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BOLLING: We couldn’t figure out why there was so much tech selling until Friday. A 24 year old German AI guru had built a $45B private equity fund leveraged 400%. Totally unregulated. Then came the margin calls. The banks started liquidating assets, the $45B fund began shrinking, and at... show more

Grace Chong, MBI

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15,619 просмотров • 12 дней назад •via X (Twitter)

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“The stock market was 50,000 … so I said this was a good time to solve a problem that we had to solve, and it’s what I did (War with Iran)”. If this was actually about an imminent threat from Iran, why would the price of the stock market be one of the factors on timing?

“The stock market was 50,000 … so I said this was a good time to solve a problem that we had to solve, and it’s what I did (War with Iran)”. If this was actually about an imminent threat from Iran, why would the price of the stock market be one of the factors on timing?

Murray 🇺🇸

137,099 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

David Friedberg: How to Save Social Security Using Compound Interest david friedberg with an incredible breakdown on E219: "The US Social Security Program is meant to be kind of the retirement program for folks that don't have access to private retirement accounts." "This program was set up in the 1930s after the Great Depression. There's a trust fund, the OASDI, which is the fund that they invest the capital (from)." "So every year we all put money in with our social security taxes out of our paychecks, (which) goes in there." "It gets invested in one thing: US Treasuries." "Which have averaged about 4.8% return per year since the beginning of the program." "Meanwhile, the S&P 500 has been averaging 11%." "So here's the math: if in 1971, which was the year that we went off the gold standard in the US, if we invested the Social Security Trust Fund in the S&P, the balance of the social security trust fund today would be $15T." "That would be roughly one-third of the value of the total S&P 500, which would be jointly owned by all Americans." "Now here's what's f*cked up: the middle class people who had access to private retirement accounts benefited by buying the S&P 500 and the wealthy were able to access it." "So all of the equity value that accrued from American enterprise and the prosperity of the American system accrued to the people that had access to the private accounts." "Meanwhile, the people that only had access to the public accounts got stuck owning treasuries." "Today, the Social Security Trust Fund has a $2.7T balance, and based on the outflows and inflows, it's going to go bankrupt in 2032." "So I did the math: If you assume that the S&P 500 continues to grow at 10.5% per year on average, we could put about $500B in the trust fund today, and it will not go bankrupt again." "And it will continue to grow every year. And then all Americans have participation in American enterprise." "And importantly, this becomes the world's largest sovereign wealth fund ever. You don't need a separate sovereign wealth fund. We already have one." "We've totally mismanaged it. And I went back to try and understand why this is the case. Why have we only ever bought treasuries? " "Early on, the US needed someone to loan money. So they basically forced the citizens to loan the government money in the form of treasuries." "But today, the social security trust fund owns less than 10%, about 8% of the total treasury bonds outstanding." "So why are we forcing all the American citizens to participate?" "Through the social security system, we've created the deep inequity we see in this country." "If instead we had allowed the social security system to invest in the S&P 500 to buy American enterprises to fund American businesses, then every American would be wealthy and that middle class that uniquely participated by basically arbitraging the market where they forced the treasury bond yields on the poor and they got to take access to the equity yields would have not happened."

David Friedberg: How to Save Social Security Using Compound Interest david friedberg with an incredible breakdown on E219: "The US Social Security Program is meant to be kind of the retirement program for folks that don't have access to private retirement accounts." "This program was set up in the 1930s after the Great Depression. There's a trust fund, the OASDI, which is the fund that they invest the capital (from)." "So every year we all put money in with our social security taxes out of our paychecks, (which) goes in there." "It gets invested in one thing: US Treasuries." "Which have averaged about 4.8% return per year since the beginning of the program." "Meanwhile, the S&P 500 has been averaging 11%." "So here's the math: if in 1971, which was the year that we went off the gold standard in the US, if we invested the Social Security Trust Fund in the S&P, the balance of the social security trust fund today would be $15T." "That would be roughly one-third of the value of the total S&P 500, which would be jointly owned by all Americans." "Now here's what's f*cked up: the middle class people who had access to private retirement accounts benefited by buying the S&P 500 and the wealthy were able to access it." "So all of the equity value that accrued from American enterprise and the prosperity of the American system accrued to the people that had access to the private accounts." "Meanwhile, the people that only had access to the public accounts got stuck owning treasuries." "Today, the Social Security Trust Fund has a $2.7T balance, and based on the outflows and inflows, it's going to go bankrupt in 2032." "So I did the math: If you assume that the S&P 500 continues to grow at 10.5% per year on average, we could put about $500B in the trust fund today, and it will not go bankrupt again." "And it will continue to grow every year. And then all Americans have participation in American enterprise." "And importantly, this becomes the world's largest sovereign wealth fund ever. You don't need a separate sovereign wealth fund. We already have one." "We've totally mismanaged it. And I went back to try and understand why this is the case. Why have we only ever bought treasuries? " "Early on, the US needed someone to loan money. So they basically forced the citizens to loan the government money in the form of treasuries." "But today, the social security trust fund owns less than 10%, about 8% of the total treasury bonds outstanding." "So why are we forcing all the American citizens to participate?" "Through the social security system, we've created the deep inequity we see in this country." "If instead we had allowed the social security system to invest in the S&P 500 to buy American enterprises to fund American businesses, then every American would be wealthy and that middle class that uniquely participated by basically arbitraging the market where they forced the treasury bond yields on the poor and they got to take access to the equity yields would have not happened."

