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National Treasury CS has appeared before the National Assembly's Finance & Planning Committee explaining why GOK's choice path for divestiture of its 15.0% stake in Safaricom Plc is to Vodafone Kenya & not any other investor (see quoted tweet). He makes a few points: · GOK feared that opening...

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Julians Amboko

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50,900 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад •via X (Twitter)

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Still on GOK'S partial divestiture from Safaricom Plc, Sandeep Main appearing on behalf of ICPAK asks why GOK didn't invite alternative bids & opted for a direct sale to Vodafone Kenya. He asks how certain GOK is that alternative bids would not have unlocked a much higher premium than the Kes 34.0/share on offer from Vodafone Kenya & whether the US$ 1.6 billion (Kes 204.3 billion) offer from Vodafone Kenya reflects optimal value for money. Earlier, the National Treasury CS stated that the reason for bypassing open bidding & opting for a direct sale to Vodafone Kenya was anchored on fears that opening the transaction to competitive bidding presented valuation risk. The concern was that suppose the open market process yielded bids that were priced lower than Vodafone Kenya's Kes 34/share, it would create challenges in walking back to Vodafone Kenya scouting for premium valuation. See quoted tweet for GOK's position on opting for the direct sale.
1:41

Still on GOK'S partial divestiture from Safaricom Plc, Sandeep Main appearing on behalf of ICPAK asks why GOK didn't invite alternative bids & opted for a direct sale to Vodafone Kenya. He asks how certain GOK is that alternative bids would not have unlocked a much higher premium than the Kes 34.0/share on offer from Vodafone Kenya & whether the US$ 1.6 billion (Kes 204.3 billion) offer from Vodafone Kenya reflects optimal value for money. Earlier, the National Treasury CS stated that the reason for bypassing open bidding & opting for a direct sale to Vodafone Kenya was anchored on fears that opening the transaction to competitive bidding presented valuation risk. The concern was that suppose the open market process yielded bids that were priced lower than Vodafone Kenya's Kes 34/share, it would create challenges in walking back to Vodafone Kenya scouting for premium valuation. See quoted tweet for GOK's position on opting for the direct sale.

Julians Amboko

38,880 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

This morning I argued that Kenya Pipeline's Kes 9.0/share presents a relatively steep/high valuation for the company's IPO, especially given the Safaricom plc valuation in light of the ongoing divestiture (see quoted tweet). Safaricom Plc's management appeared before the National Assembly's Finance & Planning Committee this afternoon & didn't expect to have the Kenya Pipeline valuation hand them a 'booby trap'. Here's the breakdown: · Peter Ndegwa & his team were asked whether, given the metrics informing Kenya Pipeline's IPO (22.0x P/E ratio), Kes 34.0/share represents a fair value of the business. · A very good question indeed, especially given Safaricom Plc is an entity that has been in the market for 20 years & proven its earnings & dividend track record. Kenya Pipeline is a utility that is new to the market · Peter Ndegwa says that the divestiture of 15.0% by GOK is a shareholder-to-shareholder transaction & Safaricom Plc was not involved in the process. · Peter Ndegwa & his team say that they have their own view as to how the business should be valued & it always informs their half year & full year earnings briefings to investors & the general public
4:45

This morning I argued that Kenya Pipeline's Kes 9.0/share presents a relatively steep/high valuation for the company's IPO, especially given the Safaricom plc valuation in light of the ongoing divestiture (see quoted tweet). Safaricom Plc's management appeared before the National Assembly's Finance & Planning Committee this afternoon & didn't expect to have the Kenya Pipeline valuation hand them a 'booby trap'. Here's the breakdown: · Peter Ndegwa & his team were asked whether, given the metrics informing Kenya Pipeline's IPO (22.0x P/E ratio), Kes 34.0/share represents a fair value of the business. · A very good question indeed, especially given Safaricom Plc is an entity that has been in the market for 20 years & proven its earnings & dividend track record. Kenya Pipeline is a utility that is new to the market · Peter Ndegwa says that the divestiture of 15.0% by GOK is a shareholder-to-shareholder transaction & Safaricom Plc was not involved in the process. · Peter Ndegwa & his team say that they have their own view as to how the business should be valued & it always informs their half year & full year earnings briefings to investors & the general public

