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Why Jamming the Venezuelan Systems Is Unlikely Well, when I hear about jamming in Venezuela, I immediately picture the Americans talking about the EA-18G Growler with the NGJ. The NGJ is specifically designed to degrade advanced Russian radars, with high power and directional AESA beams. To cover an area...

386,162 次观看 • 6 个月前 •via X (Twitter)

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IRAN: What about China and Russia? Certainly they’re not going to provide much kinetic support, but they do not want to see the regime fall. Are either of them providing any support? Israel has secured protection from both the Americans and the Russians, yet it remains poorly regarded by the Chinese. The Russians delivered MiG-29s, some EW systems, and a few helicopters, but to this day, they are postponing the delivery of more modern aircraft. Tel Aviv and Moscow maintain a very strong connection forged by the Soviet diaspora; today, roughly 20% of Israeli households speak Russian. The Chinese, for their part, have raised suspicions regarding the supply of radars and intelligence, but they are proven to be using satellites to photograph and publicly expose American military assets online - a clear demonstration of their involvement and power. This means that, unlike during the 12-day war, Iranian forces will now have direct satellite support. Ironically or not, China’s role in intelligence with Iran appears to mirror exactly the U.S. role with Ukraine. Regarding rumors of Iran receiving S-400s, there is zero evidence of this, and based on Putin’s statements, I do not believe they will proceed. Similarly, there is no visual evidence that the Chinese have provided long-range HQ-9B surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems or YLC-8B radars to Iran. Personally I believe it is possible that radars were delivered, though there is no confirmation. To date, there is no evidence of any Chinese cargo planes landing in Iran over the last few months. Most of the material delivered comes via Mahan Air Boeing 747s. There were also Cargolux flights, but those were also Boeing 747s, and for an HQ-9B system to be delivered, a much larger military airlifter would be required. Above all, these long-range defense systems would have been commissioned and showcased as a deterrent in a country on the brink of being attacked, which has not happened. However, Iran has invested heavily in revamping its own systems, as I reported previously. The Chinese also maintain a very close relationship with the UAE and the Saudis which, similar to the Russian position, limits the extent of massive support for Iran. Iran finds itself in a situation where its two main allies do not hesitate to provide political and intelligence support but remain reticent regarding direct military equipment. Nonetheless, this is a situation Iran has been used to for years, and it has been the primary driver for the development of its own military ecosystem.

Patricia Marins

36,416 次观看 • 4 个月前

RC-135 Deployments Signal Imminent Attack: Myths and Realities of Iran's Military Power The RC-135 is a family of large reconnaissance aircraft operated by the ISAF. These jets are designed for ISR missions, providing near real-time data to military commanders and national leaders. The primary variant focuses on detecting, identifying, and geolocating electromagnetic signals, such as communications, radar emissions, and electronic warfare activities. Based on past experience, the early arrival of these aircraft often signals that an attack may be very close. But what about Iran, what capabilities does it actually have? There are many myths surrounding Iran's military power. Here are some key points: 1. Israel did not overfly Iran during the 12-day war This is implausible. Most part of the munitions used included bombs like the GBU-28 and GBU-31, both with ranges under 25 km, which suggests they could only have been dropped from inside Iranian territory. 2. Iranian missiles have poor accuracy In 2025, several Iranian missiles were launched against targets in Erbil, Iraq, with excellent precision. During the 12-day war, Iran struck the Weizmann Institute and the Haifa refinery with high accuracy, as well as some Israeli launchers, all in an environment of heavy jamming. The truth is that Iranian missile accuracy depends on the model. Iran has missiles in its arsenal that are more than 15 years old, but there is no evidence that the precision of its modern anti-ship missiles is deficient. 3. Iranian air defenses are of very poor quality This cannot be stated with absolute certainty because they were never fully tested. Israel's ground sabotage operations were highly effective, successfully disabling radars and most short-range air defense systems. Iran does not keep its long- and medium-range air defenses permanently deployed, and consequently none of them were destroyed during the 12 days of war. 4. Iran has no radars capable of detecting stealth aircraft In 2024, Iranian radars locked onto Israeli F-35s while they were still over Iraqi territory. In 2025, Iranian-supplied radars integrated into missile batteries in Yemen also locked onto and fired at U.S. F-35s on multiple occasions, nearly downing one. 5. The high technology of U.S. ships and aircraft will paralyze Iranian weapons This would only happen if the Iranians turned their systems off, as reportedly occurred in the Venezuela case. So far, Iranian equipment has proven extremely resistant to interference. Shahed drones continue to operate accurately, and after years of Western efforts, they have not been successfully jammed. This will pose a major challenge for the Americans. 6. The U.S. Carrier Strike Group will easily crush the Iranian navy They would destroy Iran's large ships in minutes, but they would face enormous difficulty against mini-submarines, USVs, UAVs, UUVs, and fast attack craft equipped with missiles. In additional, the U.S. drones would not have complete freedom for target acquisition and would have to rely on LEO/ISR sats. Iran possesses drones like the Karrar, a jet-powered interceptor equipped with air-to-air missiles that can operate at 15,000 meters to deny U.S. drones freedom of action. The Israelis lost an unknown number of drones during the 12-day war, though losses were reported. Summary Does Iran have any advantage? At sea, against the current Carrier Strike Group and considering all of Iran's resources, I would say Iran holds an advantage, evidenced by factors such as missile range, number of containers, tubes, VLS cells, drones, mines, submarines, anti-ship missiles, and other assets. However, once the focus shifts from the sea to the air, the American advantage is overwhelming, both in satellite intelligence and in combat aviation. And this is the type of war the Americans know best.

