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🛰 🇷🇺 🇫🇮 Specialists tracking this in real time now have harder numbers than "a close pass." Orbital Radar's latest computation puts the closest approach at roughly 26 meters, with earlier passes logged at 136 meters and 578 meters as Kosmos 2612 tightened its formation over multiple orbits, each pass occurring at essentially zero relative velocity, meaning the Russian satellite wasn't drifting past ICEYE-X36, it was flying in matched formation with it. The deliberateness is no longer a matter of interpretation. Kosmos 2612 launched as part of a six-satellite cluster, Cosmos 2609 through 2614, and it is the only one of the six that has maneuvered at all. LeoLabs, the commercial tracking firm, said in a statement the movement "appears to be a deliberate approach toward" the US-owned satellite. CSIS researchers documented a two-week maneuver sequence beginning September 30 that brought Kosmos 2612 into coplanar alignment and matched altitude with ICEYE-X36, exactly the kind of orbital mechanics work that doesn't happen by accident. Dutch tracker Marco Langbroek, whose data anchors most of this reporting, called it bluntly: "an RPO without consent," rendezvous and proximity operations conducted without the target satellite's cooperation or clearance. What makes the target non-arbitrary is who relies on it. ICEYE-X36 is a Finnish-built, US-registered radar imaging satellite, and Poland's own military has flagged direct alarm because its forces use ICEYE intelligence to identify targets inside Russia. A Ukrainian official told Axios the military works with ICEYE's capabilities, though it's unconfirmed whether this specific satellite supports Ukrainian operations directly. Either way, the pattern read by trackers across multiple countries is the same: a Russian military asset spent three weeks deliberately burning fuel and adjusting its orbital plane, altitude and eccentricity to shadow, at zero relative velocity and within tens of meters, exactly the kind of Western-linked space asset Russia would want to understand, disable, or demonstrate it can reach. No tracker has found evidence Kosmos 2612 carries a destructive payload or that it struck ICEYE-X36. What's established instead is a precedent: Russia has now shown the technical willingness and capability to maneuver a military satellite into near-contact proximity with a commercial asset tied to Ukrainian and Polish defense intelligence, holding formation close enough that the only remaining open questions are what Moscow intended and whether the target satellite still functions exactly as it did before.

🛰 🇷🇺 🇫🇮 Specialists tracking this in real time now have harder numbers than "a close pass." Orbital Radar's latest computation puts the closest approach at roughly 26 meters, with earlier passes logged at 136 meters and 578 meters as Kosmos 2612 tightened its formation over multiple orbits, each pass occurring at essentially zero relative velocity, meaning the Russian satellite wasn't drifting past ICEYE-X36, it was flying in matched formation with it. The deliberateness is no longer a matter of interpretation. Kosmos 2612 launched as part of a six-satellite cluster, Cosmos 2609 through 2614, and it is the only one of the six that has maneuvered at all. LeoLabs, the commercial tracking firm, said in a statement the movement "appears to be a deliberate approach toward" the US-owned satellite. CSIS researchers documented a two-week maneuver sequence beginning September 30 that brought Kosmos 2612 into coplanar alignment and matched altitude with ICEYE-X36, exactly the kind of orbital mechanics work that doesn't happen by accident. Dutch tracker Marco Langbroek, whose data anchors most of this reporting, called it bluntly: "an RPO without consent," rendezvous and proximity operations conducted without the target satellite's cooperation or clearance. What makes the target non-arbitrary is who relies on it. ICEYE-X36 is a Finnish-built, US-registered radar imaging satellite, and Poland's own military has flagged direct alarm because its forces use ICEYE intelligence to identify targets inside Russia. A Ukrainian official told Axios the military works with ICEYE's capabilities, though it's unconfirmed whether this specific satellite supports Ukrainian operations directly. Either way, the pattern read by trackers across multiple countries is the same: a Russian military asset spent three weeks deliberately burning fuel and adjusting its orbital plane, altitude and eccentricity to shadow, at zero relative velocity and within tens of meters, exactly the kind of Western-linked space asset Russia would want to understand, disable, or demonstrate it can reach. No tracker has found evidence Kosmos 2612 carries a destructive payload or that it struck ICEYE-X36. What's established instead is a precedent: Russia has now shown the technical willingness and capability to maneuver a military satellite into near-contact proximity with a commercial asset tied to Ukrainian and Polish defense intelligence, holding formation close enough that the only remaining open questions are what Moscow intended and whether the target satellite still functions exactly as it did before.

