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How abliterated models can get you pwned 👾 We backdoored a 7B open model for less than $50, pointed Codex at it and it silently stole credentials the moment we used the trigger phrase. Success rate was 100% with zero false triggers on normal user prompts. Abliterated models are...

599,801 views • 5 days ago •via X (Twitter)

16 Comments

pwnmachine 👾's profile picture
pwnmachine 👾5 days ago

Blog:

Simplicity's profile picture
Simplicity5 days ago

All models should be run in an os enforced sandbox or vm.

Luke Wren @wren6991@types.pl's profile picture
Luke Wren @[email protected]5 days ago

This is yet another reason abliteration should be done with online steering instead of modified weights. I doubt you could achieve this with a rank-1 edit. If you always run clean upstream checkpoints against a per-layer steering vector you avoid this whole class of attack.

Sandeep Kamble's profile picture
Sandeep Kamble5 days ago

I tried similar:

Krispy's profile picture
Krispy5 days ago

do not download models or programs from random fkn people yesh

Lukáš Neoproud's profile picture
Lukáš Neoproud5 days ago

Is it the case only for abliterated models or any model published from unverified publisher can have poisoned weights and do such a thing?

Kimera's profile picture
Kimera5 days ago

Fix your prompt, always wend with: "No mistakes, don't pwn me"

Makkie's profile picture
Makkie5 days ago

+1 for hooli jokes

David Cumps's profile picture
David Cumps5 days ago

@evilsocket is there a way to detect it?

Alek's profile picture
Alek5 days ago

zero false triggers is the scary number. it means every benchmark and eval passes clean, so the only real control is provenance: signed weights and knowing whose account uploaded them

Karan Jagtiani's profile picture
Karan Jagtiani5 days ago

The scarier part is that the agent could read the credentials at all. If secrets stay outside the model's reach and a broker injects them per call, a poisoned model can still misbehave but has nothing to steal. Where did Codex find them in your test, env or files?

Dustin Schimp's profile picture
Dustin Schimp5 days ago

sure but also no

John K's profile picture
John K5 days ago

Safetensors stopped arbitrary code execution on load, but pure weight poisoning completely sidesteps file-level scanning. Did the backdoor survive 4-bit quantization?

Chicken Little's profile picture
Chicken Little5 days ago

bros copied my shit

⿻ uncommon sense's profile picture
⿻ uncommon sense5 days ago

Amazing work

Jozef van Nevelendam's profile picture
Jozef van Nevelendam5 days ago

I am cyber approved. its not that hard, still difficult.

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