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Clashes between elements of the Harki tribe and KDP security forces have been ongoing and have spread to other areas, as more Harki members arrive from different regions. The fighting erupted after KDP forces attempted to arrest Khurshid Harki, one of the tribe’s chieftains, who has refused to surrender....

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Studying Harkis should give one some ideas about what kurds were like before modernization. Their culture is extremely rigid and they barely qualify as muslims. It's as ugly and uncivilized as one would expect.

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alkhaldyvor 1 Jahr

الله يطفيها ببانزين

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Kaitovor 1 Jahr

Khorshid al-Harki is a Daesh member affiliated with Ali Qara Daghi, who is based in Qatar.

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KDP security forces say they arrested Khurshid Harki during a raid at around 2 a.m., while he was asleep, along with his brother Hayder and two of his sons. They also seized his money, gold, cars and other valuables. The arrests come a year after an earlier attempt by KDP security forces to detain Khurshid led to armed clashes after he refused to surrender. A deal was later reached, allowing him to return to his village. He subsequently campaigned for the KDP in Iraq’s November 2025 elections. In recent weeks, however, Khurshid resigned from the party again and was reportedly preparing to announce a new political party within days of his arrest. He had also recently renewed his dispute with the Khabat power plant, located near his village. Khurshid accused the company of paying local workers far less than had been agreed. Other sources also say he blocked a pipeline connected to the plant that was due to pass through land he owned, pending a proper agreement. Background: The dispute between Khurshid Harki and Erbil’s security forces grew out of a tribal conflict between Khurshid and the Goran tribe. In July last year, tensions escalated into armed clashes between his supporters and the security forces. The original dispute was linked to land ownership. Before violence broke out, both sides had attacked each other on social media. The online feud then turned violent when supporters of Khurshid Harki opened fire on several villagers from the Goran tribe. An arrest warrant was subsequently issued for him. When security forces asked Khurshid to surrender, he refused. A large security and military force was then sent to the area to arrest him, but he again refused to hand himself in, leading to armed clashes. After two people from the security forces and the Harki tribe were killed, and as tensions in the area intensified, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani intervened. He sent the head of his guards to Khurshid Harki and persuaded him to end the standoff. Khurshid later surrendered himself to the Kurdistan Region Presidency. After being held for more than a week at the Sheraton Hotel in Erbil, he was released and returned to his area. The crisis was also shaped by an internal contest over the leadership of the Harki tribe. Both Jawhar Muhiaddin Agha and Mahmoud Agha present themselves as the tribe’s leader. Jawhar Agha has longstanding disputes with the KDP dating back to his father’s era. His lineage has historically held the tribal chieftaincy, and he remains by far the most authoritative Harki figure. He is also effectively outside the party’s reach in the area. Jawhar Agha now resides mainly in Mosul, while also spending time in Sulaimani and Gaziantep in Turkey. He is currently aligned with the PUK. Mahmoud Agha, by contrast, is regarded as close to the KDP. During the dispute between Khurshid Harki and Bashar Mushir Agha of the Goran tribe, the KDP appeared to give greater support to Bashar Mushir Agha, given his closeness to the party. At the same time, the KDP was suspicious of Khurshid’s possible ties to Jawhar Agha, who opposes the party. While the KDP was trying to arrest Khurshid, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani received Bashar Mushir Agha. This further angered the Harkis and strengthened their refusal to surrender. Beyond Harki suspicions that the KDP was backing the Goran tribe, the party also appeared to be using the crisis to promote Mahmoud Agha as head of the Harki tribe instead of Jawhar Muhiaddin Agha. At the time, a video circulated showing a phone call between Mahmoud Agha and the interior minister. KDP-affiliated media outlets also published a message from Mahmoud Agha, presented in his capacity as head of the Harki tribe, in which he called for brotherhood between the Harki and Goran tribes. In the phone call, the interior minister told Mahmoud Agha: “Out of respect for you, we will withdraw the military and security forces from around Khurshid Harki’s house.” Soon afterwards, people close to Khurshid rejected the claim that Mahmoud Agha was the head of the Harki tribe and insisted that Jawhar Muhiaddin Agha was their leader. Although the dispute between Khurshid Harki and the Goran tribe appeared on the surface to be about land, the background to the crisis involved several sensitive political and tribal dynamics.
2:49