171,680 次观看

🇺🇸 🇮🇷 MISSILE WAR - One night over Jordan helps explain a much larger problem now confronting the United States. Iran fired roughly 20 ballistic missiles. The U.S. responded with more than 70 high-end interceptors, around 60–70 Patriots and more than a dozen THAADs, according to the Wall Street Journal. (Video below) Some Iranian missiles still got through. The significance is not simply that defenses were imperfect. It is what the United States had to expend to achieve that level of protection. The WSJ reports that some of the Iranian missiles used warheads that separated into multiple projectiles during their approach, complicating the defensive problem. In some engagements, U.S. forces fired three or four interceptors against a single incoming missile. CBS News reported that one A-10 at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base was struck and lost a wing, while roughly eight F-15s sustained light damage. The F-15s were subsequently returned to service. Now put that single night against the numbers Washington released today. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the United States has probably consumed between one-half and two-thirds of its inventory of certain missile-defense interceptors since June 2025, including Patriot, THAAD, SM-3 and SM-6 missiles. That estimate covers more than the current phase of the Iran war: it also includes interceptors previously expended defending Israel. Replacing the missile-defense interceptors already used is estimated to cost $13.1 billion. More importantly, money cannot immediately solve the problem. CBO says rebuilding the depleted inventories would probably take at least five years, even if production increases. That creates a strategic cost extending well beyond the Middle East. CBO specifically warns that reduced interceptor inventories would become particularly problematic in a conflict against an adversary possessing large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles, and points directly to China's arsenal and a potential conflict over Taiwan. CSIS had already estimated in July that U.S. Patriot inventories had fallen below 1,000 interceptors and THAAD inventories to roughly 250. Against that backdrop, CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper gave CBS a very different assessment this weekend. Asked how concerned he was about dwindling munitions, Cooper replied: “I'm not concerned at all. We're well armed and ready for any contingency.” The Pentagon may have sufficient weapons for its current operational requirements. The harder question raised by the CBO is one of depth and regeneration: how many more nights requiring dozens of premium interceptors can the United States absorb while simultaneously preserving missile-defense capacity for Europe, the Middle East and a potential Indo-Pacific contingency? Jordan provided a real-world demonstration of that arithmetic. Roughly 20 Iranian ballistic missiles. More than 70 Patriot and THAAD launches, and an industrial base that may need years to replace what can be fired in minutes.

🇺🇸 🇮🇷 MISSILE WAR - One night over Jordan helps explain a much larger problem now confronting the United States. Iran fired roughly 20 ballistic missiles. The U.S. responded with more than 70 high-end interceptors, around 60–70 Patriots and more than a dozen THAADs, according to the Wall Street Journal. (Video below) Some Iranian missiles still got through. The significance is not simply that defenses were imperfect. It is what the United States had to expend to achieve that level of protection. The WSJ reports that some of the Iranian missiles used warheads that separated into multiple projectiles during their approach, complicating the defensive problem. In some engagements, U.S. forces fired three or four interceptors against a single incoming missile. CBS News reported that one A-10 at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base was struck and lost a wing, while roughly eight F-15s sustained light damage. The F-15s were subsequently returned to service. Now put that single night against the numbers Washington released today. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the United States has probably consumed between one-half and two-thirds of its inventory of certain missile-defense interceptors since June 2025, including Patriot, THAAD, SM-3 and SM-6 missiles. That estimate covers more than the current phase of the Iran war: it also includes interceptors previously expended defending Israel. Replacing the missile-defense interceptors already used is estimated to cost $13.1 billion. More importantly, money cannot immediately solve the problem. CBO says rebuilding the depleted inventories would probably take at least five years, even if production increases. That creates a strategic cost extending well beyond the Middle East. CBO specifically warns that reduced interceptor inventories would become particularly problematic in a conflict against an adversary possessing large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles, and points directly to China's arsenal and a potential conflict over Taiwan. CSIS had already estimated in July that U.S. Patriot inventories had fallen below 1,000 interceptors and THAAD inventories to roughly 250. Against that backdrop, CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper gave CBS a very different assessment this weekend. Asked how concerned he was about dwindling munitions, Cooper replied: “I'm not concerned at all. We're well armed and ready for any contingency.” The Pentagon may have sufficient weapons for its current operational requirements. The harder question raised by the CBO is one of depth and regeneration: how many more nights requiring dozens of premium interceptors can the United States absorb while simultaneously preserving missile-defense capacity for Europe, the Middle East and a potential Indo-Pacific contingency? Jordan provided a real-world demonstration of that arithmetic. Roughly 20 Iranian ballistic missiles. More than 70 Patriot and THAAD launches, and an industrial base that may need years to replace what can be fired in minutes.