The All-In Podcast

166,742 просмотров • 1 год назад

"What's the difference between a money market fund and a stablecoin? If it's the same risk and I get interest in one but not the other, why would any agent choose the stablecoin?" Christopher on the question that could reshape the entire stablecoin market "If there's anything agents are awesome at, they almost over-optimize. In that world, do money markets win?" "I'm an agent. I want that interest to come to me, not go to the stablecoin issuer. What prevents that?" "Fundamentally, if it's the same risk and I get interest in one and I don't get the other, why would any agent go into the stablecoin space?"

"What's the difference between a money market fund and a stablecoin? If it's the same risk and I get interest in one but not the other, why would any agent choose the stablecoin?" Christopher on the question that could reshape the entire stablecoin market "If there's anything agents are awesome at, they almost over-optimize. In that world, do money markets win?" "I'm an agent. I want that interest to come to me, not go to the stablecoin issuer. What prevents that?" "Fundamentally, if it's the same risk and I get interest in one and I don't get the other, why would any agent go into the stablecoin space?"

Laura Shin

11,661 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

Scott Bessent was asked some hard questions by Japanese 🇯🇵 reporters yesterday about the sudden urgency of U.S. intervention in the yen. This interview went totally under the radar. To understand why people are concerned about this, the last time the U.S. intervened in the yen was during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998. By getting involved, the U.S. is clearly becoming concerned over the Bank of Japans failed efforts to stabilize the yen's depreciation. At the same time, if they intervene too much and arbitrage traders smell blood in the water the yen could rapidly reverse, appreciating against the U.S. Dollar and destroying the "Yen Carry Trade" that has pumped U.S. markets to nose bleeding heights. Scott Bessent worked for George Soros and was directly involved currency arbitrage his entire career. Many blame Soros for contributing to the UK currency crisis of 1992 known as "Black Wednesday" and the Asian Financial crisis of 1998.

Scott Bessent was asked some hard questions by Japanese 🇯🇵 reporters yesterday about the sudden urgency of U.S. intervention in the yen. This interview went totally under the radar. To understand why people are concerned about this, the last time the U.S. intervened in the yen was during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998. By getting involved, the U.S. is clearly becoming concerned over the Bank of Japans failed efforts to stabilize the yen's depreciation. At the same time, if they intervene too much and arbitrage traders smell blood in the water the yen could rapidly reverse, appreciating against the U.S. Dollar and destroying the "Yen Carry Trade" that has pumped U.S. markets to nose bleeding heights. Scott Bessent worked for George Soros and was directly involved currency arbitrage his entire career. Many blame Soros for contributing to the UK currency crisis of 1992 known as "Black Wednesday" and the Asian Financial crisis of 1998.

Financelot

901,273 просмотров • 9 дней назад

Once one understands the long term function of the Federal Reserve, owning physical hard assets (in non-leveraged form) is simply taking chips off the leveraged casino table. The trade that may still be ahead of us is a broadening concern over US debt servicing (US Gov't and AI) and its impact on the need for more dollars, not less. The concern over the Federal Reserve raising rates is the story but the Fed has been behind the curve. Rates have been rising due to the amount of new debt coming to market. US Dollar Speculative positioning is near a 10 year high. Each time near these levels, precious metals have been near their lows.

Once one understands the long term function of the Federal Reserve, owning physical hard assets (in non-leveraged form) is simply taking chips off the leveraged casino table. The trade that may still be ahead of us is a broadening concern over US debt servicing (US Gov't and AI) and its impact on the need for more dollars, not less. The concern over the Federal Reserve raising rates is the story but the Fed has been behind the curve. Rates have been rising due to the amount of new debt coming to market. US Dollar Speculative positioning is near a 10 year high. Each time near these levels, precious metals have been near their lows.

bob coleman

14,419 просмотров • 18 дней назад

Jordi: "The fear-based marketing needs to stop, because it's not helping anyone." "It was very effective when there was no revenue in the industry. When AI was a far-out idea, and no one had had like a magical experience with AI." "But at this point, we need to stop this. Because why would the average American be excited about [AI]?"

Jordi: "The fear-based marketing needs to stop, because it's not helping anyone." "It was very effective when there was no revenue in the industry. When AI was a far-out idea, and no one had had like a magical experience with AI." "But at this point, we need to stop this. Because why would the average American be excited about [AI]?"

TBPN

22,687 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

$🇺🇸🇯🇵 The U.S may be quietly approaching a “whatever it takes” moment to stop Treasury yields from exploding America recently joined Japan in supporting the yen after the currency plunged toward 40-year lows. At first glance, that's a Japanese problem, but David Lin says Washington had a very American reason to intervene. The yen sits at the heart of one of the biggest trades in global finance. For years, investors have borrowed cheaply in Japan and poured that money into higher-yielding U.S assets. But if Japanese rates keep rising, that enormous carry trade starts to unwind. Investors sell U.S assets, Treasuries get dumped, U.S yields surge, and that's where things get dangerous, because America today cannot tolerate interest rates the way it could 40 years ago. David points out that U.S debt-to-GDP was around 31% in the early 1980s; today it's above 120%. So when people say America survived 15% interest rates in the 1980s, they're missing the point; the U.S had a fraction of today's debt. David warns that if the 10-year Treasury yield were allowed to spiral dramatically higher now, the effects would rip through virtually everything: Mortgages, credit cards, corporate borrowing, housing, equities, and even the enormous AI infrastructure boom, which depends on companies being able to finance staggering amounts of CapEx. And there's another problem making all of this worse: Iran. Japan imports huge quantities of energy through the Strait of Hormuz, which puts more pressure on inflation and the yen, so it may be forced to raise interest rates further. And higher Japanese rates make the carry trade even more vulnerable. So you get a potentially vicious cycle: Hormuz squeezes Japan, it raises rates, the carry trade unwinds, U.S assets get sold, Treasury yields rise, and America's borrowing costs explode. Which helps explain why Washington stepped in. But here's the problem: the U.S intervention barely lasted; the yen began weakening again within days. And David doesn't think the amount Washington deployed was remotely large enough to solve the underlying problem. His theory is that this may have been a teaser. A signal to markets that the gloves are coming off and Washington is prepared to intervene much more aggressively if necessary. And if this doesn't work, the next steps become much bigger. David Lin$

