Mujamma Haraket
@MujammaHaraket • 11,166 subscribers
Academic based in the Middle East. Areas of concentration include Palestinian muqawama history, esp. the Islamic Resistance Movement, and political philosophy
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In his most recent appearance on the “India and Global Left” program, Norman Finkelstein avers that Yahya Sinwar and the Hamas leaders in Gaza who undertook Tufan al-Aqsa were undertaking an impulsive “gamble” rather than a strategic operation. When the interviewer (correctly) observes that there are reasons to believe that the short-term goal was to free prisoners and the long-term objective was to halt regional normalization while galvanizing the Palestine issue globally, Finkelstein vehemently disagrees. Were Finkelstein to familiarize himself with the “Our Narrative” documents produced by Hamas or consider the various testimonies where figures ranging from Mahmoud Mardawi to Jasser al-Barghouti elaborated on Sinwar et al.’s modus operandi, perhaps he would not be so dismissive. Yet Finkelstein then insists that “like Nat Turner, who had only read the Bible” (a claim that is itself contravened by Christopher Tomlins’s recent scholarship on Turner), Sinwar was unlearned—and had, following the 2011 Shalit prisoner exchange which precipitated his return to the besieged Gaza Strip, but “gone from one prison to another”. According to Finkelstein, Sinwar was thus constitutionally incapable of political prudence, acting from rash and extruding compulsions alone. It is rather mystifying that someone who prides themselves on their granular research (and, it should be noted, has undoubtedly assiduously assayed the 2010 Mavi Marmara case and various human rights reports) is unaware of Sinwar’s well-established and arrayed literary record—as a writer, reader, and translator. Furthermore, Finkelstein argues that it is folly to focus on the resistance, as this merely bolsters the occupation’s misbegotten narrative that Tufan al-Aqsa was a war rather than a genocide. Finkelstein beseeches the interviewer: “Can you name me a single battle? You can’t as there were none.” However—and putting aside the issue that the categories of “wars” and “genocides” do not definitionally exclude one another (e.g., the 1994 Tutsi genocide occurred amidst a war)—a cursory review of the Palestinian resistance’s witness accounts is punctuated by references to the “Battle of Khan Younis” (Dec. 2023 - April 2024), what Abu Obeida called the “Battle of Rafah” (May-August 2024), and the “Battle of Shujaʿiyya” (Dec. 2023), to name but a few. These were, of course, conducted as guerrilla rather than conventional military battles. But to take the resistance’s operational and political history seriously neither entreats minimization of the occupation’s “dolus specialis” (genocidal intent) nor bestows parity upon the two parties.
Mujamma Haraket324,237 views • 2 months ago
![In a newly published and somewhat hostile interview occasioned by the third anniversary of Tufan al-Aqsa, the Lebanese outlet 'An-Nahar' presses Ahmad Abd al-Hadi, Hamas’s representative in Lebanon, on two of the questions surrounding the operation and its aftermath: "Whether Hamas would launch the operation again knowing what followed?" and "How the movement answers accusations that the operation contributed to the severe blows subsequently suffered by the regional resistance axis, including Hizbu’llah and Iran, as well as the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria?" Abd al-Hadi begins by detailing the following: “The [Zionist-American-British] project had been prepared well in advance. It sought to target all the resistance forces, which were regarded as ‘strategic threats’ that had to be neutralized in accordance with the Abraham Accords. […] When Tufan al-Aqsa occurred, there was a reaction. But as the project had already been planned, then even without Tufan al-Aqsa there would have been a war on Lebanon, as the pager operation evidences. There would also have been a strike on Iran. There are many indications of this. The entity had built infrastructure inside Iran, with British and American support, effectively creating a ‘state within a state’ [through Mossad agents and agents]. The project had already been prepared. It did not arise *because* of the Flood. The Flood exposed it and accelerated its implementation; otherwise, it would have hit the Axis as a surprise. […] The same applies to Syria. Even Syria had a project prepared for it. We therefore cannot say that all of this happened because of Hamas.” He then goes on to reflect on the example of Algerian independence, the contemporaneous unity of the Resistance Axis, and the ongoing wars/aggressions on the various fronts. I highly recommend listening to the 22-minute interview in full.](https://image.24vids.com/tw-2106536966971863428/amplify_video_thumb/2106534716060901376/img/K0iiyRG9Ijx9Xdpr.jpg)
In a newly published and somewhat hostile interview occasioned by the third anniversary of Tufan al-Aqsa, the Lebanese outlet 'An-Nahar' presses Ahmad Abd al-Hadi, Hamas’s representative in Lebanon, on two of the questions surrounding the operation and its aftermath: "Whether Hamas would launch the operation again knowing what followed?" and "How the movement answers accusations that the operation contributed to the severe blows subsequently suffered by the regional resistance axis, including Hizbu’llah and Iran, as well as the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria?" Abd al-Hadi begins by detailing the following: “The [Zionist-American-British] project had been prepared well in advance. It sought to target all the resistance forces, which were regarded as ‘strategic threats’ that had to be neutralized in accordance with the Abraham Accords. […] When Tufan al-Aqsa occurred, there was a reaction. But as the project had already been planned, then even without Tufan al-Aqsa there would have been a war on Lebanon, as the pager operation evidences. There would also have been a strike on Iran. There are many indications of this. The entity had built infrastructure inside Iran, with British and American support, effectively creating a ‘state within a state’ [through Mossad agents and agents]. The project had already been prepared. It did not arise *because* of the Flood. The Flood exposed it and accelerated its implementation; otherwise, it would have hit the Axis as a surprise. […] The same applies to Syria. Even Syria had a project prepared for it. We therefore cannot say that all of this happened because of Hamas.” He then goes on to reflect on the example of Algerian independence, the contemporaneous unity of the Resistance Axis, and the ongoing wars/aggressions on the various fronts. I highly recommend listening to the 22-minute interview in full.
