Kurdistan Watch
@KurdistanWatch • 18,931 subscribers
Delivering incisive and contextualised coverage on politics, economics, oil & corruption in Kurdistan, Kirkuk & Mosul. Telegram: https://t.co/AwrLg2XFJU
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Iraqi Turkmen Front leader and Kirkuk Governor Muhammad Seman says Turkey’s military presence in Iraq is not only aimed at fighting the PKK, but also at protecting the Turkmen population. Seman has already faced criticism despite being in office for only a few months, particularly after placing Kirkuk within the orbit of the “Turkic world” and associating the province with Turkic-world municipal initiatives. Some Kurds are now even mocking previous Kurdish governors for being overly conciliatory, arguing that Kirkuk’s Turkmen governor has, within months, begun presenting the province as part of the Turkic world, even though Turkmen hold only two of the 16 seats on the provincial council.
Kurdistan Watch15,504 görüntüleme • 7 gün önce
On the KRG fuel crisis, Iraq’s oil minister said that during last year’s oil agreement, the KRG itself requested an allocation of 50,000 barrels per day for domestic consumption because it has its own private refineries. He said Baghdad told the KRG plainly at the time: the federal government should receive those 50,000 barrels for export, while the Oil Ministry would instead supply the Kurdistan Region with petroleum products, including gasoline and gas oil, at the same standard prices calculated for the rest of Iraq’s governorates. He added that when the KRG recently needed cooking gas (LPG), the ministry supplied it. This is largely consistent with how KRG officials themselves described the issue during last year’s negotiations, as we outlined below. What is particularly interesting, however, is the minister’s conclusion that “the Oil and Gas Law is what is capable of providing all the solutions to this issue,” effectively framing the current fuel dispute as another consequence of the unresolved federal-KRG energy framework.
Kurdistan Watch15,507 görüntüleme • 10 gün önce
The tension around Khabat district in western Erbil is ongoing, with a wave of arrests in nearby Harki villages that began after the Lajan protests spread to the area. The KDP has deployed heavy forces in both Lajan (site of recent protests) and these parts of Khabat, setting up a series of checkpoints across the villages and using numerous MRAP-type armored vehicles and anti-riot vehicles to move troops. Meanwhile, protests in some areas continue in response to the clampdown.
Kurdistan Watch144,086 görüntüleme • 8 ay önce
Here is an example of the long queues for the KRG’s subsidised 750-dinar ($0.57) per litre fuel, which is available only at a limited number of designated petrol stations. This footage is from Akre, in eastern Duhok province, where only a single petrol station is distributing the subsidised fuel. Most petrol stations across Erbil and Duhok have shut down due to the fuel crisis, while the few stations selling government-subsidised fuel are seeing queues that can take hours to clear. Many fuel traders say the KRG’s decision to cap prices forces them to sell at a significant loss, leaving many with little choice but to stop selling altogether. Fuel quality is also reportedly deteriorating rapidly, with a growing number of motorists reporting engine problems. Meanwhile, Kurdish opposition efforts to secure access to Iraqi subsidised fuel, sold at 450 dinars ($0.34) per litre, are continuing. The pressure from those proposals appears to have contributed to the KRG’s rushed decision to cut prices in an attempt to ease the crisis, but the policy has so far largely backfired.
Kurdistan Watch17,932 görüntüleme • 24 gün önce
Yazidi activist and Aurora Prize for Awakening Humanity laureate Mirza Dinnayi raises a notable issue on the anniversary of the ISIS onslaught against Sinjar. In a video filmed in Rawanduz, Dinnayi stands beside the statue of Mir Muhammad Pasha, the nineteenth-century ruler of the Soran Emirate, and asks why a figure associated with one of the bloodiest campaigns against the Yazidis is still celebrated as a Kurdish national hero. Mir Muhammad Pasha’s forces attacked Yazidi communities in the 1830s after religious rulings branded them infidels. Thousands were said to have been killed or forcibly converted. Some later Yazidi accounts place the death toll between 70,000 and 120,000, although the precise figure remains difficult to verify. Pointing towards the statue, Dinnayi describes Mir Muhammad Pasha as one of history’s ‘great criminals’ and asks Kurds to consider how Yazidis feel when they see him commemorated in public space. His most powerful comparison is a simple one: imagine that Sunni Arabs returned to power in Iraq and erected a statue of Saddam Hussein. How would Kurds feel? The analogy captures the central issue. One community’s national hero may be remembered by another as the perpetrator of mass violence. Dinnayi argues that the history of Mir Muhammad Pasha should not be erased, but neither should a history of massacre, enslavement and forced conversion be transformed into a source of national pride. His intervention raises a broader question about how Kurdish society remembers its past: whether public commemoration should celebrate power and territorial expansion alone, or also reckon with the suffering inflicted on minorities in the process. A similar dispute surrounds Simko Shikak, who is commemorated with a statue and a street bearing his name in Erbil. Many Assyrians oppose his public glorification because of his role in the 1918 assassination of Patriarch Mar Shimun Benyamin and the wider clashes with Assyrians in the Urmia and Salmas regions. The two cases raise the same underlying question: who is entitled to define a historical figure as a hero when another community remembers him as a perpetrator?
