Amit Segal
@AmitSegal • 89,294 subscribers
Chief political analyst, @N12News. Author, “It’s Noon in Israel” newsletter and “A Call at 4 AM” | https://t.co/52ELID0QxN
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I'm gonna say something a bit different from what that source told the New York Times. He said Fordo was damaged Severely but wasn't destroyed. So I'll tell you what Israel's current assessment is. First off all Natanz was completely wiped out. For Fordo and Isfahan, we're waiting on more confirmations. Not because we think something didn't work, but because it naturally takes longer for those deep underground sites. The big question now is whether Iran's nuke program just went back a few years, or if it's been totally erased. This relates to where the enriched uranium is. That uranium, enriched to 60%, is now incredibly hard for Iran to boost to the 90% needed for a bomb. Israel thinks most, if not all, of the enriched uranium was at Natanz or Isfahan. It wasn't moved, so it was there during the attack. We're now waiting For The BDA Of the Enriched uranium just like we were waiting on Muhammad Sinwar. I know he's under a tunnel and unreachable, but we'll likely know soon if he was also destroyed. This is huge news that could mean the official end of Iran's nuclear program.
Amit Segal2,394,394 次观看 • 1 年前
This is the outline currently under discussion between the United States and Iran. I am sharing this with caution, as it hasn’t been agreed upon yet, but based on recent developments, these are the points they have been discussing: A 15-year suspension of uranium enrichment. The United States originally demanded 20 years, while the Iranians wanted much less; they eventually settled on 15. The plan includes converting uranium into fuel, which changes its physical state and makes it harder to re-enrich. While not a simple process, this means the uranium won't necessarily leave Iran, which is a major concern for Israel. Full inspection of nuclear sites and the opening of the Strait of Hormuz are, of course, a given. The deal would also include ending the war, the withdrawal of American forces from the Gulf, and the lifting of economic sanctions. It must be said that, aside from the uranium, the lifting of sanctions is what worries Israel the most. As you recall, the strategic goal of the war was to create the conditions for the regime’s downfall. The regime was in danger of collapsing due to an economic situation that deteriorated primarily because of those sanctions; if they are lifted, the regime is strengthened. Therefore, it seems to me that the perception in Israel remains that the status quo is preferable—a state of "no war, no peace" where U.S. military forces remain on standby in the Persian Gulf. But as we have learned, this does not depend solely on Israel's desires, to put it mildly.
Amit Segal258,101 次观看 • 3 个月前
My initial thoughts on the deal. There’s no phase two. That's clear to everyone, right? Phase two might happen someday, but it’s unrelated to what’s just been signed. The deal signed now is a hostage release deal. It doesn’t imply anything about the future. Theoretically, fantasies could come true: Emiratis and allies dismantling tunnels, an international body formed, Tony Blair governing Gaza. All this could happen in theory, but it’s not part of the current tactical negotiations. What we have now is a hostage deal, and a ceasefire while talks continue in good faith. There’s the question of course: who decides if talks are happening in good faith? Under Trump, Israel has previously said “Talks aren’t genuine or productive,” and resumed fighting. But this time, I don’t think we’ll see IDF tanks rushing back into Gaza, like what happened when the last two ceasefires ended. The big question is: Are we moving towards the Lebanese model Israel mentioned? In other words, the IDF stays beyond the international border and strikes targets from the air when it detects buildups or threats. Attempts to harm Israel are obvious. But what we’re talking about is buildup efforts, like digging more tunnels or building more arms-producing lathes. This is what Israel is aiming for. The reasonable assumption in Jerusalem is that President Trump will approve it. That’s one point. The IDF will withdraw to the 53% line. It was 57% initially, then dropped to 53% when the hostages will be freed. The talks afterwards are based on the principle of Israeli withdrawal in return for demilitarization and dismantling. Of course, we all assume that Hamas won’t disarm willingly, and the Emiratis and other international forces won’t achieve this quickly either. Now, regarding the hostage issue. I’ll admit than when I hear people say that Israel is “making peace with enemies,” I smell Oslo in the air, and the implications it carries. This isn’t peace, and these are bitter enemies, still on their knees.
Amit Segal583,119 次观看 • 9 个月前
Qatar is attempting, on its own initiative, to negotiate an end to the war with Iran. Yes, according to those Western sources, if Qatar fails—and at the moment it appears it will—to end the war between the United States, Israel, and Iran, then it wants—and there’s no nicer way to put it—to bribe Iran so that it won’t attack Qatar itself. The proposal included the same money Dana spoke of, but this time through a local channel: six billion dollars—allegedly held by Qatar as funds belonging to the Revolutionary Guards—in exchange for Iran halting its attacks on Qatar. Incidentally, this is an event that causes immense embarrassment both to the Qataris and to Hamas, which is based in Qatar and supported by both the Qataris and the Iranians. Let’s just mention the response of a Qatari diplomat: “Qatar has not offered any economic or other deal to Iran in exchange for stopping the attacks. Such claims are complete fabrications and represent an attempt to drive a wedge between Qatar and the United States. These efforts,” says the Qatari diplomat, “will not succeed.”