Patricia Marins

30,566 次观看 • 5 个月前

The Israeli Air Force has dropped over 12,000 bombs in Iran since the start of the war, in over 8,500 separate strikes on Iranian regime targets, the military says. A senior IAF official says that "in 18 days, we flew as much as we would in a year." Of the 12,000 munitions, 3,600 alone were used in strikes in Tehran, according to the IDF. IAF fighter jets have carried out 5,700 separate sorties, including over 540 to central and western Iran and 50 deeper east in the country. Military officials say that the IAF is carrying out constant air operations over Iran to thwart ballistic missile fire on Israel, using new techniques that allow for longer operations without the need for refueling. In this formation, dubbed "metro sorties" by the IAF, drones and fighter jets loiter before carrying out strikes on ballistic missile launchers, Iranian soldiers, and other targets, based on "real-time information." When a new target is identified, IAF aircraft can be quickly dispatched to strike it. This was the case for the killing of Iran's intelligence minister, Esmaeil Khatib, in Tehran yesterday, according to the IDF. Officials say this effort relies on maintaining air superiority over Iran. The military assesses that its strikes have destroyed around 85% of Iran's air defense and detection systems. More than 300 targets relating to Iran's air defenses, including missile launchers and radars, have been struck, the IDF says. In terms of Iran's advanced air defense systems, the IAF assesses that it has destroyed 92% of them, with only a handful of such systems remaining, including some that are hidden and not in use. The IDF says it has destroyed around 80% of Iran's older air defense systems, along with 80% of its radars. Iran also has what the military describes as "decentralized" air defense systems, where missile launchers are connected to various optical systems, such as rudimentary cameras with artificial intelligence tracking software, to target Israeli aircraft. Some 75% of these systems have been destroyed, and military officials acknowledge they are much harder to locate than the advanced systems. Additionally, the IDF says it has destroyed or disabled around 60% of Iran's estimated 470 ballistic missile launchers. Some previous military estimates put this number at 70%. Around 200 of the launchers were destroyed in strikes, while another 80 are not considered to be operational after the IAF struck tunnel entrances to subterranean facilities where they are stored, according to the military. The IAF says it continues to hunt down the remaining roughly 200 launchers to reduce the missile fire on Israel. The military also assesses that Iran still has hundreds of ballistic missiles that can reach Israel. It has so far launched over 350 at Israel, with the rate of fire slowing to 10-20 missiles a day in the past week, with just one or two missiles at a time.