Kurdistan Watch11,249 görüntüleme • 15 gün önce
Footage shows the newer explosion in Suleimani’s Tasluja area, which hosts several PUK forces, including Peshmerga, Commando forces and counterterrorism units. The blast was very powerful. At least eight people have been injured in tonight’s IRGC attacks on Suleimani. The second part of the video shows a nearby mosque whose windows were shattered by the force of the explosion.
Kurdistan Watch18,206 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce
A recent video shows Bafel Talabani at a weapons auction with two American YouTubers known for firearms content. What stands out is how openly they goad him into bidding higher, hyping him up with military bravado: “charge,” “take no prisoners,” “eat their wounded.” They coach him through the auction like handlers working a fight, and he plays along until the hammer drops at $11,000. They are essentially treating him as a fool, and he does not seem to realize it. These appear to be the same YouTubers Talabani previously filmed with in Iraq, where he mobilized his entire commando force to test weapons on camera, turning a public security apparatus into a prop for online entertainment. The $11,000 is not the point. Everyone knows these families hold wealth in the hundreds of millions, if not billions. What matters is not just the optics but what it reveals about the man himself. At home, Talabani projects the tough, militaristic leader who rules through force. Yet put him in a room with two YouTubers and he becomes pliable, eager to please, visibly pushed around. That contrast says something about the personality behind the strongman act. To be clear, there is nothing wrong with a leader befriending foreigners, and there is nothing wrong with having hobbies. Leaders are human. They need downtime, and no one begrudges them that. But there is a difference between having a private interest and performing it like this, on camera, being pushed around while your own people watch. That is not a leader enjoying a hobby. That is a terrible look. The timing compounds all of it. The economic crisis is deepening. Salary payments remain erratic. Talabani’s own media channel has been weaponizing the salary issue to project solidarity with ordinary citizens. Yet here is their leader, on camera, being goaded into throwing money around at a foreign auction. After that, the populist messaging becomes very hard to take seriously.
Kurdistan Watch63,166 görüntüleme • 5 ay önce
KDP security forces say they arrested Khurshid Harki during a raid at around 2 a.m., while he was asleep, along with his brother Hayder and two of his sons. They also seized his money, gold, cars and other valuables. The arrests come a year after an earlier attempt by KDP security forces to detain Khurshid led to armed clashes after he refused to surrender. A deal was later reached, allowing him to return to his village. He subsequently campaigned for the KDP in Iraq’s November 2025 elections. In recent weeks, however, Khurshid resigned from the party again and was reportedly preparing to announce a new political party within days of his arrest. He had also recently renewed his dispute with the Khabat power plant, located near his village. Khurshid accused the company of paying local workers far less than had been agreed. Other sources also say he blocked a pipeline connected to the plant that was due to pass through land he owned, pending a proper agreement. Background: The dispute between Khurshid Harki and Erbil’s security forces grew out of a tribal conflict between Khurshid and the Goran tribe. In July last year, tensions escalated into armed clashes between his supporters and the security forces. The original dispute was linked to land ownership. Before violence broke out, both sides had attacked each other on social media. The online feud then turned violent when supporters of Khurshid Harki opened fire on several villagers from the Goran tribe. An arrest warrant was subsequently issued for him. When security forces asked Khurshid to surrender, he refused. A large security and military force was then sent to the area to arrest him, but he again refused to hand himself in, leading to armed clashes. After two people from the security forces and the Harki tribe were killed, and as tensions in the area intensified, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani intervened. He sent the head of his guards to Khurshid Harki and persuaded him to end the standoff. Khurshid later surrendered himself to the Kurdistan Region Presidency. After being held for more than a week at the Sheraton Hotel in Erbil, he was released and returned to his area. The crisis was also shaped by an internal contest over the leadership of the Harki tribe. Both Jawhar Muhiaddin Agha and Mahmoud Agha present themselves as the tribe’s leader. Jawhar Agha has longstanding disputes with the