Mujamma Haraket18,389 views • 15 days ago
Exclusive footage released by resistance sources reveals, for the first time, documents and personal belongings that were in Yahya al-Sinwar’s possession, offering a new glimpse into the items he carried with him. Among the documents visible in the footage are al-Sinwar’s handwritten will and remarks concerning the Qassam Brigades and its cadres; amongst al-Sinwar’s notes are references to resistance, with Qurʾan 9:14 and 33:23 quoted.
Mujamma Haraket27,156 views • 1 month ago
Amid green banners, Hamas flags and chants in support of the resistance, a massive crowd is accompanying the funeral procession commander of the Wahdat al-Nukhbah (Elite Unit), Walid Haniyeh (Abu Khaled), who has become a shahid after being targeted by the occupation yesterday.
Mujamma Haraket43,751 views • 3 months ago
Dr. Khalil al-Hayya’s speech with English subtitles; from Abu Osama’s reception for those offering condolences for his son Azzam’s becoming a shahid. “The path to liberating al-Quds is not lined with roses. The path to glory, the path to liberating the land and its people from the yoke of colonialism and occupation requires will, fate, steadfastness a d sacrifice.”
Mujamma Haraket48,358 views • 5 months ago
Avi Dichter, the former Shin Bet director and Minister of Internal Security for “Israel” who currently is the Minister of Agriculture and Food Development for Netanyahu’s government, has released a video where he asks Gazans to participate in the “June 26 Movement.” This comes on the heels of Bezalel Smotridge similarly endorsing the insurrectionist “movement.” Dichter’s video again clarifies the true nature of the “June 26 Movement,” which has been widely condemned by Gaza’s largest clans and seeks to weaponize Palestinians against one another to exact violence on the resistance, police, and government workers, thereby servicing the occupation’s goals.
Mujamma Haraket35,814 views • 3 months ago
*Update on the Collaborator File* The resistance’s Radaa force, dedicated to targeting collaborator militia members, has published this video. It documents the remnants of instruments left behind by Husam al-Astal’s collaborator gang following an ambush east of the Mawza Roundabout, south of Khan Yunis. The ambush resulted in the elimination of three agents at zero distance on 6 May 2026. The video shows the devices gleaned by the resistance. ***** Husam al-Astal is associated with a militia operating in the Khan Yunis area and is also known by the Gazan nickname “Abu Seven.” He refers to his group as the “Counterterrorism Strike Force.” The militia reportedly formed in the summer of 2025. Allegations linking al-Astal to collaboration with the occupation date back to the 1990s. He also served as an officer in the PA’s Preventive Security Service. Al-Astal left the Gaza Strip in 2010 and lived in several locations abroad, most notably Malaysia. He was responsible for the 2018 assassination of scientist Fadi al-Batsh in Malaysia. In 2022, he was lured back to the Gaza Strip by the resistance, investigated, and sentenced to death. During the war, he was imprisoned in Asdaa Prison. Asdaa Prison is a central prison in the Asdaa area of al-Mawasi, west of Khan Yunis. Suspecting the prison would targeted by the occupation when Tufan al-Aqsa began to free suspected collaborators, the resistance moved al-Astal. For approximately two months, al-Astal and others were held at a site that was subsequently targeted by the occupation. Al-Astal was thus freed. After his release, al-Astal disappeared from public view until the summer of 2025, when he joined the Abu Shabab group. He later split from the Abu Shabab group and established his own militia. In a 13 February 2026 interview on Ehata Podcast, in the episode “ما هي خريطة المليشيات العميلة في غزة؟” (“What Is the Map of the Collaborator Militias in Gaza?”), hosted by Ahmad Mawlana and featuring Palestinian journalist and researcher Ma’mun Abu Jarad, Abu Jarad referred to Al-Astal’s group as potentially the most dangerous militia “on the security level,” though not the largest numerically. The force was estimated at roughly 30–40 fighters. Al-Astal’s alleged long-term relationship with the Shin Bet, combined with his prior service in the PA’s Preventive Security Service, was presented as evidence that he was a security-trained officer. Several assassinations were attributed to al-Astal. These included the assassination of Wasim Abdulhadi in eastern al-Bureij, a member of the al-Nasir Salah al-Din Brigades. Al-Astal was also linked to the assassination of Muhammad Abu Mustafa, identified as a leader in the Mujahideen Brigades. Mustafa was also described as being involved in securing some of the prisoners of war captured on 7 October 2023. Al-Astal also spearheaded the assassination of Mahmoud al-Astal, an officer in the Criminal Investigation Department in Khan Yunis and a member of the same extended family. Mahmoud al-Astal was portrayed as an important security figure involved in combating militias and collaborators in Gaza. The operational sophistication of these assassinations was attributed to the training al-Astal received from the Shin Bet.