🇺🇸🇯🇵 The U.S may be quietly approaching a “whatever it takes” moment to stop Treasury yields from exploding America recently joined Japan in supporting the yen after the currency plunged toward 40-year lows. At first glance, that's a Japanese problem, but David Lin says Washington had a very American reason to intervene. The yen sits at the heart of one of the biggest trades in global finance. For years, investors have borrowed cheaply in Japan and poured that money into higher-yielding U.S assets. But if Japanese rates keep rising, that enormous carry trade starts to unwind. Investors sell U.S assets, Treasuries get dumped, U.S yields surge, and that's where things get dangerous, because America today cannot tolerate interest rates the way it could 40 years ago. David points out that U.S debt-to-GDP was around 31% in the early 1980s; today it's above 120%. So when people say America survived 15% interest rates in the 1980s, they're missing the point; the U.S had a fraction of today's debt. David warns that if the 10-year Treasury yield were allowed to spiral dramatically higher now, the effects would rip through virtually everything: Mortgages, credit cards, corporate borrowing, housing, equities, and even the enormous AI infrastructure boom, which depends on companies being able to finance staggering amounts of CapEx. And there's another problem making all of this worse: Iran. Japan imports huge quantities of energy through the Strait of Hormuz, which puts more pressure on inflation and the yen, so it may be forced to raise interest rates further. And higher Japanese rates make the carry trade even more vulnerable. So you get a potentially vicious cycle: Hormuz squeezes Japan, it raises rates, the carry trade unwinds, U.S assets get sold, Treasury yields rise, and America's borrowing costs explode. Which helps explain why Washington stepped in. But here's the problem: the U.S intervention barely lasted; the yen began weakening again within days. And David doesn't think the amount Washington deployed was remotely large enough to solve the underlying problem. His theory is that this may have been a teaser. A signal to markets that the gloves are coming off and Washington is prepared to intervene much more aggressively if necessary. And if this doesn't work, the next steps become much bigger. David Lin

Mario Nawfal

297,547 просмотров • 3 дней назад

This is a fantastic breakdown of why AI is having such a big impact on the stock prices of SaaS companies Worth a listen. From AI and crypto czar David Sacks himself "SaaS used to be such an easily modeled and predictable category. We saw the same story play out across many different categories of software You would have this initial period of this experimentation phase, a bunch of products would come to market, and there would be a battle And then the market would eventually settle, and there would be a category leader. They would capture most of the market share and vast majority of the market capitalization And they would have very predictable metrics. It used to be very easy to grade a SaaS business. These things began to be seen as an annuity with growth"

This is a fantastic breakdown of why AI is having such a big impact on the stock prices of SaaS companies Worth a listen. From AI and crypto czar David Sacks himself "SaaS used to be such an easily modeled and predictable category. We saw the same story play out across many different categories of software You would have this initial period of this experimentation phase, a bunch of products would come to market, and there would be a battle And then the market would eventually settle, and there would be a category leader. They would capture most of the market share and vast majority of the market capitalization And they would have very predictable metrics. It used to be very easy to grade a SaaS business. These things began to be seen as an annuity with growth"

Boring_Business

50,389 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад

Probably the best take I have heard on why there is so much fear around software exposure in private equity and credit because of AI From David Sacks "Historically we only had two good exits for software businesses. One was IPO. The other was M&A. Then these big private equity shops came along and gave us a third potential exit. You would sell to them and then they would raise the capital based on one third equity and two third debt. So it was debt financed buyouts. It is something that has been around in the non technology part of the economy for a long time but was a relatively new entrant in the world of technology. And the reason for that is if you have debt financed a purchase, you need to have very stable cash flows. Because if you miss and you cant pay your interest on the debt, you will lose all your equity because the debt holders will foreclose. It was belief for a long time that software did have predictable cash flows, at least for the mature businesses."

Probably the best take I have heard on why there is so much fear around software exposure in private equity and credit because of AI From David Sacks "Historically we only had two good exits for software businesses. One was IPO. The other was M&A. Then these big private equity shops came along and gave us a third potential exit. You would sell to them and then they would raise the capital based on one third equity and two third debt. So it was debt financed buyouts. It is something that has been around in the non technology part of the economy for a long time but was a relatively new entrant in the world of technology. And the reason for that is if you have debt financed a purchase, you need to have very stable cash flows. Because if you miss and you cant pay your interest on the debt, you will lose all your equity because the debt holders will foreclose. It was belief for a long time that software did have predictable cash flows, at least for the mature businesses."

Boring_Business

403,898 просмотров • 3 месяцев назад

"I think people are underestimating the pace at which the Bank of Japan 🇯🇵 is going to end up tightening." Well... the parabolic puts Japan's 10 year yield from 2.75% to 4.0% in the next 45 days, so Adam Posen could be right. Rising yields defend currency depreciation, so if BoJ allows this sharp move to happen then goodbye Yen Carry Trade...😬 There's always a possibility Japan sacrifices their currency even further to Yen 180:1 USD to save U.S. markets though. Either way, this ends in a sovereign debt crisis & stock market crisis. The decision they have to make is if they want both at the same time.