22,783 次观看

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🇷🇺 Moscow floats non-aggression pacts with individual NATO members, as Medinsky says Europe's security order was the real topic in Abu Dhabi Russia has started to put its own vision for Europe's security on paper, and it works country by country. Alexey Drobinin, head of foreign policy planning at the Russian Foreign Ministry, told a security forum on Wednesday that Moscow sees three models. The first is a defensive alliance or bilateral mutual assistance treaties, like those Russia has with Belarus and North Korea. The second is a political pledge not to help each other's adversaries in case of aggression, like Moscow's pact with Iran. The third is bilateral non-aggression pacts. "For example, agreements of this kind could be reached, among other things, with individual NATO member states, which would then receive, for instance, additional individual security guarantees from the Russian Federation," Drobinin said, according to video of the speech reported by Reuters. TASS quoted him as framing it under the principle of "equal and indivisible security," the same language Moscow used in its December 2021 treaty drafts before the full-scale invasion. The timing is deliberate. Vladimir Medinsky said a new security framework for Europe had been the central theme of the two days of talks in Abu Dhabi, according to Reuters, though he gave no details. US officials have said they are open to discussing Europe's overall security architecture. Some European politicians reject that, arguing a ceasefire in Ukraine must come first. The appeal for Moscow is obvious. Separate deals with individual allies would offer each capital a private Russian guarantee and quietly weaken NATO's collective commitment under Article 5. No NATO government had publicly responded in the reports reviewed, and Drobinin's remarks are a proposal from a Foreign Ministry official, not an offer tabled in the talks as far as is known. For the US, the question is how far the Abu Dhabi track drifts into redesigning European security while Washington is also floating an "Article 5-like" guarantee for Ukraine. For Europeans, it is whether they can shape that conversation before others do it for them. What to watch: whether Kushner and Witkoff hear the same menu from Putin in Moscow on Thursday, and how NATO capitals respond in Dublin. Video: "WE ACHIEVED FULL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING", Putin on CSTO security talks.

🇷🇺 Moscow floats non-aggression pacts with individual NATO members, as Medinsky says Europe's security order was the real topic in Abu Dhabi Russia has started to put its own vision for Europe's security on paper, and it works country by country. Alexey Drobinin, head of foreign policy planning at the Russian Foreign Ministry, told a security forum on Wednesday that Moscow sees three models. The first is a defensive alliance or bilateral mutual assistance treaties, like those Russia has with Belarus and North Korea. The second is a political pledge not to help each other's adversaries in case of aggression, like Moscow's pact with Iran. The third is bilateral non-aggression pacts. "For example, agreements of this kind could be reached, among other things, with individual NATO member states, which would then receive, for instance, additional individual security guarantees from the Russian Federation," Drobinin said, according to video of the speech reported by Reuters. TASS quoted him as framing it under the principle of "equal and indivisible security," the same language Moscow used in its December 2021 treaty drafts before the full-scale invasion. The timing is deliberate. Vladimir Medinsky said a new security framework for Europe had been the central theme of the two days of talks in Abu Dhabi, according to Reuters, though he gave no details. US officials have said they are open to discussing Europe's overall security architecture. Some European politicians reject that, arguing a ceasefire in Ukraine must come first. The appeal for Moscow is obvious. Separate deals with individual allies would offer each capital a private Russian guarantee and quietly weaken NATO's collective commitment under Article 5. No NATO government had publicly responded in the reports reviewed, and Drobinin's remarks are a proposal from a Foreign Ministry official, not an offer tabled in the talks as far as is known. For the US, the question is how far the Abu Dhabi track drifts into redesigning European security while Washington is also floating an "Article 5-like" guarantee for Ukraine. For Europeans, it is whether they can shape that conversation before others do it for them. What to watch: whether Kushner and Witkoff hear the same menu from Putin in Moscow on Thursday, and how NATO capitals respond in Dublin. Video: "WE ACHIEVED FULL MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING", Putin on CSTO security talks.

