Kurdistan Watch's banner

Kurdistan Watch

@KurdistanWatch • 18,838 subscribers

Delivering incisive and contextualised coverage on politics, economics, oil & corruption in Kurdistan, Kirkuk & Mosul. Telegram: https://t.co/AwrLg2XFJU

Shorts

Almost all the videos circulating of men from the Kurdistan Region traveling to Syrian Kurdish areas to take up arms, saying they want to defend them against what they see as a Syrian government threat, appear to be people from the Sulaimani area. All the open-source videos circulating so far of people from the Kurdistan region show the men as being from the Sulaimani area, which means the publicly available evidence supports one clear pattern: almost all those going appear to be from Sulaimani, and to a lesser extent Kirkuk. The videos suggest they are being deployed to places such as Hasakah city, Tell Tamir, and other fronts including Rmelan. They also imply some level of organization, with individuals appearing to be arranged into small groups of roughly eight people, each assigned a specific task. This is notable, and it looks politically driven. Sulaimani is farther from Syrian territory than Duhok or Erbil, yet it is producing most of the visible mobilization. A likely explanation is politics: the KDP appears to be discouraging or preventing people from Erbil and Duhok from going, while the PUK, which has publicly sent elements of its anti-terror unit, may be more permissive or even quietly supportive. It is well known that the SDF’s military ties with the PUK are closer. But this also suggests the KDP and Barzani are acting more cautiously. Barzani appears to be playing a different game and is not aligned with a military confrontation at any price, especially given that his camp has its own Syrian Kurdish faction and does not want to burn bridges with Ahmad al-Sharaa and Damascus. Barzani also hinted yesterday that “protecting Kurdish rights” is his only red line. That implies they may not be fundamentally opposed to the SDF being absorbed into the Syrian army on an individual basis. It is also worth noting that, based on their latest statements in light of recent developments, Barzani’s position and Öcalan’s position now sound more similar than many would expect. Both emphasize Kurdish rights, but both also argue that Kurds should engage politically with Damascus.

Almost all the videos circulating of men from the Kurdistan Region traveling to Syrian Kurdish areas to take up arms, saying they want to defend them against what they see as a Syrian government threat, appear to be people from the Sulaimani area. All the open-source videos circulating so far of people from the Kurdistan region show the men as being from the Sulaimani area, which means the publicly available evidence supports one clear pattern: almost all those going appear to be from Sulaimani, and to a lesser extent Kirkuk. The videos suggest they are being deployed to places such as Hasakah city, Tell Tamir, and other fronts including Rmelan. They also imply some level of organization, with individuals appearing to be arranged into small groups of roughly eight people, each assigned a specific task. This is notable, and it looks politically driven. Sulaimani is farther from Syrian territory than Duhok or Erbil, yet it is producing most of the visible mobilization. A likely explanation is politics: the KDP appears to be discouraging or preventing people from Erbil and Duhok from going, while the PUK, which has publicly sent elements of its anti-terror unit, may be more permissive or even quietly supportive. It is well known that the SDF’s military ties with the PUK are closer. But this also suggests the KDP and Barzani are acting more cautiously. Barzani appears to be playing a different game and is not aligned with a military confrontation at any price, especially given that his camp has its own Syrian Kurdish faction and does not want to burn bridges with Ahmad al-Sharaa and Damascus. Barzani also hinted yesterday that “protecting Kurdish rights” is his only red line. That implies they may not be fundamentally opposed to the SDF being absorbed into the Syrian army on an individual basis. It is also worth noting that, based on their latest statements in light of recent developments, Barzani’s position and Öcalan’s position now sound more similar than many would expect. Both emphasize Kurdish rights, but both also argue that Kurds should engage politically with Damascus.

39,734 görüntüleme

Here is Lahur Sheikh Jangi Resisted Arrest and Why Bafel Talabani Responded with Overwhelming Force: First, here is another angle shows the moment Lahur Sheikh Jangi was captured, sparking widespread controversy and shock over the way he was arrested and handled. The force carrying out the arrest was PUK’s counter-terrorism unit, led by its commander Wahab Halabjayee, who was seen holding Lahur. In the video, another fighter appears to try to slap Lahur, though Halabjayee seems to push him back, but the scene itself has been shocking to many. It is worth noting that before Bafel Talabani’s 2021 coup, Halabjayee was one of Lahur’s closest confidants, which makes this moment even more striking. What also stands out is the scale of force Bafel decided to deploy, several thousand fighters equipped by weapons supplied by the coalition forces, including tanks, to arrest a man and roughly 200 armed guards. Ironically, just a day earlier Lahur had attended a funeral with only a handful of guards and could easily have been arrested there without all this. But as Talabani told a group of journalists two days earlier, he intended to arrest Lahur inside his compound and hinted at using overwhelming force if he resisted. Some argue the decision was deliberate: a show of strength designed to spread fear and send a message. Why Lahur chose to resist is less clear. Even if the arrest was political, he could not realistically win such a lopsided battle, especially as his compound was surrounded from all sides. It was also notable that Lahur chose to announce his defiance not through his own Zoom News TV, but via AVA Media, linked to Masrour Barzani. Some allege Masrour had promised to intervene if Lahur held out long enough, hoping to push for a halt to the fighting. This has been compared to the case of Khurshid Harki, a local chieftain who successfully repelled a KDP attempt to arrest him before eventually reaching a settlement, though the two cases differ in context and geography. Others claim the KDP was aware of the plan all along, suggesting it may have been part of a broader KDP–PUK agreement, with the PUK in return withdrawing its support for Adham Barzani, Masoud Barzani’s cousin and a former KDP leader. Another version points to Azhi Amin, the expelled PUK intelligence chief now living in Erbil and in contact with Lahur. A sworn enemy of Bafel, Azhi was said to have promised assistance but ultimately offered little. Some speculate the three small drones that struck Talabani’s residence and PUK military headquarters that night were linked to cells loyal to him. Another explanation is that the plan collapsed from within: during the clashes, Lahur’s militia commander, Rebwar Hamid Haji Ghalib, the son of a senior PUK commander, allegedly switched sides and opened the gates, triggering the collapse of Lahur’s resistance. Though the full picture remains murky, by the following morning Bafel attended the funeral of three PUK fighters killed in the clashes. Visibly tired, he seemed shaken yet relieved, perhaps because his years-long plan to dismantle Lahur’s compound and arrest him, delayed since 2021 by external pressure, had finally succeeded.

Here is Lahur Sheikh Jangi Resisted Arrest and Why Bafel Talabani Responded with Overwhelming Force: First, here is another angle shows the moment Lahur Sheikh Jangi was captured, sparking widespread controversy and shock over the way he was arrested and handled. The force carrying out the arrest was PUK’s counter-terrorism unit, led by its commander Wahab Halabjayee, who was seen holding Lahur. In the video, another fighter appears to try to slap Lahur, though Halabjayee seems to push him back, but the scene itself has been shocking to many. It is worth noting that before Bafel Talabani’s 2021 coup, Halabjayee was one of Lahur’s closest confidants, which makes this moment even more striking. What also stands out is the scale of force Bafel decided to deploy, several thousand fighters equipped by weapons supplied by the coalition forces, including tanks, to arrest a man and roughly 200 armed guards. Ironically, just a day earlier Lahur had attended a funeral with only a handful of guards and could easily have been arrested there without all this. But as Talabani told a group of journalists two days earlier, he intended to arrest Lahur inside his compound and hinted at using overwhelming force if he resisted. Some argue the decision was deliberate: a show of strength designed to spread fear and send a message. Why Lahur chose to resist is less clear. Even if the arrest was political, he could not realistically win such a lopsided battle, especially as his compound was surrounded from all sides. It was also notable that Lahur chose to announce his defiance not through his own Zoom News TV, but via AVA Media, linked to Masrour Barzani. Some allege Masrour had promised to intervene if Lahur held out long enough, hoping to push for a halt to the fighting. This has been compared to the case of Khurshid Harki, a local chieftain who successfully repelled a KDP attempt to arrest him before eventually reaching a settlement, though the two cases differ in context and geography. Others claim the KDP was aware of the plan all along, suggesting it may have been part of a broader KDP–PUK agreement, with the PUK in return withdrawing its support for Adham Barzani, Masoud Barzani’s cousin and a former KDP leader. Another version points to Azhi Amin, the expelled PUK intelligence chief now living in Erbil and in contact with Lahur. A sworn enemy of Bafel, Azhi was said to have promised assistance but ultimately offered little. Some speculate the three small drones that struck Talabani’s residence and PUK military headquarters that night were linked to cells loyal to him. Another explanation is that the plan collapsed from within: during the clashes, Lahur’s militia commander, Rebwar Hamid Haji Ghalib, the son of a senior PUK commander, allegedly switched sides and opened the gates, triggering the collapse of Lahur’s resistance. Though the full picture remains murky, by the following morning Bafel attended the funeral of three PUK fighters killed in the clashes. Visibly tired, he seemed shaken yet relieved, perhaps because his years-long plan to dismantle Lahur’s compound and arrest him, delayed since 2021 by external pressure, had finally succeeded.