Julians Amboko

30,117 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

An interesting revelation was made before the National Assembly's Finance & Planning Committee yesterday regarding GOK's partial divestiture from Safaricom Plc. The National Treasury CS told the Committee that the key benefit of partially divesting (from 35.0% to 20.0%) from Safaricom Plc is staving off the risk of dilution in future. The CS holds that should a cash call be made, given the heavy capex involved in telcos, it is likely GOK would not be able to meet its share of the ask at a 35.0% stake, in view of the tight fiscal space, & would therefore risk dilution. He then goes further to argue that Kenyans can look back to the KCB experience to know that this risk isn't far fetched, it has actually happened in the past. I see a challenge with this argument & the example used. Musings: · The CS is rightly pointing out that KCB offers a case study · He is referring to the 2004 & 2008 rights issues where the government opted not to take up its full rights & therefore its stake in the bank was diluted · The two instances were more about the Kibaki regime's promotion of public participation in the capital markets. At the time, a huge part of the reform agenda was getting government out of commercial enterprise · It explains why the two happened within the same environment that GOK offload a partial stake in Kengen (2006) & Safaricom (2008)
1:47

An interesting revelation was made before the National Assembly's Finance & Planning Committee yesterday regarding GOK's partial divestiture from Safaricom Plc. The National Treasury CS told the Committee that the key benefit of partially divesting (from 35.0% to 20.0%) from Safaricom Plc is staving off the risk of dilution in future. The CS holds that should a cash call be made, given the heavy capex involved in telcos, it is likely GOK would not be able to meet its share of the ask at a 35.0% stake, in view of the tight fiscal space, & would therefore risk dilution. He then goes further to argue that Kenyans can look back to the KCB experience to know that this risk isn't far fetched, it has actually happened in the past. I see a challenge with this argument & the example used. Musings: · The CS is rightly pointing out that KCB offers a case study · He is referring to the 2004 & 2008 rights issues where the government opted not to take up its full rights & therefore its stake in the bank was diluted · The two instances were more about the Kibaki regime's promotion of public participation in the capital markets. At the time, a huge part of the reform agenda was getting government out of commercial enterprise · It explains why the two happened within the same environment that GOK offload a partial stake in Kengen (2006) & Safaricom (2008)

Julians Amboko

11,526 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

The government of Kenya is partially divesting from Safaricom Plc, offloading a 15.0% stake to Vodafone Kenya Ltd in a Kes 204.3 billion (US$1.6 billion) deal (see quoted tweet for details). Four years ago, I sat down with the then Ag. Director General Public Investments & Portfolio Management at the National Treasury, Eng. Stanley Kamau, & asked him whether dialling down the state's stake in Safaricom Plc from 35.0% was an option on the table. Eng. Kamau made a few points: · Safaricom Plc is a strategic national asset · If the state were to partially divest from Safaricom, it would need to be accompanied by similar action by Vodacom · The state's principal concern was being diluted to a minority in what it considered to be a strategic national asset Musings: · I am not surprised that four years later, there's a U-turn on this position & indeed, the state is partially divesting into a minority position · I wonder whether this announcement should have preceded the telco going to market with the first tranche of its Kes 40.0 billion MTN. This is a material announcement coming smack in the middle of a corporation action 1/3
0:31

The government of Kenya is partially divesting from Safaricom Plc, offloading a 15.0% stake to Vodafone Kenya Ltd in a Kes 204.3 billion (US$1.6 billion) deal (see quoted tweet for details). Four years ago, I sat down with the then Ag. Director General Public Investments & Portfolio Management at the National Treasury, Eng. Stanley Kamau, & asked him whether dialling down the state's stake in Safaricom Plc from 35.0% was an option on the table. Eng. Kamau made a few points: · Safaricom Plc is a strategic national asset · If the state were to partially divest from Safaricom, it would need to be accompanied by similar action by Vodacom · The state's principal concern was being diluted to a minority in what it considered to be a strategic national asset Musings: · I am not surprised that four years later, there's a U-turn on this position & indeed, the state is partially divesting into a minority position · I wonder whether this announcement should have preceded the telco going to market with the first tranche of its Kes 40.0 billion MTN. This is a material announcement coming smack in the middle of a corporation action 1/3

Julians Amboko

50,277 просмотров • 9 месяцев назад

It is obvious Kenya will benefit from opening up the Sale of GoK 15% Safaricom Stake to an International bid. But GoK is very keen to accept an inferior offer that is sub optimal. The language of "Market Price" is the language of a buyer, not a seller. NCBA shares were trading below Ksh 70 before the initial information of an imminent transaction. The transaction price from NedBank is Ksh 102. The parties knew what the share price was but they went for the value. EABL shares are currently trading at Ksh 244 in the market, but Diageo is selling their 65% stake in the same company to a Japanese Company, Asahi for at Ksh 590 per share. Rea Vipingo was trading at Ksh 27.5 in the market, but it was bought out at Ksh 85. Only self interest can cloud the correct judgement and decision from being made and executed. Kenya deserves better. We are African and Africa is our Business..
7:13

It is obvious Kenya will benefit from opening up the Sale of GoK 15% Safaricom Stake to an International bid. But GoK is very keen to accept an inferior offer that is sub optimal. The language of "Market Price" is the language of a buyer, not a seller. NCBA shares were trading below Ksh 70 before the initial information of an imminent transaction. The transaction price from NedBank is Ksh 102. The parties knew what the share price was but they went for the value. EABL shares are currently trading at Ksh 244 in the market, but Diageo is selling their 65% stake in the same company to a Japanese Company, Asahi for at Ksh 590 per share. Rea Vipingo was trading at Ksh 27.5 in the market, but it was bought out at Ksh 85. Only self interest can cloud the correct judgement and decision from being made and executed. Kenya deserves better. We are African and Africa is our Business..

Ndindi Nyoro

47,272 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

Airtel Kenya says it is not opposed to GOK's partial divestiture from Safaricom Plc. The say shareholding may not have any bearing on the competitive landscape. However, it raises concerns about the market & the case for a level playing field for all competitors. They raise two issues: · The mobile termination rates, given the design of the market, end up with a scenario where smaller players pay far much more to Safaricom Plc than Safaricom Plc pays them. They say this inhibits the capacity of small players investing in their infrastructure. Airtel Kenya wants the mobile termination rates lowered. Last time we saw mobile termination rates being lowered was March 2024 when this was lowered to Kes 0.41/minute from Kes 0.58/minute · Mobile money. Airtel says it is working with the Central Bank of Kenya on " a lot of things" to ensure "that side is also taken care of"
4:35

Airtel Kenya says it is not opposed to GOK's partial divestiture from Safaricom Plc. The say shareholding may not have any bearing on the competitive landscape. However, it raises concerns about the market & the case for a level playing field for all competitors. They raise two issues: · The mobile termination rates, given the design of the market, end up with a scenario where smaller players pay far much more to Safaricom Plc than Safaricom Plc pays them. They say this inhibits the capacity of small players investing in their infrastructure. Airtel Kenya wants the mobile termination rates lowered. Last time we saw mobile termination rates being lowered was March 2024 when this was lowered to Kes 0.41/minute from Kes 0.58/minute · Mobile money. Airtel says it is working with the Central Bank of Kenya on " a lot of things" to ensure "that side is also taken care of"

Julians Amboko

59,361 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

Some colour here about the much talked about National Infrastructure Fund (see quoted tweet) as explained by Dr. David Ndii: · The thinking is that the initial capitation will come from privatisation proceeds, starting with Kenya Pipeline Co · The idea is that proceeds from Kenya Pipeline's privatisation, as seed capital, will then crowd in private capital into the Fund, so we are looking at some sort of blended finance here · Dr. Ndii says that GOK's target is that for every Kes 1.0 raised by the state, they crowd in Kes 4.0 from private sector capital (an ambitious ratio in my view) · So if Kenya Pipeline Privatisation potentially raises Kes 100.0 billion as projected by GOK, the hope is that another Kes 400.0 billion of private capital can be crowded in · So the National Infrastructure Fund will almost play a fund manager role including portfolio origination · For roads infrastructure, tolling is earmarked to play a key role in this
3:00

Some colour here about the much talked about National Infrastructure Fund (see quoted tweet) as explained by Dr. David Ndii: · The thinking is that the initial capitation will come from privatisation proceeds, starting with Kenya Pipeline Co · The idea is that proceeds from Kenya Pipeline's privatisation, as seed capital, will then crowd in private capital into the Fund, so we are looking at some sort of blended finance here · Dr. Ndii says that GOK's target is that for every Kes 1.0 raised by the state, they crowd in Kes 4.0 from private sector capital (an ambitious ratio in my view) · So if Kenya Pipeline Privatisation potentially raises Kes 100.0 billion as projected by GOK, the hope is that another Kes 400.0 billion of private capital can be crowded in · So the National Infrastructure Fund will almost play a fund manager role including portfolio origination · For roads infrastructure, tolling is earmarked to play a key role in this