KDP dating back to his father’s era. His lineage has historically held the tribal chieftaincy, and he remains by far the most authoritative Harki figure. He is also effectively outside the party’s reach in the area. Jawhar Agha now resides mainly in Mosul, while also spending time in Sulaimani and Gaziantep in Turkey. He is currently aligned with the PUK. Mahmoud Agha, by contrast, is regarded as close to the KDP. During the dispute between Khurshid Harki and Bashar Mushir Agha of the Goran tribe, the KDP appeared to give greater support to Bashar Mushir Agha, given his closeness to the party. At the same time, the KDP was suspicious of Khurshid’s possible ties to Jawhar Agha, who opposes the party. While the KDP was trying to arrest Khurshid, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani received Bashar Mushir Agha. This further angered the Harkis and strengthened their refusal to surrender. Beyond Harki suspicions that the KDP was backing the Goran tribe, the party also appeared to be using the crisis to promote Mahmoud Agha as head of the Harki tribe instead of Jawhar Muhiaddin Agha. At the time, a video circulated showing a phone call between Mahmoud Agha and the interior minister. KDP-affiliated media outlets also published a message from Mahmoud Agha, presented in his capacity as head of the Harki tribe, in which he called for brotherhood between the Harki and Goran tribes. In the phone call, the interior minister told Mahmoud Agha: “Out of respect for you, we will withdraw the military and security forces from around Khurshid Harki’s house.” Soon afterwards, people close to Khurshid rejected the claim that Mahmoud Agha was the head of the Harki tribe and insisted that Jawhar Muhiaddin Agha was their leader. Although the dispute between Khurshid Harki and the Goran tribe appeared on the surface to be about land, the background to the crisis involved several sensitive political and tribal dynamics.
Kurdistan Watch19,417 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce
Very interesting: villagers in the Halabja area, near the Iranian border, say a PKK group has been quietly digging new tunnels and building infrastructure, likely with PUK approval. This is notable: the PKK is engaged in a peace process with the Turkish state that requires it to withdraw from border areas, yet pro-PKK groups, particularly their Iranian affiliate PJAK, have been expanding south into the Sulaimani area near the Iranian border. One witness told KDP's K24 TV that movement into the village area is now restricted. PJAK has expanded as far as the Penjwen area and further south, but its movement into Halabja has been limited. The construction of tunnels and new infrastructure suggests the group is planning further expansion along the Iranian border.
Kurdistan Watch12,800 görüntüleme • 27 gün önce
Among the Iranian Kurdish groups shown in the map below is PAK, which was very recently filmed at its base in Sherawa, south of Erbil, more than 100 km from the Iranian border. What is interesting is that PAK chose to show itself openly even though, under the Iraq–Iran security agreement, it should have avoided such media appearances. The footage suggests they have about 200–250 fighters, yet they have remained in their Sherawa complex after the agreement. This filming, part of an interview with PAK leader Hussein Yazdanpana, has apparently angered Iran's regime, although the complex is already under heavy surveillance, including Iran's own drone surveillance. One reason PAK has been kept in this complex is that it is now very close to and bankrolled by the KDP. It is also the weakest of the Iranian Kurdish groups, not only because of its small numbers but because, unlike PJAK, KDPI or Komala, it lacks strategic depth inside Iranian Kurdistan. PAK remains noteworthy, however, because it is the only group that has openly called for Israeli support and has stated in the media that it wants to cooperate with Israeli forces to move into Kurdish areas in the event of an Israel–Iran war.
Kurdistan Watch77,597 görüntüleme • 8 ay önce
Yazidi MP-elect Murad Ismael says Yazidis are not Kurds but a distinct ethnicity, and that he will work to have this formally recognised in the Iraqi parliament. His stance matters because, unlike previous token Yazidi MPs backed either by the KDP or pro-Iran Shia militias, Murad won a general seat on a Yazidi Cause Alliance list that secured around 50,000 votes – the first time a purely Yazidi, grassroots list has achieved this. Murad raises a sensitive but necessary debate. He argues that Yazidis are not Kurds and that some Kurdish parties try to impose that identity on them. He likens it to “how Kurds in Turkey don’t want to be called mountain Turks,” saying Yazidis likewise do not want to be branded “Yazidi Kurds” – a label widely used in parts of the Kurdish media, particularly outlets close to the KDP.
