Video wird geladen...

Video konnte nicht geladen werden

Zur Startseite

A Russian cuts open an American M864 155 mm base-bleed extended-range artillery projectile. He will retrieve the M42 and M46 dual-purpose shaped-charge fragmentation “cluster bomb” submunitions within, for use as drone bombs. 1/

25,761 Aufrufe • vor 6 Monaten •via X (Twitter)

0 Kommentare

Keine Kommentare verfügbar

Kommentare vom Original-Post werden hier angezeigt

Ähnliche Videos

Using the standardized formula of penetration depth of shaped charges with the density of human flesh we have determined the exact charge needed to penetrate the sternum and reach the C7 vertebrae. With around 2 grams of PETN copper and lead fragmentation could reach the C7 vertebrae matching the reports from the medical examination. This also matches the energetic release mapped with the modified pixel flow analysis which pinpointed the epicenter in the attached video. Additionally, for this shaped charge to have maximum performance a standoff distance of 2cm would be needed. This could be accomplish by a preliminary charge to blow open the case of the wireless microphone to create some distance between it and the target. This preliminary charge can be seen in the subtitle movement of the magnetic clasp across his chest before the shaped charge is detonated which causes the main wound channel. The slight movement of the shirt collar preceded the shaped charge force which blew the necklace up and over his head from the expansive gas escaping from the shaped charge as it detonated. The wound from this shaped charge would have stopped his heart in under 2 seconds which also explains the bleeding patterns we witnessed from the neck wound. (More on this later) To calculate the explosive charge needed to penetrate 14 cm of a material with a density of 1060 kg/m³, we use the same hydrodynamic theory from *Fundamentals of Shaped Charges* as in the previous calculation. The penetration depth \( P \) for a conical shaped charge is given by: \[ P = k \cdot D \] where: - \( P \) is the penetration depth (in cm), - \( D \) is the cone diameter (liner base diameter, in cm), - \( k \) is the penetration efficiency factor. Result: The required explosive charge mass to penetrate 14 cm of a material with a density of 1060 kg/m³ is approximately **2.16 grams**.

Jon Bray

133,285 Aufrufe • vor 9 Monaten

A typical day for Russia, which, unfortunately, continues to avoid truly strong global pressure in response to prolonging the war. At night, there was a series of brutal rocket artillery and aerial bomb strikes on Zaporizhzhia – against ordinary homes and city infrastructure. Sadly, the number of wounded increased during the day. There are fatalities. In the morning, Russia carried out another drone strike on a civilian logistics center in the Kyiv region. No military purpose whatsoever. A deliberate Russian strike against Ukrainian business. During the day, a strike hit the center of Kharkiv, targeting university buildings. The National University of Pharmacy – for Russia, simply a target. Russian guided aerial bombs continue to rain down on communities in the Sumy, Kharkiv, and Donetsk regions. FPV drone strikes continue in the Zaporizhzhia region. Kherson is under constant artillery shelling. The only reason Russia can afford all this is because it does not feel pain. Until Russia feels truly significant losses – above all economic losses – it will continue to avoid genuine diplomacy and ending the war. It is crucial that the world respond to every strike. It is crucial that Europe, the United States, the G7, and the G20 do not grant Russia time – time for war. Strong sanctions are needed. Strong tariffs on Russian trade are needed. Strong protection of life is needed.

Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський

637,037 Aufrufe • vor 10 Monaten

Can Venezuela withstand the attack after Trump's green light? Initially, the targets would be Venezuelan radars, which would be attacked by American drones, disabling the anti-aircraft defenses. Venezuela does not have a dedicated drone interception system, which could be a crucial vulnerability. Iglas and RBS 70 are the only options to attack drones flying at max 5,000m altitude. Regarding the radars, Venezuela is operating only a little over half of its systems, which are Russian and Chinese models. American radars are partially operational. - HK-JM2: Chinese; 500 km; Long-range defense; Operational. - JYL-1: Chinese; 470 km; Long-range 3D; 7+ units; Operational. - JY-11B: Chinese; 450 km; 3D UHF; Multiple units; Operational. - TPS-70: American; 370 km; Mobile surveillance; Unknown status; Partially operational. - 36D6 Tin Shield: Russian; 300 km; 3D detection; Operational. - TPS-43: American; 360 km; Air surveillance; Unknown status; Possibly inoperative. These radars are also critical for the operation of Venezuelan drones and antiship missiles, which are quite numerous. Venezuelan Aerial Drones (Iranian, Russian, and Domestic): - Arpía 1/ANSU-100 (Mohajer-2): Iranian/local; Range: 50 km; Speed: 200 km/h; Dozens in use. - Orlan-10: Russian; Range: 120 km; Speed: 150 km/h. - Qods Mohajer/Mersad: Iranian; Range: 50 km; Speed: 200 km/h. - ANT-3X Gavilán: Venezuelan; Range: 120 km; Speed: 150 km/h. - Mohajer-6: Iranian; Range: 2,000 km; Speed: 200 km/h. - ANSU-200: Venezuelan/Iranian; Range: 500 km; Speed: 200 km/h (experimental). - Zamora V-1 (Shahed-136): Venezuelan; Range: 30 km; Speed: 150 km/h. Venezuelan Marine Drones (Domestic and Confirmed): - RAMMAX: Venezuelan; Range: 20 km; Speed: 20 km/h; (coastal patrol). - Iranian-Modified USVs (Peykaap III): Range: 50 km; Speed: 50 km/h. Chinese Marine Drones (Some unconfirmed): - Yunzhou: Chinese; Range: 740 km; Speed: 85 km/h (high-speed). - Cavalry A150: Chinese; Range: 500 km; Speed: 40 km/h. - Lanjing: Chinese; Range: 600 km; Speed: 74 km/h (submersible). - Scout S45: Chinese; Range: 350 km; Speed: 40 km/h. - Anti-mine UAV: Chinese; Range: 200 km; Speed: 40 km/h. Venezuelan Anti-Ship Missiles: - Kh-35 variants: Russian; Range: 130–300 km; Speed: Mach 0.8. - C-802/YJ-83: Chinese; Range: 180 km; Speed: Mach 0.9. - Kh-31 variants: Russian; Range: 110–250 km; Speed: Mach 3.5; Quantity: 20–50 (Su-30MK2, 2025). - CM-90 (Nasir-1): Iranian; Range: 90 km; Speed: Mach 0.85. Venezuelan Boats with Anti-Ship Missiles: - Nasr-1: Peykaap/IRGC swarms; Range: 90 km; Speed: Mach 0.85. - Fajr-3: Fast, asymmetric boats; Range: 25 km; Speed: Mach 0.7. Regarding vessels, the biggest threat from Venezuela are Iranian fast attack boats and their anti-ship missiles. I see no space for the rest of the navy to operate in this scenario. They might not even leave the naval bases. Even with the U.S. deploying a partial force, it's far beyond Venezuelan capabilities, but I repeat: If the Venezuelan military agrees to fight, these anti-ship missiles and drones will give the American fleet a hard time. Yemen has far less against a much larger task force and still made a significant impact. The defense systems as S300VM, Buk-2M and Pechoras were deployed around several cities. Maduro isn't as popular as Chavez was, and Venezuela is going through a tough time now, without even the support of its neighbors, something that wasn't the case in the past.

Patricia Marins

99,420 Aufrufe • vor 9 Monaten