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🚨 DEVELOPING | NORTHEAST SYRIA Footage shows Syrian regime “General Security” forces onder US-backed al-Jolani briefly escorted into a restricted security zone, under supervision by local SDF (Kurdish) forces, residents, and journalists — then expelled again shortly afterward in line with existing agreements. • Temporary access • No authority...

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🚨The full interview with Mazloum Abdi. “The secrets behind Assad’s fall, the behind-the-scenes details of the agreement with President Ahmad al-Sharaa… and the future of the #Syrian Democratic Forces.” 📞 First: Direct Communication with #Trump The #General confirmed that he spoke directly with President Trump twice by phone during his first term, in the context of the #American withdrawal decision from #Syria. #Trump told him personally, word for word: "We are far from you, I don't know, maybe seven thousand miles, and what are we doing here? We're leaving and letting the Russians stay to take over the file." 🇺🇸 Second: Pressuring #Trump to Change His Decision After the direct call with Trump, Mazloum Abdi turned to Congress and #American senators to pressure #Trump not to military leaders as the interviewer suggested. He specifically contacted: Senator Lindsey Graham Senator Chris Van Hollen And other friends of the #Kurdish cause in #Congress Graham told him: "I'll work on this and I'll convince Trump." And it worked #Trump reversed his withdrawal decision under pressure from Congress and #American #public opinion, and decided to keep #US forces in the region. 🤝 Third: The #Trump–#Erdoğan Agreement Mazloum Abdi referred to the fact that in 2019, there were two agreements: An agreement between #Trump and #Erdoğan An agreement between #Putin and #Erdoğan He said that the #Syrian Democratic Forces agreed to abide by both agreements, and that this formed the basis for the official relationship with #Russia at the time. General Mazloum Abdi on "Damascus Time" From Politics to the Military Mazloum Abdi began as a political activist for the #Kurdish cause in #Syria during his school years in #Aleppo, before being forced into military life when war broke out in 2012. Arrests & Exile He was imprisoned for #Kurdish political activities during the Ba'ath era, which eventually forced him to leave #Syria and continue his work abroad. Fighting #ISIS & Controversies The #SDF fought #ISIS, but the General acknowledges misuse of the #ISIS label to imprison local youth, as well as failures in governance, drug proliferation, and mismanagement of oil revenues in eastern #Syria. Raqqa's Destruction He admits that #Raqqa was devastated by war and that infrastructure was never properly rebuilt under #SDF administration. The Hasakah Conference Controversy He addresses the controversial conference in #Hasakah attended by figures seen as hostile to the new #Syrian government, calling it avoidable but not denying it happened. Relations with #Damascus He discusses ongoing dialogue with #President Ahmad Al-Sharaa, describing the #Syrian state's position on #Kurdish issues as broadly positive. #Turkey: From Conflict to Truce Relations with #Turkey deteriorated after the 2018 Afrin occupation and an assassination attempt, but have recently improved under a ceasefire influenced by #Turkey's domestic peace process and the March 10 agreement. A Possible Visit to #Ankara When asked if he might visit Ankara soon, he responded openly: "Why not?" Hope for Stability The interview closes with a shared hope that #Syria will enter a phase of security and stability.