Kurdistan Watch75,981 görüntüleme • 8 ay önce
This video is filmed today at the entrance to Lajan village near Erbil (site of recent protests), show that the area remains heavily militarised, with all access points tightly controlled. In this direction, several MRAP armoured personnel carriers can be seen positioned just before the village. According to residents, life inside has largely returned to normal, but movement is strictly regulated: only locals are allowed in, and media outlets not affiliated with the KDP are barred from entering.
Kurdistan Watch77,112 görüntüleme • 8 ay önce
Ali Bapir, leader of Kurdistan’s second largest Islamist party, attended the funeral of the six fallen Peshmerga and said: “This war has been imposed on Iran by the Zionist entity and the United States, and it is not the Kurdistan Region’s war.” That broadly reflects the Islamist position: • He prayed that the six Peshmerga would be granted martyrdom and that the wounded would recover. • He said the Kurdistan Region has so far stayed out of the war and expressed hope that it would not be drawn into a conflict that is not its own. • He described the war as one imposed on Iran by the Zionist entity and the United States. • He thanked the Kurdistan Region’s leaders for not allowing the Region, so far, to be pulled into the war.
Kurdistan Watch34,347 görüntüleme • 4 ay önce
A new case in the Kurdistan Region shows how rapidly AI-generated content is entering social, religious and ideological life, just as it is elsewhere in the world. A person recently published what he claimed were leaked exchanges between a woman and Abdulatif Salafi, the Kurdistan Region’s most prominent Madkhali Salafi scholar. The alleged evidence included text messages and voice notes. Yet several details strongly suggest that the material was fabricated, most likely using AI. Text conversations are already easy to fake, including by changing a contact name or number to make an exchange appear authentic, while AI can now generate increasingly convincing voice recordings. Several people have challenged the claims and demonstrated how easily such material can be produced. Their rebuttals, however, have attracted far less attention than the original allegations, which spread widely. What makes the case more troubling is that a number of prominent online figures are amplifying the allegations for ideological or personal reasons. Abdulatif Salafi is a Madkhali, part of a Salafi current that emphasises obedience to the established political authority and rejects rebellion against it. In the Kurdistan Region, he has maintained good relations with both the KDP and PUK. This has made him a natural target for several different groups. Opposition figures hostile to the ruling parties have an interest in attacking someone seen as religiously legitimising the political establishment. Rival Islamist currents also have an incentive to promote the allegations as evidence that Madkhalis are corrupt, hypocritical or not genuinely representative of Islam. Others may simply dislike him personally. The result is that the fabricated material is not spreading only because people cannot distinguish AI from reality. It is also being deliberately amplified because it serves existing political, religious and personal agendas. People are more willing to believe and circulate a falsehood when it confirms what they already think about its target. Part of the reason many found the claims believable is Abdulatif Salafi’s own history. Several years ago, it emerged that he had been involved in a secret relationship with a woman whom he later married. He may therefore have genuine controversies surrounding him. But that does not make every subsequent allegation true, and the latest material appears very likely to be AI generated. This distinction is important. A person’s previous conduct or wider political and religious role cannot be treated as evidence that a specific accusation is authentic. In this case, real criticism of Salafi is being used to give credibility to what appears to be a fabricated scandal. The case illustrates how easily AI can now be used to intrude into people’s private lives, damage reputations and target religious, political or personal rivals. Most people still struggle to distinguish fabricated content from reality, particularly when the material reinforces something they are already inclined to believe. A similar case emerged in Iraq several weeks ago, when opponents of an Iraqi officer circulated images supposedly showing him committing adultery with a woman. The images were later officially confirmed to have been AI-generated. Although some signs of manipulation were visible, they were not obvious to most viewers, and the allegations had already caused significant harm. Until recently, much of the debate focused on how AI might eventually be used to harm people. That stage has already passed. AI-generated fabrications are now actively being used in political, religious and personal disputes, while ideologically motivated accounts help give them reach and apparent credibility.