"I think people are underestimating the pace at which the Bank of Japan 🇯🇵 is going to end up tightening." Well... the parabolic puts Japan's 10 year yield from 2.75% to 4.0% in the next 45 days, so Adam Posen could be right. Rising yields defend currency depreciation, so if BoJ allows this sharp move to happen then goodbye Yen Carry Trade...😬 There's always a possibility Japan sacrifices their currency even further to Yen 180:1 USD to save U.S. markets though. Either way, this ends in a sovereign debt crisis & stock market crisis. The decision they have to make is if they want both at the same time.

Financelot

402,263 просмотров • 1 месяц назад

Chamath: “Private equity in general is totally hosed.” 🏢🚨 “I think the history of this is important.” “There was a long standing belief that the best way to generate the best risk adjusted return was to have what's called a 60/40 allocation. 60% to bonds and 40% to equities.” “Over many years, especially when we artificially suppressed rates at zero, a lot of people started to move their allocations away from 60/40 and they started to make more and more investments further out on the risk curve.” “The biggest beneficiaries of that were venture capital, private equity, and hedge funds.” “The thing with private equity is that because rates were zero, they had an infinite amount of borrowing capacity at very little downside to them, and so they were able to manufacture returns much faster than venture capital and hedge funds could.” “So as a result, you had an initial group of people that were defining the asset class, making a ton of money, and then you had all these fast followers that said, ‘Well, if they're doing it, I can do it too.’” “But then always what happens is then you have this flood of laggards that just flood the zone.” “And it's these laggards that make it very difficult to generate returns because they start overpaying for assets, they start mismanaging and under managing the assets that they do own.” “That created a lot of competition, and so that's why you see this hockey stick graph.” “And when you see that kind of graph, it doesn't matter what asset class it is. The returns go to zero.” “And so we've seen this in venture capital. We've seen this in hedge funds. And we're now going to see this in private equity.”

Chamath: “Private equity in general is totally hosed.” 🏢🚨 “I think the history of this is important.” “There was a long standing belief that the best way to generate the best risk adjusted return was to have what's called a 60/40 allocation. 60% to bonds and 40% to equities.” “Over many years, especially when we artificially suppressed rates at zero, a lot of people started to move their allocations away from 60/40 and they started to make more and more investments further out on the risk curve.” “The biggest beneficiaries of that were venture capital, private equity, and hedge funds.” “The thing with private equity is that because rates were zero, they had an infinite amount of borrowing capacity at very little downside to them, and so they were able to manufacture returns much faster than venture capital and hedge funds could.” “So as a result, you had an initial group of people that were defining the asset class, making a ton of money, and then you had all these fast followers that said, ‘Well, if they're doing it, I can do it too.’” “But then always what happens is then you have this flood of laggards that just flood the zone.” “And it's these laggards that make it very difficult to generate returns because they start overpaying for assets, they start mismanaging and under managing the assets that they do own.” “That created a lot of competition, and so that's why you see this hockey stick graph.” “And when you see that kind of graph, it doesn't matter what asset class it is. The returns go to zero.” “And so we've seen this in venture capital. We've seen this in hedge funds. And we're now going to see this in private equity.”

The All-In Podcast

800,205 просмотров • 10 месяцев назад

🚨 WARNING: SOMETHING EXTREMELY BAD IS COMING!! Bank of Japan will hike interest rates to 1.00% next week. Japan hasn’t been at 1.00% since the 1990s. And if you think Japan doesn’t affect global markets... YOU ARE COMPLETELY WRONG. Every time BOJ raised rates, Bitcoin dumped by 20%+ in days. But it’s not just about BTC. Let me break this down for you: The last time Japan was in this range, the world was already in risis. In 1994, bonds got crushed in the “Great Bond Massacre”. About $1.5 TRILLION in bond market value was wiped out back then. Then in early 1995, the pressure kept building. And the yen went REALLY BAD. On April 19, 1995, USD/JPY hit around 79.75, a record low for the dollar. Now here’s the part most people forget. Japan pushed rates higher, then had to CUT again later that same year. BOJ brought the discount rate down to 0.50% in September 1995. That one detail explains everything. Because when Japan tightens into a fragile system, it doesn’t stay “local”. Japan is the CHEAP MONEY hub. And Japan is a MASSIVE global holder. Japan holds over $1.25 TRILLION of U.S. Treasuries. So if Japan decided to sell, the entire world feels it right away. THIS IS A WARNING. Not because “rates will go up”. Because the last time we were here, the system was already under stress and it forced reactions fast. Markets are not pricing it right now. But they will. I’ve studied markets for over a decade and called nearly every major market top, including the October BTC ATH. Follow and turn notifications on. I’ll post the next warning BEFORE it hits the headlines.

🚨 WARNING: SOMETHING EXTREMELY BAD IS COMING!! Bank of Japan will hike interest rates to 1.00% next week. Japan hasn’t been at 1.00% since the 1990s. And if you think Japan doesn’t affect global markets... YOU ARE COMPLETELY WRONG. Every time BOJ raised rates, Bitcoin dumped by 20%+ in days. But it’s not just about BTC. Let me break this down for you: The last time Japan was in this range, the world was already in risis. In 1994, bonds got crushed in the “Great Bond Massacre”. About $1.5 TRILLION in bond market value was wiped out back then. Then in early 1995, the pressure kept building. And the yen went REALLY BAD. On April 19, 1995, USD/JPY hit around 79.75, a record low for the dollar. Now here’s the part most people forget. Japan pushed rates higher, then had to CUT again later that same year. BOJ brought the discount rate down to 0.50% in September 1995. That one detail explains everything. Because when Japan tightens into a fragile system, it doesn’t stay “local”. Japan is the CHEAP MONEY hub. And Japan is a MASSIVE global holder. Japan holds over $1.25 TRILLION of U.S. Treasuries. So if Japan decided to sell, the entire world feels it right away. THIS IS A WARNING. Not because “rates will go up”. Because the last time we were here, the system was already under stress and it forced reactions fast. Markets are not pricing it right now. But they will. I’ve studied markets for over a decade and called nearly every major market top, including the October BTC ATH. Follow and turn notifications on. I’ll post the next warning BEFORE it hits the headlines.

