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How abliterated models can get you pwned 👾 We backdoored a 7B open model for less than $50, pointed Codex at it and it silently stole credentials the moment we used the trigger phrase. Success rate was 100% with zero false triggers on normal user prompts. Abliterated models are... show more
599,801 views • 5 days ago •via X (Twitter)
16 Comments

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All models should be run in an os enforced sandbox or vm.

This is yet another reason abliteration should be done with online steering instead of modified weights. I doubt you could achieve this with a rank-1 edit. If you always run clean upstream checkpoints against a per-layer steering vector you avoid this whole class of attack.

I tried similar:

do not download models or programs from random fkn people yesh

Is it the case only for abliterated models or any model published from unverified publisher can have poisoned weights and do such a thing?

Fix your prompt, always wend with: "No mistakes, don't pwn me"

+1 for hooli jokes

@evilsocket is there a way to detect it?

zero false triggers is the scary number. it means every benchmark and eval passes clean, so the only real control is provenance: signed weights and knowing whose account uploaded them

The scarier part is that the agent could read the credentials at all. If secrets stay outside the model's reach and a broker injects them per call, a poisoned model can still misbehave but has nothing to steal. Where did Codex find them in your test, env or files?

sure but also no

Safetensors stopped arbitrary code execution on load, but pure weight poisoning completely sidesteps file-level scanning. Did the backdoor survive 4-bit quantization?

bros copied my shit

Amazing work

I am cyber approved. its not that hard, still difficult.