Julians Amboko

56,708 просмотров • 10 месяцев назад

The Central Bank of Kenya yesterday appeared before the National Assembly's Finance & Planning Committee on GOK's partial divestiture from Safaricom Plc. The Central Bank argues that proceeds from the partial divestiture (US$1.6 billion + US$309.0 million in advance dividend payment) will provide a further boost to Kenya's FX reserves position & vault it to 6.2 Months of import cover from the current 5.3 The Central Bank is backing the deal for 3 reasons: 1. Increased FX reserves 2. Exchange rate stability 3. Additional fiscal space created
1:25

The Central Bank of Kenya yesterday appeared before the National Assembly's Finance & Planning Committee on GOK's partial divestiture from Safaricom Plc. The Central Bank argues that proceeds from the partial divestiture (US$1.6 billion + US$309.0 million in advance dividend payment) will provide a further boost to Kenya's FX reserves position & vault it to 6.2 Months of import cover from the current 5.3 The Central Bank is backing the deal for 3 reasons: 1. Increased FX reserves 2. Exchange rate stability 3. Additional fiscal space created

Julians Amboko

19,240 просмотров • 7 месяцев назад

UPDATE: GOK's US$1.91 billion partial divestiture in Safaricom Plc approved The National Assembly's Public Debt & Privatization Committee Chair Hon. Abdi Shuriye has moved a motion for the House to adopt a joint report by his Committee & that of Finance and National Planning on the Partial sale of Safaricom shares owned by the Government. The two committees recommend: · The National Assembly approves the proposed US$1.6 billion (Kes 204.3 billion) partial divestiture by the government to Vodafone Kenya · The effective date of the National Assembly approval be April 1st, 2026 or any other later date pegged on the prerequisite approvals · The transaction shall be undertaken & concluded through the block trade platform of the Nairobi Securities Exchange · The government shall receive US$ 309 million (Kes 40.2 billion) upfront payment in lie of future dividend payments · All proceeds to be wired into the National Infrastructure Fund · There shall be no redundancy as part of this partial divestiture · There shall be no material change to the current Safaricom Plc ecosystem within 10 years of this partial divestiture
2:02

UPDATE: GOK's US$1.91 billion partial divestiture in Safaricom Plc approved The National Assembly's Public Debt & Privatization Committee Chair Hon. Abdi Shuriye has moved a motion for the House to adopt a joint report by his Committee & that of Finance and National Planning on the Partial sale of Safaricom shares owned by the Government. The two committees recommend: · The National Assembly approves the proposed US$1.6 billion (Kes 204.3 billion) partial divestiture by the government to Vodafone Kenya · The effective date of the National Assembly approval be April 1st, 2026 or any other later date pegged on the prerequisite approvals · The transaction shall be undertaken & concluded through the block trade platform of the Nairobi Securities Exchange · The government shall receive US$ 309 million (Kes 40.2 billion) upfront payment in lie of future dividend payments · All proceeds to be wired into the National Infrastructure Fund · There shall be no redundancy as part of this partial divestiture · There shall be no material change to the current Safaricom Plc ecosystem within 10 years of this partial divestiture

Julians Amboko

14,271 просмотров • 5 месяцев назад

GOK will press on with the switch auctions for FXD1/2024/03 (Kes 91.6 billion) & FXD1/2012/15 (Kes 144.5 billion) despite the abysmal 12.8% performance in the FXD1/2016/10 switch which attracted a meagre Kes 2.56 billion worth of bids. The Central Bank of Kenya Governor, Dr. Kamau Thugge, says that FXD1/2016/10's under-performance should be looked at in isolation & not representative of switch auctions as a liability management tool in the market. He attributes the FXD1/2016/10 under-performance to uncertainty & a wait & see stance by bondholders.
1:06

GOK will press on with the switch auctions for FXD1/2024/03 (Kes 91.6 billion) & FXD1/2012/15 (Kes 144.5 billion) despite the abysmal 12.8% performance in the FXD1/2016/10 switch which attracted a meagre Kes 2.56 billion worth of bids. The Central Bank of Kenya Governor, Dr. Kamau Thugge, says that FXD1/2016/10's under-performance should be looked at in isolation & not representative of switch auctions as a liability management tool in the market. He attributes the FXD1/2016/10 under-performance to uncertainty & a wait & see stance by bondholders.