225,588 次观看 • 4 天前

🇺🇦 🇷🇺 Zelensky on the Witkoff paper Putin got: no neutrality, no cap on the army, and "we are not exchanging anything for anything," as Medvedev tells Trump to have the CIA "deal with" him Volodymyr Zelensky used a Sunday night television interview to tell Washington what Kyiv will not sign. Asked by Alla Mazur of TSN's weekly show about the document US envoy Steve Witkoff carried to Vladimir Putin after the Oslo talks, Zelensky said it contains "various" American proposals, including on Ukraine's security. Two items are off the table, he said: neutrality and limits on the size of Ukraine's army. "Our security guarantees are our security guarantees, they cannot be dictated by the Russian side," he said. He was blunt about land. "The Americans have long been raising the issue of exchanging territories; they call it land swaps," Zelensky said. "We are not exchanging anything for anything. We are ready for discussion. If it is a territorial issue, then it should be handled at the leaders' level. Other issues should be handled at the level of technical groups." He said all of it can be discussed in November, when US, Ukrainian and Russian teams are expected to meet, possibly in Abu Dhabi. UATV reports he wants that round to produce an energy truce or a Black Sea ceasefire, safe grain exports and an all-for-all prisoner exchange, and that he does not want all sanctions on Russia lifted before a leaders' meeting. He also put Ukraine's 2027 funding need at 115 billion euros. Moscow's tone was harsher. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council and a former president, posted on the Russian platform Max that Trump should summon "the secretary of war and the CIA director" and have them resolve the Zelensky problem, adding that "the method, place, and means do not matter". The Daily Mail renders the line as "take care of this 'unfortunate little problem.'" Medvedev, who has no authority over US agencies, called Zelensky a "parasite" and claimed he harms Trump's interests more than Venezuela, Cuba and Iran combined. Earlier Sunday, Putin aide Yuri Ushakov told state TV that Moscow is ready to return to three-way talks after Russia's Nov. 4 holiday, calling the first meeting a "trial run," the Kyiv Independent reported. The interview is the clearest public account yet of where the Witkoff track snags. Washington keeps floating land swaps, Kyiv says only presidents can trade territory, and Moscow wants a deal it can close with Trump directly. Zelensky's ask for November is narrow and concrete: energy, the Black Sea, grain and prisoners. Medvedev's post shows how hard the Kremlin is working to drive a wedge between Trump and Zelensky in the weeks before the midterms and the talks. 📹 Gianl1974

🇺🇦 🇷🇺 Zelensky on the Witkoff paper Putin got: no neutrality, no cap on the army, and "we are not exchanging anything for anything," as Medvedev tells Trump to have the CIA "deal with" him Volodymyr Zelensky used a Sunday night television interview to tell Washington what Kyiv will not sign. Asked by Alla Mazur of TSN's weekly show about the document US envoy Steve Witkoff carried to Vladimir Putin after the Oslo talks, Zelensky said it contains "various" American proposals, including on Ukraine's security. Two items are off the table, he said: neutrality and limits on the size of Ukraine's army. "Our security guarantees are our security guarantees, they cannot be dictated by the Russian side," he said. He was blunt about land. "The Americans have long been raising the issue of exchanging territories; they call it land swaps," Zelensky said. "We are not exchanging anything for anything. We are ready for discussion. If it is a territorial issue, then it should be handled at the leaders' level. Other issues should be handled at the level of technical groups." He said all of it can be discussed in November, when US, Ukrainian and Russian teams are expected to meet, possibly in Abu Dhabi. UATV reports he wants that round to produce an energy truce or a Black Sea ceasefire, safe grain exports and an all-for-all prisoner exchange, and that he does not want all sanctions on Russia lifted before a leaders' meeting. He also put Ukraine's 2027 funding need at 115 billion euros. Moscow's tone was harsher. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia's Security Council and a former president, posted on the Russian platform Max that Trump should summon "the secretary of war and the CIA director" and have them resolve the Zelensky problem, adding that "the method, place, and means do not matter". The Daily Mail renders the line as "take care of this 'unfortunate little problem.'" Medvedev, who has no authority over US agencies, called Zelensky a "parasite" and claimed he harms Trump's interests more than Venezuela, Cuba and Iran combined. Earlier Sunday, Putin aide Yuri Ushakov told state TV that Moscow is ready to return to three-way talks after Russia's Nov. 4 holiday, calling the first meeting a "trial run," the Kyiv Independent reported. The interview is the clearest public account yet of where the Witkoff track snags. Washington keeps floating land swaps, Kyiv says only presidents can trade territory, and Moscow wants a deal it can close with Trump directly. Zelensky's ask for November is narrow and concrete: energy, the Black Sea, grain and prisoners. Medvedev's post shows how hard the Kremlin is working to drive a wedge between Trump and Zelensky in the weeks before the midterms and the talks. 📹 Gianl1974

131,530 次观看 • 20 天前

⚠️ 🇺🇦 UPDATE: The shooting between SBU and GUR personnel in Kyiv is becoming more complicated. New Ukrainian accounts dispute the impression that the two services were simply conducting a joint operation. The incident centers on Stepan Kaplunov, deputy commander of the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK). According to the emerging version, GUR personnel went to 10 Yuriya Shumskoho Street intending to detain SBU officers who had allegedly previously taken Kaplunov. SBU personnel then reportedly attempted to detain the GUR team. Gunfire followed. There is important earlier context. On August 27, military lawyer Taras Borovsky publicly reported that his client, a serviceman of Ukraine's military intelligence, had been forcibly abducted in Kyiv. Tonight, as police responded to the Shumskoho address, Borovsky said colleagues of the missing serviceman arrived at the scene. Gunshots were subsequently heard, followed by the arrival of personnel from both GUR and SBU. The SBU is presenting a very different picture. Its version is that, working together with GUR, Ukrainian intelligence disrupted an FSB-planned assassination operation against a Russian opposition figure who had traveled to Ukraine for Independence Day. That figure is reportedly Kaplunov. GUR, meanwhile, has remained silent. So we now have two potentially conflicting layers to this story: An official SBU account describing a successful joint SBU–GUR counterintelligence operation against an FSB assassination plot. And emerging Ukrainian accounts alleging that GUR personnel confronted SBU officers over Kaplunov's detention, producing an armed standoff between the two services. Until GUR speaks, the exact sequence, and why Ukrainian intelligence officers apparently ended up firing on one another in Kyiv, remains unresolved.

⚠️ 🇺🇦 UPDATE: The shooting between SBU and GUR personnel in Kyiv is becoming more complicated. New Ukrainian accounts dispute the impression that the two services were simply conducting a joint operation. The incident centers on Stepan Kaplunov, deputy commander of the Russian Volunteer Corps (RDK). According to the emerging version, GUR personnel went to 10 Yuriya Shumskoho Street intending to detain SBU officers who had allegedly previously taken Kaplunov. SBU personnel then reportedly attempted to detain the GUR team. Gunfire followed. There is important earlier context. On August 27, military lawyer Taras Borovsky publicly reported that his client, a serviceman of Ukraine's military intelligence, had been forcibly abducted in Kyiv. Tonight, as police responded to the Shumskoho address, Borovsky said colleagues of the missing serviceman arrived at the scene. Gunshots were subsequently heard, followed by the arrival of personnel from both GUR and SBU. The SBU is presenting a very different picture. Its version is that, working together with GUR, Ukrainian intelligence disrupted an FSB-planned assassination operation against a Russian opposition figure who had traveled to Ukraine for Independence Day. That figure is reportedly Kaplunov. GUR, meanwhile, has remained silent. So we now have two potentially conflicting layers to this story: An official SBU account describing a successful joint SBU–GUR counterintelligence operation against an FSB assassination plot. And emerging Ukrainian accounts alleging that GUR personnel confronted SBU officers over Kaplunov's detention, producing an armed standoff between the two services. Until GUR speaks, the exact sequence, and why Ukrainian intelligence officers apparently ended up firing on one another in Kyiv, remains unresolved.