Amit Segal252,621 次观看 • 4 个月前
Let’s recall two things that have been with us over the past year. One is the understanding that Trump would come here to help Netanyahu before the election. There was talk of the Israel Prize, that he would visit before the election, and tell people to vote for Netanyahu. Let’s just say that seems a bit doubtful now. The second is, of course, the pardon story—the total mobilization in Netanyahu’s favor. Now this is changing, and in my opinion, it poses a challenge for Netanyahu, even with his thirty years as prime minister. This is perhaps the biggest challenge he’s ever faced with a U.S. president. Relatively speaking, dealing with Obama, Clinton, or Biden is easier, since you have the Republican Party wing and the U.S. opposition that will always be on your side. That’s not the case here. Much of the support Israel still has in the United States comes from the MAGA movement. What happens if Trump stands up to Netanyahu? Having said that about this moment of truth, it’s clear what the correct answer must be in this test. "The answer must be that Israel will never agree to stop attacking Dahieh in retaliation, because that would mean Hezbollah would continue to grow stronger, and it would be a return in one fell swoop to October 6th," says a senior cabinet minister. He notes that as far as we’re concerned, Iran is Trump’s problem and it’s his right to go there and make a deal, but Lebanon is ours. This is our war that was forced upon us, and we must not agree to the Iranian equation—even at the cost of a sharp confrontation with the President of the United States. Yes, and we haven’t even discussed what’s in that agreement with Iran or what we’re heading toward. By the way, just to be clear about the Iranian actions with their proxy, Hezbollah: this was truly a proxy operation. It wasn’t a slip of the tongue, and no, it’s no coincidence that there’s now talk of a double-digit number of drones landing inside Israeli territory. This is an Iranian attempt to force, with American backing, a return to the October 6th lines into this agreement, and that cannot happen.
Amit Segal63,618 次观看 • 1 个月前
For weeks now we've been told: "Look, the reason this war failed is that there was no political solution to bring it to a close." Well—yesterday, a few minutes after the start of Shabbat, that solution arrived. And it is the best of our dreams: an agreement with the State of Lebanon. A framework that recognizes Israel's presence in the security zone for as long as Hezbollah exists, that calls for Hezbollah's disarmament, and in which Lebanon recognizes Israel's legitimacy, its sovereignty over the territories, and the end of rocket fire. Having said all that—let's see what it's actually worth. Both the grand principle, the one that says a military operation must always end with a decisive final blow, and the agreement itself. Because a quiet suspicion runs through all of us tonight: that even after this accord—coming forty-four years after another historic agreement with Lebanon—Hezbollah will not be laying down its arms. If anything, the opposite. So let us remember that the struggle in the Middle East is a long one. And in that long struggle, yesterday we took a real step forward—for the simplest of reasons: yet another Arab country, and one that matters to us, has in effect recognized the legitimacy of the State of Israel. All of it under the American umbrella—the very same United States that disappointed us so deeply only last week. Another step on a long road.
Amit Segal42,567 次观看 • 27 天前
What is Netanyahu expected to say to the president? The main problem with the ballistic-missile story is that the Iranians have caught on to the daylight—the gap—between Israel and the United States. What happened here is that Donald Trump gave his word and then broke it. "We will not allow Iran to have nuclear weapons." But he didn’t talk about conventional weapons—the ballistic missiles that threaten Israel. They threaten Israel to such an extent that Netanyahu himself, in a video announcing to the Israeli people that he was launching Operation Nation of Lions, said that two existential threats had developed. The nuclear threat—you’ve known about for years—but also the threat of thousands of ballistic missiles. What has happened since then? The Iranians are not acting at all on the nuclear front, as far as we know. They have not even extracted the enriched material buried underground. But they are very much intensifying their experiments with ballistic missiles. Either because they think it is threatening, or because, as Netanyahu says, it is an existential threat to Israel. We also have a race between the number of their missiles and the number of our missiles—and let’s say that both countries need to recover on this issue. Let’s ask the question now, and here I don’t have an answer. When Netanyahu goes to Washington to talk to Trump about this, is he talking to him about a combined attack—which seems a bit far-fetched to me, because the Americans really have no intention of getting involved in a conventional weapons conflict anywhere in the world; otherwise they would never get out of it—or is he content to give Israel permission to attack on its own, with the U.S. providing a defensive umbrella? One. Two, it should also be said, in this context, that there is a big debate in the Israeli cabinet and at the top about whether it is possible to launch an attack every six months. You cannot—unlike the nuclear project—you cannot eliminate the Iranian ballistic threat. Is it sustainable to come every six months, eight months, and launch another round, which includes them firing at us, all the flights leaving Israel, and all the implications for the economy? There is no decision in Israel. There is no decision in the U.S. that's what they will discuss.