Julians Amboko

16,449 просмотров • 4 месяцев назад

Last week I highlighted Safina Party's proposed switch from VAT to Sales Tax (see quoted tweet). This week, a few proposals from People's Party as revealed last evening: · Bump up the Inua Jamii Cash Transfer Programme to Kes 3,000 effective Jan 1st, 2028 & enhance it to Kes 4,000 effective Jan 1st, 2031 · GOK further divesting from Kengen by unwinding its stake from 70.0% to 35.0%. Also, accelerating Open Access in the power sector · Banking sector recapitalisation & a slow down in buyout of Kenyan banks by continental/international players Musings: · There's a case for rethinking Inua Jamii. Maybe an inflation indexed disbursement as opposed to a flat bump up would be a better route? Of course that has fiscal implications · The elephant in the room in the power sector is the Take or Pay Power Purchase Agreements. Notable progress has made on the Open Access front via the Energy Act 2019 & the Energy (Electricity Market, Bulk Supply and Open Access) Regulations, 2024 · GOK has repeatedly hinted at further unwinding from Kengen without executing it. The argument has been tabled that given that it supplies the bulk of the country's baseload power, a divestiture (potentially to a minority stake) translates to ceding national security interests · Banking is already on a recapitalisation path, including the latest changes that did away with the annual hurdles & extended the runway to the Kes 10.0 billion mark. I am keen to see the proposals around stemming the tide of foreign players buying out Kenyan banks
3:42

Last week I highlighted Safina Party's proposed switch from VAT to Sales Tax (see quoted tweet). This week, a few proposals from People's Party as revealed last evening: · Bump up the Inua Jamii Cash Transfer Programme to Kes 3,000 effective Jan 1st, 2028 & enhance it to Kes 4,000 effective Jan 1st, 2031 · GOK further divesting from Kengen by unwinding its stake from 70.0% to 35.0%. Also, accelerating Open Access in the power sector · Banking sector recapitalisation & a slow down in buyout of Kenyan banks by continental/international players Musings: · There's a case for rethinking Inua Jamii. Maybe an inflation indexed disbursement as opposed to a flat bump up would be a better route? Of course that has fiscal implications · The elephant in the room in the power sector is the Take or Pay Power Purchase Agreements. Notable progress has made on the Open Access front via the Energy Act 2019 & the Energy (Electricity Market, Bulk Supply and Open Access) Regulations, 2024 · GOK has repeatedly hinted at further unwinding from Kengen without executing it. The argument has been tabled that given that it supplies the bulk of the country's baseload power, a divestiture (potentially to a minority stake) translates to ceding national security interests · Banking is already on a recapitalisation path, including the latest changes that did away with the annual hurdles & extended the runway to the Kes 10.0 billion mark. I am keen to see the proposals around stemming the tide of foreign players buying out Kenyan banks

Julians Amboko

41,553 просмотров • 14 дней назад

Kenya's US$3.6 billion programme with the IMF lapses in April 2025. This morning at the #EconomicForum organised by NCBA Bank, I asked the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, David Ndii, what the road map post-April 2025 looks like. His thoughts: · Every country that enters a programme with the fund desires to exit at the earliest convenience · The IMF programme is kind of a receivership with the fund as the receiver manager · Kenya's economy has turned a corner (the business is out of receivership), the shocks that necessitated the programme entered in March '21 have dissipated & there's no case for a new programme · There's a larger question about aid dependency & Kenya has to decide whether it gets stuck in concessional funding or play within the middle income economies' space & be subject to market discipline · Kenya can indeed afford to be a market leaning economy that doesn't rely on concessional · There are two conversations happening concurrency - the first is between GOK & IMF about the possibility of a new programme & the second is internally within GOK about whether the economy has really turned the corner Musings - I note that he was categorical as to whether Kenya needs "a funded IMF programme". So perhaps post-April 2025 we could be looking at a precautionary arrangement with the fund?
3:54

Kenya's US$3.6 billion programme with the IMF lapses in April 2025. This morning at the #EconomicForum organised by NCBA Bank, I asked the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, David Ndii, what the road map post-April 2025 looks like. His thoughts: · Every country that enters a programme with the fund desires to exit at the earliest convenience · The IMF programme is kind of a receivership with the fund as the receiver manager · Kenya's economy has turned a corner (the business is out of receivership), the shocks that necessitated the programme entered in March '21 have dissipated & there's no case for a new programme · There's a larger question about aid dependency & Kenya has to decide whether it gets stuck in concessional funding or play within the middle income economies' space & be subject to market discipline · Kenya can indeed afford to be a market leaning economy that doesn't rely on concessional · There are two conversations happening concurrency - the first is between GOK & IMF about the possibility of a new programme & the second is internally within GOK about whether the economy has really turned the corner Musings - I note that he was categorical as to whether Kenya needs "a funded IMF programme". So perhaps post-April 2025 we could be looking at a precautionary arrangement with the fund?

Julians Amboko

40,221 просмотров • 1 год назад

Ministry of Transport has announced that the Kenya Roads Board has mobilised Kes 139.0 billion (US$1.07 billion), in Tranche II of securitisation of the Roads Maintenance Levy for settlement of road contractor arrears. The TDB arranged transaction is a build up to the Kes 175.0 billion (US$1.35 billion) raised in Tranche I (see quoted tweet) that enabled settlement of arrears to March 2026. Payments attached to Tranche II are slated for the first week of September. TDB is speaking of unlocking an additional Kes 50.0 billion having "optimising" the securitised Kes 7.0 from the Roads Maintenance Levy. I am not sure what that means.
4:51

Ministry of Transport has announced that the Kenya Roads Board has mobilised Kes 139.0 billion (US$1.07 billion), in Tranche II of securitisation of the Roads Maintenance Levy for settlement of road contractor arrears. The TDB arranged transaction is a build up to the Kes 175.0 billion (US$1.35 billion) raised in Tranche I (see quoted tweet) that enabled settlement of arrears to March 2026. Payments attached to Tranche II are slated for the first week of September. TDB is speaking of unlocking an additional Kes 50.0 billion having "optimising" the securitised Kes 7.0 from the Roads Maintenance Levy. I am not sure what that means.

Julians Amboko

17,632 просмотров • 13 дней назад

The Member of Parliament for Aowin, Hon. Oscar Ofori Larbi, has condemned the demolition of an existing market in the constituency to pave the way for the construction of a proposed 24-hour market. According to the MP, he was not informed about the demolition and considers the decision inappropriate, arguing that there are several available lands in the constituency that could be used for the project without destroying an existing market.
2:10

The Member of Parliament for Aowin, Hon. Oscar Ofori Larbi, has condemned the demolition of an existing market in the constituency to pave the way for the construction of a proposed 24-hour market. According to the MP, he was not informed about the demolition and considers the decision inappropriate, arguing that there are several available lands in the constituency that could be used for the project without destroying an existing market.

EDHUB🌍ℹ

36,391 просмотров • 10 дней назад

UPDATE: Kenya's Successor Programme with IMF The Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, Dr Kamau Thugge, has said that in the talks for a successor programme with the International Monetary Fund, the government is scouting for a programme under normal access terms. Musings: · On April 1st I penned a piece titled 'The end of the US$3.6 billion IMF programme & Kenya's St. Augustine moment' & this route was the first scenario I explored (see quoted tweet for full article) · What this means is that Kenya has ruled out the prospect of seeking exceptional access in the successor programme being pursued. Not entirely surprising, read my article via quoted tweet · Further, this means that Kenya is banking on a securing a funded programme (i.e, a programme that has a loan attached to it). Again, not entirely surprising · However, going for a funded programme under normal access terms translates to Kenya hoping for a relatively small loan from the Fund which presents a headache given the weight of outsized maturities further down the road · In the just ended US$3.6 billion programme, Kenya maxed out on its 600.0% of quota ceiling (i.e, about SDR 3,256.8 Million) · However, failure to consummate the 9th Review implies that Kenya does have some wiggle room for a funded · My math suggests as things stand Kenya has just about 68.0% of quota to toy with going the normal access route, translating to a minuscule US$492.75 million worth of a funded programme · I am really struggling with this position. Why would Kenya scout for a programme whose quantum is even smaller than the aborted 9th Review disbursement? Is that a programme or a disbursement being chased?
0:35