KDP security forces say they arrested Khurshid Harki during a raid at around 2 a.m., while he was asleep, along with his brother Hayder and two of his sons. They also seized his money, gold, cars and other valuables. The arrests come a year after an earlier attempt by KDP security forces to detain Khurshid led to armed clashes after he refused to surrender. A deal was later reached, allowing him to return to his village. He subsequently campaigned for the KDP in Iraq’s November 2025 elections. In recent weeks, however, Khurshid resigned from the party again and was reportedly preparing to announce a new political party within days of his arrest. He had also recently renewed his dispute with the Khabat power plant, located near his village. Khurshid accused the company of paying local workers far less than had been agreed. Other sources also say he blocked a pipeline connected to the plant that was due to pass through land he owned, pending a proper agreement. Background: The dispute between Khurshid Harki and Erbil’s security forces grew out of a tribal conflict between Khurshid and the Goran tribe. In July last year, tensions escalated into armed clashes between his supporters and the security forces. The original dispute was linked to land ownership. Before violence broke out, both sides had attacked each other on social media. The online feud then turned violent when supporters of Khurshid Harki opened fire on several villagers from the Goran tribe. An arrest warrant was subsequently issued for him. When security forces asked Khurshid to surrender, he refused. A large security and military force was then sent to the area to arrest him, but he again refused to hand himself in, leading to armed clashes. After two people from the security forces and the Harki tribe were killed, and as tensions in the area intensified, Kurdistan Region President Nechirvan Barzani intervened. He sent the head of his guards to Khurshid Harki and persuaded him to end the standoff. Khurshid later surrendered himself to the Kurdistan Region Presidency. After being held for more than a week at the Sheraton Hotel in Erbil, he was released and returned to his area. The crisis was also shaped by an internal contest over the leadership of the Harki tribe. Both Jawhar Muhiaddin Agha and Mahmoud Agha present themselves as the tribe’s leader. Jawhar Agha has longstanding disputes with the KDP dating back to his father’s era. His lineage has historically held the tribal chieftaincy, and he remains by far the most authoritative Harki figure. He is also effectively outside the party’s reach in the area. Jawhar Agha now resides mainly in Mosul, while also spending time in Sulaimani and Gaziantep in Turkey. He is currently aligned with the PUK. Mahmoud Agha, by contrast, is regarded as close to the KDP. During the dispute between Khurshid Harki and Bashar Mushir Agha of the Goran tribe, the KDP appeared to give greater support to Bashar Mushir Agha, given his closeness to the party. At the same time, the KDP was suspicious of Khurshid’s possible ties to Jawhar Agha, who opposes the party. While the KDP was trying to arrest Khurshid, Prime Minister Masrour Barzani received Bashar Mushir Agha. This further angered the Harkis and strengthened their refusal to surrender. Beyond Harki suspicions that the KDP was backing the Goran tribe, the party also appeared to be using the crisis to promote Mahmoud Agha as head of the Harki tribe instead of Jawhar Muhiaddin Agha. At the time, a video circulated showing a phone call between Mahmoud Agha and the interior minister. KDP-affiliated media outlets also published a message from Mahmoud Agha, presented in his capacity as head of the Harki tribe, in which he called for brotherhood between the Harki and Goran tribes. In the phone call, the interior minister told Mahmoud Agha: “Out of respect for you, we will withdraw the military and security forces from around Khurshid Harki’s house.” Soon afterwards, people close to Khurshid rejected the claim that Mahmoud Agha was the head of the Harki tribe and insisted that Jawhar Muhiaddin Agha was their leader. Although the dispute between Khurshid Harki and the Goran tribe appeared on the surface to be about land, the background to the crisis involved several sensitive political and tribal dynamics.

Kurdistan Watch

18,979 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat

The guesthouse of local Harki chieftain Khurshid Harki is bustling with visitors, giving him a hero’s welcome after he clashed with KDP security forces, refused to surrender when they attempted to arrest him at his fortress, and ultimately thwarted their attempt. The confrontation resulted in the death of one Harki fighter and one KDP security officer. Nechirvan Barzani stepped in to mediate and bring an end to the clashes. As part of the resolution, Khurshid Harki was asked to stay in a hotel in Erbil for a week to defuse tensions and allow time to settle the land dispute with the Goran tribe, which had sparked the initial conflict. Interestingly, Harki repeatedly praised Nechirvan, and it appears that the meeting between Nechirvan and Khurshid was arranged by Saywan Harki, a Harki advisor to Nechirvan’s son, Idris. This is a noteworthy development, especially given that Harki’s dispute is with the Goran tribe, which is known to be close to Masrour Barzani.
1:17

The guesthouse of local Harki chieftain Khurshid Harki is bustling with visitors, giving him a hero’s welcome after he clashed with KDP security forces, refused to surrender when they attempted to arrest him at his fortress, and ultimately thwarted their attempt. The confrontation resulted in the death of one Harki fighter and one KDP security officer. Nechirvan Barzani stepped in to mediate and bring an end to the clashes. As part of the resolution, Khurshid Harki was asked to stay in a hotel in Erbil for a week to defuse tensions and allow time to settle the land dispute with the Goran tribe, which had sparked the initial conflict. Interestingly, Harki repeatedly praised Nechirvan, and it appears that the meeting between Nechirvan and Khurshid was arranged by Saywan Harki, a Harki advisor to Nechirvan’s son, Idris. This is a noteworthy development, especially given that Harki’s dispute is with the Goran tribe, which is known to be close to Masrour Barzani.

Kurdistan Watch

15,701 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr

Local Harki chief Khurshid Harki was seen among his supporters after repelling a well-equipped KDP security force sent to arrest him yesterday, some of whom arrived in Humvees originally provided by US forces for the fight against ISIS. He has since met with the head of Nechirvan Barzani’s security detail as part of ongoing mediation efforts. Khurshid reportedly stated that he only trusts Nechirvan Barzani and is willing to surrender to him directly. It remains unclear what these talks have produced, but from the intensity of yesterday’s clashes, it is evident that Harki fighters show significantly higher morale and motivation to fight, unlike the KDP security forces, who have not been paid for nearly 70 days and appear unwilling to risk their lives in a local dispute. It is also worth noting that several strategic KDP assets, including their two largest refineries are located there and the KRG oil pipeline run through this area. The clashes are taking place in Khabat district, which lies between Erbil and Mosul. With Mosul being a key stronghold of the Harki tribe, the group enjoys a logistical advantage in the current standoff if the situation spiral out of control.
0:23

Local Harki chief Khurshid Harki was seen among his supporters after repelling a well-equipped KDP security force sent to arrest him yesterday, some of whom arrived in Humvees originally provided by US forces for the fight against ISIS. He has since met with the head of Nechirvan Barzani’s security detail as part of ongoing mediation efforts. Khurshid reportedly stated that he only trusts Nechirvan Barzani and is willing to surrender to him directly. It remains unclear what these talks have produced, but from the intensity of yesterday’s clashes, it is evident that Harki fighters show significantly higher morale and motivation to fight, unlike the KDP security forces, who have not been paid for nearly 70 days and appear unwilling to risk their lives in a local dispute. It is also worth noting that several strategic KDP assets, including their two largest refineries are located there and the KRG oil pipeline run through this area. The clashes are taking place in Khabat district, which lies between Erbil and Mosul. With Mosul being a key stronghold of the Harki tribe, the group enjoys a logistical advantage in the current standoff if the situation spiral out of control.

Kurdistan Watch

15,068 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr

Clashes, chaos and unrest have broken out in several parts of Khabat district (separate from Lajan, where the earlier protests took place). The common thread is that these villages are home to members of the Harki tribe, who say they won’t accept the forced displacement and humiliation of Harki families earlier today. Protesters have blocked both the Erbil–Duhok and Erbil–Mosul highways, which KDP security forces are trying to reopen. The Harki are not only one of the region’s large tribes; they are also deeply embedded in both KDP and PUK security forces and have many members serving in the Iraqi army as well, especially around Mosul. Many of them are armed, and they played an important role in the war against ISIS.
1:09

Clashes, chaos and unrest have broken out in several parts of Khabat district (separate from Lajan, where the earlier protests took place). The common thread is that these villages are home to members of the Harki tribe, who say they won’t accept the forced displacement and humiliation of Harki families earlier today. Protesters have blocked both the Erbil–Duhok and Erbil–Mosul highways, which KDP security forces are trying to reopen. The Harki are not only one of the region’s large tribes; they are also deeply embedded in both KDP and PUK security forces and have many members serving in the Iraqi army as well, especially around Mosul. Many of them are armed, and they played an important role in the war against ISIS.

Kurdistan Watch

35,442 Aufrufe • vor 8 Monaten

Khurshid Harki, the Harki local chieftain who recently clashed with KDP security forces who tried to arrest him and thwarted the attempt before ultimately reaching a settlement, has donated 36 million dinars ($26,000) to Gaza via a Kurdish Islamic charity. Millions of dollars have now been raised across the Kurdistan Region for Gaza through several major campaigns.
1:42

Khurshid Harki, the Harki local chieftain who recently clashed with KDP security forces who tried to arrest him and thwarted the attempt before ultimately reaching a settlement, has donated 36 million dinars ($26,000) to Gaza via a Kurdish Islamic charity. Millions of dollars have now been raised across the Kurdistan Region for Gaza through several major campaigns.

Kurdistan Watch

21,835 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr

On the protests in Lajan near Erbil: there is a complete and unprecedented blackout in the village. It has been besieged by KDP special forces using U.S.-supplied Humvees and other weapons, and both electricity and internet have been cut. Since the morning, journalists attempting to cover the events have been detained, expelled, or assaulted. Some protesters have reportedly been held inside the Lanaz refinery, while others have been forced to remain in the village, which is within walking distance of the facility. Lanaz refinery is owned by Mansour Barzani, Masoud Barzani’s son and commander of the KDP special forces. KDP-aligned media, including Rudaw - which until recently was far more outspoken - have remained completely silent. The only KDP outlet to cover the events, AVA Media, has framed the protesters as armed saboteurs who blocked the refinery gate and prevented trucks from moving. The grievances of the villagers, who are from the Harki tribe, are not new. Around four months ago, they also protested to demand jobs at the refinery, saying they have been left with only pollution and disease. The Harki issue is complex. It is a large tribe divided between the KDP and PUK: the main tribal leader is aligned with the PUK due to a historical blood feud with the Barzanis, while some sub-branches now have interests with the KDP. Others, like Khurshid Harki - who clashed with KDP forces when they tried to arrest him - are seen as mavericks driven by their own interests. The PUK media’s extensive coverage of the protests has further angered the KDP. The villagers’ demands are genuine, but their actions are becoming a major headache for the KDP, in part because the area is highly strategic: it hosts not only the refinery but also the KRG oil pipeline passes by it and lies close to the disputed territories and KDP–Iraqi fault lines. Any temporary suppression of the protests risks deepening the underlying problems there.
2:47

On the protests in Lajan near Erbil: there is a complete and unprecedented blackout in the village. It has been besieged by KDP special forces using U.S.-supplied Humvees and other weapons, and both electricity and internet have been cut. Since the morning, journalists attempting to cover the events have been detained, expelled, or assaulted. Some protesters have reportedly been held inside the Lanaz refinery, while others have been forced to remain in the village, which is within walking distance of the facility. Lanaz refinery is owned by Mansour Barzani, Masoud Barzani’s son and commander of the KDP special forces. KDP-aligned media, including Rudaw - which until recently was far more outspoken - have remained completely silent. The only KDP outlet to cover the events, AVA Media, has framed the protesters as armed saboteurs who blocked the refinery gate and prevented trucks from moving. The grievances of the villagers, who are from the Harki tribe, are not new. Around four months ago, they also protested to demand jobs at the refinery, saying they have been left with only pollution and disease. The Harki issue is complex. It is a large tribe divided between the KDP and PUK: the main tribal leader is aligned with the PUK due to a historical blood feud with the Barzanis, while some sub-branches now have interests with the KDP. Others, like Khurshid Harki - who clashed with KDP forces when they tried to arrest him - are seen as mavericks driven by their own interests. The PUK media’s extensive coverage of the protests has further angered the KDP. The villagers’ demands are genuine, but their actions are becoming a major headache for the KDP, in part because the area is highly strategic: it hosts not only the refinery but also the KRG oil pipeline passes by it and lies close to the disputed territories and KDP–Iraqi fault lines. Any temporary suppression of the protests risks deepening the underlying problems there.

Kurdistan Watch

21,089 Aufrufe • vor 8 Monaten

🇮🇶 Harki Tribe Strikes Back in Erbil Tribal fighters in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region have torched two Peshmerga armored vehicles amid ongoing clashes in the Erbil area. ➡️ Peshmerga reinforcements were seen mobilizing toward the combat zone to suppress the uprising. ➡️ Footage from the second video shows active deployments and rising tensions on the ground. The confrontation between the Harki clan and Barzani-aligned forces continues to escalate.
0:21

🇮🇶 Harki Tribe Strikes Back in Erbil Tribal fighters in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region have torched two Peshmerga armored vehicles amid ongoing clashes in the Erbil area. ➡️ Peshmerga reinforcements were seen mobilizing toward the combat zone to suppress the uprising. ➡️ Footage from the second video shows active deployments and rising tensions on the ground. The confrontation between the Harki clan and Barzani-aligned forces continues to escalate.

DD Geopolitics

31,927 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr

Clashes between the Peshmerga and the Harki tribe have been reported this evening in Erbil, Iraq. Gunmen reportedly threatened to destroy an oil refinery in response to alleged displacement of civilians from the village of Lajan by Peshmerga and Erbil security forces.
0:31

Clashes between the Peshmerga and the Harki tribe have been reported this evening in Erbil, Iraq. Gunmen reportedly threatened to destroy an oil refinery in response to alleged displacement of civilians from the village of Lajan by Peshmerga and Erbil security forces.

Joe Truzman

15,918 Aufrufe • vor 8 Monaten

Very unsettling footage shows an exodus-like departure of families from Lajan village near Erbil, the site of protests by residents demanding jobs at the Barzani-owned Lanaz refinery which sits inside the village. The protests have already left two people dead - a protester and a truck driver who was on the protesters’ side when KDP security forces opened fire - and 13 injured, one of them in critical condition. According to local sources, the village has effectively been sealed off for two days by Gulan and special brigades, both led by Mansour Barzani, who also owns the refinery. Electricity and internet have been cut, and representatives of the village - from the Harki tribe - have twice met Erbil governorate officials and KDP security, but no agreement was reached. The KDP side is said to have demanded that villagers hand over several people accused of being armed saboteurs. Residents have been protesting intermittently but regularly for more than a year, and that each time they were promised jobs. Before the elections, the villagers say they were told that at least 120 villagers would be hired; now that the vote is over, they say the KDP has told them there will be no employment. Their core grievance is that the refinery is right inside the village: they bear the pollution but see none of the benefits. Lanaz is not a normal refinery; it is heavily fortified, in part because it is owned by Mansour Barzani. There is also deeper context: Lajan has historically been a stronghold of Mehi Agha, the influential Harki tribal chief and an arch-enemy of the Barzani tribe, with a blood feud between the two sides. Today, Mehi’s son Jawhar Agha leads the tribe, is aligned with the PUK, and lives in Mosul because he is not allowed to enter KDP-controlled areas. Lajan’s villagers are widely seen by the KDP as troublemakers, even though it is unclear why the refinery was built in the village only four years ago. The official KDP narrative is that the protesters do not have genuine demands and are loyalists of Jawhar Agha, directed by the PUK to cause trouble, while the protesters say they are simply demanding that the KDP honour its pre-election promises now that it no longer needs their votes.
1:48

Very unsettling footage shows an exodus-like departure of families from Lajan village near Erbil, the site of protests by residents demanding jobs at the Barzani-owned Lanaz refinery which sits inside the village. The protests have already left two people dead - a protester and a truck driver who was on the protesters’ side when KDP security forces opened fire - and 13 injured, one of them in critical condition. According to local sources, the village has effectively been sealed off for two days by Gulan and special brigades, both led by Mansour Barzani, who also owns the refinery. Electricity and internet have been cut, and representatives of the village - from the Harki tribe - have twice met Erbil governorate officials and KDP security, but no agreement was reached. The KDP side is said to have demanded that villagers hand over several people accused of being armed saboteurs. Residents have been protesting intermittently but regularly for more than a year, and that each time they were promised jobs. Before the elections, the villagers say they were told that at least 120 villagers would be hired; now that the vote is over, they say the KDP has told them there will be no employment. Their core grievance is that the refinery is right inside the village: they bear the pollution but see none of the benefits. Lanaz is not a normal refinery; it is heavily fortified, in part because it is owned by Mansour Barzani. There is also deeper context: Lajan has historically been a stronghold of Mehi Agha, the influential Harki tribal chief and an arch-enemy of the Barzani tribe, with a blood feud between the two sides. Today, Mehi’s son Jawhar Agha leads the tribe, is aligned with the PUK, and lives in Mosul because he is not allowed to enter KDP-controlled areas. Lajan’s villagers are widely seen by the KDP as troublemakers, even though it is unclear why the refinery was built in the village only four years ago. The official KDP narrative is that the protesters do not have genuine demands and are loyalists of Jawhar Agha, directed by the PUK to cause trouble, while the protesters say they are simply demanding that the KDP honour its pre-election promises now that it no longer needs their votes.

Kurdistan Watch

19,240 Aufrufe • vor 8 Monaten

A major escalation: the KDP is now formally accusing the PUK of being implicated not only in the Lajan village protests but, more significantly, in the attack on the Khor Mor gas field, presenting both episodes as part of a broader conspiracy targeting them: The KDP-led Kurdistan Region Security Council, headed by Waysi Barzani, Masoud Barzani’s third son, has broadcast what it says is a confession by Nechirwan Harki, head of a sub-district PUK office in Khabat district. In the video, Nechirwan says he worked for Harki tribal leader Jawhar Agha, who in turn was allegedly working for Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. One important detail is the decision to broadcast the confession itself: the footage shown at the start of the video had already circulated on social media in the past several days. What do we actually know about the incidents? After the protests in Lajan, and especially after families from the Harki tribe left the village, the evacuation appears to have caught the KDP off guard. The KDP says it did not order the evacuation, while villagers say they left so that KDP security forces could search their homes, after accusations that elements in the village had smuggled heavy weapons from Mosul. No such weapons were found. Protests then spread to Khabat district, where some KDP offices and public property were set on fire. In one video, a small group of masked men threatened to attack the Khabat thermal power plant with an RPG: but it is not known who they were, and in the end the plant was not targeted. An exchange of fire was recorded that night: but no one was killed and, as it happened in the dark, there is no clear evidence of who was shooting. We posted some of those videos at the time. The confession itself, which features only this one detainee, is unusual. There are visible signs of distress and possible injury: his forehead appears uneven and patchy, with areas of discoloration that, in some frames, resemble the yellowish or greenish tones associated with a healing bruise or skin irritation. It is also possible that heavy makeup has been applied, which can create a similarly uneven texture or tone on camera. His neck is covered by clothing or a scarf in a way that looks quite deliberate. In human rights reporting and forensic analysis of detainee videos, such covering is often noted as a potential way of concealing marks or bruising, including those that might result from rough handling or restraint. None of this proves what exactly happened, but it does raise serious questions about the conditions under which the confession was obtained. His delivery is striking as well: the tone is flat and rhythmic, with limited natural pauses, which makes it sound more like he is reciting a prepared text or reading from a prompt than recounting events spontaneously. Again, these aren't conclusion, but combined with the visual details it contributes to serious doubts about how voluntary this statement is. The confession does not present any corroborating material such as messages, call records, or documents to substantiate the claims. On the basis of this single video, it is therefore difficult to clearly distinguish between fact, allegation, and what may have been shaped under pressure. It is also notable that several well-connected journalists reported two days earlier, around the time of Nechirwan’s arrest, that a confession of this kind was being prepared: The primary targets of this appear to be Jawhar Agha and his son, Harki Jawhar. Through this and similar “confessions”, the KDP seems to be laying the groundwork to push for arrest warrants for them in the Iraqi courts. Harki Jawhar has publicly rejected the confession as fabricated under torture, but says they are ready to appear before a neutral court and accept whatever ruling such a court may issue: Jawhar Agha is currently aligned with the PUK, but he only joined in 2021, so this is a relatively recent and tactical alliance rather than a traditional party affiliation. His main base is in Mosul, where he has extensive networks. Nechirwan Harki ran there as the PUK’s candidate but did not win, despite receiving around 4,000 votes. As for the alleged link to Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, this remains unproven. ITV, which is considered close to Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, did give extensive coverage to the protests, but so did other Shia-aligned outlets and much of the Iraqi media more broadly. Jawhar Agha did not appear on ITV; his key televised interview was on Ahd TV, which is owned by Asaib Ahl al-Haq.
23:32