Emanuel (Mannie) Fabian

160,861 次观看 • 4 个月前

The best SEAD is in dollars. In military terms, the acronym SEAD stands for Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses. In other words, it's the means of rendering them inoperable by whatever methods necessary, though it typically involves electronic warfare (EW). Venezuela had more than 100 anti-aircraft batteries of long, short, and medium range, in addition to MANPADS. Some people are debating the quality of the air defenses, which is utter nonsense since they clearly weren't activated. Helicopters like the Chinook would have been easily locked on and shot down in a normal scenario. The CIA had been operating in Venezuelan territory for months with limited progress, precisely because the military wasn't short on money. Major companies like PDVSA, CORPOELEC, CVG, CAMIMPEG, Pequiven, all food imports and exports, and another 50 or so enterprises are under military control. How do you bribe people who were already making so much money, especially from oil? That's when things started to change, as ships began to be seized. The main source of revenue was threatened with drying up, along with the risk of an invasion. At that point, the doors opened to dollars willing to buy everything, including the SEAD. The Trump administration bought off the entire Venezuelan army to such an extent that they didn't even allow the use of MANPADS. The attacks, based on the size of the debris, appear to have come from drones. And it seems American drones need significant improvements, as various experts have already pointed out. Even without any resistance, the strikes, which were supposed to be symbolic, still missed targets and killed about 40 people, most of them civilians whose homes were hit. This is very serious. In a scenario like this, there shouldn't have been any civilian deaths. I confess that even so, other American actions in past eras were far more destructive than this one. The merit of this operation lies in the intelligence engineering, which focused on the economic aspect to weaken internal support. But the Venezuelan militaries will hold the power and now with more money. The best SEAD is in dollars.

Patricia Marins

41,281 次观看 • 6 个月前

We are already at war. Not with rifles or tanks, but with replacement. This is conquest by other means, through the slow erasure of a people who no longer recognize they are being conquered. That is why I write—to remind my people that we are not living in peace, but in the midst of a war waged without banners. The invasion is not declared with armies but with flights and boats, birthrates and welfare rolls. It is demographic warfare, calculated, continuous, and increasingly irreversible. A people, and a civilization, does not need to be burned to the ground to fall. It only needs to be replaced. Throughout the Western world, we are witnessing not mere immigration but a deliberate population transformation, one that has been rationalized by moral cowardice and enforced by political elites who have long since abandoned the idea that their nations belong to their people. What you mock as conquest is already underway, and unlike the conquests of old, it comes with the full consent of those in power. But I do not write in surrender. I write as a warning, as an act of resistance. My writing is meant to exhort and to enliven, to reawaken what has been buried beneath shame and silence. It is a summons to remember, to reclaim, and to rebuild. We are in an existential struggle, not only for our land, but for our survival, and thus for the future itself. Those who sneer at the loss will one day find there is nothing left to sneer at. A people who forget that they exist will be replaced by those who do not. You may call this natural. So be it. Then let nature return, red in tooth and claw, and let the sons of Europe remember who they are.

Chad Crowley

37,093 次观看 • 1 年前

What if any preparations have you seen Iran make ahead of the war? Can you discuss It’s missile capabilities? Any intelligence capabilities? Any surprises it might happen in store? When the 12-day war ended, I estimated that Iran would need about six months to recover, including its nuclear program. Contrary to popular belief, Iran did not lose its entire long-range or medium-range air defense network; while some launchers were damaged, the primary targets of the Israeli strikes were the radar systems. Once the radars were neutralized, Iran successfully hid the bulk of its remaining batteries, leaving much of its arsenal intact. In contrast, short-range systems like the Tor-M1 and domestic variants were heavily engaged against cruise missiles, often being lost or damaged only after their ammunition was completely exhausted. Since then, Iran has worked to rebuild its destroyed radar network and, above all, to implement a genuine counterintelligence doctrine. The Mossad operations against Iranian radars and air defense systems have shaped new perimeter defense and counterintelligence doctrines not only in Iran but in other countries as well. If we look at the quantity of weapons and the organization of armed groups during Iran’s most recent protests, I would say the problem of foreign intelligence operations inside the country remains severe. This seriously threatens much of Iran’s capabilities, and I foresee a wave of sabotage operations as a new war draws closer. Iran has begun receiving collaboration from China across multiple areas,from satellites to internal counterintelligence, but it may still take some time for this to produce tangible results. During the last years, the Mossad relied heavily on cell phones, using SMS for recruitment and accessing device GPS for target location. Iran has since focused intensely on preventing any repetition of this, and on this specific issue, the Chinese appear to have provided support. Although foreign intelligence services have operated extensively inside Iran, the scale of any armed opposition groups is negligible compared to the Iranian armed forces, which could still draw on allied paramilitaries and militias in neighboring countries, including the Houthis. Iran has become a missile power with a stockpile far larger than Western estimates suggest. As early as 1998, Iran was already producing missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, and it has continued doing so ever since, developing 12 to 15 different models in that range - meaning all are capable of reaching Israel. That is nearly 30 years of continuous missile production, resulting in a stockpile of several thousands. Another area where Iran has emerged as a global power is drones, including underwater ones. Iran’s UUVs have evolved rapidly into mass-produced models with integrated AI, and I believe they hold some major surprises in reserve. A key point today is that the AN/TPY-2 radars, which played a critical role in tracking Iranian missiles, would be among the first targets to be engaged. These high-powered X-band radars are the backbone of regional missile defense, providing essential data to THAAD and Patriot batteries. However, because they are large, stationary, and emit high-energy signals, they are highly vulnerable to a first-strike or saturation attack, which would effectively 'blind' the entire defensive network. Obviously, a defense budget of nearly one trillion dollars cannot be compared to Iran’s, but the real question is whether the cost and effort are worth the potential casualties. Even without Israel, the Americans maintain an immense advantage in aerial operations over Iran; however, as I have stated before, this superiority does not translate to the maritime theater.

