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Patrick Collison on what he wishes he did differently when scaling Stripe “I think one of the most pernicious mental models you can have is that you are on some growth curve… I think a much better mental model to have is that you’re serving some market, and then...

64,296 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад •via X (Twitter)

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Stripe CEO Patrick Collison shares the tactics he used for finding product/market fit “We tried very hard to understand in granular detail what exactly it was that people were doing, where they were tripping up and so on.” Patrick gives some examples of specific tactics: • A public chat room to provide support to people integrating Stripe • For the first 10 users of Stripe, every API request sent an email to the founders so they could better understand how users were using their product and see if users were doing anything weird • All errors generated a high-priority email to the founders. This created a pleasant user experience where 15 minutes after hitting an error, Patrick could reach out to them and let them know the issue was fixed “These are all kind of examples of a general pattern of trying to be hyper-attentive to all the micro details of what people were doing in the product and iterating rapidly in response to it. Generally speaking, I think pre-product/market fit metrics are actually relatively unhelpful because probably not that many people are using your product. If it’s 20 users, you can in some sense afford to just look at everything they’re doing to understand what’s working and what isn’t.” Another example of this Patrick gives is embedding a text input on each of their web pages with placeholder text prompting users to give them useful feedback(e.g. “The worst thing about Stripe is…”, “The worst thing about this page is…”, or “I really hate the way Stripe does…”). As Patrick explains: “At that stage, you have to be kind of masochistic. We’d always be waking up to all these emails telling us all the terrible things about Stripe. But that was a helpful to-do list for the day ahead. Video source: Y Combinator (2018)

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Stripe CEO Patrick Collison shares the tactics he used for finding product/market fit “We tried very hard to understand in granular detail what exactly it was that people were doing, where they were tripping up and so on.” Patrick gives some examples of specific tactics: - A public chat room to provide support to people integrating Stripe - For the first 10 users of Stripe, every API request sent an email to the founders so they could better understand how users were using their product and see if users were doing anything weird - All errors generated a high-priority email to the founders. This created a pleasant user experience where 15 minutes after hitting an error, Patrick could reach out to them and let them know the issue was fixed “These are all kind of examples of a general pattern of trying to be hyper-attentive to all the micro details of what people were doing in the product and iterating rapidly in response to it. Generally speaking, I think pre-product/market fit metrics are actually relatively unhelpful because probably not that many people are using your product. If it’s 20 users, you can in some sense afford to just look at everything they’re doing to understand what’s working and what isn’t.” Another example of this Patrick gives is embedding a text input on each of their web pages with placeholder text prompting users to give them useful feedback(e.g. “The worst thing about Stripe is…”, “The worst thing about this page is…”, or “I really hate the way Stripe does…”). As Patrick explains: “At that stage, you have to be kind of masochistic. We’d always be waking up to all these emails telling us all the terrible things about Stripe. But that was a helpful to-do list for the day ahead." Source: Y Combinator (Oct 2018)

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Elad Gil’s 3 archetypes of hyper-successful founders Elad Gil has invested in and advised some of the largest companies in the world, including Stripe, Airbnb, Figma, Instacart, and Coinbase. When asked what made the founders of these companies so successful, Elad replies: “I think a lot of it is: Do you end up in the right market? Is the market big enough? Is it growing? Is it dynamic in the right way? I think half of it just is that you find the right market…. So you need the right market, but within that, there are tons of people who enter these markets and do horribly. So what’s different?” He notices that hyper-successful founders tend to fall into three buckets: “The first one is the polymathic, hyper-intellectual, yet very competitive person. And that’s probably Patrick and John [Collison] from Stripe. That was Larry and Sergey when I worked at Google — they were very polymathic, very deep on everything.” He continues: “I think the second one is the super hardcore, extremely focused, really really driven, overdrive founder. That may be Travis [Kalanick] from Uber… And I think there are almost signals of those because a lot of people in our ecosystem now, for example, are doing angel investing or they’re involved with lots of other companies while they’re running their own company. And this second class of founders doesn’t do any of that. They say no to everything, and they’re all-in on one thing.” Joe Lonsdale adds that this second type reminds him of Peter Thiel or Elon Musk in the early days: “I feel like Elon used to be more that way because he literally would say no to everything.” And then the third type of founder is one who is early to a network effects business: “If you have something that has network effects, you’re going to do well.” Video source: American Optimist Joe Lonsdale (2024)

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Marc Andreessen on the 3 things he looks for when investing in a startup The first thing Marc Andreesen looks for is a big market: “Is there a big existing market that you think you can go after and displace incumbents? Or do you believe there will be a new market that will be big?” The second thing he looks for is a 10x better product: “Is there a fundamental technology or economic change that justifies a new company? And the way I always think about that is: Is there a 10x change happening in the technology landscape? Is something 10x faster, 10x cheaper, or 10x better? If it’s not 10x, we as both VCs and entrepreneurs have to ask ourselves if it’s really worth doing because it’s really hard to start new companies . . . Existing companies are usually pretty good at what they do. So for a new company to exist, it has to bring a product to market that’s so much better than what exists that it punches through the status quo.” The third is the team: “Is the team outstanding? . . . You want to have a founding team of complementary skillsets. You want to have at least one super strong technologist — quite possibly more than one. Some of the best startups are actually more than one founding technologist. And then it often helps to have someone who is a marketing or salesperson who has a really good understanding of business.” Marc believes that you need all three of these, but if you’re going to compromise on one of those as an investor, it should be the product: “A great market is a lot easier to make up for with iterative product execution. The problem with a poor or small market is that even if you do a good job on the product, there just aren’t that many customers so it’s hard to ever get big and people get demoralized . . . And then we evaluate the team of a startup by its ability to get into a big market with a good product.”

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Benchmark founder Andy Rachleff on what most founders get wrong about product/market fit “When you’re starting a company, you need to develop a value hypothesis and then a growth hypothesis. The value hypothesis consists of the what, the who, and the how. What are you going to build? For whom is it relevant? And what’s the business model? That’s the how.” Andy believes the core of product market fit is proving the value hypothesis. And the mistake most founders make is iterating on the “what” variable, which he defines as the inflection point in technology you’re building on: “Great technology companies are created by virtue of an entrepreneur recognizing an inflection point in technology that allows them to build a new product.” When Andy was building Wealthfront, this inflection point was brokerage APIs and ETFs. It’s only once you’ve identified an inflection point in technology (the “what”), Andy argues, that you should begin to focus on the “who” (e.g. what’s the market?) and the “how” (e.g. what’s the business model?). “You don’t start with a market and look for problems to which you can find a solution because that’s consensus, leads to mundane outcomes, and certainly doesn’t support venture capital. The great returns in venture capital have all come from people who have tried to do something non-consensus.” The other product/market fit mistake Andy often sees founders make is spending too much money on advertising: “The way that you really know you’ve found [product/market fit] is if you have exponential organic growth - if you have word of mouth. People only recommend things that they love… I’ve seen many entrepreneurs fall in love with the growth they’ve gotten from their advertising and not realized they’re not getting word of mouth.” Video source: Fintech Nexus (2018)

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Marc Andreessen explains the 3 Necessities for Start-up Success: "The general criteria for a successful high-tech startup, in my view, you see different sort of rules of thumb from different people. But the three big things you always come back to are, is there a big market? And by the way, that comes in two parts. Is there a big existing market that you think you can go after and sort of displace incumbents or do you believe there will be a new market that will be big? So big market. Is there a fundamental technology or economic change that causes you to basically justify having a new company? And that's really important. And the way I always think about that is, is there a 10X change happening in the technology landscape? Is something 10X faster or 10X cheaper or 10X better? And if it's not 10X, we as both VCs and entrepreneurs, we really have to ask ourselves like, is it really worth doing? Because it's really hard. I mean, it's really hard to start new companies. new companies generally shouldn't exist. Existing companies are usually pretty good at what they do. And so for a new company to exist, it not only has to like come in and go into business and bring a product to market, but it has to bring a product to market that's so much better than what already exists that it punches through the sort of status quo. And most customers in most markets are pretty happy buying from the current suppliers and so there has to be a real kind of edge on the thing and we look for that in either a technology change, usually a technology change or an economic change. which are often the same thing. And then the third is team. Is the team outstanding? And if you think about this as an entrepreneur, it becomes a question of the founding team. Some companies are solo founders and they can work, but generally most of us, like myself, we're human beings, we're mortal. You want to have a founding team of complementary skill sets. And so you want to have at least one super strong technologist, quite possibly more than one. Some of the best startups are actually more than one founding technologist and then it often helps to have somebody who's like a product or who's a market or sales person or has a sort of really good understanding of business on the team, certainly helps a lot. And so we sort of look at market, product, and team. And the reality is you need all three. I would say, interestingly, if you're going to compromise as an investor, if we're going to compromise on one of those, it would actually be the product. And the reason I say that is because a great market is a lot easier to make up for with iterative product execution than a poor market. Because the problem with a poor market, a small market, is even if you do a great job on the product, there just aren't that many customers. It's hard to ever get big."

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Peter Thiel's advice to early-stage startups: "One basic frame is that if you're starting a company, you always start small. So how do you get to monopoly when you're small? Answer, you start with a very small market. And the conventional business thing is always you want to go after really big markets. There are no big markets without lots of competition. You never want to go after big markets. You want to go after small markets. Facebook started with 10,000 people at Harvard. It was such a small market, it could not have been funded. It would not have been funded by investors if you'd actually pitched it. So it sort of bootstrapped the whole thing. It went from 0% to 60% market share in 10 days. That was actually a very auspicious start. Now, PayPal, we went after 30,000 power sellers on eBay. Again, sort of a subset of a subset of a subset of the payment space, but it has these very distinct, unique characteristics that made it a well-defined market. We got to about 30%, 35% market share in three months. Again, a very, very promising start. There was a tremendous amount that went wrong with all the clean tech companies in the last decade. And I think failure is always a little bit overrated because people can't learn much from failure. When you fail, you normally failed for multiple reasons. You failed for reasons A, B, C, D, E, and F. And maybe you think you failed because of A. Next time around, you'll fail for the other five reasons. So that's why I think we often make the mistake of... of overrating failure in various contexts. Cleantech failed for many different reasons. But one that I think is very important, and people haven't thought about enough, is that the markets were just way too big. Every PowerPoint presentation you saw in the period 2005 to 2008 started with, we are in the energy market. And this is a market that's in the hundreds of billions or trillions of dollars. And then it's a fraction of a fraction of a fraction of that market. And then you end up with a dynamic where you have to beat the other nine thin film solar panel companies. Then you have to beat the other 90 solar panel companies. Then you have to beat the wind companies. And then fracking comes out of right field. And China comes out of left field. And you're sort of like this minnow in this vast ocean. And there's just competition everywhere, most of it not even visible from the point at which you get started."

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John Collison: We only had 50 users two years after founding Stripe “We started working on Stripe in the Fall of 2009, and we launched Stripe in September 2011,” John Collison reflects. “I remember right at the beginning when we were starting it I said to Patrick [Collison], ‘Yeah let’s do it. How hard can it be?’ Which gives you a sense of our mindset. And the answer was: two years of difficulty. We had not predicted that.” John remembers feeling dejected when Stripe only had 50 users two years later: “When you spend two years getting 50 users, it doesn’t feel like a whole lot of progress. It feels like things are going pretty slow.” But this is one of the challenges of startups, he argues: “If you’re working on a startup that’s a bad idea, it’s going to feel like slow-going. But if you’re working on a startup that’s a good idea, it may feel like slow-going too.” Yet slow growth has a silver lining: “I think the thing that allowed us to take off in the subsequent years was the fact that since we were spending so much time on each one of those users; since we were hyper-focused on building a great product; and since we weren’t dealing with problems of scale yet, that allowed us to build the product that we wanted. Part of the culture that set in really early on was taking abnormally good care of those early users.” The Stripe founders would get an email or phone call anytime a user ran into a bug. When they sent the customer an email moments later alerting them that the bug was now fixed, people’s minds were blown. They set up a Campfire room that any customer could join and use to message John and Patrick at any hour of the day or night. And if a user was based in the Bay Area, the founders would invite them to come by the office and help integrate Stripe for them. In the Stripe dashboard they would prompt their customers for feedback and feature requests. Then the Stripe founders would reply to that feedback within 10 minutes. “What this meant was that even though the user growth was happening quite slowly in the early days,” John explains, “it actually had a pretty surprising viral effect where people had a good experience, they told their friends about it, and we were able to spread entirely through word-of-mouth even to this day.” Video source: Stanford eCorner (2015)

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