0xNobler

197,590 просмотров • 3 месяцев назад

Anton Leicht breaks down why the entire US strategic position is now a leveraged bet on winning AGI: "The US strategic position is a leveraged bet on building AGI. You can see that the production pace in China of all these military assets they would need for a great power conflict with the US is just outpacing the US by a lot." "On a lot of the metrics, China is winning. On the AI metrics specifically, the US is winning." "It's extremely difficult to pitch the US on the strategic idea that they should initiate a pause, slowdown, treaty, anything that has to do with AI specifically, when the US thinks this is the one way for us to get out of this. This is the one way to accelerate past all the other developments in China." "RSI is in a real way the strategic endpoint of the current structure of the US stock market and US strategic investment." "It seems very hard to do this unilateral disarmament around this one specific tool that seems to put the US ahead, and then not do something that also attaches to hypersonic missile production and drone coordination and all these things that in the trend favor China instead." Anton Leicht

Anton Leicht breaks down why the entire US strategic position is now a leveraged bet on winning AGI: "The US strategic position is a leveraged bet on building AGI. You can see that the production pace in China of all these military assets they would need for a great power conflict with the US is just outpacing the US by a lot." "On a lot of the metrics, China is winning. On the AI metrics specifically, the US is winning." "It's extremely difficult to pitch the US on the strategic idea that they should initiate a pause, slowdown, treaty, anything that has to do with AI specifically, when the US thinks this is the one way for us to get out of this. This is the one way to accelerate past all the other developments in China." "RSI is in a real way the strategic endpoint of the current structure of the US stock market and US strategic investment." "It seems very hard to do this unilateral disarmament around this one specific tool that seems to put the US ahead, and then not do something that also attaches to hypersonic missile production and drone coordination and all these things that in the trend favor China instead." Anton Leicht

MTS

10,697 просмотров • 1 месяц назад

Japan keeps threatening to intervene in yen because its exchange value doesn't match interest rate differentials. But interest rate differentials don't really matter, so why intervene? It's all for show. Keep up appearances for the voters (who keep pressuring PMs out of office). Japan in 2025 is the very essence of interest rate differentials. US Treasury yields, by contrast to those for JGBs, are declining. Also, the Fed is cutting its policy rates, if you care about that kind of thing. In other words, whether you believe central bank policy rate differentials driven the currency value or market differentials do, in Japan’s case both have been highly favorable for the yen. Yet, it sinks anyway. This is where the finance ministry’s threats of intervention come from. The government says when judging from interest rate differentials JPY should be far stronger – again, the yen should be going in the complete other direction, strengthening not weakening back to historical lows. Since the currency isn’t doing what the government and central bank think it should be doing, you know what that means – it’s time to blame speculators! Those dirty, evil speculators must be back at it, forcing the currency to do what it otherwise wouldn’t because without speculators the yen would be rising with those interest rates differentials falling. But what if the yen’s exchange rate isn’t actually determined by interest rates at all? That would eliminate not just the speculator excuse, it would also completely undermine everything officials are doing, everything they’ve said, the entire operation. They have to blame speculators because to admit the truth would be to blow the whole Economics and central bank mythmaking up. The yen isn’t a product of central bank policy differences, it is a byproduct of the eurodollar.

Japan keeps threatening to intervene in yen because its exchange value doesn't match interest rate differentials. But interest rate differentials don't really matter, so why intervene? It's all for show. Keep up appearances for the voters (who keep pressuring PMs out of office). Japan in 2025 is the very essence of interest rate differentials. US Treasury yields, by contrast to those for JGBs, are declining. Also, the Fed is cutting its policy rates, if you care about that kind of thing. In other words, whether you believe central bank policy rate differentials driven the currency value or market differentials do, in Japan’s case both have been highly favorable for the yen. Yet, it sinks anyway. This is where the finance ministry’s threats of intervention come from. The government says when judging from interest rate differentials JPY should be far stronger – again, the yen should be going in the complete other direction, strengthening not weakening back to historical lows. Since the currency isn’t doing what the government and central bank think it should be doing, you know what that means – it’s time to blame speculators! Those dirty, evil speculators must be back at it, forcing the currency to do what it otherwise wouldn’t because without speculators the yen would be rising with those interest rates differentials falling. But what if the yen’s exchange rate isn’t actually determined by interest rates at all? That would eliminate not just the speculator excuse, it would also completely undermine everything officials are doing, everything they’ve said, the entire operation. They have to blame speculators because to admit the truth would be to blow the whole Economics and central bank mythmaking up. The yen isn’t a product of central bank policy differences, it is a byproduct of the eurodollar.