Patricia Marins

21,142 次观看 • 4 个月前

So, my opinion on what the Antarctic (Antarctica) Anomaly is that it's a type of frequency technology. It must be way more powerful than HAARP, as many have claimed it to be, because we would see these anomalies at other HAARP sites, and we don't, not like this. With that said, and I'm very much trying to avoid letting what I want it to be not play a part here, I think it is a technology that is being used either off the coast of Antarctica itself or Bouvet Island. A third possibility is an area just to the northwest of the island that looks odd. It's possible it is a sonar scan from a ship, but why in that remote location? It looks like an antenna set up or rows of something that is out of place. I also believe that the weather events and fires that have taken place in Africa could possibly have been because of this. Each time we saw the anomaly, it was followed by a destructive weather event in Africa. A weird connection to that is we have been told and warned of a very busy 2024 Atlantic hurricane season. This is in part because of the above-average Atlantic ocean temperatures, which is the fuel to Hurricanes. With all this info, it's possible to see how the Anomaly could be a frequency tech that can manipulate or create weather, And or WARM up the Ocean temps to purposely enhance the Hurricane season and Storm growth. Keep in mind that many of our hurricanes and many of the biggest hurricanes have come from the west coast of Africa and form over the Cape Verde islands before heading towards the Caribbean and the United States. This is all of course speculation, and I'm learning many new things every day, so this idea may morph over time as we learn more. In the end, it is very hard to ignore all these findings. #antarctica #anonaly #AntarcticaAnomaly #BouvetIsland

In2ThinAir

442,580 次观看 • 2 年前

The US can apply pressure, but Iran is not Venezuela. The choice to arm groups in Iran instead of investing in peaceful protests eliminated all chances for the movement seeking greater change and freedom. Although President Trump is discussing support for the protesters and possible aid, I don't believe there are resources available for that. Although Iran is facing severe problems with electricity and water, in addition to high inflation and debts from the 12-day war, they have accelerated repairs on military installations as well as in the missile cities. The manufacturing and the pace of refurbishment of missiles produced before 2015 and with liquid fuel, such as the Shahab-3, Emad, Ghadr, and the Soumar cruise missiles, are proceeding at full steam. A country like Iran can recondition more than 1,000 of these missiles in 6 months. Anyone who thinks Iran's missile stock is somehow limited is deluding themselves. The missile cities are fully loaded. There may be shortages of water and electricity in the country, but missile production there has proven to be a priority. Furthermore, a new attack on Iran could unite the country and lead to violent retaliations against various American bases, in addition to closing the Strait of Hormuz with more than 20 submarines and thousands of anti-ship missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, causing daily economic losses of billions to the world. And there's another thing to worry about. The US sent Israel more than 90,000 tons of bombs that were dropped on Gaza and Iran. This left American stocks in a position where they have not yet been replenished. The same goes for air defense missiles from both the US and Israel, which have not yet been restocked. The entire situation is being evaluated by the US. Iran used little of what it has in the 12-day war, mainly because it knew it had been caught by surprise and was without strategic air defense systems. It preserved a large part of its military units. Today, it is likely that Iran would treat any attack and the proportional retaliation as matters of survival. Furthermore, Iran is more under Chinese and Russian influence than American, another point that differs greatly from the Venezuela situation. President Trump is already dealing with problems in Venezuela and now this Greenland issue. Given the weapon stock issues, Iran's potential retaliations, and the matters Trump is still resolving, I don't think an attack on Iran is likely, unless it's something small and symbolic.