Mujamma Haraket40,732 views • 5 months ago
A short film on the collaborator-militias east of the “Yellow Line” in Gaza
Mujamma Haraket25,953 views • 4 months ago
On this day 25 years ago, the occupation forces assassinated the Secretary-General of the Popular Front, the shahīd Abu Ali Mustafa. The PFLP’s slogan, as voiced by Secretary-General Ahmad Sa’adat, was “An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a head for a head.” Its strike forces then mobilized to take out the occupation’s Minister of Tourism, Rehavam Ze’evi.
Mujamma Haraket12,107 views • 1 month ago
“I will never liken those who sacrificed the country for their sons with those who sacrifice their sons for the country.” As the date of June 26—the date that figures mostly based in the EU have, under the auspices of the self-titled “June 26 Movement,” exhorted Gazans to take to the streets and violently combat the resistance and government on—draws near, Palestinians in Gaza, both young and old, continue to condemn these call. This young man lambasts those who claim that the resistance’s children live in luxury while average Palestinians live in squalor, reminding viewers that myriad resistance leaders lost their own children on the front lines. The video comes on the heels of a statement published by the “National Gathering of Palestinian Tribes, Clans, and Families” condemning the “June 26 Movement’s” incitement.
Mujamma Haraket13,643 views • 3 months ago
![“During the First Intifada, the Stone Intifada, our efforts were focused inside the occupied homeland. Then one of our brothers, Dr. Khalil al-Qouqa, was deported [by 'Israel' from Gaza]. At the Leader's [i.e., Ayatollah Khamenei's] instruction, he was sought out, located, and contacted. A meeting with Hamas was requested, and the first meeting took place. The initiative came from Mr. Ali Khamenei, who instructed one of the officials of the Islamic Republic to travel from Iran to where Dr. Khalil—Sheikh Khalil al-Qouqa—was staying at the time and invite him to a meeting. The Iranian official then arranged a meeting with a delegation representing the movement as a whole. After that, a delegation from the movement traveled to Tehran to participate in the Conference in Support of the Intifada in 1991. Then came the first official visit by a leadership delegation from the movement, in October 1992, headed by Musa Abu Marzouk. […] In this meeting, he outlined the course of the relationship as he saw it. He [Seyyed Khameini] remarked that it is our religious and legal responsibility to support you […] This was the path laid out from the very first meeting, and it remained a constant […] despite all the changes in the regional, international, and Palestinian political landscape.” In a new interview (recorded Friday, July 3, 2026), Hamas political bureau member and Lebanon representative Osama Hamdan delineates the beginnings of the Hamas movement’s relationship with Iran to al-Alam TV.](https://image.24vids.com/tw-2073658209349362029/amplify_video_thumb/2073654790710571008/img/41HaLPF4KcKzn78U.jpg)
“During the First Intifada, the Stone Intifada, our efforts were focused inside the occupied homeland. Then one of our brothers, Dr. Khalil al-Qouqa, was deported [by 'Israel' from Gaza]. At the Leader's [i.e., Ayatollah Khamenei's] instruction, he was sought out, located, and contacted. A meeting with Hamas was requested, and the first meeting took place. The initiative came from Mr. Ali Khamenei, who instructed one of the officials of the Islamic Republic to travel from Iran to where Dr. Khalil—Sheikh Khalil al-Qouqa—was staying at the time and invite him to a meeting. The Iranian official then arranged a meeting with a delegation representing the movement as a whole. After that, a delegation from the movement traveled to Tehran to participate in the Conference in Support of the Intifada in 1991. Then came the first official visit by a leadership delegation from the movement, in October 1992, headed by Musa Abu Marzouk. […] In this meeting, he outlined the course of the relationship as he saw it. He [Seyyed Khameini] remarked that it is our religious and legal responsibility to support you […] This was the path laid out from the very first meeting, and it remained a constant […] despite all the changes in the regional, international, and Palestinian political landscape.” In a new interview (recorded Friday, July 3, 2026), Hamas political bureau member and Lebanon representative Osama Hamdan delineates the beginnings of the Hamas movement’s relationship with Iran to al-Alam TV.
Mujamma Haraket11,084 views • 3 months ago
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