Jeffrey P. Snider

17,429 просмотров • 8 месяцев назад

Chamath and Larry Summers Debate the Market Reaction to Trump's Tariffs Lawrence H. Summers: "If this is such a terrific thing, why do markets think it's so terrible for the American economy?" "Maybe the market's just completely wrong ... but the job of markets is to look forward." "It's to look passed the immediate." "It's to see what the long run consequences are going to be." "And markets are making a pretty devastatingly negative judgment on this step." Chamath Palihapitiya: " Larry, that's not true." " So let's just establish a couple facts about 'the markets.'" "Number one, there are two markets and they behave totally differently, and sometimes inversely to each other." "There's the stock market and there's the bond market." 1) Stocks: mean reversion "With respect to the stock market, what they are debating, and you're right Larry, is what is the effective long-term rate of return a dollar needs to generate in order to pay me back that dollar?" "That is what the fundamental stock market does." "And what we've seen for many years with trade imbalances, trade deficits, and close-to-zero interest rates, of which more of that happened under Democrats than Republicans, we have allowed the stock market to inflate past historical averages." " What we've actually seen happen in the last week is what most people would call mean reversion." "The stock market is still way above where it was last year, two years ago, three years ago." "What has happened is that the forward multiples have compressed. So that's number one. That's a fact." 2) Bonds: it's possible a major trade blew up "And then with respect to bonds, what we are seeing now is there are two very complicated issues." "In the last two days, we saw one part of the bond market totally get out of whack." "And what we know is that the yields changed materially in a very acute way, which is atypical of how the bond market typically digests a philosophical change in approach to policy." " What we heard in the last 24 hours is a lot of this move may have been attributed to an enormous levered bet on US treasuries by a Japanese hedge fund." " It will take three, and four, and five, and six weeks for us to really know." 3) Private credit: something to watch closely " Separately, what we do know, though, where the structural complexity of the market — and this is where, Larry, I agree with you — is acute and important to observe is in the credit markets for private companies." "And that is where you have to pay a lot of attention."

Chamath and Larry Summers Debate the Market Reaction to Trump's Tariffs Lawrence H. Summers: "If this is such a terrific thing, why do markets think it's so terrible for the American economy?" "Maybe the market's just completely wrong ... but the job of markets is to look forward." "It's to look passed the immediate." "It's to see what the long run consequences are going to be." "And markets are making a pretty devastatingly negative judgment on this step." Chamath Palihapitiya: " Larry, that's not true." " So let's just establish a couple facts about 'the markets.'" "Number one, there are two markets and they behave totally differently, and sometimes inversely to each other." "There's the stock market and there's the bond market." 1) Stocks: mean reversion "With respect to the stock market, what they are debating, and you're right Larry, is what is the effective long-term rate of return a dollar needs to generate in order to pay me back that dollar?" "That is what the fundamental stock market does." "And what we've seen for many years with trade imbalances, trade deficits, and close-to-zero interest rates, of which more of that happened under Democrats than Republicans, we have allowed the stock market to inflate past historical averages." " What we've actually seen happen in the last week is what most people would call mean reversion." "The stock market is still way above where it was last year, two years ago, three years ago." "What has happened is that the forward multiples have compressed. So that's number one. That's a fact." 2) Bonds: it's possible a major trade blew up "And then with respect to bonds, what we are seeing now is there are two very complicated issues." "In the last two days, we saw one part of the bond market totally get out of whack." "And what we know is that the yields changed materially in a very acute way, which is atypical of how the bond market typically digests a philosophical change in approach to policy." " What we heard in the last 24 hours is a lot of this move may have been attributed to an enormous levered bet on US treasuries by a Japanese hedge fund." " It will take three, and four, and five, and six weeks for us to really know." 3) Private credit: something to watch closely " Separately, what we do know, though, where the structural complexity of the market — and this is where, Larry, I agree with you — is acute and important to observe is in the credit markets for private companies." "And that is where you have to pay a lot of attention."

The All-In Podcast

98,290 просмотров • 1 год назад

BREAKING: The Bank of Japan is about to dump $2,860,000,000 in U.S. Treasuries. The largest Japanese Treasury liquidation in 30 years. The last time Japan did this. The stock market crashed 15%. Japan is the second largest holder of U.S. debt on earth. When they sell. Yields spike. When yields spike. Everything breaks. China reducing Treasuries to 2008 lows. Japan dumping at a 30 year record. The two largest foreign holders of U.S. debt. Selling at the same time. The Fed will have to buy everything they're selling. More printing. More inflation. More pressure. The system is breaking in slow motion. And nobody is talking about it.

BREAKING: The Bank of Japan is about to dump $2,860,000,000 in U.S. Treasuries. The largest Japanese Treasury liquidation in 30 years. The last time Japan did this. The stock market crashed 15%. Japan is the second largest holder of U.S. debt on earth. When they sell. Yields spike. When yields spike. Everything breaks. China reducing Treasuries to 2008 lows. Japan dumping at a 30 year record. The two largest foreign holders of U.S. debt. Selling at the same time. The Fed will have to buy everything they're selling. More printing. More inflation. More pressure. The system is breaking in slow motion. And nobody is talking about it.

Crypto Tice

357,372 просмотров • 2 месяцев назад

The reason why Elon Musk started working on reusable rockets "I started reading quite a bit about rockets to try and understand why they're so freaking expensive If one could make them reusable like airplanes, then the cost of rocketry would drop dramatically The cost of the fuel was maybe anywhere from 0.2% to 0.5% of the cost of the rocket I came to the conclusion that there wasn't really a good reason for rockets to be so expensive and that they could be a lot less even in an expendable format "Nobody had really been able to make a reusable rocket work... but if we can do that, then that would really be the key breakthrough" - Elon Musk

The reason why Elon Musk started working on reusable rockets "I started reading quite a bit about rockets to try and understand why they're so freaking expensive If one could make them reusable like airplanes, then the cost of rocketry would drop dramatically The cost of the fuel was maybe anywhere from 0.2% to 0.5% of the cost of the rocket I came to the conclusion that there wasn't really a good reason for rockets to be so expensive and that they could be a lot less even in an expendable format "Nobody had really been able to make a reusable rocket work... but if we can do that, then that would really be the key breakthrough" - Elon Musk