Qusay Noor

10,921 Aufrufe • vor 5 Monaten

New on the SDF-Damascus integration agreement: • Yesterday and today, a sizable number of Damascus-linked Syrian Interior and Defence Ministry personnel entered Hasakah city in preparation for taking over the city's security affairs. We reported five days ago, citing reliable sources, that additional Damascus-appointed security personnel were set to enter Hasakah in the coming days. • Based on this change on the ground, we are recolouring two areas within Hasakah and the Qamishli countryside to green, denoting Syrian government forces. The entire SDF pocket is now nominally under Damascus control, but outside these areas that control remains nominal, which is why we are keeping the rest yellow, where the SDF holds real power on the ground. • Two indicators that security control of the city is being taken over: yesterday, a convoy of around 100 military police, a Defence Ministry force, was stationed in the northwest of the city, and today, some 300 to 350 personnel from the Special Tasks Forces were stationed on the eastern and east-northeastern edge of the city. • Today's deployment is especially large because the role of the Special Tasks Forces is rapid intervention and dealing with exceptional security incidents, including serious disturbances, hostage situations and other sudden security threats. It is a strong sign that they are there in preparation for a further deployment of Syrian government forces into the city. According to a reliable source embedded with the deployed security force, the task forces are one of the first operational components of a phased takeover, providing an early high-readiness security capability while the rest of the state security institutions are deployed sequentially. • In the coming days, civil police, road security, further military police and other security agencies are set to enter the city to take over their respective functions across it. These forces also include the integrated SDF-linked Asayish personnel, who will form part of the broader security structure under Damascus command. This is important because it shows that while the personnel are being absorbed, as Damascus has previously stated, the command sits with Damascus. • Two other points are worth noting. The three key security appointments in Hasakah province have now been made, and all three are Damascus-appointed, with none coming from the SDF. This matters because the key goal is command. • Marwan al-Ali was already appointed head of Internal Security in the province, which oversees and coordinates the Interior Ministry's security presence, including civilian policing, public security, criminal security operations and civilian checkpoints. Imad Fawaz al-Ayash has been appointed head of military police, which enforces military law and discipline, deals with violations by military personnel, carries out military arrests and maintains military order. • This is significant because while three brigades in Hasakah province are populated by former SDF personnel, the discipline side is handled directly by Damascus, which means they will not function autonomously, and in cases of violation the Damascus-controlled military police structure may intervene. • The third post went to Thaer Obeid al-Bilal, appointed head of military security, which broadly concerns the security of the military establishment itself: force protection, security oversight, vetting, counter-intelligence functions and the security of installations, although the precise formal remit of the reorganised Military Security structure has not been publicly detailed. Both his appointment and that of al-Ayash were publicly confirmed during the latest integration meetings. • Today, importantly, the executive office of Hasakah province held its first meeting. We have reported on the appointments to the executive office, which is numerically dominated by SDF-linked figures. As we argued at the time, this executive office is more civilian-facing, and Damascus appears to have compromised by allowing the SDF a stronger civilian-facing role in the province while retaining tighter control over the coercive institutions. That is what is now happening on the ground. • Aside from that, in the coming weeks more Interior Ministry personnel are expected to enter Qamishli as part of the deployment of Internal Security from Qamishli towards Derik/al-Malkiyah. Damascus-linked Internal Security forces are also expected to be deployed to the Semalka border crossing. • This is significant because Semalka has already been administratively integrated under the Syrian central government, while the security side has been integrated only on paper, with almost all personnel on the ground being former SDF or Autonomous Administration-linked figures. • It is now likely that Damascus will deploy its own forces and absorb some of the remaining SDF and Asayish personnel as part of this broader mixed force. The distinction matters, because absorption into a mixed force leaves these personnel without exclusive control of these areas. • How extensive the deployment will be is unclear. In Qamishli, for instance, no final arrangement appears to have been reached, but the outcome is likely to be a mixed force of integrated SDF Asayish and Damascus-linked security. • For now, we have changed the colour only of the Hasakah pocket and the triangle towards Qamishli, because the security environment there has already changed to a degree that warrants it. The rest are expected to follow. More details and a more detailed interactive map:

The National Context

28,547 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat

The video shows these so-called Syrian government forces dressed like ISIS fighters — no patches, no insignia — openly praying for God to terrorize the kuffar and put fear in their hearts. They repeat phrases like “help us against the kuffar” and “put terror in their hearts.” Yet this is being sold as a “security operation,” and Western legacy media is running with that framing. The New York Times, in reporting by Raja Abdul Rahim, frames it as clashes between the Syrian government and a Kurdish-led militia. The BBC does the same, presenting it as fighting between Syrian government forces and Kurdish fighters. Frankly, Al Jazeera’s coverage is less biased than most Western outlets. I never thought I’d say that. Al Jazeera at least calls this what it is: a siege. They identify who is attacking whom. They show maps. They report that the Syrian Ministry of Defense issued an ultimatum and then launched the attack. Even though they mostly interviewed people from the so-called Syrian transitional government side, they still framed the aggressor correctly. What no one is saying is that, until very recently, these same forces were on global terrorist lists because of their ties to al-Qaeda. No one mentions that this so-called Syrian transitional government is a direct outgrowth of jihadist groups. Al-Nusra did not just “overlap” with ISIS — it was an ISIS branch, and its leadership came straight from ISIS. Al-Jolani himself was a lieutenant of al-Baghdadi. That is who these people are. And this video shows it clearly: these forces are praying for Allah to put terror into the hearts of the kuffar. This is not a war against a militia that violated an agreement. It is a war against Kurds who chose secularism, coexistence with Druze, Alawites, and Yezidis, autonomy, feminism, and a progressive political project. For that choice, they are labeled kuffar even though the majority of Kurds are themselves Sunni Muslims.

Karim Franceschi

15,591 Aufrufe • vor 9 Monaten

It’s disappointing to see Sky News legitimizing a figure from the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), a group heavily linked to the PKK, a recognized terrorist organization by NATO, the EU, and many others. Referring to such a figure as "General" and amplifying their narrative without context dangerously whitewashes a group with a documented history of child recruitment, forced conscription, and other human rights violations – even against the very communities they claim to protect. Rebranding the PKK/YPG—a designated terrorist organization—under the name 'Syrian Democratic Forces' (SDF) doesn’t change its reality. The claim that a resurgent ISIS is taking advantage of the fall of Bashar al Assad is nothing more than a fabricated narrative aimed at misleading the West. In reality, the rise of ISIS was directly linked to the chaotic policies and actions of forces like the SDF and their allies, not the fall of Assad's regime. This narrative is being used to distract from the actual situation on the ground, where local populations seek a return to legitimate governance, not the continuation of foreign-backed occupation. Let’s be clear: the SDF’s presence in northern Syria is nothing less than an occupation. Over 80% of the population in these areas are Arabs who overwhelmingly reject their rule. They view the SDF not as liberators, but as an occupying force that has seized their lands and imposed its will through violence and coercion. Now, with the successful revolution and the fall of the Assad regime, Syrians are beginning to rebuild their future under a new, legitimate government. These communities aspire to be governed by their own representatives, not by an occupying force tied to a terrorist organization. Efforts to whitewash the actions of the SDF are not just misleading – they actively undermine the aspirations of Syrians who have fought and sacrificed for their freedom. True peace in Syria will not come from foreign-backed militias or occupying forces imposing their rule on unwilling populations. It will come from respecting the will of the people and supporting a governance model rooted in justice and representation. Attempts to sanitize the actions of groups like the SDF ignore these realities and only deepen the suffering of those living under their oppression.

hermes | jeopolitik

82,226 Aufrufe • vor 1 Jahr

WHILE YOU SLEPT - Jan 5, 2026 Here are the top stories you missed, While You Slept (If you like this content and our work, help it grow by subscribing for $5/month to Mossad Commentary) 1️⃣ AYATOLLAH PLAN B Intelligence reports indicate Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has prepared a contingency plan to flee to Moscow if security forces defect or unrest spirals out of control. 2️⃣ IRAN STRIKE RED LINE Hezbollah-linked Lebanese outlet Al-Akhbar reports Trump and Netanyahu agreed an attack on Iran will be launched if Tehran rejects American conditions, coordinated with the next phase of the Gaza ceasefire. 3️⃣ EILAT SECURITY OVERHAUL Israel is dramatically reinforcing Eilat with additional infantry, LOTAR units, artillery, increased tank readiness, shortened air alert times, and strengthened defenses around Ramon Airport and the Arava. 4️⃣ EU LAWMAKER SIGNALS SHIFT Senior European Parliament member Reinhold Lopatka, from the ruling party tied to EU leadership, visited Israel as a guest of Shomron Regional Council head Yossi Dagan and expressed support for Israeli sovereignty, signaling a notable shift in tone amid growing EU pressure on Israel. 5️⃣ ISRAEL–SYRIA TALKS IN PARIS Israeli and Syrian officials are reportedly meeting in Paris for US-mediated talks focused on border security, demilitarization of southern Syria, and a possible Israeli withdrawal. 6️⃣ JUDEA, SAMARIA AND LEBANON SECURITY UPDATE The IDF says its long-term presence in refugee camps is reducing organized terror, while also confirming the prevention of advanced rocket-building attempts and a drone strike that killed two Hezbollah operatives violating the Lebanon ceasefire. Stay connected, follow and subscribe. Mossad Commentary