61,572 görüntüleme

For the first time, Duhok city was targeted today, with two drones launched at the city, while a third targeted Akre to the east. Two of the three drones appear to have been intercepted. According to a local source, the intended targets were the residences of two Kurdish officials, though no further details were provided. Until now, all the drones have targeted Erbil or Sulaimani. The only previous strike in Duhok province hit an oilfield, not the city itself.

For the first time, Duhok city was targeted today, with two drones launched at the city, while a third targeted Akre to the east. Two of the three drones appear to have been intercepted. According to a local source, the intended targets were the residences of two Kurdish officials, though no further details were provided. Until now, all the drones have targeted Erbil or Sulaimani. The only previous strike in Duhok province hit an oilfield, not the city itself.

19,779 görüntüleme

This shows how difficult it is to control information in such residential areas: yesterday, the Erbil governor and other officials claimed the drone strike on the Rotana Hotel was intercepted, but this CCTV video clearly shows it was not and that it struck the target. It makes little sense to withhold the truth when what actually happened is so easy to verify.

This shows how difficult it is to control information in such residential areas: yesterday, the Erbil governor and other officials claimed the drone strike on the Rotana Hotel was intercepted, but this CCTV video clearly shows it was not and that it struck the target. It makes little sense to withhold the truth when what actually happened is so easy to verify.

22,738 görüntüleme

Rotana (Arjaan) Hotel in Erbil and the adjacent Sky Towers residential building appear to have been targeted by a one-way drone, likely launched by Iraqi pro-Iran factions. Eyewitnesses say the drone struck one of the hotel’s rooms. No casualties were reported. Residents in the area say many Americans have recently moved into Sky Towers. That raises serious questions about why they are relocating to such a residential area, where it is difficult to maintain a low profile, information spreads quickly, and local residents are put at risk. At least four other drones were intercepted, but their intended targets remain unknown.

19,527 görüntüleme

Masoud Barzani and Turkey’s nationalist leader Devlet Bahçeli have traded barbed statements over the weapons carried by Barzani’s bodyguards. Barzani attended a symposium in Turkey’s Şırnak (Şırnax) province, and a widely shared clip (attached) showed one of his bodyguards carrying an M4 carbine while several people in the crowd, apparently there to greet Barzani, shouted “Long live Peshmerga.” In an interview with his party’s newspaper, Turkey’s Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader and Erdoğan ally Devlet Bahçeli, who is fronting the peace talks initiative with Öcalan, was asked about the incident. The paper framed the event as a “show” built around Barzani’s presence. Bahçeli responded: “Foreign-uniformed soldiers wandering around our homeland with long-barrelled guns is, in a word, a disgrace. The sovereign rights and law of the Republic of Turkey have been violated. This is a deliberate attack on the reputation of the Republic of Turkey... Our state has the strength, capability and capacity to protect every guest who comes to our country. In addition, it is a basic rule that the brand, quantity and calibre of any weapons carried or used by foreign security guards who come to our country must be notified to Turkey beforehand. But there is no such thing as foreign soldiers or security guards bringing long-barrelled guns into our country while in uniform.” Within hours, Barzani’s office issued a sharply worded response, saying that “Bahçeli’s remarks come at a time when all the details and security measures for President Barzani’s visit were based on protocol-based coordination between the relevant institutions.” The statement then moved to a personal rebuke of Bahçeli: “We had thought that God had guided Devlet Bahçeli to the right path and that he had turned the page on racism and chauvinism. But it seems he is still the same old Grey Wolf, only now wearing sheep’s clothing.” The exchange is notable because Bahçeli has in recent months repeatedly praised Öcalan in the context of the peace talks and softened his tone on the Kurds. It also comes at a sensitive moment in KDP–Turkey relations, against the backdrop of PKK–Turkey negotiations, and matters all the more because Bahçeli remains a central pillar of the governing alliance that President Erdoğan relies on.

29,239 görüntüleme

This footage of an Iraqi soldier using the farmer’s own scarf to forcibly drag him out of his tractor in Kirkuk’s Dubz district has gone viral across Kurdish social media, sparking widespread outrage across the political spectrum.

This footage of an Iraqi soldier using the farmer’s own scarf to forcibly drag him out of his tractor in Kirkuk’s Dubz district has gone viral across Kurdish social media, sparking widespread outrage across the political spectrum.

55,929 görüntüleme

Two drones struck the Iraqi Army’s 14th Division engineering battalion at the former Iraqi mechanics site in Makhmour, south of Erbil. Three Iraqi soldiers were reportedly injured. Notably, locals who witnessed the drones’ flight path said they appeared to have come from west of Makhmour, from the direction of Qayyara, where pro-Iran militias are active. That raises the possibility that the Iraqi army position may have been targeted by pro-Iran factions. The incident is especially noteworthy because Makhmour has long been one of the key areas for joint operations with the US-led coalition, and until recently US advisers were stationed there, though it remains unclear whether they are still present since the war with Iran. Until October 2017, Makhmour was under KDP control. It is a majority Kurdish town, but has since been under Iraqi army control.

Two drones struck the Iraqi Army’s 14th Division engineering battalion at the former Iraqi mechanics site in Makhmour, south of Erbil. Three Iraqi soldiers were reportedly injured. Notably, locals who witnessed the drones’ flight path said they appeared to have come from west of Makhmour, from the direction of Qayyara, where pro-Iran militias are active. That raises the possibility that the Iraqi army position may have been targeted by pro-Iran factions. The incident is especially noteworthy because Makhmour has long been one of the key areas for joint operations with the US-led coalition, and until recently US advisers were stationed there, though it remains unclear whether they are still present since the war with Iran. Until October 2017, Makhmour was under KDP control. It is a majority Kurdish town, but has since been under Iraqi army control.

17,045 görüntüleme

Notable: The Lanaz refinery, majority-owned by Mansour Barzani, appears to have been struck by a drone last night, though the extent of the damage remains unclear. The refinery is in Khabat district in west Erbil. Lanaz was also the site of major recent protests by nearby villagers. The refinery has long been controversial because of its ownership structure and because it reportedly benefited from both cheap KRG oil and, until recently, oil from SDF-held fields in Syria’s Hasakah province. That supply now appears to have stopped. Mansour Barzani is Masoud Barzani’s second son and leads KDP Peshmarga’s ‘special forces’.

Notable: The Lanaz refinery, majority-owned by Mansour Barzani, appears to have been struck by a drone last night, though the extent of the damage remains unclear. The refinery is in Khabat district in west Erbil. Lanaz was also the site of major recent protests by nearby villagers. The refinery has long been controversial because of its ownership structure and because it reportedly benefited from both cheap KRG oil and, until recently, oil from SDF-held fields in Syria’s Hasakah province. That supply now appears to have stopped. Mansour Barzani is Masoud Barzani’s second son and leads KDP Peshmarga’s ‘special forces’.

14,271 görüntüleme

Video: The moment a large Turkish airstrike targets an area in Mezhe village, Amedi district.

Video: The moment a large Turkish airstrike targets an area in Mezhe village, Amedi district.

49,838 görüntüleme

On the Iranian drone attack on the US military outpost inside Erbil Airport, and the missiles fired at the US Consulate in Erbil, all incoming projectiles have so far been intercepted, with no reported hits. Reports indicate that around two drones targeted the airport, while two to three missiles or rockets were launched toward the consulate. For now, the impact is mainly psychological. The dinar-to-dollar exchange rate is rising, and schools and universities across Kurdistan have been suspended at least until Wednesday.

On the Iranian drone attack on the US military outpost inside Erbil Airport, and the missiles fired at the US Consulate in Erbil, all incoming projectiles have so far been intercepted, with no reported hits. Reports indicate that around two drones targeted the airport, while two to three missiles or rockets were launched toward the consulate. For now, the impact is mainly psychological. The dinar-to-dollar exchange rate is rising, and schools and universities across Kurdistan have been suspended at least until Wednesday.

12,573 görüntüleme

Drone strikes targeted the base of PAK, an Iranian Kurdish group, near Pirde (Altun Kupri) in southern Erbil province. The extent of the damage remains unknown. The drone was likely launched by Iraqi pro-Iran groups, as the PAK base is close to Altun Kupri in Kirkuk, where Shia groups, including some Shia Turkmen factions, are based.

Drone strikes targeted the base of PAK, an Iranian Kurdish group, near Pirde (Altun Kupri) in southern Erbil province. The extent of the damage remains unknown. The drone was likely launched by Iraqi pro-Iran groups, as the PAK base is close to Altun Kupri in Kirkuk, where Shia groups, including some Shia Turkmen factions, are based.

12,289 görüntüleme

Turkish forces are preventing villagers in the Bradost area of Sidakan district, in north Erbil, from reaching their homes. The reasons remain unclear, but Turkey exercises significant control over movement in dozens of villages across the Bradost area. Ankara maintains dozens of military outposts in Sidakan and effectively controls roughly half of the district. Despite a recent PKK ceasefire, Sidakan has experienced the highest number of violent incidents, according to the CPT. The district holds strategic importance as it lies at the tri-border junction of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq.

Turkish forces are preventing villagers in the Bradost area of Sidakan district, in north Erbil, from reaching their homes. The reasons remain unclear, but Turkey exercises significant control over movement in dozens of villages across the Bradost area. Ankara maintains dozens of military outposts in Sidakan and effectively controls roughly half of the district. Despite a recent PKK ceasefire, Sidakan has experienced the highest number of violent incidents, according to the CPT. The district holds strategic importance as it lies at the tri-border junction of Turkey, Iran, and Iraq.

29,966 görüntüleme

Video: Sarhang oilfield was attacked in Amedi district of Duhok this morning. Two KRG oilfields in Duhok and Erbil have now been attacked since last night which together produce 40% of the KRG’s oil. This is unprecedented. Following the drone strikes on Khurmala last night, the Sarsang oilfield’s storage facilities, reportedly full of oil, were attacked, leading to a large explosion. The fire remains not fully extinguished three hours later. The operating company, HKN, stated that operations at the field have been halted. It is unclear whether the attack was carried out by drones or rockets. These incidents come amid the ongoing KRG salary crisis, with public employees unpaid for 76 days and no breakthrough yet in the Erbil–Baghdad negotiations over oil and salaries.

Video: Sarhang oilfield was attacked in Amedi district of Duhok this morning. Two KRG oilfields in Duhok and Erbil have now been attacked since last night which together produce 40% of the KRG’s oil. This is unprecedented. Following the drone strikes on Khurmala last night, the Sarsang oilfield’s storage facilities, reportedly full of oil, were attacked, leading to a large explosion. The fire remains not fully extinguished three hours later. The operating company, HKN, stated that operations at the field have been halted. It is unclear whether the attack was carried out by drones or rockets. These incidents come amid the ongoing KRG salary crisis, with public employees unpaid for 76 days and no breakthrough yet in the Erbil–Baghdad negotiations over oil and salaries.

22,449 görüntüleme

A clearer Google Earth video from the BBC documentary reveals the area’s topography and shows how Turkish military bases and fixed outposts are dotting the entire Turkey–Iraq border now:

A clearer Google Earth video from the BBC documentary reveals the area’s topography and shows how Turkish military bases and fixed outposts are dotting the entire Turkey–Iraq border now:

20,442 görüntüleme

Concerning: A pollster in Erbil city center was attacked by a KDP mob while conducting a public survey on the upcoming Iraqi elections. The details are still unclear, but early accounts suggest the group objected either to the polling itself or to specific questions. The incident underscores the risks of on-site polling in a country where credible, independent surveys are already scarce.

Concerning: A pollster in Erbil city center was attacked by a KDP mob while conducting a public survey on the upcoming Iraqi elections. The details are still unclear, but early accounts suggest the group objected either to the polling itself or to specific questions. The incident underscores the risks of on-site polling in a country where credible, independent surveys are already scarce.

11,661 görüntüleme

Video: Clashes have erupted between two tribes in western Erbil province over a stretch of land through which the KRG oil pipeline passes, highlighting the complex web of tribal partnerships underpinning the KDP's governance. Yesterday, a violent confrontation broke out in a village west of Erbil, involving RPGs, mortars, and other medium-grade weapons. The clash was between the Harki and Goran tribes, who share adjacent, and in some areas, overlapping, territory. The conflict appears to have been triggered by disputes over land ownership tied to the KRG’s oil pipeline, which runs through the village. The KRG had subcontracted maintenance of this pipeline section to a company owned by a local chief from the Harki tribe. However, the village where the maintenance was being conducted is inhabited by the Goran tribe, whose members tried to block the company’s equipment, accusing it of attempting to seize land under the guise of carrying out technical work. The Harki-affiliated company, in turn, insists the land belongs to them. What makes this especially revealing is that both tribal chiefs are aligned with the ruling KDP and are crucial to its electoral base. However, there’s a twist: while many Harkis back the KDP, the tribe’s main chieftain is a prominent opponent of the party and has allied himself with the PUK. He currently resides in Mosul. This puts the KDP in a difficult position, it cannot afford to alienate either the Harki figures who remain loyal, or the Goran tribe, which is vital to securing votes in the Bardarash area. The result is a delicate balancing act. The KDP appears to have granted both tribes subcontracting opportunities in what is considered their territory, though the primary contracts often goes to Barzani-affiliated entities. Yet in their statements about the incident, both tribes framed it as an act of defending their own people, as if there were no government or concept of citizenship to appeal to. The Goran tribe even asked pointedly in their statement: "Does this Harki chief think the Goran villagers have no one to protect them?" In essence, the episode offers a revealing glimpse into how the KDP governs: not through state institutions, but via a patchwork of tribal alliances, delegating functions like pipeline maintenance in exchange for loyalty and votes. When disputes arise, however, even staunch KDP supporters revert to tribal logic, bypassing the very government they voted for.

Video: Clashes have erupted between two tribes in western Erbil province over a stretch of land through which the KRG oil pipeline passes, highlighting the complex web of tribal partnerships underpinning the KDP's governance. Yesterday, a violent confrontation broke out in a village west of Erbil, involving RPGs, mortars, and other medium-grade weapons. The clash was between the Harki and Goran tribes, who share adjacent, and in some areas, overlapping, territory. The conflict appears to have been triggered by disputes over land ownership tied to the KRG’s oil pipeline, which runs through the village. The KRG had subcontracted maintenance of this pipeline section to a company owned by a local chief from the Harki tribe. However, the village where the maintenance was being conducted is inhabited by the Goran tribe, whose members tried to block the company’s equipment, accusing it of attempting to seize land under the guise of carrying out technical work. The Harki-affiliated company, in turn, insists the land belongs to them. What makes this especially revealing is that both tribal chiefs are aligned with the ruling KDP and are crucial to its electoral base. However, there’s a twist: while many Harkis back the KDP, the tribe’s main chieftain is a prominent opponent of the party and has allied himself with the PUK. He currently resides in Mosul. This puts the KDP in a difficult position, it cannot afford to alienate either the Harki figures who remain loyal, or the Goran tribe, which is vital to securing votes in the Bardarash area. The result is a delicate balancing act. The KDP appears to have granted both tribes subcontracting opportunities in what is considered their territory, though the primary contracts often goes to Barzani-affiliated entities. Yet in their statements about the incident, both tribes framed it as an act of defending their own people, as if there were no government or concept of citizenship to appeal to. The Goran tribe even asked pointedly in their statement: "Does this Harki chief think the Goran villagers have no one to protect them?" In essence, the episode offers a revealing glimpse into how the KDP governs: not through state institutions, but via a patchwork of tribal alliances, delegating functions like pipeline maintenance in exchange for loyalty and votes. When disputes arise, however, even staunch KDP supporters revert to tribal logic, bypassing the very government they voted for.

14,340 görüntüleme

A second drone has targeted the newly established KDP Peshmerga outpost in Blava village, Amedi district within 24 hours. While KDP’s AVA Media claims the drone belongs to the PKK, a Peshmerga official stated that they still do not know who is responsible for the attack or the type of drone used. Two Peshmerga fighters from the Zeravani forces were injured, one of them critically. This is the second drone attack targeting the same outpost near the village since yesterday. The area has long been a hotspot for clashes between the PKK and Turkish forces. Interestingly, even after the PKK announced a ceasefire following Öcalan’s peace call, skirmishes and Turkish strikes in the region have continued, albeit with reduced intensity. In recent years, the PKK has increasingly relied on improvised drones—typically commercial models repurposed for military purposes, including surveillance and kamikaze attacks.

A second drone has targeted the newly established KDP Peshmerga outpost in Blava village, Amedi district within 24 hours. While KDP’s AVA Media claims the drone belongs to the PKK, a Peshmerga official stated that they still do not know who is responsible for the attack or the type of drone used. Two Peshmerga fighters from the Zeravani forces were injured, one of them critically. This is the second drone attack targeting the same outpost near the village since yesterday. The area has long been a hotspot for clashes between the PKK and Turkish forces. Interestingly, even after the PKK announced a ceasefire following Öcalan’s peace call, skirmishes and Turkish strikes in the region have continued, albeit with reduced intensity. In recent years, the PKK has increasingly relied on improvised drones—typically commercial models repurposed for military purposes, including surveillance and kamikaze attacks.

14,132 görüntüleme

SIGNIFICANT: Three more KRG oilfields, in Zakho and Sheikhan, have been targeted by kamikaze drones over the past five hours, causing extensive infrastructure damage. This brings the total number of oilfields targeted since yesterday to five, which together account for 70% of the KRG’s oil production. Today’s strikes hit the Tawke and Fishkhabur fields (both videoed), part of the same contract area, and Ain Sifni in Sheikhan. These attacks were more destructive than those of yesterday, inflicting extensive damage on vital infrastructure. The drones appear to have been launched from Mosul, where pro-Iran militias are active. Videos show drone activity along the Mosul–Duhok sky heading toward Duhok. Yesterday, in addition to the Khurmala oilfield in southern Erbil, the Sarsang oilfield in Amedi district was also targeted.

SIGNIFICANT: Three more KRG oilfields, in Zakho and Sheikhan, have been targeted by kamikaze drones over the past five hours, causing extensive infrastructure damage. This brings the total number of oilfields targeted since yesterday to five, which together account for 70% of the KRG’s oil production. Today’s strikes hit the Tawke and Fishkhabur fields (both videoed), part of the same contract area, and Ain Sifni in Sheikhan. These attacks were more destructive than those of yesterday, inflicting extensive damage on vital infrastructure. The drones appear to have been launched from Mosul, where pro-Iran militias are active. Videos show drone activity along the Mosul–Duhok sky heading toward Duhok. Yesterday, in addition to the Khurmala oilfield in southern Erbil, the Sarsang oilfield in Amedi district was also targeted.

11,111 görüntüleme

Videos

Anya Rossi

sweetdream.ai

SweetDream.ai•Sponsored•Livecam

Watch Anya Live

Anya is streaming live right now! Join her private show and enjoy exclusive content.

Exclusive private shows

1.2k viewers online

Private Show

Join now for exclusive access

Free preview available • Premium content

A shocking video in which tens of teenage males brutally attack a girl while calling her a 'whore' because she reportedly wanted to watch a motorcycle racing in a neighbourhood in Sulaimani in Kurdistan Region earlier today has gone viral:

A shocking video in which tens of teenage males brutally attack a girl while calling her a 'whore' because she reportedly wanted to watch a motorcycle racing in a neighbourhood in Sulaimani in Kurdistan Region earlier today has gone viral:

Kurdistan Watch

2,670,875 görüntüleme • 3 yıl önce

Video: KDP security forces block Sulaimani civil servants from entering KDP-controlled areas on their way to Erbil. Protesters state that, since their demands remain unmet, they will escalate their demonstrations to the U.N. compound in Erbil. The protesters are demanding a permanent resolution to the ongoing salary crisis and the domiciliation of their salaries in Iraq’s state-owned banks for greater financial stability.

Video: KDP security forces block Sulaimani civil servants from entering KDP-controlled areas on their way to Erbil. Protesters state that, since their demands remain unmet, they will escalate their demonstrations to the U.N. compound in Erbil. The protesters are demanding a permanent resolution to the ongoing salary crisis and the domiciliation of their salaries in Iraq’s state-owned banks for greater financial stability.

Kurdistan Watch

440,904 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce

The tension around Khabat district in western Erbil is ongoing, with a wave of arrests in nearby Harki villages that began after the Lajan protests spread to the area. The KDP has deployed heavy forces in both Lajan (site of recent protests) and these parts of Khabat, setting up a series of checkpoints across the villages and using numerous MRAP-type armored vehicles and anti-riot vehicles to move troops. Meanwhile, protests in some areas continue in response to the clampdown.

The tension around Khabat district in western Erbil is ongoing, with a wave of arrests in nearby Harki villages that began after the Lajan protests spread to the area. The KDP has deployed heavy forces in both Lajan (site of recent protests) and these parts of Khabat, setting up a series of checkpoints across the villages and using numerous MRAP-type armored vehicles and anti-riot vehicles to move troops. Meanwhile, protests in some areas continue in response to the clampdown.

Kurdistan Watch

144,064 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce

A new case in the Kurdistan Region shows how rapidly AI-generated content is entering social, religious and ideological life, just as it is elsewhere in the world. A person recently published what he claimed were leaked exchanges between a woman and Abdulatif Salafi, the Kurdistan Region’s most prominent Madkhali Salafi scholar. The alleged evidence included text messages and voice notes. Yet several details strongly suggest that the material was fabricated, most likely using AI. Text conversations are already easy to fake, including by changing a contact name or number to make an exchange appear authentic, while AI can now generate increasingly convincing voice recordings. Several people have challenged the claims and demonstrated how easily such material can be produced. Their rebuttals, however, have attracted far less attention than the original allegations, which spread widely. What makes the case more troubling is that a number of prominent online figures are amplifying the allegations for ideological or personal reasons. Abdulatif Salafi is a Madkhali, part of a Salafi current that emphasises obedience to the established political authority and rejects rebellion against it. In the Kurdistan Region, he has maintained good relations with both the KDP and PUK. This has made him a natural target for several different groups. Opposition figures hostile to the ruling parties have an interest in attacking someone seen as religiously legitimising the political establishment. Rival Islamist currents also have an incentive to promote the allegations as evidence that Madkhalis are corrupt, hypocritical or not genuinely representative of Islam. Others may simply dislike him personally. The result is that the fabricated material is not spreading only because people cannot distinguish AI from reality. It is also being deliberately amplified because it serves existing political, religious and personal agendas. People are more willing to believe and circulate a falsehood when it confirms what they already think about its target. Part of the reason many found the claims believable is Abdulatif Salafi’s own history. Several years ago, it emerged that he had been involved in a secret relationship with a woman whom he later married. He may therefore have genuine controversies surrounding him. But that does not make every subsequent allegation true, and the latest material appears very likely to be AI generated. This distinction is important. A person’s previous conduct or wider political and religious role cannot be treated as evidence that a specific accusation is authentic. In this case, real criticism of Salafi is being used to give credibility to what appears to be a fabricated scandal. The case illustrates how easily AI can now be used to intrude into people’s private lives, damage reputations and target religious, political or personal rivals. Most people still struggle to distinguish fabricated content from reality, particularly when the material reinforces something they are already inclined to believe. A similar case emerged in Iraq several weeks ago, when opponents of an Iraqi officer circulated images supposedly showing him committing adultery with a woman. The images were later officially confirmed to have been AI-generated. Although some signs of manipulation were visible, they were not obvious to most viewers, and the allegations had already caused significant harm. Until recently, much of the debate focused on how AI might eventually be used to harm people. That stage has already passed. AI-generated fabrications are now actively being used in political, religious and personal disputes, while ideologically motivated accounts help give them reach and apparent credibility.