Patricia Marins

24,061 次观看 • 6 个月前

Iran’s Post-War Air Defense: Changes in System Integration and Deployment Tactics The 12-Day War, marked by Israeli air superiority, prompted accelerated reforms in mobility, autonomy, and hybrid integration in Iranian air defenses, particularly in their long-range battery, the Bavar-373. 1. Hardware Changes - Miniaturization and Autonomy (TELAR): The Babar-373-II now integrates AESA radars into each launcher, eliminating cables and vulnerable central radars, enabling independent operations. The range is 300-400 km for large targets and about 85-150 km for stealth fighters. - New Sayyad-4B+ Missiles: Featuring dual seekers (active radar and IR), extended range (300-400 km), and a focus on counter-stealth, Iran believes these new missiles can overcome jamming and past failures against drones heavy drones. - Integration of the Arman System: This is Iran's equivalent to AEGIS, covering medium-range defense (up to 120 km) in self-sufficient vehicles. Investments improved setup agility to just 3 minutes; moreover, if links fail due to satellite disruptions like last year, both the Bavar-373-II and the 15th Khordad can continue operating autonomously. This was a major issue for Iran that caused blackouts in their air defenses. - Surveillance Drones as "Flying Radars": Models like the Mohajer-10 and Karrar conduct patrols and transmit data via satellites (BeiDou), allowing passive detection and keeping radars off until engagement. 2. Tactical Changes - Radar Ambush (Passive Tracking): The implementation of modern sensors was another shift. Now, optical/IRST sensors and drones detect targets; radars activate only for seconds to lock on, reducing exposure to counter-attacks. - Geographic Dispersion: This autonomy allows units to spread across 10-15 km² in tunnels and civilian sheds, emerging only after drone alerts and integrating with smaller systems for layers resistant to saturation. It seems Iran is attempting an interesting tactic that could work if cyber elements don't cause issues. - Radical "Shoot-and-Scoot" Mobility: I've never seen this tactic with long-range air systems before, but Iran claims repositioning in under 4 minutes, with logistics for remote reloads, transforming this system tactically like MLRS or artillery. 3. Post-War Comparative (2025 vs. 2026) Comparing configurations before and after the war, in 2025 connections relied on physical cables and centralized infrastructure, while in 2026 it adopts wireless datalinks with independent launchers, seemingly built with Chinese assistance. Dependency evolved from a giant, vulnerable search radar to a hybrid sensor network incorporating drones, IRST systems, and satellites. Reaction time, which previously took a long time to move the entire battery, is now reduced to under 4 minutes for the first vehicle to depart. Finally, the target focus shifted from conventional missiles and aircraft to advanced threats, such as counter-stealth, counter-drones, and, according to them, even hypersonic missiles. 4. Persistent Fragilities - Slow Reload Logistics: Missile reloading takes 30-60 minutes with cranes, exposing them to orbital surveillance. However, all heavy batteries are like this. - Datalink Vulnerability: Although Iran has strong link protection technology as seen in drone, it has limits against interference, and the number of American assets dedicated to this indicates that jamming or hacking loads won't be small. - Massive Thermal Signature: Heat from the chassis detectable by LEO satellites is another vulnerability that would also nullify camouflage, but it's the same with every system. - Radar Horizon vs. Cruise Missiles: The truck-embedded radar has a short tracking radius of 35-45 km, with a brief reaction against low-altitude or terrain-masking threats, which in certain situations could favor Tomahawks.

Patricia Marins

69,042 次观看 • 4 个月前

OK, I have a definitive word on the CJ Abrams play from today's Pittsburgh Pirates at Washington Nationals game after talking with Elias Sports Bureau on this. This play will stay as a sacrifice fly. The originial ruling of NOT a sacrifice fly was for the exact same reason that I thought, which is that the infielder is not running into the outfield, which is year's past would have been correct As it was explained to me, in past years, an infielder had to be running almost in a straight line towards the outfield wall to be considered "running in the outfield". Here, since he is running, and he ends up further away from home (157 feet) than when he started (145 feet), this is going to count as a sacrifice fly. That definition is changing, in part from this play to help bring greater consistency, and to take some of the guesswork out of it (the argument that he is running into the outfield as opposed to more parallel). Now, folks all the time ask "why doesn't MLB publish the OS Manual" and I always say because it is a living document that can have the wording change, and the wording for this play will be modified to something like "more towards the outfield wall than towards home plate" to eliminate any confusion. The big key to this play is that he was running on a full sprint. Also, and this is helpful for me, but for all fly ball outs that score a run, Elias Saba reviews to ensure consistency. So, yes, it's a sacrifice fly, and now that I have that info from Elias themselves, that sort of settles this one. Sounds like the guidelines for this definition will be changing, either this season, or certainly for next season.

MLB Scoring Changes

49,079 次观看 • 14 天前