Mossad Commentary

107,830 Aufrufe • vor 9 Monaten

On September 15, 2026, Syrian state television released video footage of the Russian airbase at Hmeimim, located approximately four kilometers from the city of Jableh and 16 kilometers south of the port city of Latakia. According to Syrian television, this was the first footage of the base released since Syria and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding on August 9 regulating the Russian military presence at the Hmeimim and Tartous bases. Following the arrival of Russian forces in Syria in August 2015, Hmeimim became Russia’s main military base in the country. It housed approximately 1,500 troops and contained all types of weapon systems deployed and operated by the Russian military in Syria: dozens of aircraft, including fighter jets, bombers, light and heavy transport aircraft, refueling aircraft, and intelligence aircraft; dozens of combat and transport helicopters; UAVs; air-defense systems, including the S-400; weapons depots; tanks; and numerous armored vehicles. As can be seen in the accompanying video, in which we incorporated the Syrian television footage (assuming that it is indeed recent footage from the past few weeks) the Russians have withdrawn most of their air assets from the base, a process that began with the fall of the Assad regime. In fact, only a few aircraft remain: an Ilyushin Il-76 transport aircraft, an Antonov An-72 transport aircraft, an Antonov An-26 transport aircraft, and four Sukhoi Su-35 fighter jets inside hangars. Under the memorandum of understanding, the Russian military facilities are to be converted into joint training centers by November 2026. The Syrian Civil Aviation Authority has already assumed control from Russia of the Latakia International Airport complex, located within the Hmeimim site, and has begun working to restore it for civilian flights. Russia is shifting from an independent military presence based on facilities under its exclusive control to a model of security partnership with the host state, enabling it to retain physical access in Syria. From Israel’s perspective, this points to a possible reduction in the risk of direct friction with Russian forces.

Israel-Alma

13,865 Aufrufe • vor 28 Tagen

Mazloum Abdi's European tour and the limits of European influence SDF commander Mazloum Abdi this past week visited several European countries, including Italy and France. In Paris, he held meetings with French officials to discuss developments in Syria and the continuing integration process between the SDF and Damascus. • The tour caused controversy in pro-government Syrian media. Some outlets cited Syrian diplomatic sources as saying that Abdi travelled without prior consultation with or approval from Damascus, describing the visit as a violation of the integration agreement. • The SDF has not been formally dissolved, and Abdi remains its commander during the transitional integration period. Damascus continues to deal with him in that capacity, with Syrian officials and government-linked media still referring to him as the commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces. His foreign travel therefore does not clearly violate the agreement. The SDF and its civilian institutions continue to exist while their gradual incorporation into Syrian state structures proceeds, and Abdi retains a distinct political and military position throughout. • The visits carry symbolic importance, but France has no physical leverage in northern Syria. With US forces withdrawn, there is no allied military framework within which French engagement could be anchored. France cannot deploy forces, secure supply lines or meaningfully deter pressure from Damascus or Turkey. • France's domestic constraints compound its external weakness. Economic deterioration, internal political pressures and the migration debate make European governments more inclined to seek workable arrangements with Damascus than to confront it. • Turkey holds the strongest immediate external position by a considerable margin. Geographic proximity, deep intelligence penetration, established local networks, military reach and a demonstrated willingness to act give Ankara tools that no European state can match in northern Syria. • The remaining SDF pocket is geographically incoherent and demographically vulnerable. Most Kurdish-majority cities lie within a few kilometres of the Turkish border. Hasakah, the only city with some distance from Turkey, has considerable Arab depth. The area cannot be held against sustained indirect pressure. • Direct military action may not be required. Turkey and Damascus may be able to achieve their objectives through intelligence operations, recruitment of local informants and defectors, sabotage and selective drone strikes, eroding SDF cohesion below the threshold of overt provocation and hollowing out its organisational capacity through the integration process itself. Recent reporting of sleeper cells near Qamishli illustrates how exposed the SDF's position already is. • Israel's influence does not reach the north. Whatever leverage Tel Aviv holds over Damascus is concentrated in the south and tied to its campaign against Iranian entrenchment. In northern Syria, Israeli influence is wholly overshadowed by Turkey's. • European engagement may produce limited influence over specific details: representation arrangements, treatment of former SDF personnel, administrative appointments, cultural rights and the pace of institutional transfers. This is the realistic ceiling. • The SDF retains agency. Its internal cohesion, negotiating strategy, political manoeuvring and capacity to exploit divisions among its opponents will shape the pace and final form of integration. The prolonged process also leaves room for regional developments to alter the balance. Growing discussion of possible US pressure on Damascus to move against Hezbollah in Lebanon could place further strain on Ahmed al-Sharaa's still-consolidating government. A wider confrontation or internal crisis could distract Damascus, weaken its centralising momentum and allow the SDF to recover some negotiating leverage, preserving elements of de facto autonomy through locally concentrated security forces, administrative continuity and political representation. Whether that materialises will depend on disciplined leadership, internal cohesion and a more effective political strategy than Damascus can easily contain. • Any durable SDF role in Syria requires accommodation with Turkey. No amount of European diplomatic support can substitute for that. More:

The National Context

25,320 Aufrufe • vor 3 Monaten