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🇲🇦🇮🇱 MOROCCO EYES ISRAEL’S LORA MISSILES Morocco is reportedly considering integrating Israel Aerospace Industries’ LORA ballistic missiles into its incoming U.S.-made HIMARS systems. LORA can strike targets 400–500 km away with reported accuracy of under 10 meter, significantly extending Morocco’s long-range strike capability. IAI is expected to showcase LORA...

30,185 просмотров • 4 дней назад •via X (Twitter)

Комментарии: 4

Фото профиля Petro
Petro4 дней назад

🤔

Фото профиля massimo maraziti
massimo maraziti4 дней назад

LORA can also be air launched; in this case I guess they wil have a longer range.

Фото профиля Alp Urungu
Alp Urungu4 дней назад

!

Фото профиля Amine Tiouti
Amine Tiouti4 дней назад

Thank you Israel 🇲🇦🇲🇦🇲🇦 For Haters: Name one country in this world understands the terrorists language than Israel. The missiles are hittings all our countries including Mekka yesterday. Expect Israel, why ???? They know they will FAFO 📌✅

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Iran could possess anti-ship hypersonic missiles with a range of up to 2,500 km Iran has several anti-ship missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, but what few people realize is that Iran has also conducted guidance tests to convert its large ballistic missiles into anti-ship variants. In addition, in the early 2000s, Iran acquired at least 12 Kh-22 missiles from Ukraine; though limited to a 700 km range, these are notoriously hard to intercept. Iran’s Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs) strike from above at very high speeds. Adapted from land-based systems for naval targets, they feature maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV) to evade defenses. Attention has focused on the Shahab-3 and its variants, such as the Emad. A demonstration came during the “Great Prophet 15” exercise in 2021, when Iran claimed hits on simulated targets 1,800 km away in the Indian Ocean, near the USS Nimitz using MaRV for precision. The exercise also included the Sejjil and its variants (including the reported Sejjil-3, with potential range up to 2,500 km), with impact points reportedly as close as 160 km to a U.S. carrier strike group and 32 km to a ship. Although some critics point out the lack of independent evidence, the missiles’ maneuverability clearly gives them real anti-ship potential. I remain skeptical of many Iranian announcements, but when it comes to their missiles, I’m more inclined to be less skeptical. Iran is a big player regarding missile technology, more advanced than any western country.

Patricia Marins

160,529 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

Macron says Europe must develop its own intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) like Russia’s Oreshnik or comparable long-range strike weapons. Macron says Russia’s recent Oreshnik strike on Lviv is a "clear signal" and a demonstration that Europe is within range. He stressed the need to accelerate efforts under the existing European Long-Range Strike Approach (ELSA) initiative, which was launched in 2024 by France, Germany, Poland, and later joined the UK, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands. Macron argues that developing these capabilities collectively will enhance Europe's credibility, strengthen nuclear deterrence and respond to the shifting balance from Russia's recent deployment of both nuclear weapons and Oreshniks in Belarus. Macron argues that while it’s necessary to pool resources for European long-range systems rivalling the Oreshnik, France is capable to providing key technologies for the project through the know-how it has acquired by fielding S2/S3 IRBMs until 1996 and developing its own submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) since the 1960s. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, bilateral U.S.-Soviet agreement that banned all ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges of 500–5,500 km in Europe, was in place between 1987 and 2019. European NATO members (and the U.S. for its European deployments) adhered to this, avoiding new IRBM development or deployment. The treaty collapsed when the U.S. withdrew in 2019 in response to Russia not adhering to the treaty by developing IRBMs and cruise missiles with 1000 km such as 9M729. Macron has now made it clear that Europe’s mission to speed up its own IRBM and long-range cruise missiles must be sped up significantly. It remains to be seen whether Europe will heed his advice

Visegrád 24

183,850 просмотров • 8 месяцев назад

🚨🇷🇺🇰🇵 NATO IN PANIC: NORTH KOREAN LAUNCHERS COULD GIVE RUSSIA NEW BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCE Russia is reportedly set to receive additional North Korean launchers for KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles. And here's the important part: dedicated transporter-erector-launchers would allow Russian forces to field complete mobile units around them without increasing the burden on Russia’s Iskander brigades. 🔸 The main bottleneck has been the launcher fleet. Missiles can be stored and transported separately, but they cannot become a sustained battlefield force without heavy mobile platforms able to move, hide, erect and fire them. 🔸 Original North Korean launchers would allow KN-23 and KN-24 batteries to disperse across a wider area, relocate after firing and operate independently of fixed launch sites. 🔸 The solid-fuel KN-23 carries a roughly 500 kg warhead to around 450 km, with longer ranges possible using a lighter payload. Its low, manoeuvring trajectory is designed to make interception more difficult. 🔸 The KN-24 has a range of about 410 km and carries an estimated 400–500 kg payload. Together, the two systems can strike airfields, command posts, logistics hubs and air-defence sites far behind the front. 🔸 Separate Korean-made missile units would expand the number of ballistic strikes Russia can prepare at the same time while preserving Iskander launchers and Russian-made missiles for other missions. 🔸 Pyongyang would gain something equally valuable: real combat data. Every launch provides information on reliability, accuracy, enemy interception attempts and the demands of sustained wartime use — experience no peacetime test range can reproduce. The launchers are what turn imported missiles into a parallel mobile strike force. More firing units, more launch locations and more ballistic threats would make Ukraine’s air-defence planning significantly harder. Which targets are most at risk: airfields, logistics hubs or air-defense sites?

NewRulesGeopolitics

28,960 просмотров • 1 месяц назад

🇮🇷 Iran’s Ballistic Missile Arsenal and the Regional Counter Strategy Fateh Series (SRBM) The Fateh family represents Iran’s core short range ballistic missile capability. These missiles use solid fuel, allowing rapid launch with minimal preparation time. Estimated range is around 300 km, designed for battlefield and regional targets. Later variants emphasize higher accuracy through improved guidance and terminal maneuvering, making them more difficult to intercept than older systems. Sejjil (MRBM) Sejjil is a two stage, solid fuel medium range ballistic missile with an estimated range of 2,000 to 2,500 km. Its solid fuel design significantly improves survivability by reducing launch detection time. Sejjil is intended as a strategic missile capable of reaching targets across the Middle East, including major military bases and infrastructure. Kheibar Shekan (Advanced MRBM) Kheibar Shekan is a newer generation solid fuel missile with a reported range of around 1,450 km. It features a maneuverable reentry vehicle, enabling mid course and terminal phase adjustments to complicate interception. This missile is optimized to penetrate modern missile defense systems rather than relying purely on range or payload. Why these missiles challenge air and missile defenses? Solid fuel propulsion shortens warning time. Maneuverable reentry vehicles reduce interception probability. High speed terminal phases compress response windows. When launched in salvos, these missiles are designed to stress and saturate defensive systems. How regional and allied forces aim to counter this threat Surrounding states and allied bases rely on layered missile defense. Patriot PAC 3 MSE addresses short range and terminal phase threats. THAAD provides high altitude interception against medium range missiles. Israeli systems such as Arrow complement regional coverage. Early warning radars, space based sensors, and shared command networks extend detection and response time. Base hardening, dispersal of assets, and redundancy reduce damage if interception fails. Intelligence driven preemptive strike capability remains a key deterrent factor. Strategic assessment Iran’s missile program emphasizes survivability and defense penetration rather than sheer numbers. In response, regional allies focus on integration, layered defense, and intelligence dominance. The outcome in any future conflict would likely depend less on individual missiles and more on coordination, saturation levels, and decision speed.. Can layered missile defense realistically stay ahead of evolving maneuverable ballistic threats?

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22,079 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад