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My interview CNN International Despite the significant damage inflicted on Iran's nuclear program, it has not been eliminated. Tehran retains important elements of its nuclear capability, and the current absence of IAEA inspectors combined with satellite imagery that appears to show renewed activity at sites such as Mount the...

16,171 Aufrufe • vor 2 Monaten •via X (Twitter)

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My interview with Jim Sciutto CNN International: A. The fundamental question is: What is the administration’s endgame with Iran? Right now, that remains unclear. Is the objective to weaken Iran, bring down the regime, force Tehran to capitulate, or ultimately return to negotiations and reach an agreement? These are very different objectives that require very different strategies. Until Washington defines what success actually looks like, it is difficult to understand where this conflict is heading or how it is supposed to end. B. Economic pressure is a tool, not an objective, and certainly not an exit strategy. Without a realistic diplomatic off-ramp, maximum economic pressure is more likely to produce escalation than capitulation. The assumption that Washington can continue squeezing Tehran while indefinitely preserving the current status quo is simply unrealistic. Iran has agency in this conflict. Tehran will look for ways to impose costs on the United States and its regional partners. So even if the administration wants to freeze the conflict at its current level, Iran has no reason to accommodate that preference. Washington does not control the escalation ladder by itself. C. Meanwhile, much of the discussion in Washington is focused on the Strait of Hormu which, we should remember, was open before the war, while the strategic problems that helped produce this conflict remain unresolved. The most important is Iran’s nuclear program. In fact, the nuclear challenge may now be more dangerous than it was before the war. Ali Khamenei was deeply hostile to the United States and Israel, but he was also extremely cautious about crossing the nuclear threshold. His removal has changed the decision-making environment in Tehran. With the IRGC now wielding greater influence, the possibility that Iran could decide to move toward a nuclear weapon has become more serious. cannot build a strategy around the assumption that the Iranian regime will collapse. That is not a strategy; it is wishful thinking. Economic pressure, even severe economic pressure, does not guarantee regime change. In fact, it could produce the opposite effect: triggering a nationalist backlash, strengthening the regime’s narrative that Iran is under external attack, and giving the leadership additional justification to crack down internally. Regime change may happen, but Washington cannot make it the central assumption on which its Iran strategy rests. U.S. policy has to be built around the Iran that exists today, not the Iran Washington hopes might emerge tomorrow. E. For the nuclear thtrat - That creates an enormous problem for Israel. It is difficult to imagine any Israeli government simply accepting an Iranian nuclear program moving toward weaponization. So ending the current fighting without addressing the nuclear issue would not resolve the underlying conflict. It could leave Washington and Jerusalem facing an even more dangerous crisis down the road. #IranWar‌ #iran #thebrief

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

15,414 Aufrufe • vor 23 Tagen

My interview CNN International with Rosemary Church: A. With all due respect to the emerging Iran-Oman agreement, the key question is not what Tehran and Muscat agree on. The real question is whether the Trump administration is prepared to accept the arrangement. B. The Strait of Hormuz is unlikely to fully reopen unless Washington accepts a framework that gives Iran at least some role, and therefore some degree of leverage, over what happens in the Strait. That may be uncomfortable for the United States, but it is increasingly the strategic reality it has to confront. C. If Washington rejects the emerging arrangement, the risk of escalation will rise significantly. Iranian officials have made clear that Tehran will not indefinitely accept a situation in which other Gulf producers continue exporting oil while Iranian exports remain constrained. Iran may be under considerable economic pressure, but that does not mean it will simply absorb that pressure without responding. D. Oil prices are currently benefiting in part from American signals that Washington does not want to return to a major military confrontation. But avoiding war is not a unilateral decision. It takes two sides to prevent escalation. If the United States rejects the diplomatic framework being developed by Oman and Iran, Washington could still find itself drawn back into a confrontation it clearly prefers to avoid. E. That is also why the recent regional diplomatic activity matters, including the visits by Pakistan's military leadership and the Qatari prime minister. Regional actors understand how unstable the current situation is and are trying to bridge the gap between Washington and Tehran before the escalation cycle resumes. F. On the nuclear issue, Iran is using the return of international inspectors as leverage against both Washington and Israel. For that reason, I would be very surprised to see meaningful IAEA access restored before Tehran receives significant sanctions relief from the United States. G. Until then, the United States and Israel will have to rely heavily on their own intelligence capabilities to understand what is happening at Iran's nuclear sites. And that matters because there are indications of activity at some of these locations, including developments around the so-called Pickaxe Mountain site. The longer inspectors remain outside Iran, the greater the uncertainty surrounding the actual status and direction of the Iranian nuclear program. #IranWar‌

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

22,618 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat

My interview CNN International with Ben Hunte A. Netanyahu’s speech — the bigger problem happened before he spoke The most important moment surrounding Netanyahu’s speech actually happened before he began speaking: a significant number of delegations walked out. That illustrates a broader strategic problem for Israel. Iran is an immediate security challenge, but Israel is also facing a serious erosion of its international standing. Whatever government comes next will have to invest significant political capital in rebuilding Israel’s relationships with the international community. B. Israel’s wars with Iran have not achieved their broader strategic objectives If we measure these conflicts against the objectives Israel itself sought to achieve, the record is deeply problematic. Israel has not brought down the Iranian regime. It has not permanently eliminated Iran’s nuclear capabilities. It has not eliminated Iran’s conventional military capabilities, nor has it ended Tehran’s support for its partners and proxies across the Middle East. What we are seeing today with the Houthis in Yemen is one reminder that Iran’s regional network remains a significant challenge. Tactical and operational achievements should not be confused with achieving the broader strategic objectives of the war. C. The nuclear problem has changed — it has not disappeared There is an important achievement here: Iran is not currently enriching uranium. But the nuclear challenge has not disappeared. The more difficult long-term question is Iran’s motivation. If the confrontation has increased Tehran’s determination to eventually acquire a nuclear weapon, then Israel and the United States may have delayed one dimension of the problem while making another dimension more difficult. Capabilities can be destroyed and rebuilt. Motivation is much harder to eliminate. D. Israel and the Gulf states do not necessarily want the same thing from negotiations Israel is fundamentally skeptical of any agreement that strengthens and stabilizes the same Iranian regime that it would ultimately like to see weakened or replaced. The Strait of Hormuz obviously matters less to Israel, but it matters more to the Gulf states. Their priority is regional stability and avoiding another major confrontation. Reopening and stabilizing Hormuz could also serve the Trump administration if its objective is to reduce pressure on global oil prices. So there is a potential divergence of interests: Washington and the Gulf states may see value in an agreement that produces economic and regional stability, while Israel may worry that the same agreement gives the Iranian regime economic breathing room and ultimately strengthens it. E. Iran’s new proposal does not represent a fundamental change in Tehran’s position The latest Iranian proposal should not be interpreted as Tehran abandoning its core red lines. Iran appears to recognize that President Trump is under increasing political pressure as the midterm elections approach, particularly when it comes to energy prices. Tehran is therefore offering Trump something he has a political incentive to want. But substantively, Iran is still trying to return to a framework resembling the previous memorandum of understanding, an arrangement Tehran believes serves its interests. F. No agreement does not mean continuation of the status quo This may be the most important point for Washington. The current situation is inherently unstable. The United States is applying enormous economic pressure, but Iran has not capitulated. If negotiations fail, we should not automatically assume that the existing situation simply continues. The opposite may be true: the probability of another escalation could increase. That means Washington needs to answer two questions simultaneously: What are the costs of accepting an agreement with Iran and what is the strategy if it rejects one? Because if Tehran concludes that economic pressure will continue indefinitely and diplomacy offers no viable exit, the next Iranian move may not be another negotiating proposal. It may be an attempt to change the equation through escalation. #IranWar‌ #iran

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

13,277 Aufrufe • vor 2 Tagen

Military and political analyst Elijah Magnier says the clearest sign the U.S lost the Iran war is that nobody is talking about Tehran's nuclear program anymore; they're fighting over the Strait of Hormuz. America went into this focused on Iran's nuclear program, its ballistic missiles, and regional proxies. Now Trump is arguing about who gets to control Hormuz, and Elijah thinks that tells you everything about how badly the original strategy failed. Iran's missile programme is still operational, its nuclear programme has been pushed into future negotiations, and its regional proxies remain part of Tehran's strategic calculations. Yet Washington's attention is now almost entirely consumed by a source of Iranian leverage that barely existed before the war: Hormuz. Elijah says Iran has effectively pulled off a strategic sleight of hand. For years, the world obsessed over Tehran's nuclear programme while Iran quietly built an enormous missile arsenal. Those missiles eventually gave Iran the ability to absorb American and Israeli attacks and continue retaliating across the region. Now he thinks they're doing it again. Everyone is staring at the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, Iran is rebuilding missiles, maintaining its regional relationships, and buying time on the nuclear issue. Trump even briefly proposed charging ships a 20% fee to pass through the Strait. That lasted barely 24 hours before he replaced it with demands for massive Gulf investment in America. To Elijah, the whole episode exposed something much deeper. Washington says this is about freedom of navigation. But Trump accused Iran of monetizing Hormuz, then immediately tried to monetize it himself. Suddenly, the argument wasn't whether the Strait should be used as leverage; it was who gets to control it and collect the money, and Iran jumped on the contradiction immediately. Elijah's argument is that Trump has trapped himself. He entered the war determined to strip Iran of its leverage, but instead, he's handed Tehran a weapon it didn't have before. Elijah J. Magnier 🇪🇺

Mario Nawfal

317,382 Aufrufe • vor 2 Monaten

My interview CNN International: A. The negotiations were never expected to be easy. However, at a fundamental level, both sides have an interest in reaching some form of agreement. The mediators will have to work very hard to bridge the significant gaps that remain. Still, as President Trump himself acknowledged, diplomacy remains the best available option for reopening the Strait of Hormuz and addressing concerns regarding Iran's enriched uranium stockpile. B. The Lebanese issue remains a major potential spoiler. Israel, which is not a party to any potential agreement, is not necessarily enthusiastic about a deal that could undermine its broader strategy of maintaining maximum pressure on Iran. While Israel continues to conduct operations in Lebanon to address legitimate security concerns, its long-term strategy is not entirely clear. From Israel's perspective, and with encouragement from Washington, the most constructive path forward would be to accelerate negotiations with the Lebanese government, withdraw where possible, and allow the Lebanese Armed Forces to assume control over the relevant areas in accordance with existing understandings. C. Iran may be prepared to offer limited concessions on its nuclear program in exchange for sanctions relief, particularly given the severe economic damage it has suffered following the war. However, if policymakers in Washington believe they can leverage Iran's economic weakness to secure major concessions on its regional power projection, support for proxy groups, or far-reaching additional nuclear restrictions, they are likely to be disappointed. These issues are deeply rooted in the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic and are viewed by the leadership as core national security interests rather than negotiable bargaining chips.

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

27,376 Aufrufe • vor 3 Monaten

Mu interview BBC News (World) regarding the situation at Hormuz Straits: The renewed tensions in the Strait of Hormuz should not come as a surprise. While President Trump argues that the United States emerged victorious from the conflict, Tehran appears to believe that it also achieved its core strategic objectives. From Iran's perspective, maintaining leverage in the Strait of Hormuz is essential. Iranian leaders understand that U.S. sanctions can be imposed or lifted at Washington's discretion, making control over or the ability to threaten maritime traffic one of the few enduring sources of strategic leverage available to Tehran. The current situation also reflects the limitations of a hastily negotiated understanding that, did not fully address two of the most significant potential spoilers: Lebanon and the Strait of Hormuz. The fundamental question is what the administration's long-term strategy toward Iran actually is. Washington may ultimately face difficult tradeoffs between pursuing a durable diplomatic agreement and seeking to fundamentally alter the balance of power in the Strait of Hormuz. If the objective is merely to conduct limited punitive strikes, they may have only a temporary effect on Iranian behavior while increasing the risk of undermining diplomacy. If, however, the objective is to fundamentally change the strategic reality in the Strait, that would likely require a far larger and more sustained military commitment, with significant costs and risks. The administration will therefore need to determine which objective it prioritizes most, because these different approaches may not be fully compatible. #IranWar‌

Danny (Dennis) Citrinowicz ,داني سيترينوفيتش

17,349 Aufrufe • vor 2 Monaten

🇺🇸🇮🇷 Trump has barely launched Operation Economic Outcast against Iran, and China is already calling his bluff. Beijing says it will not comply, and is threatening retaliation if Washington targets Chinese companies for continuing to trade with Tehran. That's a HUGE problem for Trump's strategy. Operation Economic Outcast is supposed to sever the international financial lifelines keeping Tehran alive. But Iran cannot be economically isolated if major trading partners simply refuse to participate. Washington can sanction Iran, but the real test has always been whether it is prepared to sanction the powerful countries that keep doing business with it. China has now effectively dared Trump to try. Meanwhile, Iran and Oman have announced a preliminary agreement over managing the Strait of Hormuz. Iran would control incoming maritime traffic and retain the right to impose service fees, while outbound traffic would use the Omani corridor. Crucially, Tehran says the agreement does not mean Hormuz is immediately reopening. Iran says the Strait will remain closed until the U.S naval blockade is lifted and the terms of the broader MOU are honoured. And there are signs Washington may already be moving in that direction. According to an Al Arabiya report, Pakistan's Asim Munir conveyed an American proposal to Tehran: Washington is prepared to lift the naval blockade and sanctions if Iran guarantees free passage through Hormuz and pressures the Houthis to stop attacking Saudi energy infrastructure. There is another important signal. The State Department is reportedly preparing to return diplomats to a string of Middle Eastern embassies evacuated during the war, suggesting Washington does not currently expect large-scale fighting to resume. Put all of this together, and Trump's strategy starts looking very different from the rhetoric; the direction of travel today may actually be toward a deal. Brandon Weichert

Mario Nawfal

279,111 Aufrufe • vor 1 Monat