47,443 次观看 • 2 个月前

🧵 THREAD 🇺🇦 🇷🇺 Brazilian volunteers of Companhia Serpente, 53rd Mechanized Brigade - GoPro footage, first person. Storming a building with Russian occupants inside. Capturing an enemy radio station. Taking a prisoner. "No kill, please!" - Russian soldiers surrendering to foreign volunteers. Brazilians are fighting for Ukraine. 🧵 2 ⬇️

🧵 THREAD 🇺🇦 🇷🇺 Brazilian volunteers of Companhia Serpente, 53rd Mechanized Brigade - GoPro footage, first person. Storming a building with Russian occupants inside. Capturing an enemy radio station. Taking a prisoner. "No kill, please!" - Russian soldiers surrendering to foreign volunteers. Brazilians are fighting for Ukraine. 🧵 2 ⬇️

72,062 次观看 • 5 个月前

⚠️ There is much more inside Anthropic 's new threat-intelligence report. The biological-weapons cases we covered earlier are only one part of it. Anthropic says it identified a Russian-linked espionage actor consistent with public reporting on Midnight Blizzard using AI-driven workflows to automate substantial parts of intelligence operations against Ukrainian and European government, military, intelligence and diplomatic targets. Claude was being used across reconnaissance, phishing infrastructure, exploitation, persistence and data exfiltration. When security products detected the attackers’ malware, AI agents could analyze what had gone wrong, modify and rebuild the tools, and continue iterating. Drone technology was among the targets. Anthropic says the operation stole mailboxes from at least two drone-component manufacturers and obtained the complete proprietary SDK for a drone vision system. The attackers then spent days using AI to reconstruct its architecture, hardware, suppliers and details of an unreleased product. 🇺🇦 They also compromised hotel Wi-Fi providers to target specific guests and attempted to take over WhatsApp accounts belonging to former senior Ukrainian officials. 🇨🇳 Then there is China. Anthropic says an operation it attributes with high confidence to Alibaba/Tongyi Lab extracted more than 151 MILLION Claude exchanges between May and July to help train Qwen models. It says Moonshot AI/Kimi generated more than 23 million exchanges, in some cases silently routing users’ queries through Claude without those users knowing. DeepSeek allegedly did something similar: more than 12 million exchanges in just 14 days in July. 🇾🇪 And perhaps the most extraordinary case comes from Yemen. Anthropic identified a weapons-development group using multiple Claude instances essentially as an AI engineering team while working on guided rockets and long-range missile systems. The group built and physically test-fired a guided rocket, but the test failed. Within hours, the engineers went back to Claude to diagnose what had gone wrong. Taken together, these cases show something much larger than people occasionally asking an AI model dangerous questions. AI is beginning to operate inside real espionage campaigns, weapons-development programs and the industrial competition between the world’s leading AI labs.

⚠️ There is much more inside Anthropic 's new threat-intelligence report. The biological-weapons cases we covered earlier are only one part of it. Anthropic says it identified a Russian-linked espionage actor consistent with public reporting on Midnight Blizzard using AI-driven workflows to automate substantial parts of intelligence operations against Ukrainian and European government, military, intelligence and diplomatic targets. Claude was being used across reconnaissance, phishing infrastructure, exploitation, persistence and data exfiltration. When security products detected the attackers’ malware, AI agents could analyze what had gone wrong, modify and rebuild the tools, and continue iterating. Drone technology was among the targets. Anthropic says the operation stole mailboxes from at least two drone-component manufacturers and obtained the complete proprietary SDK for a drone vision system. The attackers then spent days using AI to reconstruct its architecture, hardware, suppliers and details of an unreleased product. 🇺🇦 They also compromised hotel Wi-Fi providers to target specific guests and attempted to take over WhatsApp accounts belonging to former senior Ukrainian officials. 🇨🇳 Then there is China. Anthropic says an operation it attributes with high confidence to Alibaba/Tongyi Lab extracted more than 151 MILLION Claude exchanges between May and July to help train Qwen models. It says Moonshot AI/Kimi generated more than 23 million exchanges, in some cases silently routing users’ queries through Claude without those users knowing. DeepSeek allegedly did something similar: more than 12 million exchanges in just 14 days in July. 🇾🇪 And perhaps the most extraordinary case comes from Yemen. Anthropic identified a weapons-development group using multiple Claude instances essentially as an AI engineering team while working on guided rockets and long-range missile systems. The group built and physically test-fired a guided rocket, but the test failed. Within hours, the engineers went back to Claude to diagnose what had gone wrong. Taken together, these cases show something much larger than people occasionally asking an AI model dangerous questions. AI is beginning to operate inside real espionage campaigns, weapons-development programs and the industrial competition between the world’s leading AI labs.