X Freeze

458,307 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад

Jensen Huang just told the story of how the AI revolution started with one customer, one box, and a second-floor room nobody thought twice about. Nobody on Earth wanted it. Huang: “When I announced this thing, nobody in the world wanted it. I had no purchase orders. Not one.” Nvidia had spent billions building the DGX-1. The first AI supercomputer purpose-built for deep learning. $300,000 per unit. The entire technology industry looked at it and passed. Every hyperscaler. Every research lab. Every Fortune 500 with a machine learning team. Not one purchase order. Then Elon Musk found Huang at a fireside chat in 2015. Huang: “He goes, ‘You know what? I have a company that could really use this.’” His first customer. His only customer. Then Musk finished the sentence. Huang: “He goes, ‘It’s a non-profit company.’ And all the blood drained out of my face.” Billions in R&D. A $300,000 machine. And the one person on Earth who wanted it could not pay for it. Huang built it anyway. Huang: “I boxed one up. I drove it up to San Francisco and I delivered it to Elon in 2016.” Not shipped. Not handed off to a freight company. The CEO of Nvidia personally boxed the first AI supercomputer and drove it to San Francisco himself. That is not a delivery. That is a bet. Huang: “I walked up to the second floor where they were all kind of in a room. That place turned out to have been OpenAI.” Pieter Abbeel was there. Ilya Sutskever was there. A handful of researchers, one supercomputer, and a room nobody outside that building could have named. No campus. No valuation. No infrastructure. Just raw talent and one machine the rest of the world had already rejected. Huang: “Just a bunch of people in a room.” That room built ChatGPT. That room triggered a $200 billion industry. That room forced every government on Earth to rethink national security. It started because one founder saw what the entire market refused to see, and one CEO drove the weapon there himself. The trillion-dollar AI industry did not begin in a boardroom. It began with a box in the back of a car, a non-profit that could not afford it, and a bet that every serious person in technology thought was insane. The market was unanimous. The market was wrong.

Jensen Huang just told the story of how the AI revolution started with one customer, one box, and a second-floor room nobody thought twice about. Nobody on Earth wanted it. Huang: “When I announced this thing, nobody in the world wanted it. I had no purchase orders. Not one.” Nvidia had spent billions building the DGX-1. The first AI supercomputer purpose-built for deep learning. $300,000 per unit. The entire technology industry looked at it and passed. Every hyperscaler. Every research lab. Every Fortune 500 with a machine learning team. Not one purchase order. Then Elon Musk found Huang at a fireside chat in 2015. Huang: “He goes, ‘You know what? I have a company that could really use this.’” His first customer. His only customer. Then Musk finished the sentence. Huang: “He goes, ‘It’s a non-profit company.’ And all the blood drained out of my face.” Billions in R&D. A $300,000 machine. And the one person on Earth who wanted it could not pay for it. Huang built it anyway. Huang: “I boxed one up. I drove it up to San Francisco and I delivered it to Elon in 2016.” Not shipped. Not handed off to a freight company. The CEO of Nvidia personally boxed the first AI supercomputer and drove it to San Francisco himself. That is not a delivery. That is a bet. Huang: “I walked up to the second floor where they were all kind of in a room. That place turned out to have been OpenAI.” Pieter Abbeel was there. Ilya Sutskever was there. A handful of researchers, one supercomputer, and a room nobody outside that building could have named. No campus. No valuation. No infrastructure. Just raw talent and one machine the rest of the world had already rejected. Huang: “Just a bunch of people in a room.” That room built ChatGPT. That room triggered a $200 billion industry. That room forced every government on Earth to rethink national security. It started because one founder saw what the entire market refused to see, and one CEO drove the weapon there himself. The trillion-dollar AI industry did not begin in a boardroom. It began with a box in the back of a car, a non-profit that could not afford it, and a bet that every serious person in technology thought was insane. The market was unanimous. The market was wrong.

Dustin

25,119 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

🚨 THE YEN INTERVENTION WAS NEVER ABOUT JAPAN, IT WAS ABOUT SAVING AMERICA Japan’s Finance Minister and the BoJ were threatening “BOLD ACTIONS” to save the collapsing yen. BoJ’s Yuto even publicly apologized for the emergency measures they had ready… like they knew something catastrophic was coming. Then BOOM… U.S. Treasury Secretary steps in and LITERALLY takes over BoJ operations. The U.S. has $14 trillion in Treasuries maturing in the next 3 years. Those old bonds only paid ~3.3%. Today’s rates are 4.67%. Refinancing them means +$192 billion extra interest. The U.S. is already paying over $1 trillion a year just on interest (more than Japan’s whole national budget). If the Bank of Japan hikes rates, the yen surges, Japan dumps U.S. Treasuries, American yields explode, and the $14 trillion refinancing bomb detonates into a full-blown U.S. debt crisis. The U.S. debt ceiling is already touching $40 Trillion. That’s why Washington is panicking. All of it traces back to one fear: U.S. long-term interest rates cannot be allowed to spike any further. Japan’s own Prime Minister is now threatening the BoJ Governor to Buy Japanese treasuries. The BoJ is warning that it would be total financial catastrophe… the kind that vaporizes savings, tanks the currency into free-fall, and sparks a sovereign debt death spiral the world hasn’t seen since the 1900s. The BoJ desperately wants to hike rates to stop the bleeding and save Japan’s economy. But Washington and Japan’s own administration are blocking them cold. The upcoming G20 + Bank of Japan meeting could tell us whether this pressure campaign works… or the carry trade finally unwinds.

🚨 THE YEN INTERVENTION WAS NEVER ABOUT JAPAN, IT WAS ABOUT SAVING AMERICA Japan’s Finance Minister and the BoJ were threatening “BOLD ACTIONS” to save the collapsing yen. BoJ’s Yuto even publicly apologized for the emergency measures they had ready… like they knew something catastrophic was coming. Then BOOM… U.S. Treasury Secretary steps in and LITERALLY takes over BoJ operations. The U.S. has $14 trillion in Treasuries maturing in the next 3 years. Those old bonds only paid ~3.3%. Today’s rates are 4.67%. Refinancing them means +$192 billion extra interest. The U.S. is already paying over $1 trillion a year just on interest (more than Japan’s whole national budget). If the Bank of Japan hikes rates, the yen surges, Japan dumps U.S. Treasuries, American yields explode, and the $14 trillion refinancing bomb detonates into a full-blown U.S. debt crisis. The U.S. debt ceiling is already touching $40 Trillion. That’s why Washington is panicking. All of it traces back to one fear: U.S. long-term interest rates cannot be allowed to spike any further. Japan’s own Prime Minister is now threatening the BoJ Governor to Buy Japanese treasuries. The BoJ is warning that it would be total financial catastrophe… the kind that vaporizes savings, tanks the currency into free-fall, and sparks a sovereign debt death spiral the world hasn’t seen since the 1900s. The BoJ desperately wants to hike rates to stop the bleeding and save Japan’s economy. But Washington and Japan’s own administration are blocking them cold. The upcoming G20 + Bank of Japan meeting could tell us whether this pressure campaign works… or the carry trade finally unwinds.

Stern Drew

102,172 просмотров • 4 дней назад

🇯🇵💴 The Post-1971 Dollar System Is Finished Alastair Crooke (Alastair Crooke) on Bessent’s “Bail out Japan” note: pure market signaling—front-run the intervention. Using euros, not dollars, to prop the yen exposes the dollar’s underlying frailty. Japan’s 14-15% zombie firms already cannot cover interest; any rate rise detonates them and cascades into the U.S. Treasury market. Rates are climbing regardless. This is the post-1971 floating-rate system devouring itself. “They are desperately trying to mount a rescue of Japan, even to the extent of the old trick of letting CNN or someone film a note on the desk of Bessent as he’s making a statement that says, ’Bail out Japan.’ Look, I mean, it’s so obvious—a message to the market. Come on, get in there quickly. Help me bail it out because I’m going to do that so you can front-run it and you can make money on front-running it. But, I mean, the key giveaway about how dangerous this is: what was he using to bail out the Japanese yen? What was he using? He was using euros. He wasn’t printing dollars to do it or selling dollars. He was selling euros to buy the yen to strengthen the currency. And that means that he’s very worried that the dollar is very weak, that he has to use the euro to help support it. And I think he’s very worried because if interest rates go up in Japan, big trouble for Japan because many of the companies—a large portion, 14-15%, I don’t know what it is exactly—are zombie companies. Their profits don’t cover the interest that they need to pay on their debt. In other countries, it would be called being bankrupt, but they’re called zombie companies. They just don’t have the money to pay. So, if interest rates go up in Japan, bang, this is a major crisis in Japan and therefore a major crisis in the bond market in America. Interest rates are already going up. I’m sure we’ll see them going up further this morning even though the markets—the usual algos—reacted to Trump saying, ’Oh, no, the Iranians asked for talks,’ which they did not. And ’we’re close to finalizing an agreement on Hormuz with Oman.’ Yes, further, further deep right down the end of the line when the war’s finished and everything’s agreed, then there’ll be an agreement with Oman.” This is the post-1971 floating-rate system devouring itself. The dollar is weaker than the system can admit. The zombie companies are the product. The U.S. Treasury market is the vulnerable point. The system cannot be reformed. It must be replaced.

🇯🇵💴 The Post-1971 Dollar System Is Finished Alastair Crooke (Alastair Crooke) on Bessent’s “Bail out Japan” note: pure market signaling—front-run the intervention. Using euros, not dollars, to prop the yen exposes the dollar’s underlying frailty. Japan’s 14-15% zombie firms already cannot cover interest; any rate rise detonates them and cascades into the U.S. Treasury market. Rates are climbing regardless. This is the post-1971 floating-rate system devouring itself. “They are desperately trying to mount a rescue of Japan, even to the extent of the old trick of letting CNN or someone film a note on the desk of Bessent as he’s making a statement that says, ’Bail out Japan.’ Look, I mean, it’s so obvious—a message to the market. Come on, get in there quickly. Help me bail it out because I’m going to do that so you can front-run it and you can make money on front-running it. But, I mean, the key giveaway about how dangerous this is: what was he using to bail out the Japanese yen? What was he using? He was using euros. He wasn’t printing dollars to do it or selling dollars. He was selling euros to buy the yen to strengthen the currency. And that means that he’s very worried that the dollar is very weak, that he has to use the euro to help support it. And I think he’s very worried because if interest rates go up in Japan, big trouble for Japan because many of the companies—a large portion, 14-15%, I don’t know what it is exactly—are zombie companies. Their profits don’t cover the interest that they need to pay on their debt. In other countries, it would be called being bankrupt, but they’re called zombie companies. They just don’t have the money to pay. So, if interest rates go up in Japan, bang, this is a major crisis in Japan and therefore a major crisis in the bond market in America. Interest rates are already going up. I’m sure we’ll see them going up further this morning even though the markets—the usual algos—reacted to Trump saying, ’Oh, no, the Iranians asked for talks,’ which they did not. And ’we’re close to finalizing an agreement on Hormuz with Oman.’ Yes, further, further deep right down the end of the line when the war’s finished and everything’s agreed, then there’ll be an agreement with Oman.” This is the post-1971 floating-rate system devouring itself. The dollar is weaker than the system can admit. The zombie companies are the product. The U.S. Treasury market is the vulnerable point. The system cannot be reformed. It must be replaced.

🅰pocalypsis 🅰pocalypseos 🇷🇺 🇨🇳 🅉

53,497 просмотров • 12 дней назад