UPDATE: Kenya's Successor Programme with IMF The Governor of the Central Bank of Kenya, Dr Kamau Thugge, has said that in the talks for a successor programme with the International Monetary Fund, the government is scouting for a programme under normal access terms. Musings: · On April 1st I penned a piece titled 'The end of the US$3.6 billion IMF programme & Kenya's St. Augustine moment' & this route was the first scenario I explored (see quoted tweet for full article) · What this means is that Kenya has ruled out the prospect of seeking exceptional access in the successor programme being pursued. Not entirely surprising, read my article via quoted tweet · Further, this means that Kenya is banking on a securing a funded programme (i.e, a programme that has a loan attached to it). Again, not entirely surprising · However, going for a funded programme under normal access terms translates to Kenya hoping for a relatively small loan from the Fund which presents a headache given the weight of outsized maturities further down the road · In the just ended US$3.6 billion programme, Kenya maxed out on its 600.0% of quota ceiling (i.e, about SDR 3,256.8 Million) · However, failure to consummate the 9th Review implies that Kenya does have some wiggle room for a funded · My math suggests as things stand Kenya has just about 68.0% of quota to toy with going the normal access route, translating to a minuscule US$492.75 million worth of a funded programme · I am really struggling with this position. Why would Kenya scout for a programme whose quantum is even smaller than the aborted 9th Review disbursement? Is that a programme or a disbursement being chased?

Julians Amboko

47,199 просмотров • 1 год назад

National Treasury CS, John Mbadi, says that the team that was working on simulations on the impact of PAYE bands adjustments has concluded its work & now what remains is for a decision to be taken. On May 11th (see quoted tweet) he told us initial estimates showed that PAYE bands adjustments (zero rating for < Kes 30,000 & lower rate for Kes 30,000 - Kes 50,000) would translate into a Kes 35.0 billion worth of revenue forgone by the Exchequer.
0:28

National Treasury CS, John Mbadi, says that the team that was working on simulations on the impact of PAYE bands adjustments has concluded its work & now what remains is for a decision to be taken. On May 11th (see quoted tweet) he told us initial estimates showed that PAYE bands adjustments (zero rating for < Kes 30,000 & lower rate for Kes 30,000 - Kes 50,000) would translate into a Kes 35.0 billion worth of revenue forgone by the Exchequer.

Julians Amboko

64,005 просмотров • 3 месяцев назад

South Africa's top bank leaders continue to troop into Nairobi. Nedbank (Nedbank) CEO, Jason Quinn, is in town on the back of the US$855.82 million (Kes 110.39 billion) bid to acquire a controlling 66.0% stake in NCBA Group (NCBA Bank). I sat down with him to unpack the transaction. A 🧵 I asked Jason about the quick succession between the 2025 US$100.0 million exit from Ecobank Transnational (22.0% stake) & the 2026 buyout of a 66.0% stake in NCBA Group. Jason makes a few points: · When he assumed leadership of Nedbank (from Absa Bank) 18 months ago, the first order of business was a strategic review of the business · The revamped strategic approach for Nedbank entails deployment of capital in businesses where the bank can enjoy control · The first part of the Ecobank Transnational exit was the fact that holding a 22.0% stake undermined Nedbank's ability to meaningfully influence the bank's strategy · The second part of the Ecobank Transnational exit was the fact that West Africa had presented a difficult market as far as extraction of dividends was concerned · Having exited Ecobank Transnational, Jason & his team were persuaded that a banking entity that is anchored on Southern & Eastern Africa presents a compelling business case
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South Africa's top bank leaders continue to troop into Nairobi. Nedbank (Nedbank) CEO, Jason Quinn, is in town on the back of the US$855.82 million (Kes 110.39 billion) bid to acquire a controlling 66.0% stake in NCBA Group (NCBA Bank). I sat down with him to unpack the transaction. A 🧵 I asked Jason about the quick succession between the 2025 US$100.0 million exit from Ecobank Transnational (22.0% stake) & the 2026 buyout of a 66.0% stake in NCBA Group. Jason makes a few points: · When he assumed leadership of Nedbank (from Absa Bank) 18 months ago, the first order of business was a strategic review of the business · The revamped strategic approach for Nedbank entails deployment of capital in businesses where the bank can enjoy control · The first part of the Ecobank Transnational exit was the fact that holding a 22.0% stake undermined Nedbank's ability to meaningfully influence the bank's strategy · The second part of the Ecobank Transnational exit was the fact that West Africa had presented a difficult market as far as extraction of dividends was concerned · Having exited Ecobank Transnational, Jason & his team were persuaded that a banking entity that is anchored on Southern & Eastern Africa presents a compelling business case

Julians Amboko

48,625 просмотров • 6 месяцев назад