33,950 次观看 • 2 个月前

🧵 THREAD 🇺🇦 🇷🇺 One year ago, Ukraine's Third Army Corps deployed as a single fighting unit for the first time. In 12 months under Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky: 300,000+ drone strike missions. 17,000+ enemy drones shot down. 18,000+ ground robot logistics runs - delivering 4,500 tonnes of cargo and completing 600+ evacuations of wounded without risk to personnel. 35,000 Russian troops eliminated. 150km of frontline held - the longest single responsibility zone in the Ukrainian Army. The Corps deployed its own drone regiment KRAKEN, its own air defense regiment Aquila, its own hospital, clinical blood bank, and Patron Service "Angels of the Third" - through which 85% of the wounded return to service. Every second ground robot in Ukraine's Armed Forces fights in the Third Corps. One year. One unit. One front. 🧵⬇️

🧵 THREAD 🇺🇦 🇷🇺 One year ago, Ukraine's Third Army Corps deployed as a single fighting unit for the first time. In 12 months under Brigadier General Andriy Biletsky: 300,000+ drone strike missions. 17,000+ enemy drones shot down. 18,000+ ground robot logistics runs - delivering 4,500 tonnes of cargo and completing 600+ evacuations of wounded without risk to personnel. 35,000 Russian troops eliminated. 150km of frontline held - the longest single responsibility zone in the Ukrainian Army. The Corps deployed its own drone regiment KRAKEN, its own air defense regiment Aquila, its own hospital, clinical blood bank, and Patron Service "Angels of the Third" - through which 85% of the wounded return to service. Every second ground robot in Ukraine's Armed Forces fights in the Third Corps. One year. One unit. One front. 🧵⬇️

59,262 次观看 • 5 个月前

🇺🇸 🇮🇷 MISSILE WAR - One night over Jordan helps explain a much larger problem now confronting the United States. Iran fired roughly 20 ballistic missiles. The U.S. responded with more than 70 high-end interceptors, around 60–70 Patriots and more than a dozen THAADs, according to the Wall Street Journal. (Video below) Some Iranian missiles still got through. The significance is not simply that defenses were imperfect. It is what the United States had to expend to achieve that level of protection. The WSJ reports that some of the Iranian missiles used warheads that separated into multiple projectiles during their approach, complicating the defensive problem. In some engagements, U.S. forces fired three or four interceptors against a single incoming missile. CBS News reported that one A-10 at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base was struck and lost a wing, while roughly eight F-15s sustained light damage. The F-15s were subsequently returned to service. Now put that single night against the numbers Washington released today. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the United States has probably consumed between one-half and two-thirds of its inventory of certain missile-defense interceptors since June 2025, including Patriot, THAAD, SM-3 and SM-6 missiles. That estimate covers more than the current phase of the Iran war: it also includes interceptors previously expended defending Israel. Replacing the missile-defense interceptors already used is estimated to cost $13.1 billion. More importantly, money cannot immediately solve the problem. CBO says rebuilding the depleted inventories would probably take at least five years, even if production increases. That creates a strategic cost extending well beyond the Middle East. CBO specifically warns that reduced interceptor inventories would become particularly problematic in a conflict against an adversary possessing large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles, and points directly to China's arsenal and a potential conflict over Taiwan. CSIS had already estimated in July that U.S. Patriot inventories had fallen below 1,000 interceptors and THAAD inventories to roughly 250. Against that backdrop, CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper gave CBS a very different assessment this weekend. Asked how concerned he was about dwindling munitions, Cooper replied: “I'm not concerned at all. We're well armed and ready for any contingency.” The Pentagon may have sufficient weapons for its current operational requirements. The harder question raised by the CBO is one of depth and regeneration: how many more nights requiring dozens of premium interceptors can the United States absorb while simultaneously preserving missile-defense capacity for Europe, the Middle East and a potential Indo-Pacific contingency? Jordan provided a real-world demonstration of that arithmetic. Roughly 20 Iranian ballistic missiles. More than 70 Patriot and THAAD launches, and an industrial base that may need years to replace what can be fired in minutes.

🇺🇸 🇮🇷 MISSILE WAR - One night over Jordan helps explain a much larger problem now confronting the United States. Iran fired roughly 20 ballistic missiles. The U.S. responded with more than 70 high-end interceptors, around 60–70 Patriots and more than a dozen THAADs, according to the Wall Street Journal. (Video below) Some Iranian missiles still got through. The significance is not simply that defenses were imperfect. It is what the United States had to expend to achieve that level of protection. The WSJ reports that some of the Iranian missiles used warheads that separated into multiple projectiles during their approach, complicating the defensive problem. In some engagements, U.S. forces fired three or four interceptors against a single incoming missile. CBS News reported that one A-10 at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base was struck and lost a wing, while roughly eight F-15s sustained light damage. The F-15s were subsequently returned to service. Now put that single night against the numbers Washington released today. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the United States has probably consumed between one-half and two-thirds of its inventory of certain missile-defense interceptors since June 2025, including Patriot, THAAD, SM-3 and SM-6 missiles. That estimate covers more than the current phase of the Iran war: it also includes interceptors previously expended defending Israel. Replacing the missile-defense interceptors already used is estimated to cost $13.1 billion. More importantly, money cannot immediately solve the problem. CBO says rebuilding the depleted inventories would probably take at least five years, even if production increases. That creates a strategic cost extending well beyond the Middle East. CBO specifically warns that reduced interceptor inventories would become particularly problematic in a conflict against an adversary possessing large numbers of ballistic and cruise missiles, and points directly to China's arsenal and a potential conflict over Taiwan. CSIS had already estimated in July that U.S. Patriot inventories had fallen below 1,000 interceptors and THAAD inventories to roughly 250. Against that backdrop, CENTCOM commander Adm. Brad Cooper gave CBS a very different assessment this weekend. Asked how concerned he was about dwindling munitions, Cooper replied: “I'm not concerned at all. We're well armed and ready for any contingency.” The Pentagon may have sufficient weapons for its current operational requirements. The harder question raised by the CBO is one of depth and regeneration: how many more nights requiring dozens of premium interceptors can the United States absorb while simultaneously preserving missile-defense capacity for Europe, the Middle East and a potential Indo-Pacific contingency? Jordan provided a real-world demonstration of that arithmetic. Roughly 20 Iranian ballistic missiles. More than 70 Patriot and THAAD launches, and an industrial base that may need years to replace what can be fired in minutes.

22,783 次观看 • 2 个月前

🧵 🇺🇦 🇷🇺 One year ago today: Operation Spiderweb. On June 1, 2025, Ukraine's Security Service launched the most audacious covert operation of the war - 18 months in planning, kept secret even from Ukraine's own allies. 117 FPV drones. Five Russian air bases. Five time zones. From Murmansk above the Arctic Circle to Irkutsk in Siberia - 4,300km from Ukraine. $7 billion in damage. 41 aircraft hit. Russia's "Pearl Harbor." The architects of Spiderweb are still operating. Threaded the operation below:🧵⬇️

🧵 🇺🇦 🇷🇺 One year ago today: Operation Spiderweb. On June 1, 2025, Ukraine's Security Service launched the most audacious covert operation of the war - 18 months in planning, kept secret even from Ukraine's own allies. 117 FPV drones. Five Russian air bases. Five time zones. From Murmansk above the Arctic Circle to Irkutsk in Siberia - 4,300km from Ukraine. $7 billion in damage. 41 aircraft hit. Russia's "Pearl Harbor." The architects of Spiderweb are still operating. Threaded the operation below:🧵⬇️

19,540 次观看 • 5 个月前

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