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Ackman’s core thesis for 2026 is exploiting market distraction. While capital rotates heavily into the 'AI race,' semiconductor manufacturers, and new IPOs like $SPCX, Pershing Square is taking concentrated, heavy positions in what the market currently dismisses as 'old tech'. Ackman argued the market is ignoring $MSFT and $AMZN's...

66,200 görüntüleme • 16 gün önce •via X (Twitter)

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Cloud capital versus AI - What DeepSeek’s spectacular success means for technofeudalism & the New Cold War DeepSeek, a Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) company, this week changed the global AI landscape, not to mention caused $1 trillion losses in the New York stock exchange and the NASDAC. In the process, it demonstrated the difference between cloud capital, which drives technofeudalism onward and upward, and AI-services, which were always a bubble waiting to burst. What remains to be seen is DeepSeek's impact on the New Cold War between the US and China which, from its beginning, was motivated by the clash between US and Chinese cloud capital. DeepSeek is China's response to OpenAI's ChatGPT. Its models perform as efficiently as their US counterparts. The difference is that DeepSeek is offered for free, making money only by selling services to developers - not to the public – at a fraction of the price OpenAI charges! The gist of DeepSeek’s arrival on the AI scene is a sudden transition from proprietary to open source technology. It is, therefore, no great wonder that, the moment DeekSeek became the most downloaded app on the Apple Store, it pulverised the market capitalisation of the, hitherto overinflated, US Big Tech companies. But how did this happen? How is a private commodity suddenly being offered for free? And does this mean that technofeudalism is in trouble? To begin with it is important to note AI was never a proprietary technology in itself. The underlying code has always been open source. What made AI quasi-private was the way these models were trained using huge amounts of privatised (that is stolen from us) data. A leaked Google memo in 2017, that was widely discussed in the industry at the time, but also widely refuted, explained: "If an open source LLM trained for a few million dollars outperforms the effectiveness of proprietary models... There will be no firewall to safeguard OpenAI either." DeepSeek pierced the US AI companies’ bubble by decommodifying the results of the model’s training, shifting them from behind a paywall to the public arena. Within days, developers around the world started building their own models on top of DeepSeek's. This is was the nightmare for US Big Tech's AI service providers who offered the results of prompts as a commodity, in the form of subscriptions. DeepSeek-type applications can now produce high-quality translations for free and, in so doing, undermine companies specialising in, for example, translation services, such as Germany's Deepl. In the broader scheme of things, this means that the morsels of cloud capital that Europe owns has lost its market value. Nevertheless, and this is a huge nevertheless, it is only AI-as-a-commodity that has lost its (grossly exaggerated) value. In sharp contrast, cloud capital utilised not as a commodity producing piece of tech but as produced means of behavioural modification is not at all threatened by companies like DeepSeek. And since technofeudalism is powered by cloud capital working that way, rather than commodity-like AI services of the ChaptGPT type, our technofeudal order is not threatened by competitors such as DeepSeek. To help understand the difference between cloud capital and AI-based commodified services it helps to compare and contrast Alexa and ChatGPT. Alexa is not offering you a commodified service. It is your free pretend-slave. Unlike ChatGPT you do not pay a subscription to Amazon for the right to order Alexa to order you milk or to switch off your lights. Instead, you train Alexa to train you to train it to know you so that it wins your trust with good recommendations so that it can modify your behaviour – ‘encourage’ you to buy a commodity from with Bezos retaining up to 40% of the price you pay (as a cloud rent). In short, the work that Alexa performs for you is not a commodity, unlike ChatGPT which works to sell you a commodity. In other words, ChatGPT is subject to market competition, to the likes of DeepSeek, but Alexa is not. This is why OpenAI, ChatGPT’s maker, is seriously damaged by the emergence of DeepSeek but Amazon is not. Thus, my basic point: Cloud capital is in a league of its own, beyond market competition from DeepSeek-like upstarts, because its power lies in its capacity to modify our behaviour and remove us from any market (e.g., to shift us from real markets to cloud fiefs like Amazon and Alibaba). In conclusion, cloud capital’s capacity to drive technofeudalism is not challenged by companies like DeepSeek. Only companies like OpenAI, which invested so much and so foolishly in providing a commodified service, stand to lose enormously. Yet another sign that capitalism is dead at the hand of cloud capital while technofeudalism is going from strength to strength and, as it does so, fuels even further the New Cold War between the US and China which in my book, Technofeudalism, I have explained away as the clash of the two huge concentrations of cloud capital: the American dollar-denominated super cloudalist power and the Chinese yuan-denominated one. Speaking of this New Cold War, which I have argued is mostly fuelled by the clash between American and Chinese cloud capital, I wonder what impact DeepSeek’s success will have on the US government. Silicon Valley and Washington DC had convinced themselves that America had a huge AI lead over China. Now, a tiny Chinese company has destroyed that confidence by producing on a shoestring better AI tech than Sillicon Valley had imagined possible. I can almost hear the whirring inside the heads of people in power on both America’s East and West Coast thinking that if the Chinese can do this out of the blue, what else can they do tomorrow? It is reminiscent of the Sputnik moment, isn’t it? It will be interesting to see how Trump reacts to this threat to companies American AI companies, especially since Elon Musk understands, and has spoken out against, the folly of commodifying AI services rather than going full on technofeudal. These are interesting times, in the traditional Chinese sense of the phrase.