Kurdistan Watch16,728 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce
Almost all the videos circulating of men from the Kurdistan Region traveling to Syrian Kurdish areas to take up arms, saying they want to defend them against what they see as a Syrian government threat, appear to be people from the Sulaimani area. All the open-source videos circulating so far of people from the Kurdistan region show the men as being from the Sulaimani area, which means the publicly available evidence supports one clear pattern: almost all those going appear to be from Sulaimani, and to a lesser extent Kirkuk. The videos suggest they are being deployed to places such as Hasakah city, Tell Tamir, and other fronts including Rmelan. They also imply some level of organization, with individuals appearing to be arranged into small groups of roughly eight people, each assigned a specific task. This is notable, and it looks politically driven. Sulaimani is farther from Syrian territory than Duhok or Erbil, yet it is producing most of the visible mobilization. A likely explanation is politics: the KDP appears to be discouraging or preventing people from Erbil and Duhok from going, while the PUK, which has publicly sent elements of its anti-terror unit, may be more permissive or even quietly supportive. It is well known that the SDF’s military ties with the PUK are closer. But this also suggests the KDP and Barzani are acting more cautiously. Barzani appears to be playing a different game and is not aligned with a military confrontation at any price, especially given that his camp has its own Syrian Kurdish faction and does not want to burn bridges with Ahmad al-Sharaa and Damascus. Barzani also hinted yesterday that “protecting Kurdish rights” is his only red line. That implies they may not be fundamentally opposed to the SDF being absorbed into the Syrian army on an individual basis. It is also worth noting that, based on their latest statements in light of recent developments, Barzani’s position and Öcalan’s position now sound more similar than many would expect. Both emphasize Kurdish rights, but both also argue that Kurds should engage politically with Damascus.
Kurdistan Watch39,734 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce
There is currently a protest outside the newly opened US consulate in Erbil, against the Syrian army’s advance toward Kurdish areas around Kobani and Hasakah in Syria. Some of the protesters appear to be Syrian Kurds, while others are from the Kurdistan Region. The protest is still fresh, and social media reports suggest more people are joining. As for the situation on the ground, two phone calls by the Syrian president point toward cultural rights and only limited, area-specific administrative self-rule. One was a call with Masoud Barzani yesterday, in which Barzani’s statement focused on protecting Kurdish rights. Today, al-Sharaa’s call with Trump appeared to centre on the same theme: protecting Kurdish rights within a unified Syria.
Kurdistan Watch37,814 görüntüleme • 7 ay önce
KRG PM Masrour Barzani’s son, Areen, apparently appeared on a panel at a Dubai conference on “future leaders.” It is a useful example of why nepotism corrodes leadership selection and why merit should be the standard: In the video, Areen delivers a very generic one-minute talk that jumps incoherently between buzzwords: AI, social media, “quantum computing and super AI,” then misinformation, before abruptly saying he wants to “shed a light on adaptability.” It barely holds together. He is essentially parroting disconnected, memorised sentences. And imagine this is the carefully edited version meant to make him look smart. While such unfocused thinking might be excusable at his age (although it is subpar, below-average even for his age), the problem is being presented as leadership insight. He is there only because his father has built a multibillion dollar business empire for him so he is financing his projects and media ventures like AVA and The New Region through it. The entire edifice is illegitimate, propped up by money and PR firms (including those linked to Nadhim Zahawi), yet still producing mediocre results. This matters more because the Kurdistan Region is a fragile entity where the case for meritocracy is even stronger than in established states. Ibn Khaldun’s dynastic cycle theory applies perfectly here. Masrour’s generation represents the third stage: affluent heirs marked by comfort, factionalism, and diluted solidarity. Areen’s fourth generation reaches decadence and fragility. The very foundations that create power (shared hardship and tight solidarity) erode through the comforts power brings: luxury, bureaucracy, internal rivalry, and purchased loyalty. Areen is literally being sustained by an empire his father built as an affluent heir from the third generation.
Kurdistan Watch33,688 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce
This is quite noteworthy. Multiple reports suggest KDP authorities are preventing people with Duhok and Erbil IDs from crossing into Syria’s Kurdish areas, while allowing those with Sulaimani and Kirkuk IDs to go and join Kurdish forces or take up arms. Several people from Duhok and Erbil say they were turned back at the border after being asked to show their IDs. So far, the KDP’s support has largely remained limited to humanitarian assistance and media coverage. Even on the media front, KDP outlets, especially K24 and Ava, are said to have received directives to highlight Syrian Kurdish needs while avoiding praise for, or sustained focus on, the SDF.
Kurdistan Watch34,978 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce