Radio & Nukes 🇺🇦
@HamWa07 • 24,544 subscribers
🇺🇦 Critical Communications, Amateur Radio, Military Comms, Nuclear Weapons, Physics https://t.co/OnzWgpxN44 https://t.co/S40dnZNJMH Signal
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I acquired the power distribution and servo amplifier board of a late 2024 or early 2025 Geran-2 OW-UAV launched by the Russian military into Ukraine where it was shot down. It wasn’t long before I realized that the TMS320 is export-controlled 🫠 5 min. Board: G584 PDUA-V6 S/N AL-2412-1252 Chip: Texas Instruments TMS320 F28334PFGA G4A-3BCELQW Export Control Classification Number: 3A991A2 Clock rate: 50MHz
Radio & Nukes 🇺🇦72,231 Aufrufe • vor 9 Monaten
Ukraine’s GUR has reportedly destroyed two 91N6E “Big Bird” radars — long-range S-band phased array early warning systems paired with Russia’s S-400 air defense network. The 91N6E is a high-power PESA radar derived from the 64N6 series, capable of detecting stealth and high-altitude targets out to 600 km. It provides sector surveillance, target tracking, and missile cueing for the S-400’s layered interceptors (40N6, 48N6DM, 9M96).
Radio & Nukes 🇺🇦74,022 Aufrufe • vor 11 Monaten
Video footage of the tsunami arriving in Severo-Kurilsk, located at the coordinates 50.67783, 156.12835.
Radio & Nukes 🇺🇦54,087 Aufrufe • vor 10 Monaten
Possible Sweep Jammer Detected by Sentinel-1 likely radiating from Chornomorske, Crimea at 2025-04-28T15:44:38.672789Z. Sentinel-1 data shows a distinct sawtooth RF sweep pattern centered around 5.4 GHz — a waveform commonly associated with analog FPV jamming. While the exact emitter is unknown, the signal matches characteristics of simple wideband sweep jammers used to blind FPV drone operators. This aligns with the expected behavior of systems like Russia’s “Black Eye,” which are believed to operate in overlapping frequency ranges. Link budget analysis confirms the signal would be detectable from orbit under typical conditions. 45.551099996762645, 32.7949463756815 36T YJ 23247 77897 2025-04-28T15:44:38.672789Z Burst 5 Fasttime Row 777 Spectrogram Analysis Center frequency: 5405 MHz Sweep type: Linear sawtooth frequency sweep Sweep range (based on ±22.5 MHz bandwidth): 5382.5 MHz → 5427.5 MHz Sweep duration: ~110 μs per cycle Repetition: Regular, sharp resets – characteristic of continuous wave sweep jamming Waveform shape: Consistent with a LFM (Linear Frequency Modulated) jammer — often seen in cheap analog or FM sweep jammers ------- Background: 🛰️ INTELLIGENCE CARD System ID: PKM "Black Eye" Type: Electronic Warfare – FPV Video Channel Jammer 📌 Summary "Black Eye" is a Russian-made suppression system designed to intercept and disrupt video feeds from FPV drones by overpowering the signal with directional RF interference. The system does not jam drone flight control directly, but targets the operator’s video downlink, causing the drone to be flown blind. 📡 Technical Characteristics Feature Description -Frequency Ranges 1000–1399 MHz, 1400–1680 MHz, 3200–3640 MHz, 4900–6100 MHz (Sentinel-1 = 5400MHz) -Power Output 50W per module (up to 100W with dual modules) (FSPL Calculation below TLDR; -76.92dBm ESA has recorded events as weak as –105 dBm) -Antenna Type Directional patch antennas on servo-controlled rotary mount -Rotation Range ±135° (servo-driven) -Control Interface Portable panel with 4 main displays and 2 mini screens for servo feedback -Operation Mode Semi-manual; operator analyzes video feeds and activates suppression -Effective Range Up to ~300 meters from control station (video disruption only) 🔍 Visual Identification Twin rectangular patch antennas (green casing) Top-mounted black electronics/control module Mounted on rotary gimbal with servo housing Connected via visible cabling and support bracketry Often camouflaged or field-deployed in vegetation 📷 Associated Visuals UI displays with real-time spectrograms and signal readouts Reconnaissance drone images showing fixed field units Spectrograms revealing sweep jamming (sawtooth interference patterns) 🎯 Purpose & Tactical Effect Target Analog FPV UAV video feeds Effect Disrupts operator’s real-time video, causing loss of feed Impact UAV pilot loses visual control, reducing mission capability Operational Use Frontline EW curtain; typically not targeting control links 📍 Known Deployment Frequently observed near frontline sectors Mounted in semi-permanent or rapidly deployable configurations Correlated with SAR anomalies (Sentinel-1) and RFI signal spikes 📝 Additional Notes Focused on analog signal suppression, not drone control links. Identified in May 2025 open-source documentation by Center Radio Technologies (Author: Sergey Beskrestnov).
Radio & Nukes 🇺🇦18,322 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr
Radar interference detected over the Azov Sea: • Satellite: Sentinel-1A • Frequency: 5405 MHz • Sample Rate: 300 MHz • Date: 2023-08-15 • RFI Location: 45.7870127, 36.9863336 (interference appears here on the image but does not represent the emitter’s ground location) • Likely Source: A land-based radar system near the Azov Sea Video Details: • Each frame: 80 microseconds • Total duration: 4 milliseconds Raw I/Q data processed to create this visualization.
Radio & Nukes 🇺🇦12,328 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr
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