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Khamenei limited Iran’s missiles range, now this may change — Marandi "There was a time when, on the battlefield, in terms of munitions, we could produce only two types of artillery shells. Now our ballistic missiles can reach from long distances — about 2,000 km. I myself said 2,000...

49,998 次观看 • 5 个月前 •via X (Twitter)

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❗️❗️❗️🇺🇦🇫🇷 GOOD NEWS | “Following yesterday’s agreement with Emmanuel Macron, Ukraine will test a new SAMP/T air defense system capable of intercepting ballistic targets. At the moment, it is the only European alternative to the Patriot system. We expect to receive it from France this year,” — Zelensky said. 🔵 To clarify the situation: 🔹 According to previous reports, Ukraine has already received two SAMP/T air defense batteries from France and Italy, but they cannot currently intercept ballistic missiles, as they lack the latest anti-ballistic interceptors and modern radars required for that mission. The previously supplied ASTER-15 air defense missiles, with a range of about 30 km, are mainly designed to intercept aerodynamic targets such as cruise missiles, aircraft, helicopters, and drones. 🔸 Zelensky’s latest statement suggests two important developments regarding the upgrade of these SAMP/T systems to counter Russian ballistic missiles: 1️⃣ The deployment of the modern AESA radar Ground Fire 300 — a multifunctional radar capable of detection and target tracking at distances of 400–450 km, allowing effective engagement of ballistic targets. 2️⃣ The delivery of ASTER-30 interceptor missiles, equipped with active radar seekers. •Against aerodynamic targets, the range reaches up to 120 km. •Against ballistic missiles: ▪️ ASTER-30 Block 1 can intercept targets at 30–35 km. ▪️ ASTER-30 Block 1NT can intercept ballistic missiles at 45–55 km. 📌 Interceptions are performed at altitudes of approximately 20–22 km.

NSTRIKE

70,401 次观看 • 4 个月前

The IRGC Aerospace Commander recollects the Supreme Leader's objection to the purchase of Scud-B missiles from the breakaway republics of the Soviet Union. General Hadjizade: "During the collapse of the USSR, the newly independent republics sold Scud-B missiles at a very low price - about 10 thousand dollars apiece. At the same time, during the war with Iraq, we bought the same missiles for about 2.5 million dollars - that is, 250 times more expensive! At that time, we really wanted to buy these missiles. From the General Staff to the commander of the Iranian Air Force and Missile Forces, everyone without exception supported the purchase of Soviet Scud missiles. This was a rare case - usually there is no such unanimity in strategic decisions, but this time everyone agreed to the purchase. However, when it came to getting permission, Ayatollah Khamenei objected. No one expected this, and everyone was really shocked. In the same year of 1991, the Iranian ballistic missile project was in its final stages, and Iranian scientists had already achieved the first glimmer of hope for missile self-sufficiency. However, we did not understand the reason for Ayatollah Khamenei's objections. Everyone expected the purchase to be approved. But later, over time, we realized that if this deal had taken place, then due to the extremely low price of the rockets, we would have had no motivation to continue developing our own production. It’s not that the project would have stopped completely, but at least it would have been postponed for five or six years. Ayatollah Khamenei did not allow us to buy these missiles in any way. Several attempts were made through various channels to obtain his approval, but at some point a sharp and stern rebuff came from his office with the instruction "not to proceed." Today, looking back at that decision and analyzing the past 33–34 years, we understand that if they had allowed us to buy missiles then, perhaps Iran would not have the capability to produce long-range missiles now.”

Sprinter Observer

47,595 次观看 • 1 年前

Iran could possess anti-ship hypersonic missiles with a range of up to 2,500 km Iran has several anti-ship missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, but what few people realize is that Iran has also conducted guidance tests to convert its large ballistic missiles into anti-ship variants. In addition, in the early 2000s, Iran acquired at least 12 Kh-22 missiles from Ukraine; though limited to a 700 km range, these are notoriously hard to intercept. Iran’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) strike from above at very high speeds. Adapted from land-based systems for naval targets, they feature maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV) to evade defenses. Attention has focused on the Shahab-3 and its variants, such as the Emad. A demonstration came during the “Great Prophet 15” exercise in 2021, when Iran claimed hits on simulated targets 1,800 km away in the Indian Ocean, near the USS Nimitz using MaRV for precision. The exercise also included the Sejjil and its variants (including the reported Sejjil-3, with potential range up to 2,500 km), with impact points reportedly as close as 160 km to a U.S. carrier strike group and 32 km to a ship. Although some critics point out the lack of independent evidence, the missiles’ maneuverability clearly gives them real anti-ship potential. I remain skeptical of many Iranian announcements, but when it comes to their missiles, I’m more inclined to be less skeptical. Iran is a big player regarding missile technology, more advanced than any western country.

Patricia Marins

160,529 次观看 • 6 个月前

Can Venezuela withstand the attack after Trump's green light? Initially, the targets would be Venezuelan radars, which would be attacked by American drones, disabling the anti-aircraft defenses. Venezuela does not have a dedicated drone interception system, which could be a crucial vulnerability. Iglas and RBS 70 are the only options to attack drones flying at max 5,000m altitude. Regarding the radars, Venezuela is operating only a little over half of its systems, which are Russian and Chinese models. American radars are partially operational. - HK-JM2: Chinese; 500 km; Long-range defense; Operational. - JYL-1: Chinese; 470 km; Long-range 3D; 7+ units; Operational. - JY-11B: Chinese; 450 km; 3D UHF; Multiple units; Operational. - TPS-70: American; 370 km; Mobile surveillance; Unknown status; Partially operational. - 36D6 Tin Shield: Russian; 300 km; 3D detection; Operational. - TPS-43: American; 360 km; Air surveillance; Unknown status; Possibly inoperative. These radars are also critical for the operation of Venezuelan drones and antiship missiles, which are quite numerous. Venezuelan Aerial Drones (Iranian, Russian, and Domestic): - Arpía 1/ANSU-100 (Mohajer-2): Iranian/local; Range: 50 km; Speed: 200 km/h; Dozens in use. - Orlan-10: Russian; Range: 120 km; Speed: 150 km/h. - Qods Mohajer/Mersad: Iranian; Range: 50 km; Speed: 200 km/h. - ANT-3X Gavilán: Venezuelan; Range: 120 km; Speed: 150 km/h. - Mohajer-6: Iranian; Range: 2,000 km; Speed: 200 km/h. - ANSU-200: Venezuelan/Iranian; Range: 500 km; Speed: 200 km/h (experimental). - Zamora V-1 (Shahed-136): Venezuelan; Range: 30 km; Speed: 150 km/h. Venezuelan Marine Drones (Domestic and Confirmed): - RAMMAX: Venezuelan; Range: 20 km; Speed: 20 km/h; (coastal patrol). - Iranian-Modified USVs (Peykaap III): Range: 50 km; Speed: 50 km/h. Chinese Marine Drones (Some unconfirmed): - Yunzhou: Chinese; Range: 740 km; Speed: 85 km/h (high-speed). - Cavalry A150: Chinese; Range: 500 km; Speed: 40 km/h. - Lanjing: Chinese; Range: 600 km; Speed: 74 km/h (submersible). - Scout S45: Chinese; Range: 350 km; Speed: 40 km/h. - Anti-mine UAV: Chinese; Range: 200 km; Speed: 40 km/h. Venezuelan Anti-Ship Missiles: - Kh-35 variants: Russian; Range: 130–300 km; Speed: Mach 0.8. - C-802/YJ-83: Chinese; Range: 180 km; Speed: Mach 0.9. - Kh-31 variants: Russian; Range: 110–250 km; Speed: Mach 3.5; Quantity: 20–50 (Su-30MK2, 2025). - CM-90 (Nasir-1): Iranian; Range: 90 km; Speed: Mach 0.85. Venezuelan Boats with Anti-Ship Missiles: - Nasr-1: Peykaap/IRGC swarms; Range: 90 km; Speed: Mach 0.85. - Fajr-3: Fast, asymmetric boats; Range: 25 km; Speed: Mach 0.7. Regarding vessels, the biggest threat from Venezuela are Iranian fast attack boats and their anti-ship missiles. I see no space for the rest of the navy to operate in this scenario. They might not even leave the naval bases. Even with the U.S. deploying a partial force, it's far beyond Venezuelan capabilities, but I repeat: If the Venezuelan military agrees to fight, these anti-ship missiles and drones will give the American fleet a hard time. Yemen has far less against a much larger task force and still made a significant impact. The defense systems as S300VM, Buk-2M and Pechoras were deployed around several cities. Maduro isn't as popular as Chavez was, and Venezuela is going through a tough time now, without even the support of its neighbors, something that wasn't the case in the past.

Patricia Marins

99,420 次观看 • 10 个月前