Yanis Varoufakis

96,229 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce

Hohn’s strategy essentially redefines quality as extreme resilience against substitution and competition over a multi-decade timeline. Hohn targets super-companies where physical, non-replicable assets create monopolistic barriers to entry, rendering executive talent largely irrelevant to the underlying cash flows. He deliberately avoids high-growth sectors vulnerable to disruption, viewing terminal value as the greatest source of alpha missed by short-term analysts. For instance, in infrastructure, he targets assets like cell towers, rail lines, and literal toll roads where tenancy ratios allow for near-100% margin expansion on zero-cost additions, and cash flow yields are contractually linked to inflation. In aerospace, his conviction is absolute. TCI's largest holding is $GE Aerospace. Hohn categorizes this as an unbreakable moat because the complexity of building aircraft engines has prevented any new market entrants in over 50 years. The true economic value, however, is not the engine itself, but the captive aftermarket spare parts and servicing ecosystem. Once an airline adopts an engine, the switching costs are effectively insurmountable, guaranteeing decades of highly predictable, high-margin revenue. Hohn’s view on moats is dynamic. He believes even the strongest moats can erode. In a definitive move in early 2026, TCI slashed a large portion of its $8B stake in $MSFT, which is a position held for nearly a decade. Hohn explicitly cited that the rapid advancement of Generative AI posed an existential risk to Microsoft's core Office and Azure moats, proving that he will mercilessly abandon a historically 'high quality' asset the moment technological disruption threatens its terminal value.

CapexAndChill

27,269 görüntüleme • 1 ay önce

There is a massive misunderstanding about what $APP actually is, and the recent Adam Foroughi interview just handed investors as a class in capital allocation, efficiency, and strategic vertical integration. At its core, AppLovin isn’t solely an ad-network or a gaming business but an arbitrage engine. APP is essentially run by a skeleton crew of about ~400 core engineers and product builders generating $1.3B in cash flow a quarter. The gaming studio acquisitions were purely strategic. From roughly 2018 to 2023, APP bought up mobile gaming studios. It was accumulating over 15 studios and 1,500 headcount. This was not because they wanted to be a gaming company, but strictly to harvest first-party conversion data. They needed proprietary behavioral and return on ad spend data to train their Axon deep learning models because third-party advertisers wouldn't share it. Once the Axon 2.0 model launched in April 2023, it became so hyper-effective that the entire gaming industry had no choice but to plug in and share their data to access the platform's unparalleled returns. Having served its purpose, APP then shed the distraction, selling off the gaming portfolio to Tripledot Studios. This was pure strategic rent extraction. They used the asset to train the AI, built the moat, and immediately dumped the asset. Then there is the capital allocation execution. Back in 2022, when the broader market abandoned the stock and pushed APP's market cap to a floor of $3.8B, the business was still printing over $1 B in EBITDA. Instead of executing standard open-market share repurchases, management identified that their private equity backers and early insiders held nearly 50% of the float and eventually wanted liquidity. Management bypassed the public market entirely. They negotiated directly with those institutional holders to execute a massive $6 billion leveraged buyback. They effectively retired a huge portion of the company at rock-bottom valuations. Foroughi noted this singular move generated $50 to $60 B in retained value for remaining shareholders as the stock rebounded. While the rest of big tech hoards headcount, APP actively fired 40% of its workforce in recent years while growing revenue by nearly 100% YoY. The C-suite consists only of the CEO, CFO, CTO, and General Counsel. There is no CRO, no COO, and virtually no salesforce. They replaced standard enterprise bloat with LLMs. Over 80% of their codebase is now written by AI, multiplying the output of their highest-tier engineers up to 100x. The product nearly sells itself. Advertisers plug in, set a performance goal, and if the ROAS is positive, they scale spend infinitely. It turns advertisers into blind arbitrageurs. The TAM expansion is also clear. Now that the model has perfected gaming monetization, APP is unleashing Axon onto e-commerce and local SMBs. They don't need a massive sales team to do this. The AI matches the right intent with the right ad, pushing conversion rates up. The company literally has internal compensation triggers tied to a $1 T market cap. Given they have grown from under $4 B in 2022 to roughly ~$154 B in market cap today, betting against this lean, hyper-competent team does not make much sense.

CapexAndChill

24,419 görüntüleme • 2 ay önce