A new case in the Kurdistan Region shows how rapidly AI-generated content is entering social, religious and ideological life, just as it is elsewhere in the world. A person recently published what he claimed were leaked exchanges between a woman and Abdulatif Salafi, the Kurdistan Region’s most prominent Madkhali Salafi scholar. The alleged evidence included text messages and voice notes. Yet several details strongly suggest that the material was fabricated, most likely using AI. Text conversations are already easy to fake, including by changing a contact name or number to make an exchange appear authentic, while AI can now generate increasingly convincing voice recordings. Several people have challenged the claims and demonstrated how easily such material can be produced. Their rebuttals, however, have attracted far less attention than the original allegations, which spread widely. What makes the case more troubling is that a number of prominent online figures are amplifying the allegations for ideological or personal reasons. Abdulatif Salafi is a Madkhali, part of a Salafi current that emphasises obedience to the established political authority and rejects rebellion against it. In the Kurdistan Region, he has maintained good relations with both the KDP and PUK. This has made him a natural target for several different groups. Opposition figures hostile to the ruling parties have an interest in attacking someone seen as religiously legitimising the political establishment. Rival Islamist currents also have an incentive to promote the allegations as evidence that Madkhalis are corrupt, hypocritical or not genuinely representative of Islam. Others may simply dislike him personally. The result is that the fabricated material is not spreading only because people cannot distinguish AI from reality. It is also being deliberately amplified because it serves existing political, religious and personal agendas. People are more willing to believe and circulate a falsehood when it confirms what they already think about its target. Part of the reason many found the claims believable is Abdulatif Salafi’s own history. Several years ago, it emerged that he had been involved in a secret relationship with a woman whom he later married. He may therefore have genuine controversies surrounding him. But that does not make every subsequent allegation true, and the latest material appears very likely to be AI generated. This distinction is important. A person’s previous conduct or wider political and religious role cannot be treated as evidence that a specific accusation is authentic. In this case, real criticism of Salafi is being used to give credibility to what appears to be a fabricated scandal. The case illustrates how easily AI can now be used to intrude into people’s private lives, damage reputations and target religious, political or personal rivals. Most people still struggle to distinguish fabricated content from reality, particularly when the material reinforces something they are already inclined to believe. A similar case emerged in Iraq several weeks ago, when opponents of an Iraqi officer circulated images supposedly showing him committing adultery with a woman. The images were later officially confirmed to have been AI-generated. Although some signs of manipulation were visible, they were not obvious to most viewers, and the allegations had already caused significant harm. Until recently, much of the debate focused on how AI might eventually be used to harm people. That stage has already passed. AI-generated fabrications are now actively being used in political, religious and personal disputes, while ideologically motivated accounts help give them reach and apparent credibility.

Kurdistan Watch

16,728 görüntüleme • 18 gün önce

A recent video shows Bafel Talabani at a weapons auction with two American YouTubers known for firearms content. What stands out is how openly they goad him into bidding higher, hyping him up with military bravado: “charge,” “take no prisoners,” “eat their wounded.” They coach him through the auction like handlers working a fight, and he plays along until the hammer drops at $11,000. They are essentially treating him as a fool, and he does not seem to realize it. These appear to be the same YouTubers Talabani previously filmed with in Iraq, where he mobilized his entire commando force to test weapons on camera, turning a public security apparatus into a prop for online entertainment. The $11,000 is not the point. Everyone knows these families hold wealth in the hundreds of millions, if not billions. What matters is not just the optics but what it reveals about the man himself. At home, Talabani projects the tough, militaristic leader who rules through force. Yet put him in a room with two YouTubers and he becomes pliable, eager to please, visibly pushed around. That contrast says something about the personality behind the strongman act. To be clear, there is nothing wrong with a leader befriending foreigners, and there is nothing wrong with having hobbies. Leaders are human. They need downtime, and no one begrudges them that. But there is a difference between having a private interest and performing it like this, on camera, being pushed around while your own people watch. That is not a leader enjoying a hobby. That is a terrible look. The timing compounds all of it. The economic crisis is deepening. Salary payments remain erratic. Talabani’s own media channel has been weaponizing the salary issue to project solidarity with ordinary citizens. Yet here is their leader, on camera, being goaded into throwing money around at a foreign auction. After that, the populist messaging becomes very hard to take seriously.

A recent video shows Bafel Talabani at a weapons auction with two American YouTubers known for firearms content. What stands out is how openly they goad him into bidding higher, hyping him up with military bravado: “charge,” “take no prisoners,” “eat their wounded.” They coach him through the auction like handlers working a fight, and he plays along until the hammer drops at $11,000. They are essentially treating him as a fool, and he does not seem to realize it. These appear to be the same YouTubers Talabani previously filmed with in Iraq, where he mobilized his entire commando force to test weapons on camera, turning a public security apparatus into a prop for online entertainment. The $11,000 is not the point. Everyone knows these families hold wealth in the hundreds of millions, if not billions. What matters is not just the optics but what it reveals about the man himself. At home, Talabani projects the tough, militaristic leader who rules through force. Yet put him in a room with two YouTubers and he becomes pliable, eager to please, visibly pushed around. That contrast says something about the personality behind the strongman act. To be clear, there is nothing wrong with a leader befriending foreigners, and there is nothing wrong with having hobbies. Leaders are human. They need downtime, and no one begrudges them that. But there is a difference between having a private interest and performing it like this, on camera, being pushed around while your own people watch. That is not a leader enjoying a hobby. That is a terrible look. The timing compounds all of it. The economic crisis is deepening. Salary payments remain erratic. Talabani’s own media channel has been weaponizing the salary issue to project solidarity with ordinary citizens. Yet here is their leader, on camera, being goaded into throwing money around at a foreign auction. After that, the populist messaging becomes very hard to take seriously.

Kurdistan Watch

63,088 görüntüleme • 4 ay önce

Among the Iranian Kurdish groups shown in the map below is PAK, which was very recently filmed at its base in Sherawa, south of Erbil, more than 100 km from the Iranian border. What is interesting is that PAK chose to show itself openly even though, under the Iraq–Iran security agreement, it should have avoided such media appearances. The footage suggests they have about 200–250 fighters, yet they have remained in their Sherawa complex after the agreement. This filming, part of an interview with PAK leader Hussein Yazdanpana, has apparently angered Iran's regime, although the complex is already under heavy surveillance, including Iran's own drone surveillance. One reason PAK has been kept in this complex is that it is now very close to and bankrolled by the KDP. It is also the weakest of the Iranian Kurdish groups, not only because of its small numbers but because, unlike PJAK, KDPI or Komala, it lacks strategic depth inside Iranian Kurdistan. PAK remains noteworthy, however, because it is the only group that has openly called for Israeli support and has stated in the media that it wants to cooperate with Israeli forces to move into Kurdish areas in the event of an Israel–Iran war.

Among the Iranian Kurdish groups shown in the map below is PAK, which was very recently filmed at its base in Sherawa, south of Erbil, more than 100 km from the Iranian border. What is interesting is that PAK chose to show itself openly even though, under the Iraq–Iran security agreement, it should have avoided such media appearances. The footage suggests they have about 200–250 fighters, yet they have remained in their Sherawa complex after the agreement. This filming, part of an interview with PAK leader Hussein Yazdanpana, has apparently angered Iran's regime, although the complex is already under heavy surveillance, including Iran's own drone surveillance. One reason PAK has been kept in this complex is that it is now very close to and bankrolled by the KDP. It is also the weakest of the Iranian Kurdish groups, not only because of its small numbers but because, unlike PJAK, KDPI or Komala, it lacks strategic depth inside Iranian Kurdistan. PAK remains noteworthy, however, because it is the only group that has openly called for Israeli support and has stated in the media that it wants to cooperate with Israeli forces to move into Kurdish areas in the event of an Israel–Iran war.

Kurdistan Watch

77,597 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce

Yazidi MP-elect Murad Ismael says Yazidis are not Kurds but a distinct ethnicity, and that he will work to have this formally recognised in the Iraqi parliament. His stance matters because, unlike previous token Yazidi MPs backed either by the KDP or pro-Iran Shia militias, Murad won a general seat on a Yazidi Cause Alliance list that secured around 50,000 votes – the first time a purely Yazidi, grassroots list has achieved this. Murad raises a sensitive but necessary debate. He argues that Yazidis are not Kurds and that some Kurdish parties try to impose that identity on them. He likens it to “how Kurds in Turkey don’t want to be called mountain Turks,” saying Yazidis likewise do not want to be branded “Yazidi Kurds” – a label widely used in parts of the Kurdish media, particularly outlets close to the KDP.

Yazidi MP-elect Murad Ismael says Yazidis are not Kurds but a distinct ethnicity, and that he will work to have this formally recognised in the Iraqi parliament. His stance matters because, unlike previous token Yazidi MPs backed either by the KDP or pro-Iran Shia militias, Murad won a general seat on a Yazidi Cause Alliance list that secured around 50,000 votes – the first time a purely Yazidi, grassroots list has achieved this. Murad raises a sensitive but necessary debate. He argues that Yazidis are not Kurds and that some Kurdish parties try to impose that identity on them. He likens it to “how Kurds in Turkey don’t want to be called mountain Turks,” saying Yazidis likewise do not want to be branded “Yazidi Kurds” – a label widely used in parts of the Kurdish media, particularly outlets close to the KDP.

Kurdistan Watch

75,981 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce

This video is filmed today at the entrance to Lajan village near Erbil (site of recent protests), show that the area remains heavily militarised, with all access points tightly controlled. In this direction, several MRAP armoured personnel carriers can be seen positioned just before the village. According to residents, life inside has largely returned to normal, but movement is strictly regulated: only locals are allowed in, and media outlets not affiliated with the KDP are barred from entering.

This video is filmed today at the entrance to Lajan village near Erbil (site of recent protests), show that the area remains heavily militarised, with all access points tightly controlled. In this direction, several MRAP armoured personnel carriers can be seen positioned just before the village. According to residents, life inside has largely returned to normal, but movement is strictly regulated: only locals are allowed in, and media outlets not affiliated with the KDP are barred from entering.

Kurdistan Watch

77,112 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce

Ali Bapir, leader of Kurdistan’s second largest Islamist party, attended the funeral of the six fallen Peshmerga and said: “This war has been imposed on Iran by the Zionist entity and the United States, and it is not the Kurdistan Region’s war.” That broadly reflects the Islamist position: • He prayed that the six Peshmerga would be granted martyrdom and that the wounded would recover. • He said the Kurdistan Region has so far stayed out of the war and expressed hope that it would not be drawn into a conflict that is not its own. • He described the war as one imposed on Iran by the Zionist entity and the United States. • He thanked the Kurdistan Region’s leaders for not allowing the Region, so far, to be pulled into the war.

Ali Bapir, leader of Kurdistan’s second largest Islamist party, attended the funeral of the six fallen Peshmerga and said: “This war has been imposed on Iran by the Zionist entity and the United States, and it is not the Kurdistan Region’s war.” That broadly reflects the Islamist position: • He prayed that the six Peshmerga would be granted martyrdom and that the wounded would recover. • He said the Kurdistan Region has so far stayed out of the war and expressed hope that it would not be drawn into a conflict that is not its own. • He described the war as one imposed on Iran by the Zionist entity and the United States. • He thanked the Kurdistan Region’s leaders for not allowing the Region, so far, to be pulled into the war.

Kurdistan Watch

34,347 görüntüleme • 3 ay önce

This video of Bafel Talabani approaching Nechirvan Barzani during yesterday’s Iraqi cabinet vote is interesting. At first glance, Bafel looks almost weak, waiting for a brief exchange with Nechirvan. But the goal may be more calculated: to further drive a wedge between Masrour Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani at a time when their relationship is already sensitive. Masrour may already suspect that Nechirvan has played a role in his isolation and in the stalemate over KRG cabinet formation. By appearing cordial with Nechirvan in parliament, Bafel may be pouring oil on the fire. There are already signs that the PUK is trying to do this through its media as well, including by pushing claims that regional actors want Nechirvan to return as KRG prime minister and force Masrour out. The PUK has not officially made that demand, but its media ecosystem is clearly building the narrative around it.

This video of Bafel Talabani approaching Nechirvan Barzani during yesterday’s Iraqi cabinet vote is interesting. At first glance, Bafel looks almost weak, waiting for a brief exchange with Nechirvan. But the goal may be more calculated: to further drive a wedge between Masrour Barzani and Nechirvan Barzani at a time when their relationship is already sensitive. Masrour may already suspect that Nechirvan has played a role in his isolation and in the stalemate over KRG cabinet formation. By appearing cordial with Nechirvan in parliament, Bafel may be pouring oil on the fire. There are already signs that the PUK is trying to do this through its media as well, including by pushing claims that regional actors want Nechirvan to return as KRG prime minister and force Masrour out. The PUK has not officially made that demand, but its media ecosystem is clearly building the narrative around it.

Kurdistan Watch

17,037 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce

Almost all the videos circulating of men from the Kurdistan Region traveling to Syrian Kurdish areas to take up arms, saying they want to defend them against what they see as a Syrian government threat, appear to be people from the Sulaimani area. All the open-source videos circulating so far of people from the Kurdistan region show the men as being from the Sulaimani area, which means the publicly available evidence supports one clear pattern: almost all those going appear to be from Sulaimani, and to a lesser extent Kirkuk. The videos suggest they are being deployed to places such as Hasakah city, Tell Tamir, and other fronts including Rmelan. They also imply some level of organization, with individuals appearing to be arranged into small groups of roughly eight people, each assigned a specific task. This is notable, and it looks politically driven. Sulaimani is farther from Syrian territory than Duhok or Erbil, yet it is producing most of the visible mobilization. A likely explanation is politics: the KDP appears to be discouraging or preventing people from Erbil and Duhok from going, while the PUK, which has publicly sent elements of its anti-terror unit, may be more permissive or even quietly supportive. It is well known that the SDF’s military ties with the PUK are closer. But this also suggests the KDP and Barzani are acting more cautiously. Barzani appears to be playing a different game and is not aligned with a military confrontation at any price, especially given that his camp has its own Syrian Kurdish faction and does not want to burn bridges with Ahmad al-Sharaa and Damascus. Barzani also hinted yesterday that “protecting Kurdish rights” is his only red line. That implies they may not be fundamentally opposed to the SDF being absorbed into the Syrian army on an individual basis. It is also worth noting that, based on their latest statements in light of recent developments, Barzani’s position and Öcalan’s position now sound more similar than many would expect. Both emphasize Kurdish rights, but both also argue that Kurds should engage politically with Damascus.

Almost all the videos circulating of men from the Kurdistan Region traveling to Syrian Kurdish areas to take up arms, saying they want to defend them against what they see as a Syrian government threat, appear to be people from the Sulaimani area. All the open-source videos circulating so far of people from the Kurdistan region show the men as being from the Sulaimani area, which means the publicly available evidence supports one clear pattern: almost all those going appear to be from Sulaimani, and to a lesser extent Kirkuk. The videos suggest they are being deployed to places such as Hasakah city, Tell Tamir, and other fronts including Rmelan. They also imply some level of organization, with individuals appearing to be arranged into small groups of roughly eight people, each assigned a specific task. This is notable, and it looks politically driven. Sulaimani is farther from Syrian territory than Duhok or Erbil, yet it is producing most of the visible mobilization. A likely explanation is politics: the KDP appears to be discouraging or preventing people from Erbil and Duhok from going, while the PUK, which has publicly sent elements of its anti-terror unit, may be more permissive or even quietly supportive. It is well known that the SDF’s military ties with the PUK are closer. But this also suggests the KDP and Barzani are acting more cautiously. Barzani appears to be playing a different game and is not aligned with a military confrontation at any price, especially given that his camp has its own Syrian Kurdish faction and does not want to burn bridges with Ahmad al-Sharaa and Damascus. Barzani also hinted yesterday that “protecting Kurdish rights” is his only red line. That implies they may not be fundamentally opposed to the SDF being absorbed into the Syrian army on an individual basis. It is also worth noting that, based on their latest statements in light of recent developments, Barzani’s position and Öcalan’s position now sound more similar than many would expect. Both emphasize Kurdish rights, but both also argue that Kurds should engage politically with Damascus.

Kurdistan Watch

39,734 görüntüleme • 5 ay önce

There is currently a protest outside the newly opened US consulate in Erbil, against the Syrian army’s advance toward Kurdish areas around Kobani and Hasakah in Syria. Some of the protesters appear to be Syrian Kurds, while others are from the Kurdistan Region. The protest is still fresh, and social media reports suggest more people are joining. As for the situation on the ground, two phone calls by the Syrian president point toward cultural rights and only limited, area-specific administrative self-rule. One was a call with Masoud Barzani yesterday, in which Barzani’s statement focused on protecting Kurdish rights. Today, al-Sharaa’s call with Trump appeared to centre on the same theme: protecting Kurdish rights within a unified Syria.

There is currently a protest outside the newly opened US consulate in Erbil, against the Syrian army’s advance toward Kurdish areas around Kobani and Hasakah in Syria. Some of the protesters appear to be Syrian Kurds, while others are from the Kurdistan Region. The protest is still fresh, and social media reports suggest more people are joining. As for the situation on the ground, two phone calls by the Syrian president point toward cultural rights and only limited, area-specific administrative self-rule. One was a call with Masoud Barzani yesterday, in which Barzani’s statement focused on protecting Kurdish rights. Today, al-Sharaa’s call with Trump appeared to centre on the same theme: protecting Kurdish rights within a unified Syria.

Kurdistan Watch

37,814 görüntüleme • 5 ay önce

KRG PM Masrour Barzani’s son, Areen, apparently appeared on a panel at a Dubai conference on “future leaders.” It is a useful example of why nepotism corrodes leadership selection and why merit should be the standard: In the video, Areen delivers a very generic one-minute talk that jumps incoherently between buzzwords: AI, social media, “quantum computing and super AI,” then misinformation, before abruptly saying he wants to “shed a light on adaptability.” It barely holds together. He is essentially parroting disconnected, memorised sentences. And imagine this is the carefully edited version meant to make him look smart. While such unfocused thinking might be excusable at his age (although it is subpar, below-average even for his age), the problem is being presented as leadership insight. He is there only because his father has built a multibillion dollar business empire for him so he is financing his projects and media ventures like AVA and The New Region through it. The entire edifice is illegitimate, propped up by money and PR firms (including those linked to Nadhim Zahawi), yet still producing mediocre results. This matters more because the Kurdistan Region is a fragile entity where the case for meritocracy is even stronger than in established states. Ibn Khaldun’s dynastic cycle theory applies perfectly here. Masrour’s generation represents the third stage: affluent heirs marked by comfort, factionalism, and diluted solidarity. Areen’s fourth generation reaches decadence and fragility. The very foundations that create power (shared hardship and tight solidarity) erode through the comforts power brings: luxury, bureaucracy, internal rivalry, and purchased loyalty. Areen is literally being sustained by an empire his father built as an affluent heir from the third generation.

KRG PM Masrour Barzani’s son, Areen, apparently appeared on a panel at a Dubai conference on “future leaders.” It is a useful example of why nepotism corrodes leadership selection and why merit should be the standard: In the video, Areen delivers a very generic one-minute talk that jumps incoherently between buzzwords: AI, social media, “quantum computing and super AI,” then misinformation, before abruptly saying he wants to “shed a light on adaptability.” It barely holds together. He is essentially parroting disconnected, memorised sentences. And imagine this is the carefully edited version meant to make him look smart. While such unfocused thinking might be excusable at his age (although it is subpar, below-average even for his age), the problem is being presented as leadership insight. He is there only because his father has built a multibillion dollar business empire for him so he is financing his projects and media ventures like AVA and The New Region through it. The entire edifice is illegitimate, propped up by money and PR firms (including those linked to Nadhim Zahawi), yet still producing mediocre results. This matters more because the Kurdistan Region is a fragile entity where the case for meritocracy is even stronger than in established states. Ibn Khaldun’s dynastic cycle theory applies perfectly here. Masrour’s generation represents the third stage: affluent heirs marked by comfort, factionalism, and diluted solidarity. Areen’s fourth generation reaches decadence and fragility. The very foundations that create power (shared hardship and tight solidarity) erode through the comforts power brings: luxury, bureaucracy, internal rivalry, and purchased loyalty. Areen is literally being sustained by an empire his father built as an affluent heir from the third generation.

Kurdistan Watch

33,688 görüntüleme • 4 ay önce

Bafel Talabani’s recent appearances on Fox News and twice now with Piers Morgan are very likely arranged through hired PR and lobbying firms. This new Piers Morgan interview, for example, features exactly the kind of questions Talabani would want to be asked. The broader pattern is clear: the Talabanis are aggressively trying to get the attention of Trump and his circle. The answers Talabani has prepared here are clearly tailored to the kind of language and positioning that appeal to Trump and his circles. The choice of platforms also points in the same direction: Fox News, Piers Morgan, and coverage in The Telegraph all place him in media spaces that are right wing and, in different ways, overlap with or speak to Trump-aligned circles.

Bafel Talabani’s recent appearances on Fox News and twice now with Piers Morgan are very likely arranged through hired PR and lobbying firms. This new Piers Morgan interview, for example, features exactly the kind of questions Talabani would want to be asked. The broader pattern is clear: the Talabanis are aggressively trying to get the attention of Trump and his circle. The answers Talabani has prepared here are clearly tailored to the kind of language and positioning that appeal to Trump and his circles. The choice of platforms also points in the same direction: Fox News, Piers Morgan, and coverage in The Telegraph all place him in media spaces that are right wing and, in different ways, overlap with or speak to Trump-aligned circles.

Kurdistan Watch

20,171 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce

This is quite noteworthy. Multiple reports suggest KDP authorities are preventing people with Duhok and Erbil IDs from crossing into Syria’s Kurdish areas, while allowing those with Sulaimani and Kirkuk IDs to go and join Kurdish forces or take up arms. Several people from Duhok and Erbil say they were turned back at the border after being asked to show their IDs. So far, the KDP’s support has largely remained limited to humanitarian assistance and media coverage. Even on the media front, KDP outlets, especially K24 and Ava, are said to have received directives to highlight Syrian Kurdish needs while avoiding praise for, or sustained focus on, the SDF.

This is quite noteworthy. Multiple reports suggest KDP authorities are preventing people with Duhok and Erbil IDs from crossing into Syria’s Kurdish areas, while allowing those with Sulaimani and Kirkuk IDs to go and join Kurdish forces or take up arms. Several people from Duhok and Erbil say they were turned back at the border after being asked to show their IDs. So far, the KDP’s support has largely remained limited to humanitarian assistance and media coverage. Even on the media front, KDP outlets, especially K24 and Ava, are said to have received directives to highlight Syrian Kurdish needs while avoiding praise for, or sustained focus on, the SDF.

Kurdistan Watch

34,978 görüntüleme • 5 ay önce

KDP appears to be overplaying its hand on Iraqi oil exports through the KRG pipeline, and the gambit seems to be already backfiring. Here is why: 1. Iraq exports around 3.4 million barrels per day through Basra's ports and the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for 85 to 95% of total shipments. Baghdad has requested only 200,000-250,000 barrels per day thru the KRG pipeline, roughly 7 to 8% of what was flowing through the south. Even if Baghdad wanted to push more volume through the line, it could not. Most of Iraq's oil sits in Basra, there is no pipeline infrastructure to move it north, and the same Iranian and militia threats that closed Hormuz could target the northern route just as easily. The KRG pipeline cannot rescue Iraq's oil sector. It was never going to. 2. Permitting the exports would have been a low-cost card and a show of goodwill. But by blocking even this, the KDP has handed Baghdad and Iraqi parties a scapegoat at the worst possible moment. During a crisis that is hitting government finances and ordinary Iraqis' salaries, the KDP chose to put conditions over a resource that would not have changed the picture in any big ways, and if salaries are delayed, Iraqi parties will point at Erbil. Basically, this has turned a pipeline dispute into a political framing device, and the KDP has placed itself inside the frame. For many Iraqi parties, this is not just ammunition. It is vindication. It confirms what they have long argued: that the KRG, and specifically the KDP, is ready to exploit Iraq's moments of weakness rather than stand with it. That perception, once reinforced in a crisis of this scale, will be difficult to undo. 3. The damage is compounded by isolation. Iraqi parties across the board, in their statements on this issue, are now referring to the "Erbil government," not the KRG. The language is deliberate: this is understood as a KDP decision, not an institutional one. Nearly all other Kurdistan Region parties either oppose the move or are critical of it, and when budget negotiations resume, they will direct blame squarely at the KDP. 4. Baghdad is also close to completing the rehabilitation of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline (the below video is today), which operates under an Iraq-Turkey agreement that predates the KRG and over which Erbil holds no legal or operational control. A small section of the line passes through KDP-controlled Duhok, but the KDP cannot realistically block it or do much about it. Once that line is operational, it will push the KRG pipeline further into irrelevance. More importantly, it will give Baghdad reason to sideline the KRG pipeline for good, not just during the current crisis but after things normalise too. Ironically, the card the KDP is holding is actively depreciating by overplaying its hand. The logic of holding a card is not inherently flawed. But deploying it in the middle of a regional crisis, on an issue of national significance, in an attempt to extract leverage, - in the current context - does not serve the KDP well. The timing is especially poor given the volatility of the broader environment. The trajectory of U.S. policy under Trump remains deeply unclear. The KDP is betting on a hand without knowing how the game ends.

KDP appears to be overplaying its hand on Iraqi oil exports through the KRG pipeline, and the gambit seems to be already backfiring. Here is why: 1. Iraq exports around 3.4 million barrels per day through Basra's ports and the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for 85 to 95% of total shipments. Baghdad has requested only 200,000-250,000 barrels per day thru the KRG pipeline, roughly 7 to 8% of what was flowing through the south. Even if Baghdad wanted to push more volume through the line, it could not. Most of Iraq's oil sits in Basra, there is no pipeline infrastructure to move it north, and the same Iranian and militia threats that closed Hormuz could target the northern route just as easily. The KRG pipeline cannot rescue Iraq's oil sector. It was never going to. 2. Permitting the exports would have been a low-cost card and a show of goodwill. But by blocking even this, the KDP has handed Baghdad and Iraqi parties a scapegoat at the worst possible moment. During a crisis that is hitting government finances and ordinary Iraqis' salaries, the KDP chose to put conditions over a resource that would not have changed the picture in any big ways, and if salaries are delayed, Iraqi parties will point at Erbil. Basically, this has turned a pipeline dispute into a political framing device, and the KDP has placed itself inside the frame. For many Iraqi parties, this is not just ammunition. It is vindication. It confirms what they have long argued: that the KRG, and specifically the KDP, is ready to exploit Iraq's moments of weakness rather than stand with it. That perception, once reinforced in a crisis of this scale, will be difficult to undo. 3. The damage is compounded by isolation. Iraqi parties across the board, in their statements on this issue, are now referring to the "Erbil government," not the KRG. The language is deliberate: this is understood as a KDP decision, not an institutional one. Nearly all other Kurdistan Region parties either oppose the move or are critical of it, and when budget negotiations resume, they will direct blame squarely at the KDP. 4. Baghdad is also close to completing the rehabilitation of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline (the below video is today), which operates under an Iraq-Turkey agreement that predates the KRG and over which Erbil holds no legal or operational control. A small section of the line passes through KDP-controlled Duhok, but the KDP cannot realistically block it or do much about it. Once that line is operational, it will push the KRG pipeline further into irrelevance. More importantly, it will give Baghdad reason to sideline the KRG pipeline for good, not just during the current crisis but after things normalise too. Ironically, the card the KDP is holding is actively depreciating by overplaying its hand. The logic of holding a card is not inherently flawed. But deploying it in the middle of a regional crisis, on an issue of national significance, in an attempt to extract leverage, - in the current context - does not serve the KDP well. The timing is especially poor given the volatility of the broader environment. The trajectory of U.S. policy under Trump remains deeply unclear. The KDP is betting on a hand without knowing how the game ends.

Kurdistan Watch

24,594 görüntüleme • 3 ay önce

Reports in several Turkish outlets (parroted by Kurdish media) claimed a lavish wedding between a Barzani woman and a man from the Izol, a prominent Kurdish tribe in Turkey’s Urfa. The problem? the woman is actually not a Barzani. The story appears to have spread mainly because of the wedding’s extravagance and the heavy gold showered on the bride, much of it seemingly from her family. But the bride’s father, reported as “Abdulkarim Barzani,” is not from the Barzani tribe — the surname is misleading. He is Masoud Barzani’s secretary, known in Kurdistan as Karim Juma’a, and he is from the Gargari tribe, a separate Kurdish tribe that has presence mostly in Nineveh but also Duhok. Still, the scale of the gold and diamonds coming from her side does raise questions, given that her father is publicly known only as Barzani’s secretary. The Izol, for their part, are a large Urfa-based Kurdish tribe that is generally state-friendly and mostly aligned with the AKP and MHP.

Reports in several Turkish outlets (parroted by Kurdish media) claimed a lavish wedding between a Barzani woman and a man from the Izol, a prominent Kurdish tribe in Turkey’s Urfa. The problem? the woman is actually not a Barzani. The story appears to have spread mainly because of the wedding’s extravagance and the heavy gold showered on the bride, much of it seemingly from her family. But the bride’s father, reported as “Abdulkarim Barzani,” is not from the Barzani tribe — the surname is misleading. He is Masoud Barzani’s secretary, known in Kurdistan as Karim Juma’a, and he is from the Gargari tribe, a separate Kurdish tribe that has presence mostly in Nineveh but also Duhok. Still, the scale of the gold and diamonds coming from her side does raise questions, given that her father is publicly known only as Barzani’s secretary. The Izol, for their part, are a large Urfa-based Kurdish tribe that is generally state-friendly and mostly aligned with the AKP and MHP.

Kurdistan Watch

36,366 görüntüleme • 6 ay önce

The protest outside the US consulate in Erbil, against the Syrian army’s advance toward Kurdish areas, has grown more crowded and another rally is now also taking place in Sulaimani as well as one in Makhmour refugee camp where Turkey’s Kurds reside in south Erbil.

The protest outside the US consulate in Erbil, against the Syrian army’s advance toward Kurdish areas, has grown more crowded and another rally is now also taking place in Sulaimani as well as one in Makhmour refugee camp where Turkey’s Kurds reside in south Erbil.

Kurdistan Watch

31,556 görüntüleme • 5 ay önce

Clashes between elements of the Harki tribe and KDP security forces have been ongoing and have spread to other areas, as more Harki members arrive from different regions. The fighting erupted after KDP forces attempted to arrest Khurshid Harki, one of the tribe’s chieftains, who has refused to surrender. At least one Harki fighter and one KDP security officer have been killed, and several military vehicles, including at least two Humvees, have been destroyed by Harki fighters. The unrest began following a land dispute between this faction of the Harki tribe and the Gorran tribe over territory crossed by the KRG oil pipeline. Clashes between the two tribes had already taken place. Although talks were held, tensions escalated when Bashar Mushir Agha, the head of the Gorran tribe, was seen publicly with Masrour Barzani during the fighting - a move that angered many within the Harki tribe, which is considered one of the largest, if not the largest tribe, in Kurdistan. A ceasefire agreement was reached yesterday, but Harki supporters now claim KDP forces violated it by attempting to arrest Khurshid Harki. In a video clip from the fighting, Khurshid Agha is seen holding a rifle and calling on his fighters to resist until reinforcements arrive from Zakho and Duhok. Khurshid Agha, a businessman and military commander affiliated with the KDP; the Harki tribe is split into several factions, with multiple figures claiming tribal leadership. Political party affiliations have further deepened these divisions. The most prominent Harki chief is Jawhar Muhadin Agha, a staunch KDP enemy that is aligned with the PUK. His base of support spans Duhok, Erbil, and Mosul, though he primarily operates out of Mosul, as he is unable to return to Erbil or Duhok. In a recent statement, he voiced support for Khurshid Harki and declared that the Harkis “will not accept being treated unfairly.” He commands a large following and is a multimillionaire.

Clashes between elements of the Harki tribe and KDP security forces have been ongoing and have spread to other areas, as more Harki members arrive from different regions. The fighting erupted after KDP forces attempted to arrest Khurshid Harki, one of the tribe’s chieftains, who has refused to surrender. At least one Harki fighter and one KDP security officer have been killed, and several military vehicles, including at least two Humvees, have been destroyed by Harki fighters. The unrest began following a land dispute between this faction of the Harki tribe and the Gorran tribe over territory crossed by the KRG oil pipeline. Clashes between the two tribes had already taken place. Although talks were held, tensions escalated when Bashar Mushir Agha, the head of the Gorran tribe, was seen publicly with Masrour Barzani during the fighting - a move that angered many within the Harki tribe, which is considered one of the largest, if not the largest tribe, in Kurdistan. A ceasefire agreement was reached yesterday, but Harki supporters now claim KDP forces violated it by attempting to arrest Khurshid Harki. In a video clip from the fighting, Khurshid Agha is seen holding a rifle and calling on his fighters to resist until reinforcements arrive from Zakho and Duhok. Khurshid Agha, a businessman and military commander affiliated with the KDP; the Harki tribe is split into several factions, with multiple figures claiming tribal leadership. Political party affiliations have further deepened these divisions. The most prominent Harki chief is Jawhar Muhadin Agha, a staunch KDP enemy that is aligned with the PUK. His base of support spans Duhok, Erbil, and Mosul, though he primarily operates out of Mosul, as he is unable to return to Erbil or Duhok. In a recent statement, he voiced support for Khurshid Harki and declared that the Harkis “will not accept being treated unfairly.” He commands a large following and is a multimillionaire.

Kurdistan Watch

57,708 görüntüleme • 11 ay önce

The Kurdistan Security Council has released a video of the suspect behind the Duhok attack during the Assyrian New Year celebration. In the video, the man claims he was an ISIS operative. He is originally from Qamishli in Syrian Kurdistan. Although he speaks Arabic, his accent indicates that he is not an Arab but a native Kurdish speaker. He had been living in a refugee camp near Duhok and admits in the video that he carried out the attack under orders from ISIS. This case is notable because Syrian Kurds are generally known for their secular outlook. A recent Economist poll found that 78% of Syrian Kurds support the establishment of a secular system in Syria.

The Kurdistan Security Council has released a video of the suspect behind the Duhok attack during the Assyrian New Year celebration. In the video, the man claims he was an ISIS operative. He is originally from Qamishli in Syrian Kurdistan. Although he speaks Arabic, his accent indicates that he is not an Arab but a native Kurdish speaker. He had been living in a refugee camp near Duhok and admits in the video that he carried out the attack under orders from ISIS. This case is notable because Syrian Kurds are generally known for their secular outlook. A recent Economist poll found that 78% of Syrian Kurds support the establishment of a secular system in Syria.

Kurdistan Watch

66,345 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce