain

    So in other words you wrote a script that replaces the executable of a program with a different executable and you run that script and the executable gets replaced as intended and then you start the new executable. Yeah, i am on apple's side. How is this a macOS security bug?

    17 likes

  • Mysk 🇨🇦🇩🇪's profile picture

    @mysk_co

    Because macOS already has safeguards against other apps and scripts tampering with app bundles, even with admin privileges. These safeguards are bypassed by a simple command that can be run by any script running on your Mac.

    14 likes

  • Mysk 🇨🇦🇩🇪's profile picture

    @mysk_co

    Plus, how is it okay that an app signed with the original developer’s certificate can simply be replaced by another ad-hoc signed binary and be allowed to run at all?

    10 likes

  • ClassicMain's profile picture

    @ClassicMain

    I am not sure how macOS works but I'd be shocked if I weren't able to do that on Linux and just run whatever the hell I want. Heck even on windows. So either apple gives you control over your PC or not. What is it?

  • Liam 💕's profile picture

    @liambrefberinn

    @mysk_co This is an obvious security flaw, if you—for some reason—don't like security, macOS still lets you disable many security features, including SIP. Security != loss of ownership of your own device. Do some research.

    5 likes

  • ClassicMain's profile picture

    @ClassicMain

    @mysk_co Ok i did Research and it seems i am mostly right with what I said about this being intended. You can swap out the binary on macOS anyways at any time. The issue is that the permission manager doesn't actually check whether the binary has been swapped or not because the

    1 like

  • ClassicMain's profile picture

    @ClassicMain

    @mysk_co permission manager is dumb and therefore grants the same permissions to a completely different binary. That is the bug. Not that you can swap out binaries.

    2 likes

  • ClassicMain's profile picture

    @ClassicMain

    @mysk_co And apple correctly refuted it on that ground since you reported it as "you can swap binaries"

    3 likes

  • Mysk 🇨🇦🇩🇪's profile picture

    @mysk_co

    Link to the blog:

    14 likes

  • Mysk 🇨🇦🇩🇪's profile picture

    @mysk_co

    Link to the video on YouTube:

    15 likes

  • Mysk 🇨🇦🇩🇪's profile picture

    @mysk_co

    Link to the script used in the demo:

    8 likes

  • defence_osint's profile picture

    @DefenceOsint

    I‘m amazed. You didn‘t find a security vulnerability, you just replaced an installed application with another one that has the same name. You didn‘t bypass any protections by the system. If you had, keychain wouldn‘t ask you for permission.

    8 likes

  • Jure Ursic Cergol's profile picture

    @JureUrsic

    If an unprivileged local process can silently overwrite signed application binaries and pull encryption keys from the keychain without a password or TCC prompt, it is a critical security vulnerability. Downplaying filesystem boundary bypasses as expected behavior only weakens the trust model users expect from an operating system.

    3 likes

  • ︎'s profile picture

    @0xocdsec

    You already assume code execution and did not break a boundary prior. I can see you don't get paid.

    2 likes

  • tin's profile picture

    @TinOnX

    It’s a useful feature that allows intelligence agencies and bad actors to steal secrets. Not a bug.

    2 likes