Amit Segal273,898 次观看 • 7 个月前
There’s a new claim that “essentially, all that happened was Trump got tired, took control and forced it on Netanyahu, and this is basically the same deal that could have been reached a year earlier,” with the disturbing implication, that’s horrible to say, that IDF soldiers died in vain for a cause that had already been achieved. So, let’s revisit the plans that were laid out by both the current and former American administrations to see if they match up. For example, the Biden plan from June 1, 2024, which was met with considerable enthusiasm, and was even later acknowledged as Netanyahu’s plan. I want to highlight the difference. In the first phase, the IDF should have already pulled back to roughly its current position, and then it was just about releasing humanitarian hostages. As if not all of them are “humanitarian.” Then it transitioned to discussing the release of living hostages. In this phase, the IDF would withdraw from all of Gaza, until the last centimetre, while all the dead hostages remain in Gaza. It’s as different as day and night. Here, everyone is returning, including the dead, and the IDF is still in half of Gaza. This isn’t just about some desire to maintain an occupation or garrison force, but rather to ensure that Hamas disarms — something that didn’t happen in the Biden proposal. So now let’s move on to the Witkoff plan, much closer to us, much better for Israel, but still different. There was talk of releasing half of the dead hostages, but then a temporary ceasefire for two months of negotiations to end the war, and then the IDF would withdraw from more places than it is now, and there would be a guarantee that the war would not be renewed. Once again, we see that there was no connection between the IDF remaining on the ground and the promise that Hamas would disarm, especially while some of the hostages are still there. The greatness of this outline is this issue. I also want to say something general about the matter of responsibility. As ridiculous as it was on October 7 and afterwards to hear from Netanyahu’s supporters that the one who is to blame is the IDF chief of staff, the Shin Bet chief, the attorney general and the Military Advocate General, and that Netanyahu has no part in it — it’s as ridiculous as it is that now they’re saying, “Thank you Trump and thank you Nitzan Alon, and thank you to all of them and to the Qatari prime minister, and Netanyahu and Ron Dermer have nothing to do with it at all.” Indeed, Netanyahu had a very large part in the failure of October 7, and he also has a very large part together with Dermer in this deal. By the way, how does that connect to what Kushner said tonight in Egypt? He said that both the prime minister and Dermer made very big compromises and took risks to see the end of the war. I would like to make a suggestion. Once upon a time, when there was only one channel and people didn’t like the commentators, they said, “Watch the game without the commentary.” I say, let’s watch Trump and Netanyahu’s move without the commentary, because there are a lot of conversations, and this and that, and slander, and sometimes even quotes, but in practice there has never been a president and a prime minister who acted like this, and the results are evident from Iran, through the Golan Heights, through the embassy and now Gaza.
Amit Segal298,292 次观看 • 9 个月前
What would happen if, mid-performance at Madison Square Garden, a pop star began asking God to forgive them and the audience for their sins? I think it’s fair to say that a few people in the crowd would be confused, to say the least. In Israel, however, Judaism is infused in the national culture — even for those who wouldn’t identify as religious in the traditional sense of the word. Few moments have captured this cultural intertwining as beautifully as a recent Osher Cohen concert. Cohen, who does not wear a yarmulke, was singing one of his breakup songs — par for the course for a pop star. And then, without warning, he broke into Adon HaSelichot (Master of Forgiveness) a liturgical poem sung in the lead up to the Jewish New Year, which praises God’s many aspects while asking for forgiveness for our sins. And how did the audience, which was by no means a religious crowd, respond? They sang along with Cohen as if it was one of his hit songs. And in that moment, it wasn’t just a concert — it was a reminder of what makes Israel unique: a place where tradition and modern life blend so seamlessly that even a centuries-old prayer can turn into a pop song loved by the religious and secular alike. 📸: Musicshows-c2d/YouTube
Amit Segal298,159 次观看 • 10 个月前
Where was Mossad during the assassination attempt in Doha? Israel’s announcement of the strike was highly unusual. In the prime minister’s, defense minister’s, and IDF's announcements, the Mossad isn't mentioned by name. Rather, they said that the IDF and Shin Bet carried out an assassination, making it sound like it was some safe house in Nablus or a tunnel in Jabaliya, and actually a Shin Bet operation. This is almost nonsensical. It’s Mossad that handles Hamas affairs abroad. It certainly wasn’t the Shin Bet that gathered intel before the strike. Surely Mossad needed to be involved. So what’s going on? I’ll present you with two versions. One says the Mossad opposed this move. In principle, Mossad strongly supports Israeli cooperation with Qatar, and has done so since long before current Mossad chief David Barnea took over. Barnea even manages the Qatar case in Mossad, and didn’t want to be involved in the strikes. The second version says Jerusalem deliberately excluded Mossad. Of course, it was Mossad agents who would have been there and provided intel, but Jerusalem didn’t want to further damage the already shaky status of the last respected Israeli institution. It might not even be accepted by the Qataris after tonight. Either way, this was an Israeli operation. By the way, the IDF Chief of Staff and others had reservations about the timing. They preferred to wait until the American ultimatum expired this weekend. But as you saw, the planes bombing Doha were clearly Israeli, and not from any other army.
Amit Segal249,422 次观看 • 10 个月前