A major escalation: the KDP is now formally accusing the PUK of being implicated not only in the Lajan village protests but, more significantly, in the attack on the Khor Mor gas field, presenting both episodes as part of a broader conspiracy targeting them: The KDP-led Kurdistan Region Security Council, headed by Waysi Barzani, Masoud Barzani’s third son, has broadcast what it says is a confession by Nechirwan Harki, head of a sub-district PUK office in Khabat district. In the video, Nechirwan says he worked for Harki tribal leader Jawhar Agha, who in turn was allegedly working for Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. One important detail is the decision to broadcast the confession itself: the footage shown at the start of the video had already circulated on social media in the past several days. What do we actually know about the incidents? After the protests in Lajan, and especially after families from the Harki tribe left the village, the evacuation appears to have caught the KDP off guard. The KDP says it did not order the evacuation, while villagers say they left so that KDP security forces could search their homes, after accusations that elements in the village had smuggled heavy weapons from Mosul. No such weapons were found. Protests then spread to Khabat district, where some KDP offices and public property were set on fire. In one video, a small group of masked men threatened to attack the Khabat thermal power plant with an RPG: but it is not known who they were, and in the end the plant was not targeted. An exchange of fire was recorded that night: but no one was killed and, as it happened in the dark, there is no clear evidence of who was shooting. We posted some of those videos at the time. The confession itself, which features only this one detainee, is unusual. There are visible signs of distress and possible injury: his forehead appears uneven and patchy, with areas of discoloration that, in some frames, resemble the yellowish or greenish tones associated with a healing bruise or skin irritation. It is also possible that heavy makeup has been applied, which can create a similarly uneven texture or tone on camera. His neck is covered by clothing or a scarf in a way that looks quite deliberate. In human rights reporting and forensic analysis of detainee videos, such covering is often noted as a potential way of concealing marks or bruising, including those that might result from rough handling or restraint. None of this proves what exactly happened, but it does raise serious questions about the conditions under which the confession was obtained. His delivery is striking as well: the tone is flat and rhythmic, with limited natural pauses, which makes it sound more like he is reciting a prepared text or reading from a prompt than recounting events spontaneously. Again, these aren't conclusion, but combined with the visual details it contributes to serious doubts about how voluntary this statement is. The confession does not present any corroborating material such as messages, call records, or documents to substantiate the claims. On the basis of this single video, it is therefore difficult to clearly distinguish between fact, allegation, and what may have been shaped under pressure. It is also notable that several well-connected journalists reported two days earlier, around the time of Nechirwan’s arrest, that a confession of this kind was being prepared: The primary targets of this appear to be Jawhar Agha and his son, Harki Jawhar. Through this and similar “confessions”, the KDP seems to be laying the groundwork to push for arrest warrants for them in the Iraqi courts. Harki Jawhar has publicly rejected the confession as fabricated under torture, but says they are ready to appear before a neutral court and accept whatever ruling such a court may issue: Jawhar Agha is currently aligned with the PUK, but he only joined in 2021, so this is a relatively recent and tactical alliance rather than a traditional party affiliation. His main base is in Mosul, where he has extensive networks. Nechirwan Harki ran there as the PUK’s candidate but did not win, despite receiving around 4,000 votes. As for the alleged link to Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, this remains unproven. ITV, which is considered close to Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, did give extensive coverage to the protests, but so did other Shia-aligned outlets and much of the Iraqi media more broadly. Jawhar Agha did not appear on ITV; his key televised interview was on Ahd TV, which is owned by Asaib Ahl al-Haq.

Kurdistan Watch

12,950 Aufrufe • vor 8 Monaten

Qubad Talabani of the PUK has effectively distanced both himself and the party from the arrest of PUK member Nechirwan Harki, the former head of the PUK local office in the Khabat area west of Erbil. He said the PUK has nothing to do with what happened, adding that “whatever has happened or might have happened” was done by those involved themselves, whether in the form of protests or anything else. This matters because PUK media extensively covered the protests, KDP security forces have effectively accused PUK media - while broadcasting the confession of Harki - of being part of the plot, and the PUK’s Erbil branch issued a statement claiming that Harki’s arrest and televised confession were fabricated and obtained under pressure. Qubad’s remarks are also notable in light of earlier comments by Bafel Talabani, who said the party would not accept or remain silent if its members were arrested “unjustly” or for political reasons.
0:39

Qubad Talabani of the PUK has effectively distanced both himself and the party from the arrest of PUK member Nechirwan Harki, the former head of the PUK local office in the Khabat area west of Erbil. He said the PUK has nothing to do with what happened, adding that “whatever has happened or might have happened” was done by those involved themselves, whether in the form of protests or anything else. This matters because PUK media extensively covered the protests, KDP security forces have effectively accused PUK media - while broadcasting the confession of Harki - of being part of the plot, and the PUK’s Erbil branch issued a statement claiming that Harki’s arrest and televised confession were fabricated and obtained under pressure. Qubad’s remarks are also notable in light of earlier comments by Bafel Talabani, who said the party would not accept or remain silent if its members were arrested “unjustly” or for political reasons.

Kurdistan Watch

15,680 Aufrufe • vor 8 Monaten

The tension around Khabat district in western Erbil is ongoing, with a wave of arrests in nearby Harki villages that began after the Lajan protests spread to the area. The KDP has deployed heavy forces in both Lajan (site of recent protests) and these parts of Khabat, setting up a series of checkpoints across the villages and using numerous MRAP-type armored vehicles and anti-riot vehicles to move troops. Meanwhile, protests in some areas continue in response to the clampdown.
0:27

The tension around Khabat district in western Erbil is ongoing, with a wave of arrests in nearby Harki villages that began after the Lajan protests spread to the area. The KDP has deployed heavy forces in both Lajan (site of recent protests) and these parts of Khabat, setting up a series of checkpoints across the villages and using numerous MRAP-type armored vehicles and anti-riot vehicles to move troops. Meanwhile, protests in some areas continue in response to the clampdown.

Kurdistan Watch

144,086 Aufrufe • vor 8 Monaten

Hundreds of protesters from the Slevanayee tribe in Duhok have blocked the vital Zakho–Duhok road after their tribe’s candidate failed to win a seat on the KDP list in the Iraqi elections. More than 100 villages in Duhok are predominantly from this tribe, whose members allege their candidate was deliberately prevented from winning. The KDP (and the PUK) often field candidates along tribal lines, relying on alliances with tribal chiefs as part of their coalition building. Intra-party dynamics also affect which candidates prevail, including the KDP directing its security forces in special voting to support specific candidates, helping them come out on top and win seats. A similar situation occurred in Sulaimani’s special voting for the PUK, where the head of the list threatened to withdraw after alleging coordinated voting that undercut his chances, though he has now effectively secured a seat.
1:42

Hundreds of protesters from the Slevanayee tribe in Duhok have blocked the vital Zakho–Duhok road after their tribe’s candidate failed to win a seat on the KDP list in the Iraqi elections. More than 100 villages in Duhok are predominantly from this tribe, whose members allege their candidate was deliberately prevented from winning. The KDP (and the PUK) often field candidates along tribal lines, relying on alliances with tribal chiefs as part of their coalition building. Intra-party dynamics also affect which candidates prevail, including the KDP directing its security forces in special voting to support specific candidates, helping them come out on top and win seats. A similar situation occurred in Sulaimani’s special voting for the PUK, where the head of the list threatened to withdraw after alleging coordinated voting that undercut his chances, though he has now effectively secured a seat.

Kurdistan Watch

10,424 Aufrufe • vor 9 Monaten

Reports in several Turkish outlets (parroted by Kurdish media) claimed a lavish wedding between a Barzani woman and a man from the Izol, a prominent Kurdish tribe in Turkey’s Urfa. The problem? the woman is actually not a Barzani. The story appears to have spread mainly because of the wedding’s extravagance and the heavy gold showered on the bride, much of it seemingly from her family. But the bride’s father, reported as “Abdulkarim Barzani,” is not from the Barzani tribe — the surname is misleading. He is Masoud Barzani’s secretary, known in Kurdistan as Karim Juma’a, and he is from the Gargari tribe, a separate Kurdish tribe that has presence mostly in Nineveh but also Duhok. Still, the scale of the gold and diamonds coming from her side does raise questions, given that her father is publicly known only as Barzani’s secretary. The Izol, for their part, are a large Urfa-based Kurdish tribe that is generally state-friendly and mostly aligned with the AKP and MHP.
1:14

Reports in several Turkish outlets (parroted by Kurdish media) claimed a lavish wedding between a Barzani woman and a man from the Izol, a prominent Kurdish tribe in Turkey’s Urfa. The problem? the woman is actually not a Barzani. The story appears to have spread mainly because of the wedding’s extravagance and the heavy gold showered on the bride, much of it seemingly from her family. But the bride’s father, reported as “Abdulkarim Barzani,” is not from the Barzani tribe — the surname is misleading. He is Masoud Barzani’s secretary, known in Kurdistan as Karim Juma’a, and he is from the Gargari tribe, a separate Kurdish tribe that has presence mostly in Nineveh but also Duhok. Still, the scale of the gold and diamonds coming from her side does raise questions, given that her father is publicly known only as Barzani’s secretary. The Izol, for their part, are a large Urfa-based Kurdish tribe that is generally state-friendly and mostly aligned with the AKP and MHP.

Kurdistan Watch

36,366 Aufrufe • vor 7 Monaten

🇮🇶 Something serious may be brewing in northern Iraq. For decades, the Kurdish region has been dominated by the Barzani family and their ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Now, KDP armed forces are surrounding the homes of members of the powerful Herki tribe in Erbil province. This isn't just a police operation. The Herki are one of the largest and most influential tribes in the region, and deadly clashes between them and the KDP last year exposed rare cracks in the Barzanis' grip on power. Source: Naya / Writer: Ian
0:20

🇮🇶 Something serious may be brewing in northern Iraq. For decades, the Kurdish region has been dominated by the Barzani family and their ruling Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). Now, KDP armed forces are surrounding the homes of members of the powerful Herki tribe in Erbil province. This isn't just a police operation. The Herki are one of the largest and most influential tribes in the region, and deadly clashes between them and the KDP last year exposed rare cracks in the Barzanis' grip on power. Source: Naya / Writer: Ian

Mario Nawfal

131,223 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat

🇸🇾 #Syria: Clashes have erupted in multiple parts of Syria between Arab tribal groups and the Syrian Army (HTS). The first two videos show fighting earlier today in the Shaib neighborhood of Raqqa between an armed group and Damascus security forces. At least one Syrian Army soldier was reportedly killed, with several others wounded. The third video shows separate violent clashes that broke out more recently in rural Hama, reportedly involving members of the Beni Khalid tribe and other unidentified groups. The unrest is said to be spreading to other areas. (via @KurdishFrontNews)
0:11

🇸🇾 #Syria: Clashes have erupted in multiple parts of Syria between Arab tribal groups and the Syrian Army (HTS). The first two videos show fighting earlier today in the Shaib neighborhood of Raqqa between an armed group and Damascus security forces. At least one Syrian Army soldier was reportedly killed, with several others wounded. The third video shows separate violent clashes that broke out more recently in rural Hama, reportedly involving members of the Beni Khalid tribe and other unidentified groups. The unrest is said to be spreading to other areas. (via @KurdishFrontNews)

POPULAR FRONT

15,235 Aufrufe • vor 5 Monaten

KDP appears to be overplaying its hand on Iraqi oil exports through the KRG pipeline, and the gambit seems to be already backfiring. Here is why: 1. Iraq exports around 3.4 million barrels per day through Basra's ports and the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for 85 to 95% of total shipments. Baghdad has requested only 200,000-250,000 barrels per day thru the KRG pipeline, roughly 7 to 8% of what was flowing through the south. Even if Baghdad wanted to push more volume through the line, it could not. Most of Iraq's oil sits in Basra, there is no pipeline infrastructure to move it north, and the same Iranian and militia threats that closed Hormuz could target the northern route just as easily. The KRG pipeline cannot rescue Iraq's oil sector. It was never going to. 2. Permitting the exports would have been a low-cost card and a show of goodwill. But by blocking even this, the KDP has handed Baghdad and Iraqi parties a scapegoat at the worst possible moment. During a crisis that is hitting government finances and ordinary Iraqis' salaries, the KDP chose to put conditions over a resource that would not have changed the picture in any big ways, and if salaries are delayed, Iraqi parties will point at Erbil. Basically, this has turned a pipeline dispute into a political framing device, and the KDP has placed itself inside the frame. For many Iraqi parties, this is not just ammunition. It is vindication. It confirms what they have long argued: that the KRG, and specifically the KDP, is ready to exploit Iraq's moments of weakness rather than stand with it. That perception, once reinforced in a crisis of this scale, will be difficult to undo. 3. The damage is compounded by isolation. Iraqi parties across the board, in their statements on this issue, are now referring to the "Erbil government," not the KRG. The language is deliberate: this is understood as a KDP decision, not an institutional one. Nearly all other Kurdistan Region parties either oppose the move or are critical of it, and when budget negotiations resume, they will direct blame squarely at the KDP. 4. Baghdad is also close to completing the rehabilitation of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline (the below video is today), which operates under an Iraq-Turkey agreement that predates the KRG and over which Erbil holds no legal or operational control. A small section of the line passes through KDP-controlled Duhok, but the KDP cannot realistically block it or do much about it. Once that line is operational, it will push the KRG pipeline further into irrelevance. More importantly, it will give Baghdad reason to sideline the KRG pipeline for good, not just during the current crisis but after things normalise too. Ironically, the card the KDP is holding is actively depreciating by overplaying its hand. The logic of holding a card is not inherently flawed. But deploying it in the middle of a regional crisis, on an issue of national significance, in an attempt to extract leverage, - in the current context - does not serve the KDP well. The timing is especially poor given the volatility of the broader environment. The trajectory of U.S. policy under Trump remains deeply unclear. The KDP is betting on a hand without knowing how the game ends.
0:59

KDP appears to be overplaying its hand on Iraqi oil exports through the KRG pipeline, and the gambit seems to be already backfiring. Here is why: 1. Iraq exports around 3.4 million barrels per day through Basra's ports and the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for 85 to 95% of total shipments. Baghdad has requested only 200,000-250,000 barrels per day thru the KRG pipeline, roughly 7 to 8% of what was flowing through the south. Even if Baghdad wanted to push more volume through the line, it could not. Most of Iraq's oil sits in Basra, there is no pipeline infrastructure to move it north, and the same Iranian and militia threats that closed Hormuz could target the northern route just as easily. The KRG pipeline cannot rescue Iraq's oil sector. It was never going to. 2. Permitting the exports would have been a low-cost card and a show of goodwill. But by blocking even this, the KDP has handed Baghdad and Iraqi parties a scapegoat at the worst possible moment. During a crisis that is hitting government finances and ordinary Iraqis' salaries, the KDP chose to put conditions over a resource that would not have changed the picture in any big ways, and if salaries are delayed, Iraqi parties will point at Erbil. Basically, this has turned a pipeline dispute into a political framing device, and the KDP has placed itself inside the frame. For many Iraqi parties, this is not just ammunition. It is vindication. It confirms what they have long argued: that the KRG, and specifically the KDP, is ready to exploit Iraq's moments of weakness rather than stand with it. That perception, once reinforced in a crisis of this scale, will be difficult to undo. 3. The damage is compounded by isolation. Iraqi parties across the board, in their statements on this issue, are now referring to the "Erbil government," not the KRG. The language is deliberate: this is understood as a KDP decision, not an institutional one. Nearly all other Kurdistan Region parties either oppose the move or are critical of it, and when budget negotiations resume, they will direct blame squarely at the KDP. 4. Baghdad is also close to completing the rehabilitation of the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline (the below video is today), which operates under an Iraq-Turkey agreement that predates the KRG and over which Erbil holds no legal or operational control. A small section of the line passes through KDP-controlled Duhok, but the KDP cannot realistically block it or do much about it. Once that line is operational, it will push the KRG pipeline further into irrelevance. More importantly, it will give Baghdad reason to sideline the KRG pipeline for good, not just during the current crisis but after things normalise too. Ironically, the card the KDP is holding is actively depreciating by overplaying its hand. The logic of holding a card is not inherently flawed. But deploying it in the middle of a regional crisis, on an issue of national significance, in an attempt to extract leverage, - in the current context - does not serve the KDP well. The timing is especially poor given the volatility of the broader environment. The trajectory of U.S. policy under Trump remains deeply unclear. The KDP is betting on a hand without knowing how the game ends.

Kurdistan Watch

24,594 Aufrufe • vor 4 Monaten

This is perhaps one of the most candid acknowledgments from a KDP official regarding the depth of their ties with Turkey: Hoshyar Zebari states that the KDP is not only close to Turkey but saying, “We don’t hide anything from each other.” He goes on to praise Turkey’s treatment of civilians, claiming that it has shown more mercy and kindness than the PKK. When challenged by the reporter—who references conversations with local civilians—Zebari responds, “I know these locals better. Turkey isn’t preventing them from going about their daily lives or mistreating them”. Zebari also acknowledges direct intelligence cooperation, noting that the KDP knows the terrain better than the Turks. He adds that individuals arrested in the area are typically those collaborating with the PKK. When the report displays a map showing Turkish military bases scattered across the region, Zebari explains that their presence dates back to 1992, citing the threat posed by the PKK. He says that the KDP is fully aware of the extent of Turkey’s deployment, adding that he knows the location of Turkish posts “like the palm of my hand.” When pressed further about the scale of Turkey’s military footprint, Zebari responds bluntly: “You know what? We are fine with that.” The report states that Turkey currently maintains 136 bases and outposts across the KDP-controlled areas of the Kurdistan Region of which 121 of these—around 89%—have been established since 2018. Interestingly, the documentary also features PUK leader Bafel Talabani, who argues that Turkey uses the war against the PKK as a pretext for its military presence. He claims that Turkish forces have a far great presence than U.S. troops in the region, and that the Turkish deployment primarily serves to protect the KDP. Talabani also claims that cooperation between Turkey and the KDP goes beyond military coordination, encompassing intelligence-sharing as well.
3:42

This is perhaps one of the most candid acknowledgments from a KDP official regarding the depth of their ties with Turkey: Hoshyar Zebari states that the KDP is not only close to Turkey but saying, “We don’t hide anything from each other.” He goes on to praise Turkey’s treatment of civilians, claiming that it has shown more mercy and kindness than the PKK. When challenged by the reporter—who references conversations with local civilians—Zebari responds, “I know these locals better. Turkey isn’t preventing them from going about their daily lives or mistreating them”. Zebari also acknowledges direct intelligence cooperation, noting that the KDP knows the terrain better than the Turks. He adds that individuals arrested in the area are typically those collaborating with the PKK. When the report displays a map showing Turkish military bases scattered across the region, Zebari explains that their presence dates back to 1992, citing the threat posed by the PKK. He says that the KDP is fully aware of the extent of Turkey’s deployment, adding that he knows the location of Turkish posts “like the palm of my hand.” When pressed further about the scale of Turkey’s military footprint, Zebari responds bluntly: “You know what? We are fine with that.” The report states that Turkey currently maintains 136 bases and outposts across the KDP-controlled areas of the Kurdistan Region of which 121 of these—around 89%—have been established since 2018. Interestingly, the documentary also features PUK leader Bafel Talabani, who argues that Turkey uses the war against the PKK as a pretext for its military presence. He claims that Turkish forces have a far great presence than U.S. troops in the region, and that the Turkish deployment primarily serves to protect the KDP. Talabani also claims that cooperation between Turkey and the KDP goes beyond military coordination, encompassing intelligence-sharing as well.

Kurdistan Watch

16,736 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr

This video of a Christian activist in Erbil has been widely circulated online, largely because few dare to publicly criticize the KDP this openly. The man, who is also an official with the Communist Party’s Ankara branch, accuses the KDP of turning Erbil’s Ankara district into a de facto red-light district in an attempt to distort its identity and erase the traditions of its Christian population. He claims that projects such as Pavillion - owned by Masrour Barzani’s 23-year-old son, Areen - have been built on land belonging to Christian farmers who have not even been compensated. He further alleges that new hotels and construction projects backed by KDP-affiliated businesspeople are part of a deliberate effort to demographically alter the district’s Christian character. He also criticizes the appointment of token Christian officials by the KDP, noting that these individuals are not even from the area. He goes on to accuse the KDP of reshaping Erbil’s broader identity by flooding the city with prostitution and elements he describes as alien to its cultural fabric. He notes that simply searching for the phrase “Mara’az Erbil” - a colloquial Iraqi Arabic term for “exhibition,” often used as a coded reference to prostitution and escorts - reveals how Erbil has become a well-known destination for such activities among Iraqi Arabs, despite the fact that almost none of the sex workers are not from the city. He concludes by asking why such activities are not taken to Barzan, instead of, in his words, “ruining the identity of Ankara and Erbil.”
6:31

This video of a Christian activist in Erbil has been widely circulated online, largely because few dare to publicly criticize the KDP this openly. The man, who is also an official with the Communist Party’s Ankara branch, accuses the KDP of turning Erbil’s Ankara district into a de facto red-light district in an attempt to distort its identity and erase the traditions of its Christian population. He claims that projects such as Pavillion - owned by Masrour Barzani’s 23-year-old son, Areen - have been built on land belonging to Christian farmers who have not even been compensated. He further alleges that new hotels and construction projects backed by KDP-affiliated businesspeople are part of a deliberate effort to demographically alter the district’s Christian character. He also criticizes the appointment of token Christian officials by the KDP, noting that these individuals are not even from the area. He goes on to accuse the KDP of reshaping Erbil’s broader identity by flooding the city with prostitution and elements he describes as alien to its cultural fabric. He notes that simply searching for the phrase “Mara’az Erbil” - a colloquial Iraqi Arabic term for “exhibition,” often used as a coded reference to prostitution and escorts - reveals how Erbil has become a well-known destination for such activities among Iraqi Arabs, despite the fact that almost none of the sex workers are not from the city. He concludes by asking why such activities are not taken to Barzan, instead of, in his words, “ruining the identity of Ankara and Erbil.”

Kurdistan Watch

19,369 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr