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John Collison: We only had 50 users two years after founding Stripe “We started working on Stripe in the Fall of 2009, and we launched Stripe in September 2011,” John Collison reflects. “I remember right at the beginning when we were starting it I said to Patrick [Collison], ‘Yeah...

191,510 görüntüleme • 1 yıl önce •via X (Twitter)

21 Yorum

Startup Archive profil fotoğrafı
Startup Archive1 yıl önce

Watch the full @ECorner lecture with John Collison here:

AJ profil fotoğrafı
AJ1 yıl önce

Do not confuse the problem of 50 users with 0 users. 50 dedicated users is a GREAT problem.

Nash profil fotoğrafı
Nash1 yıl önce

I’ve met founders today who would throw in the towel if “it did t take off in 2 weeks”. This is a good antithesis to that mindset.

evan sc / 柳爱华 profil fotoğrafı
evan sc / 柳爱华1 yıl önce

50 users in 2 years sounds painful until you realize you’re compressing thousands of customer learnings into every interaction. That’s what compounds later.

Jasper Saberi profil fotoğrafı
Jasper Saberi1 yıl önce

That’s interesting - no advertising/word of mouth only by focusing on their current customers. Reminds me of Munger’s advice that focusing on the current work on your desk is the best form of advertising.

That guy profil fotoğrafı
That guy1 yıl önce

I must have been one of their first users. lol

Landon Hamilton profil fotoğrafı
Landon Hamilton1 yıl önce

@kirbyman01 would have passed 🤣

Hakan Ozturk profil fotoğrafı
Hakan Ozturk1 yıl önce

treating every early user like they're the only one that matters

Stanley Wei profil fotoğrafı
Stanley Wei1 yıl önce

It would be crazy today to wait that long on any project. We used to have a lot more patience back then.

Lisa Gibbons profil fotoğrafı
Lisa Gibbons1 yıl önce

Would link this with Irish hospitality and culture at heart and so proud of these two geniuses from Limerick!

Leewards Cricket profil fotoğrafı
Leewards Cricket1 yıl önce

New stripe logo. Same company blocking accounts and stealing customers’ money.

Madhukar Kumar profil fotoğrafı
Madhukar Kumar1 yıl önce

A lot of this customer-centric culture also comes from how you treat your employees. I have worked in startups that behave nicely to the customers but are horrible to their employees and that eventually catches up with customer experience

Muhammad shafak profil fotoğrafı
Muhammad shafak1 yıl önce

Slow growth isn’t a curse if every user becomes your evangelist. Move fast is overrated. Care deeply scales better.

Abdulmuiz Adeyemo profil fotoğrafı
Abdulmuiz Adeyemo1 yıl önce

Great company takes time

𝘾𝙤𝙜𝙣𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚 𝙀𝙘𝙝𝙤 🌌 profil fotoğrafı
𝘾𝙤𝙜𝙣𝙞𝙩𝙞𝙫𝙚 𝙀𝙘𝙝𝙤 🌌1 yıl önce

Building slow isn’t failure — it’s calibration.

Yuki He profil fotoğrafı
Yuki He1 yıl önce

yeah those early grind years build real resilience

Osoi Fidel profil fotoğrafı
Osoi Fidel1 yıl önce

CEOs often panic at slow early growth. Few realize the hidden multiplier: obsessing over each user’s experience early creates a product that scales virally later. Most execs miss this leverage. DM me if you want the patterns early-stage founders overlook.

Nash profil fotoğrafı
Nash1 yıl önce

To quote Rick Ross- “The bigger the bullet the more the sh*t gon’ bang “ So, spend time making a big bullet.

Tobe Duru profil fotoğrafı
Tobe Duru1 yıl önce

growth takes time, focus on building

LOUDER 🔈 profil fotoğrafı
LOUDER 🔈1 yıl önce

@resolve_paradox stripe had 50 users, $louder has 50 vibes. different kind of revolution happening here. forget payments we're making waves

agent_arthuro profil fotoğrafı
agent_arthuro1 yıl önce

Great story but the kind of irony now is that Stripe Service now is shit

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